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PREFACE 
The number of students of political science attending Australian uni-
versities has grown steadily in the past ten years but their hbrary 
resources have failed to keep pace. The frustrations of teachers of 
poUtical science have grown in strict proportion to the widening of 
the gap between students and sources. Today, when half a dozen 
universities have first year courses in pohtics with five hundred or 
more students apiece, the situation is indeed desperate, and the fran-
tic pursuit of students after a prescribed or recommended article is 
soon terminated by one enterprising or antisocial individual in their 
number who converts the pages or the whole bound volume to his 
own uses. 
One remedy has already been provided by Professor Henry Mayer 
who has edited Australian Politics: A Reader^ to bring together the 
contributions of a number of politicians and academics over the whole 
field of Austrahan government and politics. With a wisdom bom of 
many years of successful teaching, Professor Mayer warned in his pre-
face that teachers too readily send new students oflF to journals to read 
articles written for other and more advanced pubHcs with the result 
that they are mystified and, he might have added, in many cases 
never look at a journal again. Accordingly his authors wrote new 
material or revised previously pubHshed papers with the first year 
student clearly in mind. The success of the work, in its second edition 
within a year, shows how right he was. 
Yet there remain some articles, invaluable studies of a particular 
problem or a particular institution, which are akeady "classics" of 
Austrahan political science, cited in every study of their general field, 
with which students should be famihar. Combined, they do not con-
stitute a comprehensive survey of the Austrahan political system for 
there are still many gaps, but they do provide a quarry from which 
the conscientious student can derive information, opinions, and a 
knowledge of some of the techniques of political analysis which he 
could not obtain elsewhere. They provide a supplement, rather than 
an alternative, to the survey texts by Crisp,^ Davies,^ Miller,* and now 
Mayer, but at a time in their academic careers when too many stu-
dents still beUeve that there should be a single book which will tell 
them all they need to know such a supplement can be justified. 
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The twenty-nine articles reprinted in this volume include some 
which have figured in every teacher's reading Ust for years and a few 
which have appeared very recently but are certain to join most hsts. 
Two main criteria have been apphed in selection. The work is shaped 
by the needs of the first year courses currently being taught in Aus-
trahan imiversities. Thus it concentrates on national government and 
ignores state and local government levels, although it can be added 
tibat the scarcity of suitable material would have made the presenta-
tion of articles of comparable quality over an equally broad range of 
topics virtually impossible. Again, there is no section on public ad-
ministration, partly because a number of well-known articles have 
been added to the second edition of Australian Politics: A Reader, 
partly because it is understood that a collection of articles in public 
administration is to be compiled at another university, and partly 
because it appears that most first year courses can give little attention 
to administration. Similarly, there is no section on the High Court 
because constitutional law is generally neglected in our introductory 
courses in pohtical science and left to the law schools and, a closely 
related point, because most writings on the courts and constitutional 
law are directed to lawyers and are incomprehensible to first year 
students of pohtical science. 
The second criterion of selection applied has been the availabiUty 
of the article in question. A number of chapters in symposia which 
would otherwise have warranted inclusion are still in print or are 
known to be reprinting. The purpose of this volume is to make avail-
able that which would otherwise be unobtainable and, given the sub-
stantial bulk it has attained with this point only in mind, comprehen-
siveness in describing all aspects of national government has been 
sacrificed. Two articles, by the late Professor Webb and by Professor 
Sawer, which appeared in symposia, are out of print, and another, by 
Professor Parker, has been available only as a mimeographed con-
ference paper. All others appeared in Austrahan, British, Canadian, or 
New Zealand journals. 
The papers are reproduced as they were originally published; s&mB 
authors have taken the opportunity to revise their contributions. 
Notes to the text are on page 459. 
I would like to record my gratitude to the authors concerned for 
their kind permission to reproduce the articles which follow, and 
especially to Professor K. C. Masterman for permission to reprint his 
son's article and to Mr. Nicholas Webb for permission to reprint his 
father's paper. I have much appreciated the encouragement which 
several contributors, concerned as I have been with the problem of 
introducing young Austrahans to the pohtical life of their continent, 
gave to the project, and the assistance of the stafiF of the University of 
Queensland Press. 
My gratitude is due also to the following journals and pubhshers 
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for their generous permission to reproduce the work contained in this 
book: 
Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics for: 
Keith O. Campbell, "Austrahan Farm Organizations and Agricul-
tural Pohcy", X (1966) 
Australian Journal of Politics and History for: 
S. Encel, "The Concept of the State in Australian Pohtics", VI (1960) 
Anthony Fusaro, "The Austrahan Senate as a House of Review: 
Another Look", XII (1966) 
B. D. Graham, "The Place of Finance Committees in Non-Labor 
Politics, 1910-1930", VI (1960) and "The Choice of Voting 
Methods in Federal Politics, 1902-18", VIII (1962) 
C. J. Masterman, "The Efi^ ect of the Donkey Vote on the House of 
Representatives", X (1964) 
Joan Rydon, "Electoral Methods and the Austrahan Party System, 
1910-1951", II (1956) 
Australian National University Press and F. W. Cheshire Publishing 
Pty. Ltd. for: 
Geoffrey Sawer, "The Record of Judicial Review", in Federalism: An 
Australian Jubilee Study (1952) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology for: 
R. S. Parker, "Power in Austraha", I (1965) 
Australian Outlook for: 
H. B. Turner, "The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Austrahan 
Parhament",XX(1966) 
Australian Quarterly and the Austrahan Institute of Pohtical Science 
for: 
J. A. La Nauze, "The Inter-State Commission", IX (1937) 
L. C. Webb, "The Austrahan Party System", in The Australian 
Political Party System (1954) 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science for: 
K. A. MacKirdy, "The Federahzation of the Australian Cabinet, 
1901-39", XXIII (1957) 
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies and Leicester University 
Press for: 
R. M. Martin, "Trade Unions and Labour Governments in Aus-
traha: A Study of the Relation between Supporting Interests and 
Party Pohcy", II (1963-64) 
G. S. Reid, "Austraha's Commonwealth Parhament and the 'West-
minster Model'", II (1963-64) 
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Parliamentary Affairs for: 
Geoffrey Bolton, "The Choice of the Speaker in Austrahan Parha-
ments",XV(1962) 
R. M. Martin, "Austrahan Trade Unions and Political Action", XX 
(1966-67) 
Political Science for: 
J. D. B. Miller, "Party Disciphne in Austraha", V (1953) 
Joan Rydon, "The Relation of Votes to Seats in Elections for the 
Austrahan House of Representatives, 1949-1954", IX (1957) 
Political Studies and the Clarendon Press for: 
S. Encel, "The Pohtical Elite in Austraha", IX (1961) 
P. H. Partridge, "Some Notes on the Concept of Power", XI (1963) 
Politics for: 
Cohn A. Hughes, "Compulsory Voting", I (1966) 
Public Administration (Sydney) for: 
R. D. Freeman, "Trade Associations in the Australian Economy", 
XXIV (1965) 
F. O. Grogan, "The Australian Agricultural Council: A Successful 
Experiment in Commonwealth-State Relations", XVII (1958) 
C. G. Headford, "The Australian Loan Council—Its Origin, Opera-
tion and Significance in the Federal Structure", XIII (1954) 
R. J. May, "The Commonwealth Grants Commission and Pohcy 
Formulation in the Claimant States", XXI (1962) 
J. Monro, "The Preparation of a Draft Bill", XXIII (1964) 
Public Law and Stevens for: 
Geoffrey Sawer, "Councils, Ministers and Cabinets in Austraha", I 
(1956). 
The cover cartoon of Cough Whitlam was pubhshed in the Sydney 
Morning Herald and is reproduced by permission of George Molnar; 
the cartoons of Arthur Calwell and Harold Holt by Aubrey Collette and 
of Sir Robert Menzies by Bruce Petty are reproduced by permission of 
the Australian. 
CAM. 
October 1967 
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part one POLITICAL POWER 
Austrahans are pragmatists, and their pohticians are pragmatists par 
excellence. Austrahan sociahsm was soon diagnosed as being without 
doctrines, and Austrahan conservatism is usually dismissed as being 
without traditions. Yet since Sir Keith Hancock's eloquent Australia^ 
it has been indisputable that there are Austrahan pohtical ideas which 
warrant attention for the hght they cast on Australian institutions and 
pohtical behaviour. Historians like Professor Russel Ward,'^  Dr. R. A. 
GoUan,^  and Father Patrick Ford* have enhanced our knowledge of 
ideas at the beginning of the story past the First World War, but we 
still need a local Hofstadter" who will tease the strands of political 
thought from the fabric of a century and a half of political history. 
Professor Sol Encel in 'The Concept of tlie State in Austrahan Poh-
tics" has made a good beginning, and his work is supplemented in the 
studies of pohtical parties by Professor Louise Overacker^ and Mr. 
James Jupp,'^  of the A.L.P. by Dr. D. W. Rawson,^ and the Co\mtry 
Party by Dr. B. D. Graham.^ 
In the study of pragmatic politics it may be best to begin with the 
mercurial concept of power. In "Some Notes on the Concept of 
Power" Professor P. H. Partridge provides a critique which has wide 
apphcations but is of particular use to us as the framework within 
which Professor R. S. Parker has examined "Power in Austraha". The 
two papers combined take us from the broadest problems of pohtical 
theory to the hard reahties of Austrahan pohtics. 
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I SOME NOTES ON THE CONCEPT OF 
POWER 
P. H. Partridge 
I 
Power is one of the many terms of popular wisdom and discourse that 
philosophers, historians, and social theorists have also always found in-
dispensable. Until very recently, I think, they have habitually let the 
word faU in their confident periods without any uncomfortable prick-
ing of the intellectual conscience. This, of course, is no longer true. 
Power is now a subject of specialized study; there are some even who 
would make it the "field" of a separate science—I refer especially to 
those pohtical scientists who have proposed that their subject should 
be defined as the study of "power" or "influence" or "control", a 
suggestion which, if there is anything at all in the argument I ad-
vance in these "Notes", woxild certainly present the pohtical scientist 
with a job and a half. Power has been subjected to minute and 
detailed conceptual analysis as in the work of Lasswell and Kaplan; 
it has attracted the attention of the quantifiers; and it is the subject 
of an ever-increasing flood of empirical studies of actual power 
structures. It is no longer a common coin of the linguistic reahn; at 
least, every effort is being made to give it the dignity of a scientific 
concept. 
It is permissible to ask: With what success? One might even let fall 
the subversive hint that the conclusion most clearly intimated by 
much of the recent work is that power is a concept or phenomenon, 
too amorphous, sprawling, or chameleon-like ever to be amenable to 
exact identification, to say nothing of anything that deserves to be 
called "measurement". Perhaps the sociologists and political scientists 
would do better to search for a set of more manageable concepts to 
replace it with; or perhaps it is after all indispensable, but, since this 
is so, we must reconcile ourselves to the thought that where we are 
concerned with power, we must be satisfied to hve with vagueness, 
indeterminateness and generality. I do not propose to consider this 
question in these "Notes": it is too hard for me. But we can be sure at 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
4 I Readings in Australian Government 
least of this, that we have not approached any nearer the point where 
we can expect either precision or uniformity in the employment of 
the concept. 
Talcott Parsons, in a review article attacking Wright Mills's The 
Power Elite, rejects many of Mills's empirical conclusions about the 
distribution of power in the U.S.A. He gives as one of his reasons that 
Mills works with a defective concept of the nature of power; Parsons 
goes on to remark that "unfortunately the concept of power is not a 
settled one in the social sciences, either in pohtical science or in 
sociology";^ no one who has read the recent literature of the subject 
could disagree with him. The same uncertainty attaches to other 
closely related concepts. Thus, in the Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, Michels defines "authority" as "the capacity, innate or 
acquired, for exercising ascendency over a group"; but Bierstedt,^ an 
American sociologist who has written a good deal on these matters, 
says that this is wrong in every one of its terms: authority is not a 
capacity, it is not innate, and it is not a matter of exercising ascen-
dency. He argues that what Michels has done is to confuse authority 
with something quite different, viz. "competence". We need not illus-
trate further; in the writing about power (as about freedom) there is 
no end to the disputes about definition and usage. And these are not 
merely disputes about usage; as I have briefly hinted by referring to 
the dMerences between Wright Mills and Parsons, they are sometimes 
connected with the different conclusions that different writers reach 
in their studies of the exercise and distribution of power in actual 
societies. 
It is not hard to see why these differences should persist. We have a 
series of terms which are obviously very closely related: such terms as 
freedom, power, influence, coercion, constraint, force, compulsion, 
authority, leadership, prestige, and so on. In ordinary language, each 
of these words has an indeterminate use: they are pretty loosely used 
to stand now for one relationship, now for another. Most of them are 
open-ended terms: as regards each one of them we know that at a 
certain point we would at last draw the line and refuse to employ it, 
but usually we are not able to say at all exactly where we would draw 
the hne. In other words, in almost every case, the situations to which 
we apply the terms form a continuum (as we shall see in more detail 
later on in the case of "power") and we do not precisely know at what 
point on the continuimi our use of the term would stop. Thus, there 
are many situations to which we would not hesitate to apply the des-
cription "coercion": but suppose that one man controls tbe actions of 
another by offering him bribes which his psychological constitution 
makes it virtuaUy impossible for him to resist (for instance, plying him 
with alcohol): is this a denial or impairment of the latter's freedom? 
(Pohtical morahsts have often written as if "bribing the electorate" 
were an illegitimate way of exercising power.) Again, since we are 
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referring to situations which form a continuum, pairs or groups of the 
terms with which we are concerned overlap at the edges. Yet again, 
though we are dealing here with series of different situations or 
relationships between persons which "shade" into one another, for the 
purposes of ordinan: life we are not concerned to identify and distin-
guish the quite different sorts of interpersonal relationships to all of 
which we may apply such words as "freedom", "power", "influence" 
or "constraint". One of the purposes of this paper is to point to a few 
of the different interpersonal relations all of which are frequently 
described as being examples of the exercise of "power". 
These, then, are some of the reasons why it is not surprising that 
there should be no agreement about usage, or even a very high degree 
of consistency in the writing of a. single writer. And, of course, it goes 
without saying that there is no set of definitions or usages which 
should prevail over all otliers for all purposes. In these "Notes" I am 
proposing certain ways of viewing the concept of power; but I do not 
recommend my usages (and my ways of distinguishing "power" from 
other very closely connected concepts) as being equally valid for all 
theoretical purposes; as a matter of fact, I have come at the subject of 
power in this way mainly because it has seemed to me to be useful in 
illuminating certain questions about freedom. Other writers, with 
different theoretical purposes in mind, will no doubt continue to pro-
pose other usages and other classifications. Thus, as will become 
apparent later, the classifications and discriminations I point to do 
not at all coincide with Weber's famous distinction between forms of 
authority, viz. charismatic, traditional and bureaucratic authority: the 
distinctions I am especially concerned to illustrate and to insist upon 
can be found within each of Weber's three types of authority. It is not 
that I am offering an alternative analysis; the distinctions he is point-
ing to may quite well be real and extremely important; but he is con-
cerned with different problems. 
But there is one point on which it is important to be clear. However 
we may decide to employ the terms that ai-e available from ordinary 
language, we must deal faithfully with the facts. In speaking of 
power, freedom, coercion, and the like, we are concerned with rela-
tions between persons and groups of persons; and different types of 
relations differ subtly from one another, although, as I have men-
tioned, some shade into others. Whatever system of nomenclature we 
may find it convenient to adopt, we must ensure that we do not do 
violence to the quahtative differences between the different sorts of 
relationships we are really referring to; and especially that we do not 
treat as being identical relationships which differ from each other in 
subtle but important ways. 
Before I come to my subject there is one more explanation I must 
make. Pohtical scientists and sociologists are primarily concerned, of 
course, not with individuals, nor with simple groups of two or three 
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persons, but with highly organized communities; and they are mainly 
concerned, therefore, with power in its most highly organized and in-
stitutionahzed forms. In these "Notes" I shall refer only incidentally 
to the organized and institutionalized manifestations of power; my 
examples will be almost always of relations between two persons. I 
have two reasons for concentrating attention on these extremely simple 
or "primitive" forms of interpersonal relationships: first, it is easier 
with these simple relationships to bring out the qualitative differences 
I want to emphasize; and, second, I would argue that these relation-
ships are in a sense fundamental: that is, they are the very relations 
which we find, most bewilderingly and intricately intertwined, within 
the complex institutionalized relationships of great groups and highly 
organized communities. I do not want to deny that institutionalization 
brings with it additional important elements and complexities; but I 
would want to maintain that the "primitive" relationships are also 
present; and further, and most important, that we cannot understand 
or judge the more complex structures unless we can identify the 
simpler forms of relations that are involved therein and determine 
some of their relevant quahtative features. 
II 
I shaU begin with a proposal and work from it. I propose to take 
"power" as being the most inclusive term, and, within this wider con-
cept, I shall distinguish two poles, the pole of "influence" and the pole 
of "domination". These will mark the ends of the scale: I shall suggest 
how we might arrange a number of situations all involving the exer-
cise of power in order along the scale: and I shall also want to mark 
somewhere on the scale a point that I take to be of especial impor-
tance—the point at which a conflict situation between the person exer-
cising power and the person over whom it is exercised begins to mani-
fest itself. 
First, as regards "power". Russell says that "power is the production 
of intended effects".^ According to this definition, A has power over B 
when A can produce certain effects that he intends to produce in B's 
behaviour. It wiU be convenient to accept this formulation to begin 
with; however, later on I shall point out that it brushes aside certain 
comphcations that it is very necessary to take into account. The com-
phcations mainly concern the notion of power as the production of 
effects, and the requirement that the effects are intended effects. How-
ever, postponing those matters for the time being, it will be noted that 
RusseU's definition of power is in some respects a very wide one: we 
could be said to have power over inanimate material hke wood or iron 
because we have the power to produce certain intended effects on 
those materials. When we use the word in reference to the relations 
between htmian beings, we certainly give it a rather narrower 
reference: thus, the surgeon has power over my body in that he can 
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produce intended effects upon it, but we should not say that this is an 
example of his power over me. As a concept employed in the discus-
sion of interpersonal relations and social affairs, we give "power" a 
more restricted range. I shall not try to state exactly what the restric-
tion is: it is sufficient for my purposes to say that A has power over B 
when A can affect B's acts or behaviour in ways intended by B. 
At one end of the continuum of relationships involving the exercise 
of power we may place "influence". A teacher may have influence over 
a pupil or a parent over a child; a painter like Cezanne may influence 
a generation of painters; or a great thinker everyone who subsequently 
writes about a subject. It will already be apparent that some of these 
examples raise questions about intended and vmintended effects, but we 
may postpone these: let us assume that the effects are intended effects. 
At the extreme end of the scale I wish to place the type of situation in 
which it can be said that A affects the behaviour of B in intended 
ways, without its being true that B is required to subordinate his own 
wishes, inclinations, beliefs, interests, ire. to those of A. These wiU be 
cases in which a conflict situation does not appear at all. Now, it may 
well be that this is an "ideal" case, never in fact reahzed, because it 
may be argued that, wherever influence exists, there is some element 
of conflict present, some degree of subordination of one man's desires 
or interests to those of another. This, also, is a matter that will have to 
be considered more fully later. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently obvious 
that we can readily distinguish situations which approximate to that 
which I have defined from those at the other end of the scale which I 
have arbitrarily called "domination". This, of course, is the type of 
situation in which A directs or controls the behaviour of B and where 
A's wishes prevail over those of B: B acts as he does only because he is 
compelled so to act by A, and would not do so but for A's abihty to 
make him act in ways that he does not want to act. There is mani-
festly a conflict situation. As an example of the pole of "influence", we 
may take the example of a scientist who takes a young man into his 
laboratory, commimicates to him his own passion for scientffic research, 
some of his own quahties of mind and character, passes on his own 
skiUs, and perhaps by the exercise of the influence that he has, enables 
the student to become the independent scientist that he wanted to 
become. Or perhaps it is only gradually that the pupil comes to feel 
the spell of the master: what initially had elements of conflict or resis-
tance in it may be changed as the situation develops. At the other end 
of the scale, the gunman's intimidation of his victim manifestly in-
volves a conflict situation. 
Now, it is equally obvious that if we begin with the Rutherford-
pupil type of relationship, we can slightly vary the conditions and 
produce a series of relationships which he along a continuum, getting 
nearer and nearer to the pole of "domination" or pure coercion. In the 
Rutherford-pupil relation we can introduce a slight element of domi-
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nation: teachers are not unknown who, in order to bind disciples to 
themselves, use certain advantages they enjoy in order to restrain the 
natural inclinations or "bent" of their pupils: again (and we must not 
forget that power is generated by the beliefs, feelings, and attitudes of 
both parties to the relationship) pupils are not unknown who yield 
to the supposed wishes of teachers because of sanctions that they 
suppose teachers to possess—for instance, the disposal of good jobs. It 
is uimecessary to multiply examples: it wiU be evident that, as one 
"goes down" the scale, different types of relationships involving the 
presence of power shade into one another. Of course, this geometrical 
mode of representation is a very crude expository device; as a matter 
of fact, as we look more closely at a number of these very complex 
situations, it is perhaps not so much a matter of one sort of situation 
being followed by, and shading into, another, but rather of the pre-
sence in varying degrees of many different psychological and other 
components. For this reason, the notion of a continuum may after all 
be rather misleading, but I can think of no simpler method of exposi-
tion. 
As you "move down" the scale, sanctions (inducements and penal-
ties to induce comphance with the wishes of one party) begin to 
appear, but at first in such subtle ways that it is very difficult to deter-
mine whether sanctions are operating at all. The difficulty is not only 
that of the observer; it is often impossible for the actor or patient to 
know whether his action is affected by consideration of real or 
possible sanctions, or whether, in conforming to the wishes of another, 
he is acting "on his own initiative". Later, of course, sanctions become 
more obvious and assiune increasing severity. Again as we examine 
types of situation arranged along the scale in relation to the absence 
and presence of a conffict situation, we observe differences concerning 
the "bases" or "sources" of the influence or domination that A enjoys 
over B, and also as regards the "mechanisms" by means of which 
power is exercised. It is not always easy to distinguish "bases" and 
"mechanisms". Thus, the influence of a Rutherford over his pupil may 
flow in part from his known standing in his science and the authority 
he enjoys by virtue of his achievement (and these, I suppose, would 
be examples of what many writers now caU "bases" of power); but 
also in part from felt superior quahties of mind or imagination, and 
these may perhaps be regarded as mechanisms by means of which 
influence is exerted. Moving further down the scale, we know that 
many rulers have managed to dominate subjects not by employing 
manifest sanctions (either penalties or inducements) but by subtle 
and hidden means of manipulation—causing the subjects to want what 
the ruler wants them to want and think what he wants them to think. 
This is an example of the "shading into" of which I have spoken, and 
of the extraordinary difficulty often in recognizing the kind of power 
situations we are dealing with: it is often impossible to say witib any 
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confidence whether we are observing a situation in which B "freely" 
subordinates himself to an imposed discipline or accepts the authority 
of a leader or whether his comphance has been secured by means of 
manipulation by A. Yet, tricky, subtle, and arguable as such distinc-
tions often are, they are the distinctions we are compelled to try to 
make if we want to describe the structure of power within a social 
group, the quahtative features of the power relationships that are 
present, and their significance for the freedom of members of the 
group. 
In ordinary talk, and in much of the writing of political scientists 
and sociologists, assertions about power, its distribution, its conse-
quences, &c. are often very confidently made; one of the objects of the 
points I have been making is to suggest that this confidence is usuaUy 
unjustffied. Even in a simple relation between two persons, it is fre-
quently extremely difficult to identify the kind of relationship it is, the 
motives, the psychological mechanisms, and so on, of the parties in the 
relation; this difficulty is, of course, very much greater when we are 
dealing with complex groups and institutions. The position is clearer 
when the patient in a power relation is aware of a conffict situation, 
and when overt sanctions are present. In our ordinary talk about 
power, I imagine that we usually apply the term to situations of this 
kind, and this is also the practice of many pohtical scientists. I shall 
return to this point also at a later stage. This does not seem to be a 
very convenient restriction of the apphcation of the term "power", 
and, as we shall see, it can lead to misleading results in the empirical 
study of social groups and communities. In tiie pohtical relationships 
of actual societies, relations of the "influence" type and those of the 
"domination" type are frequently so much intertwined, are causally so 
closely interconnected, that it is not very sensible to make an analysis 
of a political structure which leaves on one side the relationships 
which I have caUed "influence". For example, in the analysis of many 
examples of pohtical "leadership", it would be impossible not to bring 
into the reckoning relations botii of "influence" and "domination", and 
the manner in which they interact with one another. 
m 
Let me now return to Russell's "Power is the production of intended 
effects". If we confine our attention to situations down towards the 
"domination" end of our scale, we shall emphasize intended effects: 
the power of the gunman is certainly his production of intended 
effects—for instance, the handing over of the contents of the tiU. But if 
we look at relations of influence, the position is more difficult: the in-
fluence A has on B is sometimes intended, sometimes unintended; 
furthermore, A may be either conscious or unconscious of the influence 
he has upon B, and similarly B may be conscious or unconscious of the 
fact that he is being influenced. Towards the end of these "Notes" I 
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want to suggest some reasons why a reahstic or adequate study of 
pohtical or social power cannot afford to discount unintended effects. 
On the other hand, it is easy to see why the majority of social scien-
tists agree with Russell in connecting power with intended effects 
only. In the first place, intended effects are much easier to deal with 
empiricaUy: we can observe A expressing a wish or demand or a 
pohcy: we can observe B's disagreement or reluctance: and we can 
observe B's final comphance with A's demand. In the case of unin-
tended effects, it is often more difficult to estabhsh the fact that there 
has been influence at aU, and not merely a coincidence of decisions. 
Moreover, the concept of unintended influence is a tricky one to deal 
with; clearly, it would be impossible to claim that A is influencing B 
whenever he produces unintended effects on B. Mr. Menzies produces 
unintended effects on The Sydney Morning Herald: we should 
scarcely say that he is influencing The Sydney Morning Herald. 
(Actually he is, but not in the sense that is relevant to this discussion.) 
Apparently, it is not simply a matter of A producing unintended 
effects on B; it appears, roughly speaking, that unintended effects are 
equated with being influenced when B becomes more like A, adopts 
his opinions, or his preferences, or his way of living: the once much-
discussed "embourgeoisement" of the working class is perhaps a 
sociological example of influence in the form of unintended effects, 
and one that supports the point akeady made that a reahstic account 
of social power can hardly afford to ignore influence as the production 
of unintended effects. On the other hand, if the unintended effect the 
parent has on the child is to stiffen the child's determination to be as 
different from the parent as possible, such influence would not be 
taken as an instance of power. 
What has been said of unintended influence illustrates again the 
manner in which any one of these power relationships becomes a 
whole family of relationships as soon as we inspect it closely. Let us 
separate out just two or three of the relationships that we may call 
unintended influence. A may influence B in the sense that B repeatedly 
imitates A, adopts his opinions or his style, acts as he acts, and so on. 
We may say that A has power over B in the sense that he, albeit un-
consciously, decides for B, is the dominant character of the pair. At 
the same time, it may be in no way to A's advantage that this should 
be so; there may be no interest of A's that is furthered by this situa-
tion; on the contrary, if B is a heutenant from whose advice A wishes 
to profit, it may be a defect in him from A's point of view. But, 
secondly, we may have a situation which is identical with the first 
except for this, that B's "reflection" of A may have the effect of 
supporting or strengthening some interest of A's, of helping to secure 
him in some position or way of hfe that he enjoys. Now, obviously, 
this is a very important type of situation for the analysis of pohtical 
power or the power structure of a society: the tendency of the mem-
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bers of a society to imitate or take their colour from ruhng groups or 
elite groups has often been one of the most important factors in main-
taining the political and social position of such groups. Some of the 
things Marx says about the absorption of the ideology of a ruling class 
give examples of this mechanism. Or, thirdly, if we say that Joyce 
exercised a great influence upon many subsequent writers, what is 
the analysis of this relationship? The influence is not only a matter of 
conscious or unconscious imitation; some writers rather developed and 
exploited in their own way techniques that he taught them; but, 
although they were original and independent writers, Joyce's influence 
is apparent, and they could not have written as they did but for him. 
We may hesitate to class this example of unintended influence as a 
form of power; yet in principle it is not very different from forms of 
power or influence in the field of pohtical and social action; political 
and social leadership can be sometimes partly a matter of unusual 
power of imagination and inventiveness. The chief difference seems 
to be this: unhke the influence exercised by a book, pohtical leader-
ship is a reciprocal relation persisting over a considerable period of 
time; and the leadership is, so to speak, being repeatedly renewed by 
fresh acts of inventiveness. But often it is a form of influence identical 
neither with the first nor with the second of the other two forms I 
have also pointed to. 
IV 
Russell says "the production of intended effects". But, of course, socio-
logists and pohtical scientists, when they speak of power, wish to 
include, not only the actual production of effects, but also a capacity 
to produce effects if and when the power holder should decide to 
produce them. This is a distinction which is imphcit in most of our 
discussion of power in social affairs: we may make statements to the 
effect that "the working class does not reahze the power that it 
possesses", or again, we may say that a strike or a war will be a test of 
the distribution of power. There is a distinction involved here be-
tween what might be called manifest and latent power which is of 
central importance for the study of power as a political and social 
phenomenon; however, it is connected with matters which cannot 
be dealt with in the compass of these "Notes". I shall touch on one 
aspect only. 
In organized societies, there is power that is institutionahzed and 
power that is not; it follows from what I have said that power may be 
present in almost any relationship between two persons, it "flows" in 
every nook and cranny of interpersonal and social hfe; thus institu-
tionalized, or socially sanctioned and defined, power is only one of 
many forms which power takes. The sanctioned or institutionalized 
power that a man has we may call his "powers"; and it will usually 
be necessary in empirical study to distinguish his powers from his 
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power. Sometimes the two coincide (thus, in this country, the power 
of the ticket inspector on the train will usually not exceed his 
powers); sometimes his power will fall a great deal short of his 
powers, sometimes it wHl exceed them. Men who occupy the greatest 
offices very often acquire power beyond what is authorized by their 
powers, because high office frequently attracts to its holders an awe or 
deference which endow them with additional sources and forms of 
influence—this is what some sociologists call the "halo effect". This 
suggests that it will not do to define power as the production of in-
tended effects. Suppose we are deciding whether to launch a revolt 
against the dictator who now rules us. We try to estimate the power 
he now has. The estimation of his present power is not the same as 
observing the effects he now produces or has produced in the past; 
our task is to estimate what effects he will be able to produce when 
we challenge him. In other words, the concept of power does not 
always refer to a process between persons that is actually in train; 
power is not something that is present only when the process of 
producing effects is actually going on (in the way that hfe can be said 
to be present only while certain chemical and other processes are 
occurring); the concept may also refer to the capacity to produce 
effects in the future. We say sometimes that a man has the power to 
do so and so even though we believe that he will never in fact act to 
produce the effects in question. The identification of power with the 
production of effects would make nonsense of much of what we 
habitually say about power in social affairs. 
Thus, we encounter another difference of meanings which writers 
often fail to notice. When I was discussing the scale from "influence" 
to "domination", I had in mind interactions or transactions actually 
occurring between persons; it would have been meaningless to speak 
of such things as voluntary acceptance of disciphne, manipulation, 
sanctions, a conffict situation, &c. if that were not so. Similarly, it 
would be meaningless to speak (as we have done) about quahtative 
differences between different sorts of power relation unless we are 
thinking of power as an interaction, a process actuaUy in train. If, 
however, the power we are referring to is the present power to pro-
duce effects in the future, part of what we are talking about must be 
a man's control over the means sufficient to produce the effects—as 
when we say that "wealth is power". In recent writing the distinction 
is sometimes made between power itself and the "power base" (what-
ever it is in virtue of which a man can exercise power);* but it now 
appears that, so far as one of the most common and important con-
ceptions of power is concerned, the "power base" is itself part of the 
power we attribute to the power holder. 
But only part. If we say that A has great power (that is, power to 
produce effects in the future) we refer not only to his wealth, inteUi-
gence, skiU, physical strength, or whatever the "bases" may be. Power, 
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in any of its senses, is always a structure of relations; we can only 
attribute power to a man with reference to other persons; and, in fact, 
in most of the statements we make about the possession of power, the 
other persons are not specffied. But obviously our estimate of A's 
power must refer, not simply to the "bases" that A controls, but also 
to attributes and "bases" of B and C and D. A has as much power as 
he has partly because A, B and C desire money as much as they do, 
or are as credulous or as physically timid as they are. 
Summing up this part of the discussion, we may conclude that 
attributions of power always (or almost always) involve future 
reference. Assertions about the power that an individual or a group 
possesses are assertions about both an existing structure or system of 
processes and also about future effects. Influence, and other concepts 
of power, refer to continuing structures; they refer to systems of caus-
ally related actions which are constantly repeated; and they are often 
used in a way that involves a projection into the future. So far as this 
is so, the empirical analyses of social power structures which are 
undertaken by sociologists and pohtical scientists are not purely con-
temporary or purely descriptive exercises; they will include rather 
comphcated predictions about the future, assumptions which it will be 
very difficult to make exphcit about effects that will follow if certain 
decisions are made or certain other events occur. 
Let us now glance briefly at another comphcation. What are the 
future events we have in mind when, at this moment, we attribute 
power to A? I have said that we are referring, not only to future 
events, but also to other persons (usually unspecffied). But we can 
easily see that this is an over-simplification. In addition to the aspects 
of power we have aheady pointed to—the character of the interrelated 
motives and desires of the actors, the presence or absence of a conflict 
situation, the mechanisms and bases of power—we must introduce still 
another aspect in order to exphcate the concept, what we may call the 
"field"; that on which the power holder operates or within which he 
produces his effects. Attributions of power are incomplete, and strictly 
meaningless, unless there is at least some specffication of the "field". 
Between persons and within social groups, power is, of course, dis-
tributed and diffused in infinitely comphcated ways. And even with 
simple relations between two persons it will not be easy to find a case 
where the weaker is Hterally powerless in relation to the stronger. It 
seldom happens that B is so weak that he cannot compel A to pay a 
price he would rather not pay for the sake of enforcing his will. Be-
cause of the virtual omnipresence of power in human relations, our 
attributions of power to particular persons are comparative more often 
than we reahze; they are quantitative judgments. A powerful man is 
like a moneyed man; most of us have some money, but not as much 
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as the moneyed man. And when we look more closely at what these 
quantffications involve, we see the relevance of what I have called the 
"field". 
There are a number of different dimensions that we are (usually 
imphcitly) quantifying. I shall mention three by way of example. First, 
the power of a "powerful" man may relate to the number of men he can 
influence or coerce: Billy Graham is a more influential lecturer than I 
am, Menzies a more powerful man, because they can affect the 
behaviour of far more men than I can. This dimension may be called 
the "range" of power. Second, the power that A has over B is relative 
also to the particular set of B's interests, desires, or activities that are 
amenable to A's influence or control. If I tiy to influence the views my 
students have about Marx, I may succeed; if I try to influence, still 
more to prescribe, their choice of wives, they will ignore me. Follow-
ing Simon,^ we call this dimension the "zone of acceptance"; and 
clearly it is of fundamental importance in describing the distribution 
of pohtical and social power; a government may have very great 
power within some "zone of acceptance", but its power can quickly 
evaporate if it attempts to operate outside that zone. Thirdly, we find 
also that within the "zone of acceptance", and with respect to one 
particular segment of a man's interests or activities, there is a hmit to 
the extent that another can influence or control this segment. A Fagin 
may have estabhshed a great influence or domination over an appren-
tice in crime, but the apprentice may rebel rather than be induced to 
attempt certain particular crimes. This dimension we call the "inten-
sity" of power; it, too, is an extremely important one in the analysis of 
pohtical power.® A commander may be able to compel his troops to 
endure a certain amount of suffering; but perhaps there is a hmit 
beyond which mutiny will occur. 
Thus, when we attribute power to a man, and especially when our 
attribution is comparative (as it usually is), we were referring to a 
"field" in which the power holder operates, and we are giving quanti-
tative values to these and no doubt to other dimensions. There is no 
reason, of course, to suppose that these dimensions are commensur-
able. For this reason, it does not seem likely that measurements of 
pohtical and social power, including judgments about the distribution 
of power, have, or can ever have, any very exact meaning. In par-
ticular cases we might try to increase comparabihty by restricting 
comparisons to positions on a single dimension; but this will not often 
be very illuminating in deahng with the extremely intricate power 
relations of a pohtical system or a complex social group. 
VI 
Thus, it is usually easy to pick holes in empirical studies of the power 
structure of actual societies. Wright Mills's book. The Power Elite,'' 
has been attacked on the ground that MiUs does not define the criteria 
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which in his opinion would have to be met before one could say that 
a particular group of men (say, the top men in the Pentagon) have the 
predominance of power in the U.S.A., and that consequently the asser-
tions he makes about the distribution of power in the U.S.A. cannot 
be verified. As we have suggested, it is probably impossible for 
"logical" reasons for any global study of the structure of power within 
a society to meet these requirements. 
R. A. Dahl, in an article which criticizes Mills's book on these 
grounds, outhnes a method for the study of the distribution of power.^ 
To abridge fiercely, what he proposes is something like this: one must 
start with a conflict situation, on a cluster of conflict situations. One 
must identify in advance the conflicting interests and demands within 
the situation or situations. And one must then be able to show, over 
a period of time and in a specified proportion of cases, that the de-
mands or interests of one group have prevailed or predominated in 
the decisions that are finally taken. 
No doubt, some such method will often be applicable, yet there is 
much that could be said about this recipe for the empirical study of 
the distribution of power. In the first place, it will be noticed that 
Dahl has especially in mind what I have called the "domination" sec-
tor of the power continuum: his procedure would not be apphcable 
to what I have called the "influence" sector, where there is no clearly 
identffiable conflict situation, and where the defining characteristic of 
the situation is not that one man's demands or interests are forced to 
yield to those of another. In the second place, we must recognize that 
this is a rather important exclusion, because of the concept of pohtical 
and social change that is presupposed. Dahl concerns himself with 
cases in which decisions are debated and made. But social change is 
not only a matter of the taking of a series of discrete and distinguish-
able decisions. Equally important is slow, non-deliberate, unforeseen 
and unintended change; and in this sort of change the influence that 
is exercised by elites or pace-setting minorities on the masses of men 
rtiay be a crucial factor; here, however, we cannot begin by identify-
ing opposing interests or assume that power is expressed in the solu-
tion of a conffict situation. At those points where, for instance, "power" 
and "prestige" interact, the methods of empirical analysis which may 
help in the study of situations of the "domination" type may be en-
tirely useless. 
But, thirdly, suppose that we do confine ourselves to those cases 
where deliberate, discrete decisions are taken. Even so, the method 
we are examining will secure greater empirical rigour only at the cost of 
a great over-simplffication of social reality. One thing that Mills appears 
to be saying is this: that certain groups (for instance, the military, 
the industrialists, and the top political men) constitute the "power 
Slite" in the U.S.A. because the decisions they make affect most 
deeply, and throughout a very wide "zone", the hves of all the citizens 
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of their country. This statement introduces all three of the dimensions 
I have just distinguished. But its interest for us at this point is that it 
brings us back to the question of unintended effects. I do not under-
stand Mills to imply that all the effects of the decisions of his "power 
Slite" are intended effects; it is quite inteUigible to say that men whose 
decisions alter the hves of a great number of other men, continuously, 
deeply, and through a wide range of their interests and activities, are 
far more powerful than you and I whose decisions have effects in a 
very restricted "field". Thus, it is plausible to suppose that sometimes 
when we attribute great power to an individual or group, we have in 
mind the range, the intensity, the extent of the zone of influence of the 
power that is exercised, but we may not think it highly relevant to 
consider whether the effects of decisions are intended or unintended. 
Pohtical scientists and sociologists might well find it convenient to 
distinguish pretty sharply between power as the production (or abihty 
to produce) intended effects and aU other forms or senses of power 
(including power to produce effects that are not intended); in studies 
of the distribution and mechanisms of political power, it might be 
convenient for them to concern themselves only with the first. StiU, 
this would be at variance with the history of the term "power". For 
many important social theorists have habitually employed the concept 
as meaning simply power to produce effects on other men (intended 
or unintended); for instance, Marxist-inspired analyses of the power 
structure of capitahst society, with their emphasis on the power of the 
capitahst, the entrepreneur, and the investor, have certainly imphcitly 
included the effect of their decisions in "determining" the fate of other 
men, not necessarily in intended or expected ways, in the calculation 
of the sum of their power. Similarly, the arguments which have been 
advanced in the present century in support of what is called "eco-
nomic democracy"—bringing the operation of the economy within the 
system of democratic control—have also usually appealed as much to 
the assumed power of "big business" to produce unintended effects as 
to its power to impose dehberate decisions. And it seems to me that 
no study of the nature of power and of its pohtical and social signffi-
cance can afford to exclude this meaning from its inquiries. 
vn 
I remarked earher that one problem for an empirical study of a power 
structure is the problem of "identffication"—to recognize the quahta-
tive characters of the power relations present in the situation we are 
studying. I remarked also that we shall find, in any pohtical system or 
social group, a great number of quahtatively different power relations 
most intricately intertwined. The discussion in the last section wiU 
have reinforced these points. When we are examining the power that 
may be said to be enjoyed by a particular social group, we are hkely 
to be confronted by the whole gamut of power relations. For example, 
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we will usually be able to discern the kind of "influence" I pointed to 
at the outset: the case where the presence of the conffict situation is 
not a crucial defining characteristic. We shall almost certainly find 
"influence" in the rather different sense: the power to affect the 
decisions or actions of others, which, however, falls short of being able 
to control or prescribe what those responses or decisions shall be; and 
this is a concept of power which is very prominent in democratic for-
mulations, in notions of popular participation, consultation, and the 
hke. We shall find relations which do involve conffict situations of 
different sorts and degrees, and sanctions of different sorts. And we 
shall find decisions having both intended and imintended effects. It is 
not easy to make the necessary discriminations; it is so difficult in fact 
that very often the participants themselves, the man who exercises 
power and the man over whom it is exercised, do not themselves know 
whether sanctions are being employed, or whether there is an element 
of what I have called "domination" in the relationship. That the 
quahty of the relationship is often concealed from the actors them-
selves is often enough illustrated by interpersonal relations within the 
family—for instance, in the relations between husbands and wives, 
between parents and children: this is a commonplace with which 
psychoanalysts and novehsts are very famfliar. It is clear that the psy-
choanalytical theory of "internalization" or "intrajection" would intro-
duce some very nasty problems for analysts of power. It is a still more 
difficult problem to identify relationships within pohtical or social 
situations. Abundant examples of this difficulty can be found in dis-
cussions of democracy; pohtical scientists do not agree, nor are they 
hkely ever to agree, concerning the role of "domination" in democratic 
societies hke our own, the extent to which sanctions are brought into 
play in maintaining the stabihty of democracies, the extent to which 
the pattern of power (or structure of "powers") depends upon the 
consent of the governed, the voluntary acceptance of leadership, an 
ingrained respect for legitimate or constituted authority, and so on. 
Within recent years, pohtical scientists and sociologists have been 
giving some attention to the problems connected with the measure-
ment of power.^ It appears to me, however, that a prior problem, and 
perhaps an even more important one, is what I call the problem of 
identification. At any rate it is a difficult enough task, apart from 
quantification, to discover what kinds of relationship confront us in 
any complex social situation; imless we can make these quahtative 
identifications and discriminations, we cannot begin to consider the 
sigmficance of a power structure, its relation to problems about free-
dom and many other issues. 
I want to amplify this last point a httle further by returning in 
conclusion to the "influence" pole of the continuum. Talcott Parsons, 
in another article attacking MiUs's book about the power Slite of the 
U.S.A.,^ ** asserts that Mills works with a "zero simi" conception of 
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power: that is, that Mills assumes, or tends to assume, than an in-
crease in power at one point within a social system imphes its diminu-
tion at another. I shall not ask whether this criticism really apphes in 
this case; nevertheless, in our ordinary talk about power it is certainly 
true that the assimiption is often made that there is, so to speak, a 
finite sum of power, and that if A has become more powerful, then 
there is a B who has become less powerful. Yet it is easy to see that 
this is an assumption that cannot generally be made without consider-
able amphfication and quahfication. 
Now, we can observe in many power relations that a man who 
enjoys power over others is endowed with the power that he has by 
those over whom it is exercised. One of the simplest and most famihar 
examples of this is the leadership situation—the situation where a 
group of men endow another man with power (including power over 
themselves) because they expect that by so doing their own power 
to satisfy some desire, demand, or interest they want to satisfy will be 
augmented. The power of the leader often survives (or continues to 
grow) so long as the expectations of those over whom power is exer-
cised continue to be satisfied. Of this situation there are many vari-
ants; for instance, the power that the leader or ruler has conferred 
upon him by the foUowers or subjects may be the result of a conscious 
calculation of advantage, or it may come from non-rational behef or 
sentiment of one kind or another, such as a behef in the magical or 
non-natural gifts of the leader. Some instances of what Weber calls 
"charismatic authority" belong here. 
But there are features of all the variants that are worth pointing to. 
First, A's power does not flow merely from his exclusive possession of 
some power base (wealth, superior strength of knowledge, or whatever 
it may be) ; it is an aspect of the interaction between A and those 
over whom he has the power. Second, sanctions may be completely 
absent, or quite secondary. Third, and this is here the most relevant 
point, the power with which A is endowed need not entail what B, C 
and D would consider to be a signfficant loss of power; on the con-
trary, the increase of A's power can contribute to an increase in their 
own power to satisfy certain of their own demands. In fact, one of 
the main functions of social power, one of the purposes of creating 
power structures and reservoirs of power, and of experimenting with 
possible distributions of power, is to enlarge the available volume of 
power—the volume of power that is available not only to the leaders 
or governors of the group but to all its members. 
And this appears with particular clarity in relationships at the ex-
treme end of the "influence" pole of the continuum. We sometimes say 
of thinkers, writers, painters or musicians that they possess unusual 
power; we appear to mean that they can produce effects in their work, 
or that they have a control over their medium, beyond the power of 
ordinary men—this is power simply as the "production of (intended?) 
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effects". Now, a painter may not possess "by nature" the power of a 
Picasso, or a thinker the power of a Marx or a Freud; but it is not 
uncommon for them to develop a power that they could not otherwise 
have acquired by subordinating themselves to a master, following a 
discipline imposed upon them, and learning to work with the other 
man's skill and technique, to master his style. And in pohtics, as in aU 
other forms of co-operative working, there are close analogies to this 
particular relationship. 
But if we want to argue that a man can in certain circumstances 
increase his own power by subordinating himself to the authority or 
the power of another person, we can avoid paradox only by admitting 
further complexities in the power relation. During the war the 
Enghsh, let us say, increased their own power by conferring on 
ChurchiU an unusual degree of power and a set of unprecedented 
"powers": thereby they may be said to have increased their power to 
achieve ends they were pursuing in common, the defeat of Germany. 
To build up their power to achieve this end, they surrendered their 
power to act in certain other ways or to achieve certain other ends. 
The essential point is that the individuals who participate in a power 
relation possess many different interests and motives and are engaged 
in different sets of activity concurrently. Moreover, each person will 
often give different values to his different interests and activities; at 
least, he may in many cases rank them in an order of importance to 
himself. 
It is at this point that one of the dimensions I distinguished, "the 
zone of acceptance", becomes of some importance. It is seldom that A 
who is said to have power or influence over B has the same power 
over aU of B's interests or activities. In simple interpersonal relations 
it often happens that A's power to control certain of B's desires or 
activities (even sometimes to the point of being able to prevent their 
expression or indulgence) is a necessary or a sufficient condition of B's 
being able to satisfy other desires or carry out other activities. This, of 
course, is one of the famihar relationships between parents and 
children, and between teachers and pupils; the ordinary common-
sense justffication of the power of parents and of teachers assumes 
that this does happen. The influence or control which A exercises over 
B within the "zone of acceptance" may be experienced by B as un-
aUoyed frustration or domination, without any compensating satisfac-
tion or enlargement of potency (as of course it often is by children 
and school pupils); or B may rank his interests, desires, &c. in such 
an order that he may feel that the interests which gain in potency or 
facihty are more important to him than those that are blocked. And, 
although I have spoken only of cases where these judgments are made 
by the actors themselves, we also habitually make such judgments for 
other persons; just as we do not make a rule of consulting the wishes 
of young children when we require them to submit themselves to 
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educational discipline, so as pohtical philosophers and as citizens we 
habitually make such judgments for other men: we do so whenever 
we take a position on questions of the legitimacy and illegitimacy of 
forms, distributions, modes of exercise, &c. of power. And, indeed, 
with power as with freedom, evaluations of the kind I have been 
referring to often affect our use or non-use of the term "power" as a 
proper description of concrete situations. 
vin 
A survey of a few only of the different relations that may be inter-
mingled and confused within any power situation warns us that the 
connections between one man's power and another's, between one 
form of power and another, or between power and freedom, may be 
extremely obscure, and their unraveUing a very hazardous enterprise. 
One conclusion that is possibly suggested by these "Notes" is that the 
concept of power, for reasons imphcit in this discussion, is not hkely to 
be a fruitful concept in the exphcation of the "power structures" of 
actual societies; perhaps what is called for is a great deal of analysis in 
the sense of breaking up and discrimination, and the substitution of 
more manageable concepts for the portmanteau concept of power. I 
cannot pursue this question here. It is fair to say, I think, that both in 
ordinary discussion, and in the discussions of social scientists, there is 
a tendency to concentrate very heavily on certain manifestations of 
"power", and to ignore or minimize others. The power relations which 
he towards the lower end of the scale tend to be emphasized; those 
lying towards the pure "influence" end tend to be played down. Further-
more, common sense does tend to assume a "zero sum" concept of 
power; everyday discussions (for instance, of the growth of the state's 
power or of the power of the bureaucracy) not only pay scant regard 
to the "dimensions" I have shown to be highly relevant, but also tend 
to assume that if there is a building up of power at one point within 
the system there must be a diminution at others. Again, in thinking 
about power as a social phenomenon, we tend to be too much 
obsessed with problems of distribution; and perhaps we operate with 
very crude notions of distribution to boot. No one would be in danger 
of assuming that the wealth of a society is a fixed quantity; or that the 
effects of a re-allocation of wealth could be calculated by simple 
operations of addition and subtraction. Or, again, if we happen to be 
interested in moral issues connected with power and its operation, it is 
very obvious that such well-worn assertions as Acton's "power tends 
to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely", or Reinhold 
Niebuhr's theme of the persistent tension between power and morahty, 
are not in an undissected form either illuminating or interesting. Widi 
power as with many other things, as Oakeshott has reminded us, la 
vSrite rests dans les nuances. 
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POWER IN AUSTRAUA 
R. S. Parker 
I 
In this essay "power" is seen, not as an attribute of individuals nor as 
a storable commodity, but as a psychological relation between indi-
viduals or groups of people. It is a more or less stable relation where 
A, an individual or group, at a given time can cause B, another indi-
vidual or group, or a specffied number of individuals, to act in a direc-
tion desired by A, with respect to specffied goals, and despite a speci-
fied degree of reluctance or resistance.^ 
The concept of power is not coterminous with that of pohtical 
action. On one hand, there are power relations which would not be 
defined as "pohtical". On the otiher hand, power is only one of the 
dimensions of pohtics. Hence, by itself, it does not provide adequate 
means for analysing the pohtical process in a society. Consequently 
this essay does not attempt to elucidate "the power structure" of Aus-
trahan society, but to see pohtical power in Austraha in its relation 
to the other dimensions of Austrahan pohtics. 
As a framework for this, Professor Partridge has defined "the 
pohtical system" as comprising a set of more or less stable, legitimate 
institutions whose social function is to formulate, to promulgate, and 
to adjust confficts among "pohcies", i.e. proposals with a degree of 
generahty about the objectives of individuals or groups, about the 
distribution of resources or values among them, and about the very 
manner itself of adjusting such confficts.^  
This resembles David Easton's conception, in The Political System, 
of pohtics as being concerned with the authoritative allocation of 
values in a society.^ But Easton's discussion makes a httle more ex-
phcit the place of power as a pohtical dimension. Partridge's definition 
of pohty could apply equally to a market—i.e. to the field of eco-
nomics as well as political science. Economics also is concerned with 
the competitive and often confficting pursuit of "values"—but this con-
ffict takes place in terms of the production and exchange of goods and 
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services, and is regulated by a price mechanism and the tensions of 
supply and demand. Easton presents pohtics as concerned with the 
pursuit of values by means of power, and its regulation by means of 
legitimate power, or authority, i.e. by decisions whose vahdity is 
generally accepted. (Thus the production and distribution of goods 
and services would become "pohtical" if regulated by authoritative 
directions instead of by a price mechanism.) 
I part company witii Easton, however, where he speaks of the com-
plex of pohtical institutions that regulate power "for a whole society" 
as "the pohtical system". For this complex I would reserve the tra-
ditional term "the State", remembering the many societies in which 
there is no such umfied or comprehensive complex of pohtical institu-
tions—societies, that is, which are Stateless but which contam a num-
ber of other pohtical systems. Such non-State pohtical systems exist 
also, of course, alongside the State in those societies which have it. 
I also find it more helpful to think of politics (hke economics) as 
being concerned with the allocation of values rather than with the 
resolution of conffict about policies—simply because the latter is only 
a special case of the former. Values are anything for which there is a 
felt need—whether material possessions or pleasures, or intellectual or 
spiritual satisfactions. (The latter may include the sense of relative 
power itself. Power, or more strictiy speaking, hving on the advan-
tageous side of a power relationship, is thus both a value and a means 
to the attainment of values.) Now the competitive struggle for values 
which demands pohtical regulation is not coiffined to those regular 
or consistent series of actions which can be called "pohcies". One 
could hardly call common assaults, lapses from moral rectitude, un-
authorized occupation of land by "squatters" or the carrying of infec-
tious fruit into a disease-free area, acts of pohcy—but they may all call 
for pohtical regulation. It may be argued more plausibly that the re-
sponsive acts of pohtical regulation, precisely because their object is 
generally to introduce order and regularity into the struggle for values, 
normaUy tend to take the form of "pohcies"; but what they regulate 
includes both pohcies and more isolated acts. 
This theoretical preamble has seemed necessary in order to make 
clear (particularly to myself) just what I am trying to do in discussing 
power in Australia. EssentiaUy, it is imreahstic to talk of "the power 
structure" in isolation from the other elements in the pohtical struc-
ture—and this especiaUy in Austraha, because painful reflection sug-
gests the thesis that power as defined above plays an unusually re-
strained role in the struggle for desired values in this country. I want 
to suggest three broad reasons which would help to explain this pro-
position, if it is true. 
n 
In the first place, Austraha is a society comparatively blessed in the 
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resources, skills and organization necessary to provide a high average 
standard of material values for its people—relative to their expecta-
tions. I think it may be shown historicaUy that power in various forms 
looms larger where the struggle for material existence is keenest. 
If, for example, we consider pre-industrial societies where popula-
tion pressed hard on the means of subsistence, we invariably expect to 
find direct power relations playing a larger part in the distribution of 
material welfare. There is the institutionalized domination of feudal-
ism, in which the sanctions of pohtical obhgation, rather than market 
processes, enforce a distiibution heavily in favour of nobles and 
priests. There are the various forms of quasi-pohtical extortion prac-
tised by powerful economic minorities today in countries hke Thai-
land or the Phihppines. And there was the prevalence of simple 
bandits and highwaymen in Europe to the end of the eighteenth 
century. Comparatively speaking, high average living standards and 
the economic and social mobility that go with them in a country like 
Austraha conduce, other things being equal, to a general acceptance 
of the economic processes of bargaining and exchange, and a reduced 
need for the exercise of power in arranging the allocation of material 
values. The readiness of a majority to accept the removal of wartime 
pohtical contiols over such allocation might be thought to be evidence 
of this. 
For the moment I am postponing the question whether economic 
bargaining "power" is power in the sense of this paper. In particular I 
would ask patience of any members of the Consumers' Association 
who may want to apply the foregoing reasoning about banditry to the 
Australia of mass advertising, hire-purchase, automobile dealers, ohgo-
poly, monopoly and restrictive trade practices. Not only David Easton, 
but also many sociologists are wilhng to allow a distinction between 
economic (exchange) processes and pohtical (power) processes. And 
I shall return later to the problem of the concentration of "economic 
power" which I believe is of first importance in Austrahan hfe—if not 
in Avistrahan pohtics. 
in 
So much, at this moment, for the allocation of material values. The 
second reason I would assign for the inconspicuous role of power 
in Austrahan pohtics is the low importance ascribed to non-material 
values—especially those associated with rehgion, race, and pohtical 
ideology which have been such fruitful sources of power struggles 
within other societies. Whether this be characterized as the healthy 
tolerance of a sane and prosperous people, or as the regrettable apathy 
of a tribe of hedonistic sun-worshippers, the Austrahan lack of in-
terest in ideas and principles, so regularly lamented by our more 
earnest European guests, certainly reduces the zeal with which we 
seek to influence our fellows to our own way of thinking. Where are 
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our parallels to the American intensity of feeling and pohtical activity 
about the negro, to French and Itahan feehngs and activity about 
Church and State, to the upheavals about pohcy on matters hke dis-
armament and socialization in the British Labour Party, to the essen-
tially nationahstic tension between Boers and Britons in South Africa? 
The nearest answer might he in the passionate anti-Communism of 
the Democratic Labour Party—minority offshoot of the 1954-5 spht in 
the Austrahan Labour Party—and its ahgmnent with the Roman 
Cathohc Church in the fight for State aid to church schools. But these 
cases are so exceptional as to emphasize the foregoing generalization. 
Other apparent exceptions to it are also, on reflection, of the kind 
that go to prove the rule. There is the vociferous separatism of the 
movements to carve new States out of the existing territories of New 
South Wales and Queensland. There were the displays of synthetic 
passion over the Labovur Prime Minister's attempt in 1949 to nationalize 
Austraha's private trading banks. There was the mushroom growth 
(and decay) of pseudo-ideological movements during the great depres-
sion: the charismatic appeals of New South Wales's eccentric Premier, 
J. T. Lang, to the economic underdog; the pretentious pledges of a 
Colonel Eric Campbell, "Leader" of a semi-fascist para-mihtary organ-
ization, the "New Guard", to "protect" the State from Langism and 
Communism; the patriotic panic of other middle-class rallying move-
ments such as the "All for Austraha League".* However, these were all 
comparatively short-hved phenomena; more important, they were, 
sociologically, never more than skin-deep—the outward and visible 
signs of empty pockets and pantries, but not of outraged, intransigent 
souls, or of deeply committed minds. A mild economic recovery, or the 
passage or defeat of bitterly contested legislation, has been sufficient 
to erase such flashes of protest from most men's memories. 
It is true, but only reinforces the point, that some national pohcies, 
such as the control of immigration to preserve a "white Austraha", 
are dehberately designed to insulate domestic pohtics from explosive 
currents hke race conffict. Nor are these examples intended to give 
exclusive or undue stress to the domination-and-sanctions end of the 
"power-influence" continuum.^ Elsewhere, the clash of ideological 
values has no doubt been a prohfic source of violence in power rela-
tionships. But other forms of power have been equally prominent: the 
struggle over disestabhshment in France, I beheve, in its later stages 
worked largely through influence on conventional pohtical institutions. 
I am simply saying that in Austraha the relative unimportance of con-
fficts over non-material values has removed a whole range of motives 
for the exercise of power in any form. One is reminded of T. V. 
Smith's thesis® that conscience (that is, the drive to the pursuit of 
moral values in action) generates a need of power which is so impera-
tive as to menace social stabihty in the absence of restraints that go 
"beyond conscience". 
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A relevant question which could only be answered empirically (and 
has not been) is whether power as a value-in-itself is relatively un-
important as a social motivation in Austraha. To give a superficial 
answer, the lust for power might be held to be incompatible with easy-
going materiahsm, and to be inhibited by the Austrahan commimity's 
reputed rejection of deference, status distinctions and authority, legiti-
mate or otiierwise. And yet, there is no lack of Austrahans who have 
been debited with a keen enjoyment of power for its own sake—flam-
boyant figures in pohtics and joumahsm flock to mind—who have not 
minded the accompanying hmehght, and perhaps a greater nmnber, 
including some notable pubhc servants, who in conformity with the 
Austiahan ethos have been contented by "power without glory". What 
may be said is that, in the Austrahan context, all of these men have had 
to be expert in the techniques of influence, competence and manipu-
lation, rather than in the domination end of the power continuum. 
IV 
I come now to the third main factor which has qualffied the role of 
power in Austrahan pohtics. This is the long-estabhshed habit, carried 
further, perhaps, than in any other advanced society, of institutional-
izing the resolution of confficts over the allocation of values. This pre-
dilection we share with the New Zealanders, who must be credited 
with the invention of our system of industrial arbitration, the proto-
type and prime example of our pre-eminence in transmuting power 
confficts into arbitral and administrative processes. Its central feature 
is the attempt to remove important allocative decisions from a process 
of ad hoc bargaining or trials of strength, based on the relative power 
of the competing interest groups, to a system of adjudication by com-
mittees, boards, tribunals, departmental agencies, autonomous cor-
porations and similar institutional devices.'^  
In the industrial field, compulsory arbitration by quasi-judicial tri-
bunals replaces collective bargaining as the main means of deter-
mining the relative share of wage and salary incomes in the gross 
national product. In the federal and each State pubhc service, a pub-
hc service Board or Commissioner has statutory powers to determine 
questions of departmental organization, estabhshments, appointments 
and promotions, largely by mediation and negotiation among depart-
ments, staff associations, individual officers, and sometimes Ministers. 
In these ways the public service commissioners perform functions 
which are very differently organized in those countries that commit 
estabhshments and staffing to Treasury contiol under a responsible 
Minister. Furthermore, the pubhc service boards themselves, particu-
larly in matters of wage-fixing, promotions and disciphne, may be 
regulated by way of appeal to other quasi-judicial tribunals, such as 
the Pubhc Service Arbitrator and the Commonwealth Industrial Com-
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mission in the federal sphere, or the Crown Employees' Appeal Board 
in New South Wales. 
But the method is by no means confined to the personnel, organiza-
tion and industrial relations field. In most Austrahan electoral systems, 
the redistribution of constituency boundaries, at intervals provided by 
statute, has long been entrusted to statutory commissions, generally 
including a responsible pubhc servant and a judicial officer, with the 
declared aim of neutralizing a function so germane to the relative 
power and advantage of the pohtical parties. The distribution of 
special federal financial largesse among the needier State governments 
is, by convention, determined by accepting the recommendations of a 
pohticaUy-independent Commonwealth Grants Commission, which, 
since 1933, has superseded the previous process of direct bargaining 
between the governments concerned. A similar function has been per-
formed, in relation to Commonwealth grants to the States for tertiary 
education, since 1960, by an Austrahan Universities Commission. 
There is a sense in which these institutions are an extension of the 
process by which Austraha adventured first and farthest into the 
modem type of statutory pubhc corporation, insulated in varying 
degrees from direct Ministerial responsibihty, as administering 
authorities for ah kinds of govemmentally-sponsored activities, from 
the building and ruiming of railways and airhnes to the contiol of 
betting shops. This device has been especiaUy popular where it was 
desired to protect elected governments from continuous involvement 
in the resolution of sharp and contentious clashes of group interest. 
Boards of Railways Commissioners, dating from the 1880s, were 
created largely to avoid two kinds of direct pressure on governments: 
for patronage in appointments and for influence on the directions of 
new hne construction. In the 1920s the River Murray Commission was 
established not only to build conservation and irrigation works but to 
provide a regular medium for resolving the competing claims of three 
States to the waters of that river system. The wartime need for quick 
turn-around of shipping was met by setting up a Stevedoring Industry 
Commission for mediating the clashes of interest among shipping com-
panies, stevedoring companies (where these were separate) and water-
side workers. Since long before the war, the Austrahan Tariff Board 
has been holding hearings and making recommendations upon which 
changes in the protective tariff may be based—though this body is not 
so habituaUy heeded by governments as some of the others mentioned. 
The same apphes to a post-war creation, the Austiahan Broadcasting 
Contiol Board, charged with investigating and recommending upon 
the aUocation of hcences to private broadcasting and television com-
panies, and with pohcing the programme standards and minimum 
quotas of Austrahan material laid down by statute. 
It is this general phenomenon which, I suggest, gives signfficant 
meaning to Alan Davies's dictum that "Austiahans have a character-
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istic talent for bureaucracy".^ We have insistently sought to bureau-
cratize in this way the allocation of values or, as Max Weber might 
have put it, to routinize decisions that would otherwise register the 
prevailing patterns of power. 
I am not here saying that all these attempts to substitute arbitial 
institutions for the free play of power are unique to Austraha; only 
that they have been carried further here than in most other societies. 
I am not saying that they wholly succeed in neutiahzing the relevant 
confficts of interest or in supplanting the arbitiament of power. But I 
would claim that they appreciably reduce, or at any rate modify, the 
role of power in this society. One example may illustiate this claim, 
and for better support I take the exposition from the opinions on in-
dustrial arbitiation of E. L. Wheelwright, who is not apt—as may be 
seen in this very quotation—to underestimate the role of direct power: 
It is fairly obvious that organisational strength plays a part, irrespective 
of the system of wage determination. . . . This organisational factor is clearly 
of most importance when wage determination is carried on under a system 
of collective bargaining—because the wage bargain has aspects of a trial of 
strength. This factor is still of importance under a system of arbitration-
there is nothing hke a quick strike for getting speedier hearing, as is well 
known. But it is of far less importance with arbitration than collective 
bargaining. In fact it seems clear that one of the distinctive features of 
compulsory arbitration is that it greatly improves the position of the weaker 
sections of the community, especially those who are difficult to organise. . . . 
. . . Compulsory arbitration acts as an umbrella, under which both weak 
and strong can expect more equahty of treatment than if they remain out-
side the umbrella.^ 
I submit that the same reasoning would be found to apply in many 
other fields. Let us make all allowances for the possibihty of certain 
diluted pressures being apphed to these bureaucratic institutions, for 
the technical and administiative imperfections of their procedures, for 
the element of arbitrariness in arbitral decisions. The fact remains 
that, to an appreciable degree, their allocative function takes the form 
of independent analysis and reasoning, and to this extent displaces the 
trial of power that would otherwise engage the embattled interests, 
and, as in Wheelwright's example, would lead to a somewhat different 
result. 
Here we may pause to note a paradox of particular interest to the 
sociologist. If we look for the origins of this complex of arbitial institu-
tions, we are generaUy hkely to find them among earher, undisguised 
contests of power—the nineteenth century struggles of transported 
convict and immigrant master, of pardoned or released convict and 
free settler, of wealthy, pastoral leaseholders and small farmers given 
the right to "select" holdings from their lands, of grazier, and nomadic 
shepherd and shearer, of importer and manufacturer. A feature of 
these struggles in Austiaha, noted by many historians,^" has been their 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
^
 
•
t
í
c
O
r
-
j
C
S
a
C
n
-
i
S 
a
 
n3 o o 
bO
 
SN 
C ca (D 
4-1 
3 
.S
 
-3
 §
 
tí 
^
 
«
 R
 S 
d 
ü 
•a
 
s C (D 
•íí
 
V) 
JS
 
S
 
'T3 
«
 
-C
O
 
ü
 
S
 
eu
 
-w
 (u
 
"2 
«
',
 
fl
 
•:!!
 T
S
 
(-i
 
r/
'
 
*i
 
OJ
 s
 
0
 
i
.
 
^
«§^§e|ir/S.:H
 tí
 
'"
 
o
 
*^
 
V5 
•B
 
B
'
^ 
c3
 S
 
C 
•a
 
D
 CJ 
O
in
a 
g
 
(DCO
 
<u
 
rt
 
«
 
2í 
o 
4->
 
C/l end;+-I 
^
 o 
<u
 
>
 
•.c loca cti 0 
«!
 
'"
^
 
CD
 
cS
 
S 
ca 
o 
ca o
 
§3
 
«;.»
 
TH
.
 
3
 
M
 
^
 
•S
 
a 
O
 
4-1 
s o» 
.
.
•5 
V)
 
, 
•
•
 
3 
•a
 
a 
•F-t 
c o 
^
5 
ca
 iH
 ca 
ca 
o
 
2
 
.3
 V5 
3
 
,
.
 13
 
a> 
.
•t;
 
«
 
r
a
 
-H
 
H
^
 
o
 
1
3 
"?
 
-S 
C
o
 
C
o
 
00 
•4-*
 
t/i
 
-Jj
 
^
 
•43
 
.ti
 
'«
 >=§ 
.3
 
V3
 
"H
 
(U 
C
 
4-; 
ü
 
„
 Ia
 C
 
.o
 
g 
g
 
>
.,ciic3
 
d
^
 
g
 33
 
"S
 
«D
 
"B
 2 
2
 
*^
 
.2
 
oj
 ti
 
2
 
'^
^
 
-S
,
 
"^
 
ca
 3
 
,D
 
-^
 
'Ç 
ç21;
 
.ti
 
=2
 
•)=;
 ra
 
c 
o
 j3
 
-S
 
bT-B
 ^
 
ca
 
"
^
 
4-1 
.2rfl
 
.
 
-<
 
3 
ca
 ca 
.2
 
<u 
CO
 
o
 
(D
 CO
 
•4H
 
O
 
O
 Oi
.
 (D 
S
 
to
 
-
^
 
o
 
oj
 XI 
ca
 
ca 
35
 
O)
 
C 
iH
 
c
a 
Oi
 
•£ 
•B
 
^
 
tu
 
.2 
t!
 43 
^
H
 
4-»
 
ca
 
o 
3
 
^
 
(D
 
<D
 
ca 
(D 
u
 
1
 rC 
o
 rrt
 
"
 
3
 
—
' 
3
 
V5
 
'^
 
ca
 
^
<
u
'§-3
 
o
.2
 
fe 
tí 
o
 
ca 
I
 
ca 
ca
 
o 
4-
.
 
-
^
 
2
 
«
 
•
 
l-â.2 
?
 
O)
 
ca 
cu
 
•
-
 
C
U 
M
H
 
-a
 
m
 
ví
 
ca
 
'3 
§
 
53-
^ 
.S
 
«
 
4->
 
«5
 
O)
 
ü 
^
 
_^
,
 
ci>
 
o
 
.S 
•43
 O
 T3
 2
 T3 
Tí <U 
c; 
3 3 c 
•
•
^
 
CO
 
M
 
D
 
r£! 
4-
' 
O
 
O
 
.M
 
a
 
^
 
0) 
"S
o
 
c stro ca 
c/3 
3 O 
Crt 
'tí ate ü 
"S 3 s s o 
g
^
rtã
)2
-r!S
§ 
.2
 
c
 
<u
 
•i^
 CO
 
•fcí
 
"
^
 
c/l
 
*4H
 
c
a 
tí,2^
 
*
^2 
O
 
(D
 
CT^
 ca 
o»
 r
^
 
-M
 
•
-
 
<D
 O
 
V5
 
S
 
?í
 
,^
 
1
 
'íi 
in
3 
.2
 
bO
 
<u
 
O)
 
.5 
m
 
ü
 
M
 
to
 
<P 
Ctí
 
3
 
-ti
 
(S
 
P
 
^
'
 
li 
•S
 S 
4->
 
O
 
.
 
c
«
 
to
 
C 
OJ
 3
 
S
 
^
 
o
 
>
«
•
'•
'
 
2
 
S2
 
c
a
*
 
^
 
.0
.
 
^
,
 
>
,'
^
 
<D
 H
 
^
 
4^
 
•n
 
5
 
0
 
o
 
'
 
N
«
.2
i 
3
 
«
 
c
a
H
 
o
_
^
^
4
J
-
7
! 
gj
 43
 
.
 T3
 3
 
2 
>
 
2
 
3
 
53
 
o
 
P 
ca
 3
 
<u
 
^
 
(D
 
,£4
 
c
a
 
p
 
<
u
 
+
J 
"
•Ia
 
S3r£! 
O
 
ca
 
,^
_
,
 
^
 
ca 
•
^
 
.h4 S
O
(üC
:«-^íaía<
«
 
3
 
&
(V
J
-<
M
H
 
g
^
 
C
 
K
^
 
S
 
0
^
0
5
3
3
3
.
^
 
to
 
e
u
 
o
 
.
.
 
.
 
»H
 
.3
 
_g
 
.Sí^
 ca
 ^
.'S
 
-S 
•c
 
,5
^
 
.g
 
"ü
 t:
 
'O
 
-M
 T
í
 
-
^
 
ca
 
0
3 
o
 
o
 
ca
 
>
^
 >
^
 B-iíti
 
-^
 
•S
 33
 T!
 S
 
-ê^ti
 
?5
 OJ
 Tí 
(D 
4-1
 
.3 
2
 1
 S
 
-i
 2 
j2
 
c
 
(D
 
y
 
fr 
w
 
-3
 TJ 
g
 
g
 ca 
.2
 
,f4
 
>-< 
43
 
'
^
 
(D 
M
 
O
 
(D
 
r
a
 
•
: 
^
 
ca
 
-a
 
o
 
•D
 
2 
;r
 
"
 
v5
 T
3 
S "
 
O
 
r
rt
 
=
^
 
>
 
to
 
n
n
 
«
^
 
V?
 
y 
•43
 bOXi
 
í^
 2
 
S
 
3 
S
 S
 2
 
d
-5
 fc^
 <u
 
.S
 S
 
'3
 
-^
 ^
 
^
 
.
 
fl,
 E
 
v
5
^
-'„
o
 
aj
 caMH
 
-
°ll 
(p
rC
jv
J
Írt
^
 
ü
S
O
-
t
í
o
3
3
-
«
,
—
c
^
o
J
í 
2
.|
 
«
 
<tí
 rD
 T) 
^
 
o
 
<U 
1"! 
ca 
V3 
P
"
 
J
c
 
a
 
"
-
^
 
.ÍH
 
ca
 
>
 
'3
 
H
 
+
4
,0 
"
 
S
 
"
 
S
 
4^
 
2 
'
 
+4
 
(D
 
C
 
a 
°
2
r
 
>>4^
 
.4-^
 H)
 
.ií
 
3
 
P. 
a 
O
t
O
C
a
^
^
t
í
C
 
iT
t+
4 
:
^
8
 
o
 
055
 
O
H
^
 
ca
 g
^
 
ca
 
rt
 
ca
 ?!?
 
-
 
-
-
cá
 
-w
 3
 
b
 
.t!
 
aí
 
•=<
 B
 S 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
PoUtical Power I 29 
stead of being concentrated at the centie, power is distributed on 
relatively even terms between the constituent branches and the 
national organ, thus weakening each organization vis-d,-vis the govern-
ment and its protagonists in the economic and pohtical arena. Power, 
as usual, is diffused under federahsm, and federalism tends to per-
meate the whole social structure in a pohtical federation. Among the 
governments, no doubt, the past twenty years have seen a remarkable 
accretion of power to the Commonwealth in its relations with the 
governments of the States. But this has not meant a net increase in the 
power of the organs of government over private groups, except per-
haps in the sense mentioned by Dr. Encel, that governments, 
especially that of the Commonwealth, have not been able to escape 
some independent responsibihty for economic development and 
stabihty. To this end they have recruited sotne formidable official 
advisers whose influence on the allocation of values, though indirect, 
is real and increasing.^^ 
Also obvious and well documented is the extiaordinary and still 
rapidly grovsdng concentration of economic organization in Austiaha. 
I am thinking of those elements of monopoly, oligopoly and "com-
binations in restraint of trade" which have angered generations of 
radicals, fascinated the younger economists, and now even attiacted 
the threatening attention of a conservative federal Government.^* 
Coming to the more elusive part of the problem, let me try to examine 
briefly whether, in the sense that concerns us here, this concentiated 
organization also means concentrated power, and if so, of what kind. 
The private sectors of the economy can, I think, be fairly sharply 
divided into two classes: those which have felt the need for govern-
mental power to help them reach their goals, and those which on the 
whole have not been dependent on government action, though very 
wiffing to take advantage of it on occasion. This second class includes 
most of the fields characterized by business concentration or concerted 
pricing or merchandizing pohcies: private banking and finance, 
shipping, mining and steel, oil, large-scale retailing, chemicals and 
drugs, tobacco, motor manufacturing, brewing, and tiie mass media of 
press, radio and television. Undoubtedly the enterprises in these fields 
can be accused, as Professor Amdt accused them ia. 1957, of wielding 
certain kinds of power: 
. . . power to exploit the consumer by charging exorbitant prices, power 
to exploit the worker, power to make enormous profits, and power to ensure, 
through control of the nation's finance, press and even government policies, 
the maintenance of a capitahst system and of the privileges of big bxisiaess 
and its capitalist owners.^^ 
Now, is this "power" in the sense of influencing people to do what they 
would not otherwise do, and how far does it really include "control 
over government pohcies"? 
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The answer to the first question is affirmative if the exploitation of a 
monopoly position through the ordmary market processes is rightly 
defined as exercising power in a pohtical sense. I would have some 
doubts about this, smce the differences in the bargaining factors 
determimng prices in a market situation are mamly ones of degree, and 
I would hesitate to class all market tiansactions as mutual exercises of 
power in terms of the definition adopted here. 
But power in this sense certamly does enter the situation in another 
way. By and large, the population aUows itself to be exploited with 
remarkably httle resistance, and this must be due at least in part to 
the pervasive conditioning influence of the mass media in the forms of 
advertising, of general propaganda, and of distortion or suppression of 
the truth about costs, prices and business organization. The result is 
that, on the whole, the citizens do not actively press for a different 
aUocation of material values, much less for the use of governmental 
power to modify the economic structure itself. To the extent, then, 
that citizens' attitudes are shaped by business control of the media of 
opinion and information, the most striking advantages in the aUocation 
of material values in Austrahan society are enjoyed with impunity 
largely as a result of usmg that form of power which Professor Part-
ridge would caU "manipulative". 
This brings us to the second question, whether the great economic 
interests have the power of "contiol over government pohcies". This I 
very much doubt, if intended in any direct sense. Certainly, as I have 
said, big business has enjoyed an unusually high degree of immunity 
from governmental control in Austiaha. This is partly due to the 
diffusion of governmental powers under federahsm, though let it be 
remembered that repeated appeals in constitutional referendums have 
never persuaded a majority of electors in a majority of States to reduce 
that diffusion one whit. Truly, also, business interests have often in-
fluenced Austiahan governments towards favourable pohcies: the 
history of the hquidation of the first Commonwealth shipping line, of 
New South Wales pubhc enterprises in the 1920s and 1930s, and of the 
treatment of the national airlines since 1949, provides irrefutable 
examples of this.^ ® 
But again, are these unequivocal examples of superior power? In the 
kinds of cases I have quoted, the governments in office belonged to 
the pohtical parties of business; those parties had been elected by 
majorities of the voters; and the sabotage of pubhc assets raised no 
substantial pubhc protest. The crucial question of power is: could the 
governments have resisted this business pressure if they wanted to? I 
beheve they could have done so. To take a more striking example, 
there is httle doubt that, but for the High Court's interpretation of the 
federal constitution, in 1949 the Clufley Government could have suc-
cessfully carried through the nationalization of private banking. Nor 
do I think anyone would assert that the judges were in the power of 
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the banks. As the Government was immediately afterwards defeated at 
a general election, the Court's decision seemed consonant with the 
overwhelming opinion of the electorate; and if that opinion was in-
fluenced by manipulation, it corroborates the view that this is the sig-
nfficant form of power in the field I am discussing. It is not irrelevant 
to remark, moreover, that in general the "independent" business in-
terests are not concerned to exert positive power to induce govern-
ments to do things. What they want is to be left alone.^ ''^  In this 
respect, they do not effectively resist minor government interference 
in the form of taxation or the regulatory banking measures of 1945, 
most of which have been preserved by the present business govern-
ment. If these groups have not been subjected to more radical 
measures, it is because of constitutional restraints and the general 
acceptance of their status by pubhc opinion. 
The probabihty that bank nationalization could have been enforced, 
on the one hand, and the acceptance of constitutional restraints, on the 
other, are both symptoms of the high degree of legitimacy attributed in 
our society to duly enacted law, in almost aU fields except drinking and 
gambling. This aura of legitimacy is relevant in considering the power 
mobilized by the second main class of economic interests I have men-
tioned—those dependent for security and welfare on governmental 
organization. Here again the phenomenon itself is famiharly known 
and often described. A succession of organized interest groups—tiade 
unions, sugar and butter producers, wheat farmers, ex-servicemen, 
manufacturers, the aged, and so on—have in turn, according to the 
pohtical party with a balance of power for the time being, contrived 
to build into the fabric of legislation a series of schemes—industrial 
arbitiation, marketing boards, stabilization plans, bounties, home con-
srmiption prices, preference in employment, tariff protection, and 
pensions—to guarantee them some secure share of available values. 
Now since these groups have turned to government precisely be-
cause of their deficiency in market strength, and yet have been able 
to influence the aUocation of values to some extent in their own 
favour, the question which naturaUy arises is: what form of power 
have they exercised? The answer is, the power of pohtical organiza-
tion. In describing aspirations. Professor Hancock may rightly have 
said that, "to the Austrahan, the State means coUective power at the 
service of individuahstic 'rights'".^^ But in accounting for achieve-
ment, we must turn to Andre Siegfried's phrase about the New 
Zealand Prime Minister: "If you are an influential elector he can refuse 
you nothing."^^ In this context an influential elector is a member of a 
group that can muster or withhold votes where the Government needs 
Qiem most—and the most effective of such groups are those that can 
form or sway pohtical parties, help to y/ia elections or organize a per-
suasive lobby. This is the kind of power wielded by those who want 
positive State action, and its history suggests that for this purpose in 
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Austiaha, direct access to legislative institutions is more important 
than mtrinsic economic stiength. And if we seek to account for the 
"coUective power" thus generated, it is hard to find another answer 
than in that acceptance of the legitimacy of enacted law, and of the 
admmistiative action that flows from it, to which I have akeady re-
ferred. And note finaUy that the kmd of government action that Aus-
trahans normally prefer to invoke is not the direct exercise of restram-
ing power, but, characteristicaUy, the distribution of benefits through 
re-distribution of income, and the mediation of confficts between 
competing social groups. 
VI 
I have emphasized that this paper offers a thesis rather than an 
analysis, and it passes over many points that have been adequately 
made in other essays on the subject. I conclude by summarizing the 
thesis as briefly as possible. 
It began with some conventional observations on the nature of 
power, defined some working concepts—"pohtics" and "pohty", 
"values," "pohtical system"—and undertook, not to elucidate the power 
structure of Austiahan society, but to try to relate power to the other 
dimensions of Austiahan politics, and to identify its characteristic 
forms and its relative importance in this society. The argument then 
ran as foUows. 
The direct exercise of political power plays a comparatively limited 
part in Austiaha, for three reasons—the high material prosperity, the 
lack of sharp ideological differences, and the well-developed structure 
of institutions for resolving by mediation, rather than power, the 
usual confficts over the allocation of values. The third factor tends to 
confer important powers on judicial and administiative officials, but 
they rarely have a direct interest in the allocative results of their 
exercise of these powers. 
Despite these limitations on the role of power in aUocating values, 
there are certain firm and stable power relationships—in acbninistra-
tive hierarchies pubhc and private, in the general rehabihty of law 
enforcement, and in the latent power of mobilization for war and 
other emergencies. On the other hand, the effect of federahsm is to 
stiffen the odds against the central organs within aU kinds of nation-
vvdde organizations besides the set of seven governments, as well as to 
hmit severely the areas in which the governments can exercise power 
over private groups, especiaUy in the economic field. 
Private groups in that field fall into two classes. In the first, business 
organization is highly concentiated, the resulting monopoly conditions 
confer great market stiength, the groups need httle help from govern-
ment and desire maximum freedom from contiol. However, most 
citizens accept this situation, so the only form of power needed to 
maintain it is the manipulation of pubhc opinion. "That these groups 
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do not enjoy "power over governments" is suggested by the fact that 
minor forms of regulation of their activities are enforced, and the same 
could be predicted of quite drastic acts of curtailment. But federahsm 
and public opinion, no doubt partly influenced by manipulation 
through the mass media, combine to deter most governments from 
attempting drastic reforms. 
The second class of private groups, lacking market strength, have 
secured various forms of economic protection from governments by 
organizing electoral power and, through that, voting power in the 
legislatures. The re-aUocation of values for their benefit can be 
eirforced simply by legislation because of the society's widespread 
acceptance of legitimate authority. 
So much for the argument. Its theme is the nature of the connec-
tions between the aUocation of values and the pattern of power rela-
tions in Austiaha, and its conclusion is that the relation is by no means 
symmetrical. To develop the arginnent into an analysis it would be 
necessary to examine the conditions of change in each of these 
variables. This has been neglected partly through obsession with the 
apparent stabihty of our patterns. Perhaps that is a legacy of Han-
cock's emphasis in his Australia (1930) on the domination of Aus-
tiahan pohtics by a number of "settied pohcies" (industrial arbitra-
tion, protection, "white Austiaha") and by a stable structure of 
pohtical parties (parties of "initiative" and of "resistance"). At any 
rate, the picture is reflected in the more self-conscious studies of 
power in this country which have appeared since then.^ Although 
parts of the picture had begun to be challenged by Henry Mayer and 
others towards the end of the 1950s,^ ^ it is not so much the composi-
tion of that picture which is questioned here, as its scope. To the 
extent that it is a true picture—that it depicts a period of relative 
stabffity in the distribution of power and welfare in Australia—it cannot 
contain adequate material for explanatory analysis, which depends 
substantially on the measurement of relative change in important 
variables. For this it wiU be necessary to scan longer perspectives of 
Austrahan history, and to do so not only with the empathetic eye of the 
historian, but also with the analytical instruments of dynamic socio-
logy. Unless we can identify the seeds of change and predict their 
likely fruit, social science must remain an irresponsible conmientary on 
the ineluctable past. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
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IN AUSTRALIAN POLITICS 
S. Encel 
Pohtical science in Australia is of recent growth, and pohtical scien-
tists are only now begiiming to produce theories about the pohtical 
system which bear the recognizable imprint of their own disciphne. A 
hst of works pubhshed in 1950 underlined the junior status of pohtical 
science as compared with law, history and economics.^ An important 
result has been the weighting of interest in favour of topics such as 
federahsm, the history of the labour movement, and the economic 
functions of the State, and the accompanying tendency to favour one 
type of explanation of pohtical phenomena in preference to others. It 
is natural that lawyers should regard the Engineers' Case, the Uniform 
Tax Case, or the vicissitudes of section 92 as the major events of Aus-
trahan pohtical history. Historians, looking for a prime mover, are 
naturaUy susceptible to historical explanations, in particular to Marxist 
historicism, whose influence is partly responsible for the picture of a 
dialectical relation between the Labor Party and the "parties of resis-
tance", carrying on in the parhamentary and electoral sphere the 
underlying war of the masses against the classes. With its fine 
dramatic sweep, this theory is unfortunately hable to encourage some-
what desperate attempts to impart an ideological tone to our pohtics, 
and it has undoubtedly stimulated efforts to find a golden age in the 
1880s or 1890s when laboiur was indisputably and unambiguously 
sociahst. What has happened once can, presumably, happen again. 
The economists, detached from these heroic activities, have in their 
turn been given to analysing the defective economics of governmental 
adventures into business, without bothering much about the ineluct-
able pohtical forces behind them. 
From these rather disparate sources there does emerge a pattern 
which may be regarded as the received version of Austiahan pohtics. 
It pictures the state in Austraha as an institution whose inherent ten-
dency is interventionism in economic, social and cultural matters. The 
progress of this intervention is hindered by a fragmented constitu-
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tional structure and by the resistance, which is however only effectual 
in the short term, of the "residual" or "resistance" parties. The 
character of this state was determined during the formative period of 
Austrahan pohtics between 1890 and 1914 as the result of the emer-
gence of the Austiahan Labor Party, which throughout its history has 
been the lodestar or positive pole of Austiahan pohtics, and important 
extensions of the frontiers of intervention have coincided with periods 
of Labor rule. 
It is true that one or two awkward aspects of Austrahan pohtics do 
not quite conform to this image. For instance, the Country Party does 
not fit into it, any more than the peasants have ever been satisfactorily 
accommodated into the orthodox Marxist scheme. The usual method 
of disposing of this problem is to speak harshly of the Country Party, 
and to describe it as just another pressure group, adding even more 
than the usual pejorative overtones to that hard-worked expression. 
The interventionist pohcies of the Liberal Party in South Austiaha, on 
the other hand, may be dealt with by mysterious references to the 
Nonconformist conscience and to special circumstances such as the 
unparalleled reign of Sir Thomas Playford. Finally, there is the un-
deniable fact that the Labor Party has been in office for long periods 
in the states without any signfficant advances in the frontiers of 
government intervention. This problem is sometimes disposed of by 
treating it as a subject that should not be mentioned in pohte society. 
I have imphed that the accepted stereotype, if not full of holes, at 
least has a few sizeable ones, and it is therefore not surprising that 
pohtical scientists, since they have begun to write regularly and pro-
fessionally about Austiahan politics, should have levelled severe 
criticism at one aspect or another of the received version. Henry 
Mayer has throwTi cold water on the "initiative-resistance" motif in the 
study of pohtical parties, whose inteUectual pedigree, he suggests, is 
not above suspicion. "The initiative-resistance theme," he maintains, 
gives a misleading account because it "usuaUy treats both sides as 
self-sufficient and pretty isolated entities. . . . The analysis of 
Austiahan parties in terms of interest behind them breaks off when it 
comes to the crucial question of the context of party pohcy."^ 
Mayer's remarks strengthen the innate suspicion that political par-
ties have httie to do with the formulation of pubhc pohcy. Alan 
Davies, for instance, has recently sketched a pohtical dialectic which 
derives not from Marx but from Weber. In the opening paragraph of 
his book Australian Democracy he hmns the features of his first pro-
tagonist, the bureaucratic state. "The characteristic talent of Aus-
tiahans is not for improvisation, nor even for repubhcan manners," he 
writes, "it is for bureaucracy." It is no use for the spiritual descendants 
of Ned Kelly to be shamefaced about this, to feel, as Mr. Davies 
piquantly suggests, that "being a good bureaucrat is a bit like being a 
good forger", because in practice the talent is "exercised on a massive 
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scale . . . even in bodies as superficiaUy unwelcommg as imiversities, 
free churches and voluntary associations of all kinds".^ 
Against this apparatus of bureaucratic rationaUty is poised the 
irrational force of the party system (though not even Mr. Davies can 
endow the parties with the charismatic attributes demanded by a 
strictly Weberian analysis). The mam mterest of pohtical parties, in 
his view, is "their anti-bureaucratic role in the pohtical system. . . . 
There are, of course, other groups and institutions of an anti-bureau-
cratic set, but none rivalling the parties in sheer bravado."* 
Mr. Davies' work has quahties which, transcendmg mere science, 
give a poetic touch to apparently unrewarding material. Pleasure must 
not, nevertheless, be allowed to distiact one from the sterner task of 
correction. Mr. Davies makes, in my opmion, two important theo-
retical errors. It is rather simpliste, for example, to equate "state 
action" with "bureaucracy", something which Weber would never 
have done. Certainly Austiahans have an irrepressible tendency to 
demand state action on a bewildering variety of matters, but no one 
famihar with the workings of the administrative system would de-
scribe us as having a "gift for bureaucracy". Secondly, the antithesis 
between "rational" bureaucracy and "irrational" parties is at least 
debatable, if not downright question-begging. The interpretation of 
"rationahty" as the apphcation of intellectual analysis is, moreover, 
not the only possible one—witness Locke and Bentham. Mr. Davies 
accepts Mayer's criticism of the "initiative-resistance" theme, and his 
dialectic is a more satisfying one, but he has not emancipated himself 
from the tiaditional theory of the clash between the "national interest" 
as pursued by state institutions and "seffish interests" as represented 
by special interest groups working through or alongside the parties. 
As I shaU endeavour to show, this schema is as misleading, in its way, 
as the estabhshed view of the party system. 
J. D. B. Miller's recent book attempts to avoid the abusive overtones 
of the term "pressure group" by the use of "syndicate", meaning an 
organization of "people whose economic and vocational interests have 
induced them to band together for action to their common advantage, 
such as tiade unions, associations of manufacturers and traders, 
farmers' and graziers' unions—which exercise continual influence over 
party pohcy".^ It is the tmiversally accepted function of Austiahan 
government as developmental and protective (in the sense of "pro-
tective tariff" rather than "protective custody"), which accounts for 
the special importance and pervasiveness of such organized groups. 
The task of government is simultaneously to develop tiie country and 
to serve the interests of "syndical" groups whose position wiU benefit 
from direct governmental action. In consequence, the structure of 
government is decentialized to give these groups greater freedom of 
manoeuvre, both through the federal constitution and the estabhshment 
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of numerous "organs of syndical satisfaction" like marketing boards 
and arbitiation tribunals. 
Party differences, on this analysis, are to be explained not in terms 
of "intervention" versus "resistance", but of different forms of inter-
vention slanted in the interests of different syndicates. For this reason 
the "Liberal" party has little affinity with traditional liberahsm, the 
Country Party sees nothing strange in its demands for "agrarian 
sociahsm", and the Labor party is less the party of initiative than the 
one which is most consistently eager to exploit settled interventionist 
pohcies. It is arguable. Miller contends, "whether this has given it any 
claim to represent the most dynamic elements in Austrahan pohtics".* 
It wiU be noticed that one important point in common between 
these three writers is their concern, whether implicitly as in the case 
of Mayer, or exphcitiy and directly as in the case of Davies and MiUer, 
with the nature of the state and its relation to society. It is hardly 
surprising that pohtical scientists should return to the original pre-
occupation of aU pohtical inquiry, contained as it is in the very name 
of the subject, and certainly less surprising in view of the tremendous 
importance of state action in this country. For is this not 
The generation of that Great Leviathan, or rather . . . of that Mortall God, 
to which we owe under the Immortall God our peace and defence . . . and 
in him consisteth the Essence of the Commonwealth; which (to define it) is 
One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutual! Covenants one 
with another, have made themselves every one the Author.'^  
The thesis which I shall assert in this paper is that an adequate 
theoretical picture of Austrahan pohtics requires some vahd notions 
about the nature of the state which can be shown to be generaUy 
held, and are therefore likely to underhe the ideas and activities of 
pohtical parties. It is easy to imagine that no such thing as pohtical 
philosophy exists in Austiaha, but in fact political discussion at any 
level, no matter how simple, requires some inteUigible view of pohtics 
and society. This view, no matter how primitive or debased in form, is 
essential to the use of any kind of pohtical rhetoric, and rhetoric is 
inseparable from the conduct of politics at any time, least of aU the 
kind of pohtics which operates through representative government. If 
this philosophy is difficult to discover, the reason is surely not that it 
does not exist, but rather that it is taken so much for granted as never 
to be discussed. We shaU find that, in the formative period of Aus-
trahan pohtics which I have mentioned, it was spoken of freely 
enough to be quoted at length. Another sign of its existence is the 
divergence of views about its nature, views whose sources can be 
foimd in the most respectable philosophic quarters. 
In his now classic book of 30 years ago. Sir Keith Hancock found 
the driving force in Austiahan pohtics to be an ^gaUtarianism which 
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is, in its turn, only a local version of nineteenth century British in-
dividuahsm. 
The whole of Austrahan history has within the period which succeeded the 
French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, a period filled with a 
deafening clamour for rights and a few shriU protests about duties. In 
Austraha the assertion of rights has been less a matter of theory than of 
instinct; nor has this instinct been pecuhar to any one class. 
To the Austrahan, the State means collective power at the service of 
individualistic "rights". Therefore he sees no opposition between his indiv-
iduahsm and his reUance upon Government. . . .* 
In consequence, "Austiahan democracy has come to look upon the 
State as a vast pubhc utihty, whose duty it is to provide the greatest 
happmess for the greatest number."^ Because of the relative unimpor-
tance of old-world social groupings, of those "httle platoons of life" to 
which Burke ascribed the formation of our characters, the aU-embrac-
ing coUectivity of the state becomes correspondingly more important. 
Every citizen, says Hancock, is a subject "who claims his rights—the 
right to work, the right to fair and reasonable conditions of hving, 
the right to be happy—from the State and through the State".^* 
The stiess on egalitarianism as a driving force provides an inteUec-
tual basis for Hancock's use of the "initiative-resistance" theme in rela-
tion to party pohtics. Labor, being the party of intervention and of 
egahtarianism, is clearly the party of initiative. Unfortunately, Han-
cock does not give a very detailed or convincing picture of his "vast 
pubhc utihty" and his contribution to the "initiative-resistance" myth 
is much more important. It is not surprising that his account should be 
xmsatisfactory, because it is based very heavily on the work of Eggles-
ton, whose ambivalence on the subject is not hard to demonstiate.^^ 
Both Hancock and Eggleston, though they are inchned to equate 
"state intervention" with "sociahsm", are embarrassed by their aware-
ness that sociahsm, if it means anything, means a great deal more 
than this.^^ Eggleston says, for instance, that what he caUs "State 
Sociahsm" 
. . . is not pohtical socialism in the Marxian sense; it has no theoretical 
basis; it is simply the result of the desires and ideas of average men who 
see difficulties in front of them, are accustomed to the idea of State action, 
and ask the State to assist. . . .^ ^ 
Sinularly, Hancock soon finds the term inapphcable to his subject 
matter. 
. . . the Austiahan tendency, as we have seen, . . . is to employ coUective 
power to foster interests which are primarily individual. "This is my sort of 
sociahsm," an Austrahan Prime Minister once said; but it is not the sociahsm 
which reahstic people advocate nowadays in Europe. It is something more 
primitive. One thinks of Wentworth's description of Austrahan Governments 
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—"indulgent nursing fathers". Perhaps it is a fraud to assert that there is 
such a thing as Austrahan sociahsm. It would be truer to speak of Austrahan 
paternalism.^* 
State intervention in economic and social affairs had advanced 
almost uninterruptedly, irrespective of the party in power, and in 
recent years, the Liberal Party has gone so far as to give itself credit 
for experimentation in new forms of state action. A recent statement 
of Liberal pohcy manifests a view on the proper relation between pub-
hc and private action which hardly differs from the as yet unrealized 
aims of British and European sociahst parties. 
. . . The Liberal pohcy leans toward private enterprise, but Liberals beUeve 
that private enterprise should fimction vwthin a government framework and 
that certain public utihties—for example, railways, telephones, heat, and 
Hght—are in some cases best operated as government enterprises. As R. G. 
Menzies has said, an elector need not be a Sociahst to beheve that the 
state should run the railways or the tramways or some big source of elec-
trical power.is 
There is, however, nothing new in this claim of being first in the 
field. During the famous Reid-Hohnan debate on sociahsm two 
generations ago, Reid took pride in pointing out the achievements of 
his ministry (1894-9) in extending state activity into spheres such as 
the construction of public works by day labour—an action, be it noted, 
which was widely condemned at the time as a step towards social-
ism.^ * In 1933, Hohnan was able to defend state enterprise on the 
grounds of its non-partisan character. When the Stevens government 
proposed to seU the state undertakings which had been set up during 
Hohnan's tenure of office in the first Labor government in N.S.W., he 
protested, pointing out that there was no question of political principle 
involved, and that the enterprise had had "the approval and support 
of other governments of every shade of pohtical opinion during a 
period amounting to 22 years".^'^ 
It is not, I think, possible to make a consistent intellectual case 
which includes both the initiative-resistance theory of the party 
system and the view that interventionism is a pohcy favoured by aU 
groups. Nor is it possible to argue, as Eggleston does, in favour of the 
social purposes to be served by state intervention and then to attack 
particular interest groups for advancing their social and economic 
position through the use of state machinery. Eggleston admits that 
"development" is a pohtical aim, but then objects to the fact that 
"under pohtical control a pubhc utihty is expected to serve ends 
beyond its actual economic purpose". The farmers are to blame for 
manipulating railway charges, and Labor is equaUy to blame for 
behaving, not as ethical sociahsts who are concerned v^dth income 
redistiibution, but as the "opportunist representative of a unionist 
party machine without any thought of ultimate economic interest".^^ 
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Eggleston finds paraUel difficulties in describing tiie 'Xiberal way" 
because he cannot help observmg the manipulation of pubhc utihties 
in the mterest of the economic groups supporting what he caUs the 
"residual party". He recognizes that the end of state activity should 
be social justice, but boggles at the practical imphcations. Perhaps this 
is what he meant by describmg hunself as a very Fabian sociahst." 
Hancock shares Eggleston's indignation about the predatory 
behaviour of seffish groups, and expresses hunself forcibly on the 
subject: 
. . . Austiahan democracy has dehberately resolved that it wiU have no 
over-mighty subjects. But, in its fear and hatred of the strong, it has bared 
its walls to the destructive vandahsm of the weak. Swarms of petty appetites 
attack the great common services for which the Government has made itself 
responsible. . . . Since the railways are under no necessity to square their 
ledger, they become an instrument in the hands of pohticians for squaring 
the electors.^ 
However, continues Hancock, the government is imable to cut its 
losses because the vested mterests created by state intervention wiU 
resist such steps ferociously. The final crisis is, consequently, aU the 
worse: "The wretched government has so many scraggy chickens, and 
when they come home to roost they all seem to come at the same 
time." 
Hancock's mdignation, though undoubtedly merited, oversimplffies 
the situation. Liberal thinkers as far back as Bentham have been prone 
to consider interest groups as a sinister iiffiuence on the proper rela-
tion between the individual and the state, and the suspicion has lin-
gered on weU into the twentieth century. In America, on the other 
hand, ever since the pubhcation of Bentley's The Process of Govern-
ment, group theories of pohtics have attracted an increasing amount of 
attention among pohtical scientists, particularly in the last 25 
years. David Truman sums up the change in attitude by observing: 
For aU but those who see in the growth of new groups the evil ways of 
individual men, it is obvious that the trend towards an increasing diversity 
of groups functionally attached to the institutions of government is the 
reflection of the characteristics and needs . . . of a complex society.^^ 
It is precisely this concept of functional attachment which Miller is 
employing when he speaks of "organs of syndical satisfaction", but it 
can be extended to the whole range of government activities in the 
economic and social spheres. 
Interpretation of the role of the state has been affected for many 
years by the very common view that there is a watershed in economic 
history caUed "the end of laissez-faire".'^ Historical writing was, until 
a generation ago, oriented towards the idea of a "positive state" which 
emerged towards the close of the nineteenth centuty, Dicey's Law and 
Opinion in England being one of the classics of tiiis school. In Aus-
traha, the coincidence of this period with the rise of the Labor Party 
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makes it only a short step to beheve that the latter was mainly respon-
sible for the former. Post hoc, ergo propter hoc. More recent historical 
writing, especially as the result of attention to administiative histoty, 
has tended to refute the theoty of a watershed and to stress the un-
broken growth of state action since the early years of industriahza-
tion.^^ In Austraha, recent research has imderhned the steady expan-
sion of state intervention from the gold rushes onwards, and suggests 
that it was a decisive factor in the economy even during the period of 
the "pastoral ascendency", when state action, particularly in regard 
to the formation of capital, was at least as influential as the export of 
wool. A great deal of interesting research in this field has been carried 
out during the past ten years by Mr. Noel Butiin, who observes in his 
latest study that "contemporaries tended to be unduly conscious of 
government intervention in the nineteenth centmy, and later historians 
have gone in the opposite direction in virtually ignoring it".^ * 
Butiin suggests that the whole latter half of the nineteenth centuty 
was characterized by a partnership between pubhc and private insti-
tutions, with the government playing a particularly important role in 
regard to the formation of capital, which is always difficult to create in 
a colonial economy. "The common pattern", he says, was one of 
"positive government intervention with the central feature of large 
scale outlays for capital formation".'^ ^ It would be interesting, he 
observes, to make a study of administrative histOty in this period and 
he asserts that this would demonstrate that "the behaviour of govern-
ment has been grossly under-estimated and the governmental contri-
bution to economic growth has been seriously misinterpreted".^® 
According to these studies, government intervention was responsible 
for about one half of aU capital formation in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, and the pastoral ascendency itself depended 
heavily on state action. Government ownership of railways was a key 
factor, and it was the result not only of the unprofitabihty of private 
operation, but also of dehberate pohcy. The "partnership of private 
and government institutions" developed early as an "ad hoc solution to 
the problem of developing local resources in the face of considerable 
physical difficulties".^ ''^  This development took place against prevailing 
doctrinaire attitudes, such as those expressed by an official inquity 
which, noting that expenditure on "extiaordinaty" matters such as 
pubhc works and social services was double the amount spent on 
"ordinaty" functions of government, regarded this as "a necessary 
incident of the imperfect stage of development that pertains to a very 
young countty", whereas "private enterprise or local exertion" would 
be the agents in more advanced countries.^^ 
The administrative histoty of New South Wales also shows the 
importance of government employment in the economy. Numbers on 
the government payroU rose from 1,077 in 1856, to 12,213 m 1886, and 
34,000 in 1894. The population of the colony had meanwhile grown 
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from 270,000 m 1856 to 958,000 m 1886-that is, the size of the pubhc 
service had grown three times as fast as the population.^^ 
In these circumstances, the crash of the 1890s did not so much 
generate the demand for large-scale government intervention as it 
imderlined the extent to which previous prosperity had depended on 
government capital expenditure. The result, declares Butiin, was a 
change in the nature rather than the scope of government poUcy, and 
it would be "meanmgless to attempt a judgment as to whether gov-
ernment intervention increased or declined".^" 
The character of the situation, where a whole range of interest 
groups were pressing the government for action, was well understood 
by contemporaty observers, who were less prone than many of their 
successors to regard Austiaha (and New Zealand, where developments 
were paraUel) as social laboratories. Rather, they emphasized the 
intensely material character of the pohtically important forces which 
were at work, and the derivative nature of the ideas put into practice 
as a result of this pressure. Both Coghlan and Wilham Pember Reeves, 
for instance, take pains to point out the inteUectual antecedents— 
mostly British—of the important "state experiments" of the period. 
Sinularly, the two Frenchmen—Albert Metin and Andr6 Siegfried— 
who visited Australasia at the time, were quick to seize on this point, 
and to argue that the only local influence of importance was that of 
material interest, which was concerned not with the extension of state 
action as a general principle, but only with specific extensions to 
favour the interests of particular groups. 
One could say, rather brutaUy, that the struggle between the supporters 
and the opponents of labor legislation is concerned almost entirely with 
material questions. On either side, the poverty of ideas astonishes those 
who are accustomed to European polemics. The employers express an 
intransigent opposition based on the defence of their profits; there are no 
argimients, but only a declaration of war. The pubhcists who uphold the 
capitalist cause restrict themselves to practical matters, and reveal that they 
are on tmf anuhar ground as soon as they venture upon inteUectual ques-
tions.^^ 
Metin goes on to suggest that a comprehensive programme along 
sociahst hnes would be regarded by the labour movement as a positive 
hindrance. In the labour movement, he observes 
. . . theoretical arguments are no better, or rather they do not exist; they 
are ignored or avoided. Sociahsm, whose philosophy appeals to many Euro-
pean reformers, does not attract the Australasian workers and actuaUy 
disturbs them by the very breadth of its ideas. When I asked a Labor man 
to outline his programme, he rephed: "My programme! Ten Bob a Day!" 
. . . The workers of the antipodes have such a narrow conception of their 
interests and pursue them so conscientiously that they are Mraid of any-
thing which might make them appear less narrow.^^ 
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Consequently, he concludes, one should not be misled by class-
conscious postures assumed by the Labor Party. "In appearance, they 
[the Labor parties] are what we would caU a class party, cartying on 
a struggle against the bourgeoisie. In reahty, they include employers 
and salaried workers and are concerned simply with obtaining good 
working conditions in the world as it is."^^ 
A few years later, Andr6 Siegfried, on one of his early globe-tiotting 
expeditions in search of national character, described a similar situa-
tion in New Zealand. 
Up to our day, or nearly so, England has been regarded as the stronghold 
of doctrinaire individualism, and the Enghsh as a people of initiative, whose 
strength is in their seh-rehance. The second proposition has remained 
correct, but the first is rapidly becoming untrue, for every day the Enghsh 
show themselves prepared to accept some new intervention of the public 
authority, and, under the compulsion of self-interest, to sacrifice some part 
of their hberty. For long the colonials have led the way along this path, and 
it is a curiovis spectacle to see the sons of the men of the Manchester School 
becoming the most stalwart disciples of State intervention. . . .3* 
This simphcity of approach is facihtated by the fact that in a society 
hke that of New Zealand the government does not appear stiange or 
remote. 
Their land is small, the Government is close at hand; it seems that one has 
only to stietch out one's hand to grasp it, and to dictate to it laws and 
regulations. With us the State always remains a distant and rather mys-
terious institution, which excludes ah idea of personality. We laugh at the 
story which tells of the misadventures of the citizen who wanted to see the 
State. In New Zealand, nothing is easier. It is enough to find the Prime 
Minister.35 
Both Metin and Siegfried were concerned to distinguish this prag-
matic, ad hoc interventionism from the doctiinaire sociahsm with 
which they were famUiar, and Metin, throughout his book, is at pains 
to point out that ideological statements made by men hke Reeves are 
not typical of the common view. He remarks: 
The development of the pubhc service would tempt one to beheve that it 
represents the growth of state sociahsm, and this view might seem to be 
confirmed by a profession of faith made by Mr. W. P. Reeves at New 
Plymouth on March 25th, 1895: "The more the state does for the citizen," 
declared Mr. Reeves, "the more it fulfils its purpose. . . . The functions of 
the state should be extended as much as possible. . . . True democracy 
consists in the extension of state activity." ^^  
A contemporaty example of a similar viewpoint expressed by an 
Austrahan can be found in one of Hohnan's speeches during the 
Reid-Hohnan debate, when he said: 
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We regard the State not as some mafign power hostile and foreign to 
oiuselves, outside our contiol and no part of our organized existence, but 
we recognize in the State, we recognize in the Government merely a com-
mittee to which is delegated the powers of the commvmity . . . only by the 
powers of the State can the workers hope to work out their emancipation 
from the bonds which private property is able to impose on them today.'f 
A more recent writer on New Zealand, J. B. Condliffe, shares the 
views of his predecessors; his favourite term for the characteristic out-
look of the period is "opportimism". He remarks: 
The widening of State functions is due primarily to colonial opportunism 
and freedom from theories. It has httle to do with Socialism. Reeves's 
phrase, "colonial govemmentalism", is a truer description of New Zealand 
practice than "State Sociahsm" or Metin's "socialisme sans doctiines". It is 
"etatisme" rather than Sociahsm.^s 
The image of the state which has, I hope, emerged from the fore-
going discussion is one that rehes upon almost the simplest possible 
species of utihtarianism. Primitive Benthamism (Disraeh's "screw-and-
lever philosophy") has triumphed in Austraha in a manner that would 
be inconceivable in Bentham's native land. We may go to that 
reformed utihtarian, John Stuart Mill, for a description of this theoty 
as apphed to pohtics. 
By some minds, government is conceived as strictly a practical art, giving 
rise to no questions but those of means and an end. Forms of government 
are assimilated to any other expedients for the attainment of human objects. 
They are regarded as whoUy an affair of invention and contrivance. Being 
made by man, it is assumed that man has the choice either to make them 
or not, and how or on what pattern they shall be made. Government, 
according to this conception, is a problem, to be worked hke any other 
question of business . . . the minds of those who adopt this view of pohtical 
philosophy look upon a constitution in the same hght (difference of scale 
being allowed for) as they would upon a steam-plough, or a threshing 
machine.^^ 
A state constructed along these lines is not, in any philosophic sense, 
related to the pursuit of the good life or the realization of tiie general 
wiU. It is a machine, or perhaps a collection of pieces of machinety, 
available for manipulation by sufficiently powerful interested groups 
or syndicates.*^ MiU describes an alternative conception, which is 
clearly the "organic" as opposed to the "mechanical" theoty of govern-
ment. On this opposing view, says MiU, the science of government 
is regarded as a branch of natural histOty and the state as something 
having grown organicaUy out of society. Mill's description reminds 
us, not imnaturaUy, of the language of Burkean conservatives down 
to and including Oakeshott. MiU himself (characteristicaUy) argues 
that neither of tiiese views is whoUy correct, but that the truth prob-
ably Ues somewhere in between. 
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THE PROBLEM OF APPLICATION 
I have attempted, in this paper, to show that there is an operative 
concept*^ of the state which can be observed at work in Austiahan 
pohtics, both through the expression of ideas about it and indirectly, 
as manifested in the actual conduct of affairs. It now remains to find a 
form of words in which to express this concept accurately, dangerous 
as this attempt may be in the face of modem linguistic philosophy. I 
would say, then, that the image of the state that emerges from the 
foregoing discussion is of a body which, to paraphrase one of the most 
famous of aU definitions, acts as the administrative agency of the 
masses. 
That is to say, it is a body where the organs of government and 
their concomitant institutions, like the party system, exist not to frame 
national pohcy but to execute the expressed demands of the com-
munity as formulated in practice by organized bodies claiming to 
interpret the general interest correctly. It exists in a social context 
where group confficts are only to a limited extent the result of clashes 
between social classes, so that party confficts are less important than 
disagreements between extia-party interest groups. (This is, of course, 
on the assmnption that class confficts give the real bite to party strife.) 
This state, further, operates in an economic context where the social 
purpose of industrial production is of comparable importance to its 
economic purpose; tension between the two invites continual state 
action to resolve it. 
The concept is one of a state which is committed rather than 
neutral. To mitigate the effects of commitment, state intervention, 
whether of a regulatoty or operating character, tends to be detached 
as much as possible from the fraditional state machine and dealt 
with in either a quasi-judicial or "non-pohtical" manner, or to be 
diffused among a number of organs with claims to sovereignty in their 
ovra sphere. 
This formulation expresses, I beheve, the common factor of agree-
ment between the views I have discussed, and should also help to 
clarify both the similarities and differences between Austraha and 
other countries with democratic institutions. Its value, if any, should 
be found in its resolution of puzzles about the party system and the 
administiative system such as those aheady described, and its apph-
cation to these questions may now be briefly sketched. We may con-
sider, first of all, some aspects of the party system. 
The emergence of the Countty Party is clearly linked with the 
adoption of three major forms of intervention as the settled pohcy of 
the countty at the turn of the centuty—state fixation of wages, protec-
tion, and closer settlement. Discussions of the Countty Party often do 
not perceive with sufficient clarity the connection between tbe charac-
ter of the party and the character of its midwife, the state. Refusals to 
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classify it as a "proper" pohtical party are based on a failure to recog-
nize that, m the Austiahan pohtical system, the function of a party is 
not to make pohcy but to gaui control of the organs of government 
and make them work m the interest of the "syndicates" with which it 
is associated. The difference between the Countty Party and the other 
parties is chiefiy that the former has taken this situation to its logical 
extiemity and does not even manifest any particular interest in the 
role of government outside its ovm immediate purposes. 
The problem of differences between the Labor and Liberal parties 
may also become more mtelhgible in this light. It is my own view that 
too much energy is devoted to the demonstration that these two parties 
do not differ on any major pohcy issues. Once we regard the parties 
as convenient devices for forming a government rather than as agen-
cies for formulating basic policies, the question becomes ahnost unim-
portant. The signfficance of differences in party pohcy becomes, then, 
that of the hmiting case; nor do we need to employ the dubious con-
cept of the "floating vote" to account for similarities in policy. This 
does not mean that there is no such thing as a political dialogue be-
tween the parties, but that it is confined within the fairly narrow 
hmits of an interventionist rhetoric in which the main Liberal theme 
is "national development", the Labor Party is concerned with the woes 
of the underdog, and the Countty Party beats the rather irrelevant 
drum of sentimental patriotism. Of course, these themes are not 
mutuaUy exclusive, either in rhetoric or in pohcy. 
I have imphed, in this, that the egalitarianism of the Labor move-
ment is largely rhetorical.*^ This does not mean it is fictitious, but that 
it has httle value as an explanatoty principle in either pohtics or 
sociology. I suspect that when an Austiahan school of sociology finally 
makes its appearance, one of its early tasks will be to debunk the 
practical, as distinct from the ideological importance of egahtarianism 
in Austiahan life. The narrow concentration of vocational groups 
on their immediate interests is, for example, just as plausible an ex-
planation for the Austiahan suspicion of inteUectuals as any wide-
spread sentiment in favour of equahty. In the field of social policy, 
where one might expect that the effects of egahtarianism would be 
most marked, a countty such as New Zealand has a far stionger claim 
than Austiaha. So has Britain in recent years, especiaUy in regard to 
health, education, and the employment of women. 
Some hght may also be shed on the famous problem as to why 
there is no "real" conservative party in Austraha. There has not, I 
beheve, been any signfficant difference since the first world war be-
tween the pohcies and outlook of the British Conservative Party and 
its Austrahan counterpart, which has passed through three incarna-
tions in that period. What difference there is arises from the fact that 
untU 1914 it was still possible for a British conservative to think in the 
terms formulated by Biurke. Such notions only make sense for a per-
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son who can beheve that he is not dependent on state or coUective 
action for his position in society. Since 1914, and more particularly 
since 1929, the number of people who are in a case to beheve this 
has shrunk rapidly, and philosophic conservatism has become attenu-
ated to a rhetoric which is now used mainly by pohtical pubhcists 
and by some professors, both in Britain and latterly in the United 
States. The themes of this rhetoric hardly differ from Burke's—the 
warning against rationahty in pohtics, the stress on understanding 
histoty, the primacy of society over the individual, and the organic 
character of the state.*^ In Austiaha, where the universal demand for 
intervention destioys the basis of these quasi-mystical propositions, the 
use of these terms is characteristic not of the Liberal Party, but of 
certain isolated groups hke the "piure merinos" of the squattocracy, 
generals, prelates, and judges. 
It is also apparent why an analysis of Austiahan pohtics along 
orthodox Marxist hnes makes httie sense. The state I have described 
bears httie resemblance to an executive committee of the ruhng class. 
Its functions are administrative rather than executive, and segmental 
rather than comprehensive. Only in times of acute social crisis does an 
analysis in terms of class conflict become plausible, and the state 
appear to be fashioned in the Marxian image. Such years were those 
between 1916 and 1920, or from 1929 to 1932. At such times, the 
A.L.P. assumes a posture of initiative and the other parties the posture 
of resistance or even repression, the latter enhanced by the individual 
behaviour of men like W. M. Hughes and Mr. Justice Pring at the 
earher date, or of Sir Robert Gibson, Judge Lukin and Sir Philip Game 
on the later occasion. Nor is there any reason to suppose that a similar 
situation could not arise again. 
If we turn now to the nature of the adminisfrative system, we find our-
selves again in Marxian territoty. One of the difficulties of applying 
orthodox Marxism to modem industrial communities stems from the 
hberal faUacy, shared by Marx with the rest of his generation, that 
the state has no business to be in business. Recent economic and 
pohtical analyses of the problems of "underdeveloped" economies, 
which lay great stiess on the positive role of the state, are certainly 
heterodox in Marxist terms,** although Marx himself did throw out 
hints about the "superstructure" having its own effect on the economic 
"foundations". A vahd analysis of the connection between economy, 
society, and pohtics in Austiaha is, in my view, only possible if the 
institutions of the state are themselves regarded as active parts of the 
socio-economic pattern and not only as its "epiphenomena". A. F. 
Davies' book recognizes this but has not, I think, adequately digested 
its imphcations, one of which is that it is misleading to use the term 
"bureaucracy" in its original sense of a centiahzed, rationalized and 
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hierarchical power stmcture. In Austiaha, large-scale government in-
tervention, at least at the state level, has given rise rather to a coUec-
tion of more or less self-contained admmistiative satiapies which are 
not infrequentiy engaged in disputes whose basis is demonstrably 
"irrational". These segmented government machines are themselves 
the reflection of a segmented society, to which the apphcabihty of 
MiUer's notion of "syndicates" is obvious. The activities of these com-
peting groups, both inside and outside the machine, are perfectiy 
rational in the sense that they perceive then: own particular mterests 
and pursue them with gusto, and "irrationahty" can arise either in a 
party or in the administiation because the reconcffiation of all these 
pressiu-es is vety difficult to achieve hi a rational manner, especiaUy 
where resources are limited. Perhaps the acuteness of the problem 
accounts for the quite unparaUeled use of Royal Commissions in Aus-
tiaha as a method of canahzing these pressures and thereby reducing 
them below the threshold of discomfort.*^ 
One of the most important features of state intervention in this form 
has been the growth, of machine pohtics on the American rather than 
the British model. During the nineteenth centuty, colonial ministries 
came and went with kaleidoscopic rapidity, reflecting on the parha-
mentaty scene the shifting patterns of interest group ahgnments. The 
intrusion of the state machine as a major pohtical force led to a com-
parative stabihzation of these relationships, and consequently to stable 
ministries which have remained in office sometimes for decades at a 
time, vidth changes of personnel occurring largely by co-option follow-
ing death or retirement.** This situation is not easily described in 
categories arising from British experience, where parties behave in a 
more ideological fashion and party philosophies can plausibly be re-
garded as motivating forces in the pohtical struggle. It is, I believe, 
erroneous to suggest that Austiahan pohtical institutions are "deriva-
tive";*'' on the contiaty, the institutions themselves are of a distinc-
tively local character, but are commonly thought of in derivative 
rather than indigenous terms, a process often enhanced by their 
superficiaUy old-world appearance. An analysis along lines famihar to 
students of pohtics in America, where pohtical machines and interest 
groups have long been regarded as normal facts of hfe, would have 
been more pertinent to tihe Austrahan scene. The growing use by 
pohtical scientists in this countty of group theories of pohtics is partiy 
the result of American influence. In his most recent essay on the sub-
ject, Henty Mayer argues that pohtical crises such as the faU of the 
Bruce-Page government are much better interpreted in terms of con-
fficting consteUations of group interest than in the tiaditional cate-
gories of party differences, notions of the common good, or constitu-
tional entanglements.*^ 
In other words, an analysis of Austrahan pohtics in terms of a two-
party conffict is hardly relevant because no such thing as a two-party 
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system on the British model is to be foimd in Austraha. But this, in its 
turn, is related to the nature of the state and of the executive govern-
ment. "Responsible" or "cabinet" government in Britain is linked with 
the image of two parties behaving hke opposing cricket teams, and 
requires conventions of responsibihty not reaUy apphcable to the 
machine pohtics which is so important in Austiaha. 
These are but a few of the problems which can, I beheve, be eluci-
dated by reference to the concept of the state as defined in this paper. 
It only remains to observe that, since aU concepts of reahty involve 
abstiaction from and consequently distortion of that reahty, the con-
ception I have described must also involve distortion. But the extent 
to which it does so must be left for another occasion. 
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part two CABINET 
In Cabinet Government in Australia^ Professor Sol Encel argues the 
paramountcy of cabinet among Austiahan pohtical institutions as "the 
supreme decision-making body", a central part of the constitutional 
system, the apex of the party system, the highest organ of pubhc 
administiation, and a top ehte group. The Commonwealth and State 
Cabinets are much more the creations of dehberate pohcy and statu-
toty enactment than their Westminster model, and it is fitting that a 
constitutional lav^ tyer hke Professor Geoffrey Sawer should intioduce 
"Councfls, Ministers and Cabinets in Austiaha". The poverty of Aus-
tiahan pohtical biography and autobiography deprives us of the 
detafls which a Jennings^ or a Mackintosh^ can provide, although 
recentiy biographies of Prime Ministers hke Deakin,* Hughes,^ Bruce,® 
Lyons,'^  and Chifley® have extended our knowledge of the workings of 
federal cabinet. 
It is a federal cabinet, and Professor K. A. MacKirdy's "The Feder-
ahzation of the Austiahan Cabmet, 1901-39" shows the extent to which 
the demand of a federal system have affected the selection of cabinet 
members. Professor Encel carries the subject further and examines the 
social origins of federal and state mmisters, to ask how they differ 
from the rest of the population. 
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COUNCILS, MINISTERS AND 
CABINETS IN AUSTRALIA 
Geoffrey Sawer 
In Januaty, 1956, the Prime Minister of Austiaha, Mr. R. G. Menzies, 
announced a reorganisation of the Federal or Commonwealth Mmis-
terial system. Hitherto, in both the Commonwealth and state executive 
governments, Mmistiy and Cabinet have been synonymous. Mr. 
Menzies decided to institute in the Commonwealth sphere the modem 
United Kingdom distinction between the Ministty—all the Mmisters 
—and the Cabinet—a group of senior Ministers who alone meet to-
gether to make the collective pohcy decisions of the Govemment. This 
is a convenient occasion for reviewing some features of responsible 
Cabinet govemment in Austraha. 
From 1854 on, the six Australian colonies of the British Crown 
acquired responsible parhamentaty govemment on the British model;^ 
when the states federated in the 1890's, they carried the principle of 
responsible Cabinet govemment into the Federal Constitution.^ Some 
of the Federal Fathers doubted the possibility of basing a parhamen-
taty executive on the new legislature since, like the Congress of the 
U.S.A., it included an Upper House, representing the states as such, 
whose powers were ahnost co-ordinate with those of the Lower House 
and were intended to be exercised.^ The parties to the argument about 
responsible govemment kUling the federal principle or vice versa 
have each been proved partly right and partly wrong. The Common-
wealth Senate has for the most part operated not as a States House 
but as a revising chamber dividing on the same party lines as the 
House of Representatives: hence there has been httle difficulty in 
having Cabinets "responsible" primarily to the Lower House. But Aus-
tiaha has retained a constitutional system which is in many important 
respects "federal", or which at least has many of the constitutional 
rigidities of federahsm; these have not kiUed responsible govemment, 
but have modified its operation. The federal experiment made no 
institutional changes in the organisation of the state governments, but 
it reduced their spheres of operation and more recently their financial 
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autonomy in a manner which has enabled even the most populous 
and wealthy states to retain a bucohc simphcity in their executive 
arrangements which the United Kmgdom and the Commonwealth 
have outgrown—not necessarily to the advantage of the latter. 
THE STATES 
Legal Origins 
This section deals mainly with the states, since the Commonwealth 
has many pecuhar features in legal organisation and practice. As with 
most British colonies of nineteenth-centuty origin, the states derived 
part of their organic structure from prerogative instruments issued by 
the Crown, and part from statutes of the United Kingdom Parhament; 
prerogative instnunents were most important in the sphere of execu-
tive govemment, but the original constitution statutes dealt more 
exphcitiy with Ministerial arrangements than did contemporaty 
United Kingdom usage. The Crown was represented by Governors 
whose office was created by Letters Patent, whose conduct was regu-
lated by Instructions, and whose appointments were made by Com-
missions, all resting on the prerogative and issuing under the counter-
signature of the Secretaty of State for the Colonies.* These documents 
instructed the Govemor to obtain the advice of an Executive Council, 
made up of such persons as he chose; two Councillors and a President 
of Council (the Govemor, with provision for acting Presidents in his 
absence) were'to constitute a quorum, and all formal acts and docu-
ments were to be executed in Council. This body bears an obvious 
hkeness to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom, but m Austiahan 
histoty it had at first suggestions of the Tudor ratiier than the Vic-
torian Privy Council, since in the days before representative and 
responsible govemment it was an active advising body. It has been 
retained to this day as a convenient forum for tiie execution of the 
most solemn types of executive instrament—Orders in CouncU, Regu-
lations of the Govemor in Council, Proclamations and the hke. Since 
most of the states lack Official Secrets Acts, the oath of the Executive 
CoimciUor who is also a Mmister may provide-again rather as m the 
United Kingdom-some guarantee of ministerial secrecy. But it would 
take vety httle constitutional ingenuity today to provide forms of 
administration such that the Executive Councils could be entirely 
abohshed. Their contmuation m the early days of responsible govem-
ment was quite appropriate, since it was not certain how fast the 
colonies would adopt in its entirety a system of mmisterial executives 
chosen from the parhaments; the gradual rather than the sudden re-
tirement of the Governor's official, active, non-parhamentaty Execu-
tive Councillors was contemplated as a possibihty, altiiough as it 
turned out the colonists and tiieir parhaments insisted on immediate 
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adoption of fully responsible Ministries.^ The older status of the Coim-
cU is StiU reflected m the case of Tasmania, where the judges are 
appointed to it, although never summoned to attend meetings. In the 
other states, only Ministers of the Crovm are appointed. In Victoria, 
Queensland and Tasmania, appointments are for hfe, but only the 
Mhiisters of the Crovm for the time being are summoned to meetings; 
they are members of the Council "under summons." Those no longer 
"under summons" sometimes regard their membership as a sort of 
minor local dignity. In New South Wales, South Austraha and 
Westem Austiaha, Ministers resign from the Executive Council when 
they resign as Ministers, and would be removed by the President of 
the Council if they did not do so. AU state Constitution Acts now 
recognise and to some extent regulate the Executive Councils—for 
example by providing that Ministers are ex-officio members—but 
leaving them on a substantially prerogative basis. 
Ministers of the Croum hkevdse received full legal recognition from 
the first, in the constitutions and in special Acts. In this as in other 
respects the most remarkable document was the South Austrahan Con-
stitution Act of 1855,^ which set out a hst of Ministers, required that 
they should be or become within three months of their appointment 
Members of the Parhament, made them ex-officio members of the Execu-
tive CouncU, and recited that such Ministers would be "hable to loss 
of office, by reason of their inabihty to become Members of the said 
Parhament, or to command the support of a majority of Members 
thereof"—the most exphcit statement of the basis of responsible 
govemment in any organic document of the period. The South Aus-
tiahan Constitution Act also abandoned from the first the United 
Kingdom mle originating hi the Succession to the Crovm Act, 1705, 
requiring Ministers to seek re-election if appointed to office after their 
original election.''^ All the other states adopted constitutional provisions 
which necessitated re-election of Ministers: the Victorian^ and 
Westem Austrahan^ were explicit and taken almost verbatim from the 
United Kingdom Acts of 1705 and 1707, but in the other colonies the 
sections on "office of profit under the Crown" were much more 
obscurely drafted and have to be read in the hght of contemporaty 
histoty before it is seen that the exceptions in favour of "officers hable 
to retire on pohtical grounds" required re-election.^" These provisions 
were amended so as to abohsh the necessity for re-election as follows: 
Victoria 1859; Queensland 1884; Tasmania 1900; New South Wales 
1906; Westem Austiaha 1947. (The Commonwealth from the first 
adopted the principle of no re-election. )^i Queensland has neatly 
reversed the tiaditional provisions about offices of profit under the 
Crown datmg from the U.K. Act of Settiement 1701; there, if the 
holder of such an office (not bemg a Ministerial post) is elected to 
parhament, he automaticaUy vacates not his parhamentaty seat but 
the office of profit^-a. principle which if adopted at Westminster 
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would save many of the special Acts passed to rescue members from 
the mtricacies of the law on this subject.^ ^ 
These state constitutions were in general highly flexible, and remain 
so on the matters now under consideration. Hence there have been 
no constitutional obstacles to the creation of larger or smaUer Minis-
tiies, of Honoraty and Assistant Ministers, and of Parhamentaty 
Under-Secretaries or Private Secretaries, though actuaUy examples of 
the last two classes have been vety rare. The choice of nomenclature 
has sometimes been quaint; there are now a number of state "Honor-
aty" Ministers for whom statutes provide regular salaries.^* All states 
give legal recognition to the office of Premier (the tide adopted by 
convention to distinguish the State Chief Ministers from the Common-
wealth Prime Minister), and after initial hesitations they have included 
the Attorney-General in the hst of responsible Ministers.^^ 
Queensland's parhament is unicameral; in the five states with bi-
cameral parhaments, the U.K. principle of primaty Cabinet respon-
sibihty to the Lower House apphes. But claims of Upper Houses— 
especially elective ones^ ^—to Cabinet representation, and the neces-
sities of piloting the Government's legislative programme through the 
Upper House, have produced both a general convention that some 
Ministers shaU be in the Upper House and express constitutional mles 
on the matter. Thus in Victoria,^ '^  not more than two Ministers may 
be in the Legislative CouncU (Upper House) and not more than eight 
in the Legislative Assembly, the emphasis being on the Assembly's 
claims; in South Austiaha,^^ not more than five shall be in the 
Assembly, the emphasis here being on protection of the Council's 
position; Westem Austraha also emphasises the Council's position with 
a requirement that at least one Minister shall be a member of that 
House.^^ These provisions apply only to Ministers with Porifoho. 
Victoria and New South Wales make provision for Ministers from one 
House appearing in the other House to defend Govemment BiUs, but 
the N.S.W. section has never been used, and the Victorian one never 
since 1905.2<> 
Cabinets on the British model were also estabhshed from the first, 
notwithstanding the doubts of the Colonial office as to whether there 
existed the necessaty party basis for viable Cabinet govemment. UntU 
the 1890's pohtics were in fact more a matter of faction and of per-
sonal intrigue than of distinct party opposition, and changes of 
Ministty were frequent; it was often vety difficult for the Governors 
to choose the appropriate person to form a Mhiistty. In that turbulent 
atmosphere, there was also a tendency to place less emphasis on 
British mles of Cabinet sohdarity and secrecy and to undermme the 
authority of Chief Mmisters. But the general intention was to foUow 
the United Kingdom principles; the precedents and hterature of the 
Mother of Responsible Govemment were closely studied, and before 
federation, the expression "unconstitutional" usuaUy had the unprecise 
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London reference to convention and political morahty rather than the 
present-day precise Austrahan reference to rigid written constitutional 
rules.2^ 
The United Kingdom shibboleth that Cabinets are "unknown to 
the law" was hkewise often repeated. If this means that Cabmets are 
not organically regulated by positive law, and that no formal legal 
acts are required to be performed in Cabinet, the statement is 
innocuous. But courts can and do take notice of the existence of 
Cabmets, and what happens or is considered there may become of 
legal interest, as is illustiated by nineteenth-centuty state cases. In 
R. V. Tooth and R. v. Davenport,'^ the Supreme Court of Queensland 
had to decide disputes over the purported cancellation of Crown leases 
for breaches of tihe conditions of lease. The lessees claimed waiver. 
Rent had been accepted after the breaches alleged, and one question 
was whether this had been done after persons wdth whose knowledge 
the Crown could be fixed had become aware of the breaches. A 
change of govemment provided the lessees with former Ministers 
willing to give evidence of what had occurred both in the Executive 
Council and in Cabinet; when this evidence was tendered, Lutwyche 
J. upheld an objection by the Attorney-General (for the Crovmi). As to 
the Executive Council, he ruled that it would be against pubhc policy 
to admit evidence of discussions in that body: "I should open a door 
which I do not think would be vety easily closed again." A decision 
of the CouncU could be proved by its minutes, but no specffic decision 
was here in question. As to Cabinet, his Honour said: "The Cabinet 
. . . is not a body recognised by the Constitution. . . . The dehbera-
tions of the Cabinet and the determinations to which the Cabinet may 
come, are only binding and effectual if they are proposed to be 
carried into execution, and are ratffied, by the action of the Executive 
Council."'23 He pointed out that the Council might decide differentiy 
—an echo from the days when the Council did in reahty "advise".^* 
He also pointed out that the responsible Minister for Lands might have 
competently made certain decisions within the scope of his depart-
mental authority, but that nothing would be added to the authority of 
those decisions by the fact that he had discussed them with fellow 
Ministers in Cabinet, so that "his colleagues united with him in 
thinking he was right in acting as he did." These dicta accord with 
the general traditional notion that to the law the Cabinet is an 
accidental parley of Ministers and nothing more. But Davenport's 
case went on appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,^^ 
which held (reversing the Supreme Court) that there had been waiver 
of the breaches so that the leases stood. Their Lordships recited the 
vety evidence of the Minister for Lands conceming Cabinet proceed-
mgs which Lutvsyche J. had ruled inadmissible—"Having made 
himself acquamted vsdth the report" (conceming the breaches of 
condition) "he laid it before his coUeagues m the Ministiy, and . . . 
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the result of their dehberations was a determination not to proceed for 
the forfeiture of the allotments,"'^® and it was obviously this evidence 
they had in mind when ruling that rent had been received "not only 
witb fuU knowledge of the breach . . . but in consequence of the deci-
sion of the Ministers of the Crown . . . come to after mature dehbera-
tion."^'' In Toy v. Musgrovel^^ the Supreme Court of Victoria discussed 
vety fully the imphcations of responsible Cabinet govemment, when 
considering the vahdity of exclusion of Chinese by fiat of Cabinet; in 
this case, however, the Judicial Committee on appeaP^ avoided the 
problems of basic constitutional doctiine which had divided the Vic-
torian judges, by holding that in any event an ahen had no enforceable 
right to enter the Queen's dominions. 
This submission that Cabinets are knov^oi to the law must not be 
carried too far. Many empowering statutes require in terms the 
making of a formal decision or instrument by a named authority— 
usually the Govemor in Council, or a Minister—and even if the pohcy 
question is first settled by Cabinet, the formal step must still be taken 
before the decision can be "knowni to the law." There are no recorded 
examples of laws which in express terms make Cabinet decision a 
formal authentication of the governmental will. Such provision could 
quite well be made so far as constitutional law is concerned, and with 
the development of Cabinet secretariats and proper records of Cabinet 
decisions, the practical difficulties would be less than might be 
assumed, but there are still sound practical reasons for avoiding such 
a course; a main purpose of ministerial conclave in Cabinet is speed 
and informahty of procedure, and this would be imperilled if the 
precise terms of a decision had to be worked out in order to constitute 
a legally effective formal record. But when a legal issue is substantiaUy 
one of fact, in which acts of the govemment as a coUective person 
with knowledge and intention become relevant, there seems no reason 
why Cabinet proceedings should not be proved in a relevant case; 
they would of course be the subject of quahfied privilege for purposes 
of defamation, etc. Questions whether a Minister had authority to 
negotiate or vaty a contract binding the Crown, and had in fact done 
so, might provide examples as well as the waiver or estoppel type of 
problem illustrated by Davenport's case.^" 
Notwithstandmg the size which some state Cabmets have now 
reached,^^ all have continued without even any suggestion of change 
the system-natural to smaU Mmistries-of mcluding aU Ministers in 
Cabinet. These bodies have not even adopted regular or standmg 
Committee systems to lessen the load on fuU Cabinet; they sometimes 
estabhsh ad hoc committees to study particular problems, but even 
tihen final decision is always left to fuU Cabmet. The development of 
secretarial arrangements has also been slow. None has accepted the 
principle of admittmg officials to Cabinet meetings. The several 
Premiers' Departments provide staffs which compile agenda, and m 
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some cases see that this is dravm up in a form invitmg Ministerial 
annotation and summaty of decision on the various items. This is 
most highly developed m New South Wales, as might be expected 
from the size of that Cabinet. Victoria has experimented with an 
interesting solution which avoids the traditional objections to officials 
breaking in on the secrecy of Cabinet discussion. Since 1954, statutoty 
provision has been made for a "Parhamentaty Secretaty to the 
Cabinet,"*^ who is paid a Ministerial allowance and whose special 
responsibihty is to record decisions and supervise their distribution to 
Departments concerned; the Premier's Department provides the 
secretarial staff with which he collaborates. Cabinets have regular 
weekly meetings, but in addition the geography of state departmental 
and legislative buddings facihtates continuous informal ministerial 
consultation in a way which, as we shaU see, is not possible in the 
federal sphere. Even the constituency duties of countty Ministers in 
large and sparsely settled states do not detract from this, since the cul-
tural, social and pohtical hfe of the states is concentiated in their 
capital cities—excessively so—and countty Ministers can live there for 
long periods without endangering their contact with the people. 
The general United Kingdom Cabinet conventions about the 
position of the Chief Minister, joint responsibihty and secrecy apply, 
v^dth the same tendency for sohdarity and secrecy to break down 
occasionaUy under the strain of Cabinet or party splits. The Premiers 
usuaUy combine with their office that of Treasurer, and the joint 
position gives them especial power because of the workings of the 
federal system. Since 1929, the Commonwealth Govemment has come 
to play a dominant role in the pubhc finance of the states, and the 
main institutions in which these relations are negotiated each year are 
the Loan Coimcil and the Premiers' Conference.^^ The state Premier-
Treasurers represent their states in both these bodies, and have a wide 
authority to commit their governments on financial questions. (The 
Commonwealth Prime Minister does not usually hold the Treasuty 
Portfoho, so in that govemment there is not quite the same concentra-
tion of power in the one man. However, the Commonwealth Prime 
Minister derives an especial authority from his position as the 
Conunonwealth's chief agent in dealings with the other governments 
of the British Commonwealth, in particular the United Kingdom 
Govemment.) 
Party Pressures on Cabinets 
The Austrahan party system is extremely highly organised, and 
although its main dialectics bear obvious relationships to the United 
Kingdom situation of Conservatives versus Labour, there are unique 
features which affect the working of Cabinets. 
First, in the Commonwealth and in the states of New South Wales, 
Victoria, Queensland and Westem Austraha, there are three parties 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
60 I Readings in Australian Government 
which between them dominate the political life of the countiy. The 
Liberal Party (caUed in Victoria the "Liberal and Countty" Party) 
occupies a position analogous with that of the United Kingdom Con-
servative Party; the Labour Party corresponds to U.K. Labour; those 
two are the only parties habitually contesting most of the seats at an 
election and claiming to be capable of supplying a Govemment based 
on their own strength. The Countty Party (which exists as a separate 
force in South Austiaha only for federal purposes, and does not exist 
at aU in Tasmania) is as its name indicates a "third party" contesting 
only rural seats and never hkely (unless under a grossly gerryman-
dered electoral system, such as once existed in Victoria) to provide a 
govemment except with the support of one of the other parties; but it 
frequently holds the balance of power. For the greater part of its 
histoty, the Countty Party has fought elections in more or less close 
alhance with the Liberal Party, and since 1923 most non-Labour 
Governments, federal and state, have been coahtions between these 
two parties. 
Thus the making of coahtion Cabinets has become a special art, 
and one in which the traditional British rules about the authority of 
the Chief Minister have had to be modffied. Usually the Liberal 
partner has the strongest parhamentaty following, and provides the 
Chief Minister. But the Countty Party component can usuaUy bargain 
for Cabinet representation out of proportion to its parhamentaty 
sfrength, and for virtual equality of leadership between the Liberal 
Chief Minister and the Countty Party Leader; the situation is indi-
cated by the names usually given the federal coahtions—the "Bruce-
Page" Governments of 1923-1929, the "Menzies-Fadden" Governments 
of 1949-1956. The two parties separately select their contributions to 
the Cabinet,^* and usually respect each other's choice; one group may, 
however, raise objections to the choice of the other and thus necessi-
tate bargaining before the hst is settled. In the Commonwealth sphere, 
the Countty Party traditionaUy claims the Treasuty and the Post 
Office. No doubt Chief Ministers in the United Kingdom and in any 
two-party situation have to negotiate with sub-groups and faction 
leaders in the course of Cabinet making, but in the Austialian situa-
tion just mentioned the procedure is more formally organised and the 
Liberal Chief Minister cannot be said even as a matter of principle 
to select his Cabinet; he has at the most a veto on the Countiy Party 
list, and his abihty to allot portfohos is hmited. Once formed, these 
coahtion Cabinets usually work on ordinaty principles, but at times 
mutual suspicion between the parties have produced special voting 
rules on determinations in Cabinet. The most important was that 
applying to the Bruce-Page Federal Governments; it was agreed that 
in a Cabinet of eleven, with six Nationalist^' and five Countiy Party 
Ministers, motions should not be regarded as carried if supported only 
by the Nationahst six.^ ® 
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Secondly, aU Austiahan parties now elect their Leader by secret 
exhaustive baUot of the parhamentaty party (if the position is con-
tested), so that there is never any question as to the person whom the 
Queen's representative wiU summon to form a Ministty. 
Tht-dly, the practice of election of Mmisters by secret and exhaus-
tive bailot of the party has been increasmgly adopted; the Leader 
as Chief Minister is left to allot portfohos, and can often successfuUy 
mn a "ticket" at the party election which will ensure at least a 
majority of men with whom he can work easily, but the restriction 
on the tiaditional British role of Leader is nevertheless vety real. 
It is a system which strengthens the tendency for the party rather than 
the Cabinet to become a main arbiter of pohcy, since under it Minis-
ters may regard themselves as answerable more to the party caucus 
than to the Chief Minister and Cabinet. However, although there is 
thus a greater tendency for Cabinet to refer critical questions to the 
party meeting, it is also usual for Cabinet's view to be adopted in the 
end, since the Ministers constitute a powerful bloc in the party meet-
ing and one which has special advantages in information and ex-
perience. Election of Ministers was first adopted by the federal Labour 
Party caucus in 1908,^ ''^  and has since been uniformly practised by the 
federal and state Labour Parties. After their formation from 1919 on, 
state and federal Coimtty Parties have also made constitutional pro-
vision for caucus election of Ministers. The Victorian Countty Party 
(which has sometimes formed state Ministries wholly from its own 
stiength with floor support from other parties—the only Countiy 
Party to do so)—has occasionally practised the system; the Westem 
Austiahan Countty Democratic League (equivalent to Countty Party) 
has used the system without constitutional provision since 1921 when 
supplying its components of coahtion Ministries. The federal and 
N.S.W. Countty Party's contributions to coahtions have always been 
selected by the Party Leader.^ ® The Liberal Parties and their pro-
genitors have usually opposed the elective principle, but in recent 
years have been more willing to consider giving it a trial. The Vic-
torian Liberal and Countty Parhamentaty Party Constitution now_pro-
vides for election of Ministries; the method was not used when the first 
govemment entirely from that party was formed in 1955, but it was 
used to fiU the first Ministerial vacancy in Januaty, 1956. In this case 
there is an interesting departure from the Labour method; at the 
initial formation of a Ministty, the choice of two Ministers is left in the 
discretion of the Leader. 
THE COMMONVSTEALTH 
The executive govemment of the Commonwealth has a number of 
special features. It is a case of particularly great importance, because 
of the national and international responsibihties of the Federal Parha-
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ment and Govemment; two world wars, a world depression and the 
necessities of Welfare-State planning, especiaUy since 1945, have com-
peUed the Commonwealth to exert a much vdder range of executive 
powers than a scrutiny of its legislative powers, and even of its opera-
tive legislation, would lead one to expect. The present Coahtion 
Govemment of Mr. R. G. Menzies (Prime Minister, Liberal Party), 
and Sur Arthur Fadden (Treasiurer, Countiy Party) is m terms of 
Austrahan pohtics a conservative regime, pledged to the maintenance 
of the federal stmcture (which the Labour Party is pledged to des-
troy), and with a good deal of state-right sentiment at least among 
its backbench supporters; it is indicative of the centripetal pressures of 
the Austrahan system that in this Ministty there are four Departments 
—Labour and National Service, National Development, Prunaty Indus-
tty and Health—which a constitutional purist would expect only in 
State administrations, since the strict constitutional authority of the 
Commonwealth touches only peripheraUy on the subjects mentioned. 
Part of this executive exuberance is a carry-over from previous war 
conditions, or an anticipation of future war conditions; during time 
of "hot" war, the defence power almost swaUows up the rest of the 
Constitution and gives the Commonwealth direct authority to control 
most aspects of the national hfe. Part of it is due to the financial 
predominance of the Commonwealth, as marked in peace as in war. 
Part is due to the tendency for problems considered provincial in 
scope in 1901 to become national in scope. The growth of dominion 
autonomy has extended the extemal authority of the Commonwealth, 
and turned the Ministty of "Extemal Affairs" from a convenient 
sinecure for Prime Ministers into a key post. The Parhament has 
groviTi from an original 105 members to its present 184, and Ministries 
have grown from an original seven to twenty-two. These problems of 
scale and weight of responsibility would alone have made probable 
some divergence from the cosy domesticity of state Cabinet arrange-
ments. But geography, the federal structure, special features of federal 
party histOty, and some more or less accidental rigidities of draftsman-
ship in the Constitution have added to the differences.^^ 
The Federal Executive Council is purely a statutOty creation. The 
Letters Patent and Instructions of 1900 estabhshing and regulating 
the office of Governor-General purported, foUowing the precedent of 
the state instruments, to authorise estabhshment of the Council, but 
legaUy this was supererogatoty.*^ Membership of the Council is at 
the discretion of the Govemor-General, except that Ministers of State 
of the Commonwealth are ex-officio members. In practice, only 
Ministers are appointed, but they are appointed by separate instm-
ments v^dthout term stated, so that imless they resign they remain 
members for life; this necessitates the same cQstinction as in some 
states between members "under summons" (being by convention 
the Mmisters for the tune beuag) and those not so.*^ The function of 
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the Executive CouncU is stated in section 62 of the Constitution as 
being "to advise" tihe Govemor-General, but as witih the state bodies 
its actual function is in the main to provide a formal occasion for the 
formal execution of documents which the Constitution or legislation 
require to be the act of the Govemor-General m CouncU. Neverthe-
less, its meetings (usually about once a week) are not necessarily 
entirely formal. This depends on the difficult question of the personal 
authority or mfluence of the Govemor-General, which can vaty with 
the character and attainments of that officer and with the state of 
party pohtics. A strong-minded, able Govemor-General accustomed 
to the exercise of authority and with little liking for the merely cere-
monial or social functions of the office, may require that Executive 
Council meetings be pretty fully informed as to the meaning and 
necessity of instmments produced for execution. Such demands 
for clarification are rare, but they have been knovini to result in 
changes of opinion among the Minister and officials concerned; of 
course, if the paper is clarified and the advice pressed, the business 
then goes through. 
This is not the place for a discussion of the Govemor-General's 
personal discretions,*^ but it may be noted that on two questions some 
Governors-General have insisted that they have a special right to be 
heard, even though the final decision is Ministerial; those are the 
exercise of the prerogative of mercy and some questions arising in the 
administration of the armed forces. Probably the prerogative of 
mercy is exercisable only because of its specffic delegation to the 
Govemor-General by the Queen in her Instructions; there is no doubt, 
however, that the Parhament could regulate the matter by legisla-
tion. The Constitution*^ expressly makes the Govemor-General com-
mander-in-chief of the Commonwealth's mihtaty forces, and this 
is a "rigid" provision; it may give the Govemor-General a special 
right to be heard on questions conceming discipline, promotions and 
awards, subject to any legislative regulation of those matters.** The 
Secretaty to the Executive Council, an officer of the Prime Minister's 
Department, rosters attendance of Ministers at Executive CouncU 
meetings, and to the extent that he succeeds in spreading attendance 
among non-Cabinet Ministers, these gatherings provide some oppor-
tunity for the latter to see work of other Departments.*^ How far the 
Govemor-General and his Executive Council may thus play a "real" 
function in govemment depends to some extent on party considera-
tions; Labour governments are less hkely to encourage it than non-
Labour, and the latter are more hkely to encourage a "spirited" 
Govemor-General if he is imported than if he is Austrahan. The 
present Govemor-General, Sir William Shm, has exerted under 
favourable conditions a particularly strong influence, and personaUy 
presides at Executive Council meetings as often as possible.*® 
The Commonwealth Ministry is lUcewise the creature of statute, 
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and the influence of the various state provisions we have mentioned 
is obvious; thus, as in South Austraha and Victoria, the Constitution 
requires that aU Ministers should be members of Parhament or 
become such within three months of appointment,*'' and, as in all the 
states, the number of full Ministers is regulated by Acts of the 
Parhament.** But owing to the extreme rigidity of the Commonwealth 
Constitution, provisions which were probably intended as narrative 
and descriptive rather than as rigidly constitutive have, in fact, turned 
out to be potentiaUy restrictive of the freedom of the Parhament and 
its Ministries to adapt their practice to changing needs. The chief 
difficulties that have arisen relate to the appointment of subordinate 
Ministers (Honoraty, Assistant, Parhamentaty Under-Secretaries, etc.), 
and these arise from two sources. 
First, sections 64-66 of the Constitution, which provide for the 
offices, duties, numbers and salaries of Ministers of State, leave in the 
discretion of Parhament only the number and the salaty of those 
officers; they can be interpreted as giving rigid and mandatory force 
to a requirement that Ministers shall have departments to administer, 
and that only such Ministers may share the lump sum appropriated 
for payment of Ministers' salaries.*^ Even the form of the appropria-
tion may be regarded as allowing the Parliament only to vaty the 
lump sum provided, and not to specify its distribution between 
Ministers; so far the Parhament has acted on that assumption. There 
were certainly no great pohtical principles demanding that the 
Commonwealth should lack Assistant Ministers, or Ministers without 
Portfoho, or that they should be paid only from a pool, when the 
Constitution was framed or since, and to apply the maxim expressio 
unius, exclusio alterius so as to produce such a constricting result 
would be pedantic. On the whole, the High Court of Austiaha and 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have leaned against such 
rigid constractions in the field of legislative and executive powers, 
although being more strict (and this writer thinks pedantic) in the 
field of judicial power.^ ^^ But when dealing with a rigid constitution 
subject to frequent judicial review, governments are naturaUy timor-
ous and unwilhng to incur even the parhamentaty criticism of uncon-
stitutional action. Several Commonwealth administiations have in-
cluded unpaid "Assistant Ministers," but none since 1940; more 
usually the name "Honoraty Minister" is used as a courtesy title 
for persons whose strict legal position is merely that of members of the 
Executive Council invited to attend meetings of the Cabinet, and 
giving unpaid personal assistance to Ministers at the discretion of the 
latter. From the first federal Ministiy, there has been an office with the 
title of "Vice-President of the Executive CouncU"; since the 1920's the 
holder has usually been Govemment Leader in the House of Repre-
sentatives, with a special responsibihty for applying the closure in its 
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various forms, and a senior member of Cabinet, but he is not as such 
a Minister. 
Perhaps Commonwealth Ministries have been unduly timorous and 
convention-bound in this matter. Even if interpreted with the greatest 
of strictness, section 64 of the Constitution does not require that only 
one person be appointed to administer a Department of State, nor 
does it say anything as to the allocation of authority between several 
persons so appointed. Hence, there is no constitutional obstacle to 
appointing a Minister and an Assistant Minister to administer the 
Department of Defence, both being "officers" and their respective 
autiiority being such as Parhament, or the common sense of Cabinet, 
dictates, and both paid. If Ministiies had the courage to proceed on 
this principle, it is hkely that they could outflank any conceivable 
judicial obstructions much as they have been able to outflank 
obstacles to the administiative use of judicial power.^ ^ 
The other difficulty arises from section 44 of the Constitution, 
which in subsection (iv) and proviso repeats the familiar inhibition 
against any holder of an "office of profit under the Crown" being a 
Member of the Parhament, subject to the famihar hcence to "any 
of the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth." As just 
indicated, the latter tide can be given a vety restricted connotation. 
If persons are appointed to offices not beyond aU question Ministries 
of State under section 64 of the Constitution and paid as such under 
section 66, they face the possibility of automatic disquahfication from 
holding their seats in Parhament (s. 44), and of actions for penalties 
at the suits of common informers (s. 46). Sometimes the Common-
wealth may wish to appoint Ministers less than "full Ministers" at a 
salaty; sometimes it may wish to pay such persons at least out-of-
pocket expenses. What then? This issue was brought to a head in 
1952, when the Menzies-Fadden Govemment appointed four 
"Parhamentaty Under-Secretaries", aUocated to particular Ministries; 
the appointments were made by the Prime Minister after consultation 
with Cabinet, and the appointees were not provided with salaries but 
were paid out-of-pocket expenses. These Under-Secretaries were 
expected to make themselves familiar with the problems of pohcy of 
their respective Ministers, to "devil" answers to parhamentaty ques-
tions,^ to conduct correspondence on behalf of their Minister, and 
to receive deputations. They were not to make any decisions nor 
execute any documents which the law required to be made or executed 
by a Minister. It was forecast that Standing Orders would be 
amended so as to permit them to deputise for the Minister on 
Committee stages of a Bill under his charge, but no such provision 
was made and no Under-Secretaty performed this function. On 
May 22, 1952, in answer to questions put to him by the Honourable 
A. A. CalweU, Deputy Leader of the Opposition, the Speaker, 
Mr. A. G. Cameron, stated that in his view the Under-Secretaries held 
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offices of profit under the Crown within the meaning of section 44 
of the Constitution, and had thereby vacated their membership of 
the House, and that he refused to aUocate rooms to them within the 
parhamentaty budding. On May 27 the Acting Prune Minister (Sir 
Arthur Fadden) tabled a statement contioverting the opinion of the 
Speaker; the debate was adjourned and not resumed. The matter was 
again brought to a head in August, 1952, when some Under-
Secretaries, defying the Speaker, occupied rooms in the Parhament 
and had their tides printed on their doors; apparently the printing of 
the titles was particularly offensive to the Speaker, who had the notices 
torn down. The Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, had by now returned 
and on August 27 he tabled a statement defending the appointment 
of the Under-Secretaries, and inviting the House to approve the 
statement and thereby the appointments. This motion was carried 
on party hnes.'^* 
The debate on this issue covered the customaty range of parha-
mentaty irrelevancies, but the main points turned out to be as follows: 
The Speaker, and the Labour Party supporting him, claimed that on 
the Enghsh precedents interpreting the phrase "office of profit under 
the Crown," it was not necessaty that a Ministerial or sub-Ministerial 
appointment should actually bring any "profit" to the holder, and 
that payment of expenses could be a "profit." It was further claimed 
that the Enghsh precedents distinguished between "Under-
Secretaries," whose office was normaUy an office of profit, and 
"Parhamentaty Private Secretaries" who were personal secretaries 
appointed not by the CrowTi but by the Minister concerned and paid 
nothing. The Govemment claimed that the appointments were neither 
to an "office," nor to offices "of profit"; they said that not names 
but substance mattered, and these "Secretaries" performed the func-
tions of the Enghsh "Private Secretaries"; further, that they were 
not offices "of profit," since no fee or salaty was or ever had been 
provided, and payment of expenses was not enough. The Speaker 
admitted that farming rather than the law was his speciahty, and it is 
clear that the Leader of the Opposition (Dr. H. V. Evatt), a vety 
eminent Austrahan constitutional lawyer, was not prepared in 
unequivocal terms to support the Speaker's view on the law. 
It is suggested that the Govemment was half right and half wrong 
in detaU, and whoUy right in the issue. The main authorities rehed on 
by both sides were May^* and the Report of the Select Committee of 
the House of Commons on Offices of Profit.^^ On these points. 
May is too condensed and aUusive to be wholly satisfactoty as a 
statement of the law.^ ® The memorandum by Lord Campion con-
stituting Appendix 2 of the Report of the Select Committee gives a 
masterly statement on the subject, but even it is slanted somewhat 
towards the particular problem then before the House of Conmions, 
and hence contains statements likely to mislead an honest farmer. 
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If the cases discussed by these two authorities are considered from 
the particular point of view necessitated by the Austrahan problem, 
the result is as follows: First, if an office has never had attached to 
it any sort of salaty or fee whatever, so that no holder of the office 
could under any circumstances claim payment of such emolument, 
then it is not an office of profit. Second, payment of reasonable 
expenses in relation to cartying out an office does not make the office 
one of profit; on this more hereafter. Thirdly, if an appointment is 
made personally by a Minister to provide pohtical assistance for that 
Minister, it is not a Crowm appointment, but if an appointment is 
made under the authority of the Crowm, or of a Chief Minister to the 
Crovm, or of the body of Ministers collectively, and the substantial 
purpose is to facilitate the work of a Department of the Crov^ai, it is 
a Crovmi appointment. The Menzies-Fadden "Under-Secretaries" 
therefore held offices under the Crown. The Prime Minister could not 
have his cake and eat it by making their appointments a Cabinet 
matter and yet treating them as personal appanages of the Ministers in 
question. In substance, not in name, they were agents of the Crov^ m. 
A Minister is not acting as such only when making final decisions 
committed to him or executing formal documents he is empowered to 
execute; aU the work of his Department is potentially "Crovmi" 
work, and even the Enghsh exception of "Parhamentaty Secretaries" 
is somewhat anomalous, in so far as they go beyond helping the 
Minister to maintain his pohtical connections with his constituents. 
But since no fees or salaty ever had attached or could attach to the 
offices, they were not "of profit" unless the out-of-pocket expenses 
paid could be regarded as such. No doubt a court, especially a court 
in a federal system accustomed to judicial review on strict lines, could 
find that an aUeged "out-of-pocket expense" contained a concealed 
fee. But it is equally hkely tiiat such a court would not require an 
audited statement of expenses actually paid, and would be content 
with a reasonable pre-estimate of hkely costs. On that test, the 
Govemment was right objectively as well as by majority.^ ''^  
Perhaps, too, the Govemment was legally right because of its 
majority. The Opposition claimed frequently during the debate that 
the House could not settle the matter by resolution; it was a justiciable 
question. They were challenged to take appropriate court action, but 
did not do so, and perhaps they were well advised not to do so. 
Section 47 of the Constitution says that until the Parhament otherwise 
provides, "any question respecting the quahfication" of a Member 
of Parhament is to be decided by the House in which the question 
arises, and it is clear from section 44 that the allegation of holding 
an office of profit under the Crown raises such a question. It may 
be thought on a first reading that Parhament has otherwise provided 
in Part XVIII, Div. 2, of the Commonwealth Electoral Act, under 
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which the High Court of Austiaha, sitting as a Court of Disputed Re-
turns, may decide such matters. But the court's power to decide 
does not arise unless the House concerned refers the "question" to the 
court; it is stiU competent for a House to decide the matter itself in-
stead of referring to the court, and if the House does so, probably its 
decision would be final for the purposes of common informer proceed-
ings before a court under section 46. If there is any doubt about the 
last proposition, the Parhament can end it by amending section 46, 
which is left within the reach of ordinaty legislative process. 
Hence, although the rigidities of the Constitution with respect to 
Ministers may be sufficient to worry the Commonwealth and its legal 
advisers, it seems that on any view the purely legal difficulties can be 
circumvented comparatively easily. It is the pohtics rather than 
the constitutional law of junior Ministers which Commonwealth 
administrations have found embarrassing. Such animals do not fit 
conveniently into Labour Party methods of election of Cabinets. Even 
the non-Labour parties have sometimes found them an embarrassment; 
the anti-climax to the argument over the Under-Secretaries whom the 
Govemment defended so vigorously in 1952, and who were supposed 
to be serving a valuable training for future Ministerial office, came in 
1956 when out of six new appointments made at a Menzies-Fadden 
Cabinet reconstruction, not one of the former Under-Secretaries was 
appointed to Ministerial office and no further appointments of Under-
Secretaries or equivalent officers were made at aU.^ * 
Commonwealth Cabinets consist of Ministers of the Crovm as 
described above, and such other members of the Executive Council as 
the Ministers choose to associate with themselves for purposes of 
counsel and advice. The Commonwealth, hke the states and the 
United Kingdom, began by concealing the office of Prime Minister 
from legal view, but like the states has ended by giving it fuU statutoty 
recognition, with an appropriate Department. The tides and duties of 
other Ministers have varied from time to time, as has the number of 
Honoraty Ministers.^^ The makers of Commonwealth Cabinets have 
to cope with a number of special difficulties, as follows: 
Firstiy, although the Constitution contains no provision requiring 
Cabinet members to belong to any particular House of the Parhament, 
convention and pohtical necessity require that the Prime Minister 
should belong to the House of Representatives, that the bulk of the 
Ministers should be of that House, but that the Senate should have 
some Cabinet membership unless (what is unlikely since proportional 
representation was intioduced for the Senate in 1949) the governing 
Party has no Senate members. Senate members rarely consider that 
they are adequately represented in Cabinet, but with thrise Senators in 
the present Cabinet of twelve, and two of the ten non-Cabinet 
Ministers, they fare reasonably weH.^ It is essential that at least the 
Govemment Leader in the Senate should be a member of Cabinet. 
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Secondly, convention requires that Cabinet should contain at least 
one member from each of the six states. State interests secure repre-
sentation to some extent through the Senate, as intended by the 
founders, and also through state or regional blocs on certain issues 
in the House of Representatives, but on the whole the most effective 
representation of state interests has been through the Cabinet conven-
tion, which has been followed since the first Cabinet. During a 
Cabinet reconstmction in 1926, the Bmce-Page Govemment omitted 
Tasmanian representation, on the plea of making efficiency override 
state claims; tiie shght was electoraUy resented by the Tasmanians at 
the general election of 1928, and Mr. Bmce (retumed with a reduced 
majority) again found room for a Tasmanian. This attempt at aban-
doning the state-representation convention has not been repeated, 
although frequently the smaUer states have been given representation 
only by an Honoraty Minister. When constructing his new Cabinet, 
distinct from Ministty, in 1956, Prime Minister R. G. Menzies inter-
preted the convention as requiring state representation not merely for 
the Ministty as a whole, but for the Cabinet as well. On the whole, 
the convention has not obstructed careers for talents so much as might 
be expected; it is a wholesome thing for the cohorts from New South 
Wales, Victoria and Queensland, with their preponderant representa-
tion in the Lower House and in Cabinet, to have to hear some voices 
from the outposts in Adelaide, Perth and Hobart, and the potential 
abihty of the smaller state representatives is indicated by the fact that 
of the sixteen Prime Ministers since federation, two of the most 
outstanding®^ have been respectively a Tasmanian and a Westem 
Austiahan. 
Thirdly, Commonwealth governments are vety much hindered in 
the organisation of their work by the problems of geography. Similar 
problems exist in all large countries; they press more in Austraha®® 
because the population is spread thinly around the perimeter of the 
countty; before air tiansport was established, the poor quahty of land 
tiansport and, in particular, the diversity of rail gauges was a great 
handicap. The federal capital, Canberra, is a smaU countty town®^ 
on the southern plateau of New South Wales inhabited chiefly by civil 
servants, research scientists and university teachers; it is not even on a 
main tiain route, and its social milieu, even more speciahsed than that 
of Washington D.C., provides no microcosm of the countty as a whole. 
Hence Members and Ministers have to spend a great deal of their time 
in their constituencies; their metropohtan foci of organisation and 
cultural interest are the state capitals, and they are tempted to spend 
as httle time with the Parhament and the Departments in Canberra as 
they can manage. (Some Departments stiU remain in Melbourne, 
federal capital until 1926.) Air travel has greatly mitigated the 
problem;®* geography and climate facihtate year-round frequent air 
services, so that at least Ministers can be brought to meetings with 
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httie notice. But not aU Ministers—they always contain a proportion 
of elderly men—relish air travel or are at their best immediately after 
ahghting from a thousand-mUe ffight, and the dangers of committing 
too many Cabinet Ministers to one plane were tiagically iUustiated in 
1940 when the second Menzies Govemment lost three of its best 
Ministers in the one crash. When Parhament is not in session, there 
is some pressiure to save up business in order to make Cabinet meet-
ings fortnightiy rather than weekly, though weekly meetings are usual 
even then. Certainly there cannot be the constant easy inter-communi-
cation between Ministers which characterises United Kingdom and 
state Cabinet life.®^ Departments are apt to be left to themselves for 
long periods, which affects the dehcate balance between the role of 
the highly skUled professional official and the more or less amateur 
tribune of the people—and the federal service attiacts a vety high 
standard of permanent official. 
Commonwealth Cabinets have developed a more formal organisa-
tion of their structure and business methods than have the Cabinets 
of the States. The development was accelerated when the administia-
tive responsibihties of the Second World War brought about an 
increase in Cabinet numbers from twelve to nineteen, and a prohfera-
tion of Commonwealth activities which peacetime has not greatiy 
pruned. The main hnes of development have been as foUows: 
Firstly, the intioduction of regular or standing committees which 
deal with regularly recurring types of business and usuaUy make final 
decisions thereon, saving the necessity for any discussion of them in 
fuU Cabinet. Attempts at such committee systems were made even 
before the Second World War; the most ambitious was in 1938, when 
Prime Minister J. A. Lyons instituted a "pohcy committee" of seven 
senior Ministers, whose task was to advise on general pohcy. The 
non-Labour coahtion was then beginning to break up from internal 
intrigues, and this proposal was greeted with scepticism both by 
Laboiur and by some Govemment supporters as an attempt to create 
an "inner group" in a purely pohtical sense. The scheme was stUl-
bom. The early Menzies wartime governments began to develop 
speciahsed Cabinet Committees, but it was under the Curtin and 
Chifley (Labour Party) war governments that such Committees were 
firmly established and readily accepted by the parties. The main 
Committees were the War Cabinet, deahng with the extemal situation 
in a broad sense, and the Production Executive, dealing with the 
supply problems of the home front, but fuU Cabinet meetings were 
frequent and the most difficult questions always went there, even if 
largely technical.®® The system broke down into a disorderly series of 
ad hoc committees during the post-war construction period, 1945-
1949, and this tendency has been a recurring problem since. The 
Menzies-Fadden Governments in power since 1950 have developed 
four main Committees. The Prime Minister chairs the Economic and 
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the Defence Preparations Committees. The former was, until 1956, 
caUed the Prime Minister's Committee, and was concerned to some 
extent with general policy questions, but economic pohcy was always 
its main business and it has now shed its other responsibihties onto 
the new smaU Cabinet. The Defence Preparations Committee, 
especially important since the Korean War started, invites tbe Chiefs 
of Staff to its meetings. The Vice-President of the Executive Coimcil 
chairs the Vice-President's and the Legislation Committees. The 
former deals with a miscellaneous group of questions not coming 
within the competence of the other Committees and not important 
enough for Cabinet; one important chore is setthng the detail of 
Customs Tariff schedules. The latter scrutinises draft BiUs to ensure 
that they express the pohcy intended to be expressed, and that when 
so expressed the pohcy stiU looks defensible. Departmental experts 
usuaUy attend wdtix their Ministers at these Conunittees, whose fuU 
Ministerial membership averages eight. However, there is a good 
deal of flexibihty in their arrangements; less than the full membership 
may be called for some questions, and they may be supplemented for 
others.®^ 
Secondly, a highly organised Cabinet secretariat was estabhshed 
in the Prime Minister's Department. Before the Second War, pre-
paration of Cabinet agenda and recording of decisions followed the 
same artless course as it stiU does in most of the states. During the 
war, the absolute necessity for getting the business attended to in 
orderly fashion and decisions properly recorded led to trusted officials 
being increasingly taken into Cabinet and Cabinet Committee meet-
ings to act as Secretaries. The Prime Minister naturally supphed the 
secretariat for full Cabinet, but untU 1948 the tendency was for some 
other Department to supply the staff for the speciahsed Committees.®^ 
In 1948, Mr. (now Sir) Allen Brown, a young lavsyer with a genius 
for pubhc administration, became at an extraordinarily early age the 
Secretaty of the Prime Mmister's Department, and he estabhshed 
a permanent peacettaie system by which both the Cabinet and its 
Committees were serviced from his Department. The responsibihty 
for preparing the hst of business and collecting relevant memoranda 
or submissions is in the first place with these officers; they also make 
suggestions as to the distribution of work between Cabmet and its 
Committees, the final decision on these questions being with the Prune 
Minister. They also suggest a hst of busmess for particular Cabinet 
meetings, which may involve deferring certain items, and the Prime 
Minister also finaUy decides this question; in the case of the Com-
mittees, aU the business on hand is hsted for the next meeting and 
it is left to the Committees to defer matters if they have to. 
Committees can refer questions to Cabinet and vice versa, but it is 
an unusual event. Cabinet and Committees can also exclude the 
recording official when they please, but that hkevidse is an unusual 
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event. The Secretariat tihen distributes a Ust of decisions to all 
Ministers,®^ and also decisions affecting particular Departments to the 
Permanent Heads of those Departments. 
This position has been achieved only gradually. Mmisters had to 
be accustomed to the presence of recording officials; some objected 
to having them at aU, and others wished to keep their ovra records 
which might differ from the record of the Secretaty. It was only 
in 1955 tihat the Cabhiet hst of busmess was confined to what a 
particular meetmg could deal v^dth; previously, Mmisters had insisted 
that aU busmess on hand should be hsted, which reduced the value 
of the notice of meeting as a reahstic warning of previous thinkmg 
required. There were inevitable suspicions that the Prime Mmister's 
Department was "emphe building"; tihis was met partly by tact and 
partly by not building up the Department.''^ The main development 
has occurred under the Menzies-Fadden r^ghne, but the system now 
seems sufficiently weU established to be continued by Labour— 
especiaUy since tiie late J. B. Chifiey, last Labour Prime Minister, was 
working towards some such end and started Sir Allen Brown on his 
Cabinet Secretariat career. 
Thirdly, the estabhshing of a Cabinet distinct from the Ministiy. 
This is too recent an event for any final judgment about its effective-
ness or the likelihood of its lasting. Some federal leaders have for 
long complained that effective discussion and decision at the execu-
tive level is impossible in a body of more than about fifteen, and some 
put the optimum figure even lower. But efficiency in this sense is not 
the only criterion of a good Cabinet. Reasonable representation 
of main opinions, principal Departments and experienced pohtical 
leadership are also necessaty. Probably the increase of the Cabinet 
from twenty to twenty-two was the step finaUy pushing Mr. Menzies 
into the creation of a separate Cabinet this year—or did he decide 
to follow the United Kingdom example first and take advantage of 
this step to create more Ministries? He has not told us. The Cabinet 
now consists of twelve Ministers, and there are ten Ministers outside 
it.'^ ^ The Ministers not in Cabinet wiU be dravm into a good deal 
of group discussion with their senior coUeagues through the continua-
tion of the Committee system mentioned above, in which all Ministers 
participate; for example, the service Ministers (Army and Repatria-
tion) not in Cabinet are on the Defence Preparations Committee, and 
the Minister for Primaty Industty, not in Cabinet, is on the Economic 
Committee. Ministers not in Cabinet wiU also figure on ad hoc 
Committees, and one of the dangers the new system will face wUl 
be that of ambitious non-Cabinet Ministers trying to organise special 
Committees on which to press their views. Non-Cabinet Ministers 
will also be invited to attend Cabinet meetings when problems con-
ceming their Departments, or problems on which they have special 
knowledge, are tmder discussion. They receive minutes of all Cabinet 
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decisions, and can see on request the submission on which a decision 
is based.''® This is aU quite sensible and workable while Parhament 
is in session and Ministers are gathered in Canberra. There wiU 
be a good deal more difficulty during the long periods when Parlia-
ment is not in session, and Ministers, like other Members, tend to 
scatter. It wUl be easier to hold regular meetings of the Cabinet of 
twelve, but it will be harder to keep the Committee system going. 
Even before the new system was introduced. Committee meetings 
were a rarity out of session; if Ministers had to be fetched to Can-
berra, they dishked sitting around waiting for a Cabinet meeting while 
some of their feUows attended a Committee meeting, so the tendency 
was to put all matters into Cabinet. Now it may be that non-Cabinet 
Ministers will resist coming to Canberra merely for Committee 
meetings, or that if they do come there will be the same tendency to 
have evetyone avaUable together and make it a Cabinet, so that the 
distinction between Ministty and Cabinet will be blurred. 
When the new system came to be debated in Parhament,^^ the 
issue was unfortunately complicated by an irrelevant pohtical dispute 
over questions of Ministerial salaty. The Labour Party, however, 
was substantially opposed to the scheme, and it seems likely that a 
Labour administration would abandon it and seek cabinet manage-
abihty by reducing the number of Ministers. Labour Party leaders 
thought a Cabinet of nineteen quite manageable, and asked why when 
exercising its more restricted peacetime powers the Commonwealth 
should require a larger Ministty.''* The equahtarian principles of 
Labour make its members suspicious of schemes for "inner groups"; 
choosing the junior group would raise difficulties for caucus election 
of Ministers, while leaving the choice to the Prime Minister would 
increase his authority and so offend against principles of party 
democracy. The Liberal and the Countty Party speakers on the 
whole supported the scheme, though v^ dth reservations and with many 
criticisms in detail. The limiting factors aheady mentioned, and 
considerations of pohtical tact, required the Prime Minister to make 
some awkward choices. For example, the Ministers for Navy and 
Air are in Cabinet, but not the Minister for the Army, merely because 
the latter is a newcomer without special "state" claims. Territories, 
a relatively minor Department, is in Cabinet because the Minister 
was the senior Westem Austrahan available. National Development, 
a somewhat residual Commonwealth activity, is in Cabinet, whereas 
Social Services, a major Commonwealth activity and one of great 
pohtical unportance, is out. Labour speakers made meny with these 
and other anomahes, and some Goverrmient supporters were glum 
for sunilar reasons. In defence of the Prime Minister it must be 
said that the shock of at once estabhshmg a rational distribution 
vsdthout regard to vested pohtical interests would have been too great. 
He has made a beghming and there are several directions in which 
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as time passes he can develop the scheme along rational lines. One 
of the most constructive speeches was that of Liberal back-bencher 
W. C. Wentworth, who suggested that the main fields of activity of 
the Commonwealth should be grouped, wdth a senior Minister, in 
Cabinet, in charge of each group, and junior Ministers, not in Cabinet, 
in charge of detailed Departments within each group; an obvious 
iUustiation would be a Cabinet Minister for Defence with overall 
responsibihty, and Ministers for Air, Navy and Army working in close 
association with the Minister for Defence but not in Cabinet. Such 
a scheme would also help to overcome the constitutional obstacles to 
having junior or assistant Ministers.''^ Although now vety v^dde, the 
range of Commonwealth responsibihties is still sufficiently defined to 
make such an orderly classification of fields easier than in the U.K.; 
however, in Austraha as elsewhere, the practical administrator and 
StiU more the practical pohtician is apt to assume that the concept 
of practicahty imphes a certain sweet disorder. 
The debate on the Menzies innovation of 1956 suggested that it 
will not be accepted at once, and may fail to endure. Indeed, the 
scheme has already been modffied on one critical occasion. In 
Februaty-March, 1956, the Govemment was under the necessity of 
taking difficult decisions in the field of economic pohcy, owing to the 
unfavourable drift of extemal balances and a renewed danger of 
internal inflation. Advisers, pressure groups and pohtical affies gave 
confficting opinions as to the steps to be taken; the Coalition once 
before (1951-1952) found its pohtical popularity slmnping vety 
rapidly because of unpopular economic measures, and since on 
July 1 the control of the Senate passes into the hands of two dissident 
Labour members,''® it is not impossible that an election will occur 
wdthin a period to which the memoty of electors wUl run. The new 
Ministerial system indicated for this case the following procedure: 
consideration by the Economic Committee (perhaps augmented, and 
perhaps after collecting speciahsed advice from outside experts); 
consideration by Cabinet; perhaps discussion by joint party meetings 
(since the political fate of aU could rest on the result); final decision 
by Cabinet. In fact, for party meetings was substituted consideration 
at a meeting of all the Ministers—which might be regarded as a 
substitute for party, but was felt by most to be a reversion to the old 
full Cabinet. A non-Cabinet Minister defended this procedure to the 
writer by pointing out that if a Govemment decision is going to be of 
critical importance for the future of the whole Ministty, then the 
whole Ministty ought to discuss it. There is no reason why the 
United Kingdom Cabinet system should be slavishly followed, and 
since twenty-two Ministers is quite a manageable meeting for the 
discussion of a well-defined issue, this compromise between the two 
systems is defensible; however, there is the obvious danger that 
reference to the fuU meeting of Ministers wiU become so frequent 
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that the "Cabinet" wUl become at most a general pohcy "inner 
group." 
This possibility of frequent or occasional meetings of the fuU 
Ministiy also comphcates a question which the Austiahans wiU in any 
event find difficult—namely, applying the rules of Cabinet 
sohdarity to the new system. The United Kingdom precedents'''' 
suggest that Ministers out of Cabinet have somewhat more freedom 
to differ from Cabinet pohcy than do Cabinet Ministers, although 
not to the point of voting against it. But the limits of that freedom 
are hard to define, and any vety consistent course of criticism would 
make the position of the Govemment intolerable. There are some 
detailed questions here which the U.K. texts do not discuss; for 
example, does participation in Committee discussion deprive the non-
Cabinet Minister of all freedom to criticise the relevant decisions?''® 
Presumably participation in a Cabinet discussion, even if only as a 
"consultant," would do so. In the new Commonwealth system, 
presumably any decision of all the Ministers should be supported by 
the Ministers out of Cabinet, but after the decision on economic pohcy 
referred to in the last paragraph, a Countiy Party non-Cabinet 
Minister criticised the policy and forecast what he considered desir-
able future pohcy in a way which even Mr. Gladstone might not have 
approved, tolerant as he was of such unauthorised pohcy statements.''® 
Austiahan practice on Cabinet sohdarity has in general been less 
rigid than Westminster's, though somewhat more rigid in non-Labour 
than in Labour administrations. But under the new Commonwealth 
system, the relationship of the junior Ministers to the Cabinet and 
its Committees is probably going to be too close to permit those 
Ministers any considerable latitude; the demand for Ministerial 
sohdarity may be another factor tending to break down the new 
system, because of correlative demands from junior Ministers for a 
fuU share in pohcy-making. 
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THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE 
AUSTRALIAN CABINET, I90I-39 
K. A. MacKirdy 
Durmg the debates in the Austrahan federation conventions of 1891 
and 1897-8, Canadian experience was usuaUy cited to indicate prac-
tices to be avoided rather than emulated. J. W. Hackett, addressing 
the 1891 convention as a representative of Westem Austiaha, which 
was then the least populous of the Austrahan colonies, stiessed the 
need of a stiong senate whose function it would be to convert the 
popular v^ dll into the federal will.^ From the viewpoint of a defender 
of the interest of the smaller colonies, the weakening of the prestige 
of the senate, through the cabinet's being responsible in practice to 
the lower house, made responsible govemment a threat which Hackett 
was ready to attack. He questioned whether responsible govemment 
could be successful imder any conditions. The experiment of the 
Canadian Dominion was hardly a success. "It was begun . . . in bribety 
and is continued by subsidies."* Pointing to the agitation for home mle 
in Ireland, he suggested that responsible govemment was a failure 
in Britain itself. "If that is the responsible govemment which they 
v^ dsh to graft into our federation," he asserted, "there wUl be one of 
two alternatives—either responsible govemment wiU kill federation, 
or federation, in the form in which we shall, I hope, be prepared to 
accept it, wiU kiU responsible government."^ Responsible govemment 
has, in fact, proved rather deadly to Hackett's idea of federalism. 
Nevertheless, in Austraha, as in Canada, the cabinet itself has been 
federalized, although the process in Austiaha has not been recognized 
by the quantity of academic and popular commentaty which has 
marked its Canadian counterpart.* 
Edmund (soon to be Sir Edmund) Barton announced the composi-
tion of the first cabinet of the Commonwealth in late December, 1900. 
As its eight members included the premiers and former premiers of 
five of the federating colonies,^ two additional members from New 
South Wales, and a second from Victoria, it seemed that the Canadian 
adaptation of the federal principle to cabinet-making was being fol-
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lowed. One state, Tasmania, was not represented in the cabinet as 
originaUy announced. The island's leading pro-federation newspaper, 
the Launceston Examiner (Dec. 31, 1900), headed the stoty: 
FEDERATION 
THE FEDERAL MINISTRY 
TASMANIA OUT IN THE COLD 
A WEAK EXCUSE 
Barton had explained that when the people of the island understood 
aU the circumstances they would agree that he had no other course 
open to him. The maximum nmnber of portfolios available was eight. 
In allotting the eighth, he said: "What influenced me was this— 
Westem Austiaha is at the extreme end of the continent and is an 
important, growing community. Unless Westem Austraha is repre-
sented in the Govemment we shall know vety httle conceming her 
requirements. Tasmania, on the other hand, is a more settled com-
munity and is in close proximity to Victoria and the Victorian minis-
ters will reaUy represent Tasmania in the cabinet."® 
The paper's editorial reaction to this explanation betiayed that sen-
sitiveness to a slight, real or imagined, which is a characteristic of the 
inhabitants of a small community merging (with no intention of sub-
merging) its identity and fortune with those of the larger ones. It is in 
such communities that the most ardent advocates of the federal 
solution are usually found. Under the heading "A Weak Explanation/' 
the editor commented on the same day: 
Tasmania is evidentiy regarded by Mr. Barton as the "Cinderella" of the 
Austrahan States—a small patch of land surrounded by water, settled by a 
handful of people whose claims to a representation in the Federal Ministry 
are not worth consideration. His explanation . . . is as weak as water; in 
fact quite imworthy of a man who is presumed to be a strong leader. No 
Tasmanian voter would wish to see Westem Australia unrepresented in the 
team, but Victoria or New South Wales could very well have done with one 
minister for the present at least, and thus have saved Tasmania from the 
humihating position Mr. Barton has placed her in. Tasmanians do not wish 
to be "represented"—save the mark—by Victorian ministers. The island State 
was most loyal in its attitude to Federation, and has every right to feel 
slighted by the base return the leader of the first Ministry has tendered its 
sterling services. The voters of the island should, to a man, assert their claim 
to a representative in the Ministry. . . . 
Barton attempted to repair the damage by inviting N. E. Levids, 
Premier of Tasmania, to serve as honorary minister (minister without 
portioho). It was a stop-gap arrangement as Lewis had no ambitions 
in the federal field and retired as soon as a suitable successor was 
found. His replacement. Sir Phihp Fysh, although a man of proved 
abffity, was also denied a portioho. Thus the federal practice of weigh-
ing the importance of the state against the abihty of the candidate in 
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aUottmg cabmet posts was established at that early date. The succes-
sion of important portfohos held by the two Westem Austiahans, Sir 
John Forrest and Senator G. F. (later Sir George) Pearce, however, 
indicates that paucity of population in the state represented was not 
an msuperable barrier to tiie advancement of an aggressive personahty 
or an able and conscientious administrator.'' 
The numerical representation by states in the various Austrahan 
cabinets after their formation or after a major reorganization is shovra 
m. Table 1. The normal preponderance of Ontario and Quebec repre-
sentatives in Canadian cabinets has its counterpart in the larger num-
ber of posts normaUy aUotted to New South Welshmen and 
Victorians. It is noteworthy that on three occasions Victoria has been 
reduced to a single representative in the cabinet and on one of those 
occasions the single Victorian held no portioho. The latter unusual 
situation resulted from the peculiar circumstances surrounding the 
formation of the second Hughes ministiy from the few Labor suppor-
ters who remained loyal to the irascible "BiUy" foUowdng the Labor 
Party's spht on the conscription issue in 1916. The single Victorian in 
the first two Labor cabinets—the Watson cabinet and the first Fisher-
can be explained in part by the fact that the Victorian voters retumed 
few Labor members in the first decade of the Commonwealth. Wat-
son, in fact, went outside his party for his Victorian, H. B. Higgins, 
who accepted the attorney generalship, an office for which no Labor 
member was qualffied.^ 
Watson was also the only Labor prime minister of the Common-
wealth who enjoyed the normal right of a first minister to select the 
personnel of his cabinet. In its conference in Melbourne in 1905 the 
Labor Party resolved that the persoimel of future Labor ministries 
should be "recommended" by the parhamentaty caucus of the party.^ 
Later Labor prime ministers (themselves selected by caucus) retained 
the right to allocate portfohos to the team thus selected for them by 
exhaustive ballot. Only the first cabinet thus chosen, the first Fisher 
administration, did violence to the developing conventions of federal 
balance: aU the states except httle Tasmania received representation, 
but the two less populous states. South Austraha and Westem Aus-
fraha, were rewarded with three and two posts respectively, whUe New 
South Wales and Victoria received two and one. This situation pro-
duced surprisingly httle editorial comment in the two major states.^ ** 
In South Ausfraha the leading Adelaide paper noted in its heading of 
the news stOty that the state had been "well freated".^^ In view of the 
fact that the state had not been represented in the preceding cabinet, 
the paper's editorial comment on the high proportion of South Aus-
trahans in the Fisher team merits quotation. The writer regarded it as 
"another tribute to the abihty which, regardless of party colour, dis-
tinguishes the representatives sent by the State to the Federal Parha-
ment". Never again has the abihty of the South Austiahan representa-
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tives been so recognized. The first Hughes administration, selected by 
caucus, failed to include a South Austrahan even though five of the 
state's six senators and four of its seven members of the House of 
Representatives were Laborites. So firmly had the principle of the 
right of a state to be represented at the council table been estabhshed 
by that date, that the question of the omission was raised in the state 
assembly^^ and editorial comment was forthcoming in far-away 
Queensland.^^ 
The most serious neglect of the interests of the small states occurred 
in the formation of the Reid-McLean ministty in 1904. The cabinet-
makers experienced too many problems in balancing the claims of the 
protectionist and free-trade elements of this uneasy coalition to be 
greatiy concerned over the additional problems of state distribution. 
Both Westem Austraha and Tasmania were passed over. H. Mahon, a 
former Labor cabinet minister from the westem state, pandered to 
regional sentiment by branding the omission of Sir John Forrest (the 
bite noire of the Laborites) from the cabinet as a shght which would 
arouse "the hottest resentment in such a free state as Westem Aus-
tiaha"." No strong protest appeared in either of Tasmania's two main 
newspapers, both of which were loyally supporting the new adminis-
tiation as a bastion against the threat of socialism. Not until the for-
mation of the third Deakin ministiy in 1909, in the formation of 
which federal considerations were more widely and more 
frankly discussed than on any earher occasion,^' did the Launceston 
Examiner (June 3, 1909) enter another strong protest on the neglect 
of Tasmanian claims: ". . . though the team is ten stiong there is not 
a Tasmanian on it. Well might one of our representatives exclaim 
upon the announcement, 'No Tasmanian need apply!'" 
Although Table 1 would suggest that Tasmanian claims were 
usually recognized after 1909,^ ® the inclusion of Joseph A. Lyons, 
former premier of the state, as Postmaster General in the Sculhn Labor 
Govemment in 1929 caused the Nationahst Premier of the state, J. C. 
McPhee, to move that the House of Assembly should express its 
pleasure in the appointment. In the subsequent discussion, attention 
was called to the fact that a Tasmanian was now "appointed a fuU 
portfolioed minister,"^'' a remmder that Tasmanians usuaUy had to be 
content with an honoraty ministership or the post of vice-president of 
the executive council. 
The desirability of providing for representation from evety state 
was clearly established by 1909, but four decades later a state found 
itself unrepresented in the federal cabinet.^^ It would seem that tihe 
task of federal cabmet-making would be far simpler in Austraha, with 
only six states to satisfy, than in Canada, with its larger number of 
provmces and the added comphcations of balancing French- and 
Enghsh-speakmg groups, and Protestants and Roman Catibohcs. The 
hnguistically and culturally homogeneous Austrahans have not had to 
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contend with the first of these comphcations, and the second has 
tended to be a domestic problem of the Labor Party which tries not 
to pubhcize it. The Labor caucus soon accepted the federal principle 
in selecting cabinet members. Anti-Labor prime ministers have fre-
quentiy been faced with a problem which has been faced only once in 
Canada after the first Macdonald administiation but which has been 
the rule rather than the exception in Austiaha, the dehcate task of 
aUocating portiohos between the parties of a coahtion. Only one 
stable anti-Labor Govemment since the resignation of Hughes in 1923 
has not included members of the Country Party and it—the first Lyons 
administiation (1932-4)—was a residt of a merger of the Nationalists 
and the few Labor men who went over with Lyons. (The first Menzies 
administiation, AprU 26, 1939-March 14, 1940, was a minority govem-
ment, composed entirely of United Austrahan Party members to which 
the Coimtty Party gave quahfied support.) 
The original Austrahan federal cabinet was far smaUer than the 
original Canadian. Whereas Macdonald required a cabinet of thirteen 
members to satisfy all the claims of the original four provinces of the 
new Dominion, Barton satisfied six states with nine positions. 
Although the increase in the number of Canadian provinces multi-
phed tihe demands for cabinet representation. Prime Minister King 
was able to construct a satisfactory cabinet on the eve of the Second 
World War with fifteen members with portioho from the House of 
Commons and the leader of the Senate, who served without portioho. 
By 1939 the membership of the Australian cabinet had increased to 
fifteen, although at no time prior to the outbreak of the war did the 
number of ministers with portfolio exceed eleven. 
The honorary ministership was more popular in Austraha than in 
Canada. As Table 1 indicates, the expansion of the cabinet was 
achieved by increasing the number of members from New South 
Wales and Victoria. In this process, honorary ministerships proved 
convenient makeweights in maintaining the balance between the two 
major states. In 1929 the Sculhn Labor administration attempted to 
replace honorary ministers with assistant ministers who would reheve 
the more heavily burdened senior men of some of their administrative 
functions. Lyons continued experimenting with the iimovation until 
1935, when it was abandoned. 
The task of selecting a cabinet approaching the size of Canada's 
from a parhament less than a third as large^® was alleviated shghtiy 
by the fact that the Austiahan Senate has continued to serve as a 
recruiting ground for cabinet ministers. No Austiahan prime minister 
has directed his administiation from the red chamber in the manner 
of Sir John Abbott or Sir Mackenzie BoweU but all major portfohos, 
with the exception of the treasury, have been open to senators. The 
offices of attorney general, postmaster general, and minister for exter-
nal aflFairs, for the interior, and for defence were all held at various 
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times before 1939 by senators. Although the portfoho of trade and 
customs remained in the lower house until 1940, it was then translated 
to "another place." The citizens of a state seem to consider that then: 
interests wiU be as weU protected at the councU table by a senator as 
by a member of the House of Representatives. 
None of the Austrahan portfohos has become associated with a 
particular state in the manner that fisheries, agriculture, and the 
interior have, at times, been identified with various Canadian regions. 
Possibly the most cogent reason is the shnple fact that under the Aus-
tiahan federal division of powers, no Commonwealth portfoho has 
been created which dealt primarily with matters of a potentially 
regional mterest. It should also be noted, however, that the distribu-
tion of economic activities bears less relation to the boundaries of 
Austrahan states than it does to those of Canadian provmces.'^ o 
The Canadian practice of recmiting cabinet members outside Par-
hament has not been followed in Austraha. The provision in Section 
64 of the Austrahan Constitution that "no minister of State shall hold 
office for a longer period than three months unless he is or becomes 
a senator or a member of the House of Representatives" would com-
phcate such recmitment, although seats are usually opened for the 
Canadian appointees in much less time. Whereas translation from a 
provincial premiership to an Ottawa cabinet post is a fairly frequent 
occurrence, no similar move has taken place in Austiaha since the 
formation of the first Commonwealth cabinet. W. H. Irvine and W. A. 
Watt, both of Victoria, E. G. Theodore of Queensland, and Joseph A. 
Lyons of Tasmania all had served as state premiers before entering 
the federal cabinet, but each had retired from state office, obtained a 
seat in the federal House, and, with the exception of Lyons, served 
some time as a private member before assuming cabinet rank.^ ^ 
Theodore, incidentally, suggests another marked contrast between 
Canadian and Austrahan practice. As a rule, Australian cabinet minis-
ters do not seek seats in states other than that with which they have 
been closely associated. Theodore, sitting for the Sydney metropohtan 
riding of Dalley, N.S.W., and W. M. Hughes, after his expulsion from 
the Labor Party, sitting for Bendigo, Vic, are the only notable excep-
tions. In both instances the move across the state border was made 
to secure a safe, available seat for an important party figure. The other 
consideration which has made the importation of outsiders as cabinet 
representatives palatable in Canada—the lack of local members with 
adequate qualifications for cabinet rank—did not exist in Austiaha. 
From the inception of the Commonwealth all its component states 
were estabhshed, long-settied communities. By 1901 Westem Australia 
had enjoyed a decade, and the other colonies almost half a century, 
of responsible govemment in which to train a group of experienced 
pohtical leaders. There was no Austrahan counterpart to the Canadian 
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west of the late nineteenth century nor to present-day Newfound-
land. No AustraHan political unit is in the position of Prince Edward 
Island, which sends only four members ehgible for cabinet posts to 
the federal Parhament. The least populous states sent eleven—six to 
the Senate and the minimum of five to the lower house. From this 
number at least one person of acceptable cabinet calibre usually 
could be found. The intense local pride of the smaller states might be 
illustrated in the failure of the Labor Party's attempt to strengthen 
its Senate ticket in Tasmania in 1925 by importing a Victorian, R. A, 
Crouch, to lead the team. The Nationalists exploited this "slight to 
Tasmania" so successfully that the experiment has never been re-
peated.^2 
Possibly the most direct move from state to federal cabinet in Aus-
tralia was that made by R. G. Menzies who, after resigning from the 
office of attorney general of Victoria to run in the 1934 federal elec-
tion, was appointed Attorney General of the Commonwealth when the 
cabinet was reorganized following the election. A volimtary move from 
the federal cabinet back to the provincial field, such as Angus Mac-
donald's return, after the Second World War, to his old office as 
Premier of Nova Scotia, has no Australian counterpart. Another 
Canadian route to the cabinet which has not been travelled in Aus-
tralia is that pioneered by Mackenzie King, via a deputy ministership 
or other civil service post. 
A frank statement of what a state required of its cabinet representa-
tive was presented by the Launceston Examiner of October 6, 1941, in 
the pre-Pearl Harbor, but still dark, war days. Speaking of a possible 
appointee to the Labor cabinet then in process of formation the 
editorial writer remarked: "If he became a Minister his duties would, 
of course, be of national scope, but he would be in a position to help 
assure recognition of Tasmania's claims for a fair share of Common-
wealth expenditure." A minister who did not secure such expenditure 
for his state could expect the type of criticism the same paper had 
levelled at King O'Malley many years before^^ for his failure to see 
that Tasmanian timber was used for the sleepers (railway ties) used 
on the construction of the Trans-Australian Railway, a project carried 
out under the supervision of the Department of Home Affairs, of 
which he was minister from 1910 to 1913. 
Similar attitudes toward the function of cabinet ministers can be 
found in other states. The Brisbane Courier regularly assessed the 
state's cabinet appointees on their ability to fight for the interests of 
their state. Thus the paper, which was anti-Labor, hailed the appoint-
ment of Fisher and Dawson to the first Labor cabinet. The two men 
were described as "combative representatives" whereas the Queens-
lander in the outgoing administration, Senator Drake, was dismissed 
as a "source of weakness to his own state."^^ The same paper viewed 
Littleton Groom's appointment to the third Deakin ministry with 
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misgiving, regarding him as too national in outlook to support the 
interests of Queensland.'^s 
Even Sir John Forrest, champion of Westem Austiahan interests 
before, during and after Federation, did not escape censure from his 
feUow Westiahans who suspected that long residence in Melboume^^ 
had seduced his loyalties. A letter from one of his old colleagues to 
another contained the following observation: " . . . I do not think from 
what I have seen and heard tiiat the East cares two pins about the 
West, and in the East I have to include, I fear, Sir John Forrest."^''^ 
One use to which the Austrahan cabinet is put which has no 
Canadian counterpart^^ is that of trying to placate the inhabitants of 
a state where dissatisfaction with federal politics is rife by holding a 
formal cabinet meeting in the state capital. Thus, in 1935, within the 
month following the decision of the British Parhament not to enter-
tain the petition of the Westem Austrahan Govemment for legislation 
to permit the state to secede from the Austialian Commonwealth,^^ 
eight Austiahan cabinet ministers and twenty-five officials journeyed 
across the continent. When they arrived at Perth, Dr. Earle Page, 
the Acting Prime Minister, explained that the special meeting was 
designed to serve as a gesture "of the goodwill which, after thirty-five 
years of federation, the eastern states bear toward Westem Aus-
tiaha".^'' A similar meeting, described on the mainland as "a pohtical 
gesture toward Tasmania and a personal gesture to J. A. Lyons,"^^ 
was held in Hobart in 1939. 
As Hackett had feared, the eflFective centre of power in the Com-
monwealth had come to rest in the cabinet rather than in a parliament 
dominated by a powerful federal senate. The elected Austrahan 
Senate soon became a party house rather than a states' house. 
Although it has remained a less moribund pohtical organism than its 
Canadian namesake it is scarcely any more effective than that body as 
a guardian of regional interests. The adoption of the principle of 
federal representation in the cabinet, the very entity whose rise to 
pohtical dominance was expected to kill federahsm, reveals the vitahty 
and adaptability of the federal concept. One price of federahsm is the 
loss of apparent efficiency. Prime Minister Menzies has recently 
(1956) adopted the British practice of distinguishing between the 
ministry and the cabinet, and has included only a few senior ministers 
in the latter body.^^ He is possibly ushering in a new phase of the 
struggle. Either the inner cabinet wiU kiU the concept of the federal-
ized ministry, or the necessity of providing places in it for representa-
tives of the several states wiU nullify its effectiveness. As the earher 
experiences have shown, it would be unwise to underestimate the 
power of the federal idea.^^ 
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The notion of the "mling class" has—with reason—been out of 
favour for a long time. It has, however, left something of a vacuum in 
pohtical thought, which a number of people have tried to fill with 
"elite groups" of one kind or another. C. Wright Mills's attempt to 
establish the existence of a "pohtical directorate" is the most appeal-
ing, or at least the most forceful, but it also suffers from the defect 
common to most studies of this sort. It is one thing to estabhsh that 
the large organized hierarchies of govemment, industry, finance, and 
mihtary power tend to throw up small directing groups whose mem-
bers exhibit well-defined social characteristics. It is a rather different 
undertaking to investigate the setting within which these "power-
holders" or "decision-makers" operate; but without such further in-
quiries the concept of the elite has very limited value for the study of 
society. By the "setting" of power I mean such matters as processes of 
selection within the hierarchy, the sanctions attached to the exercise 
of power, relations between important groups within the various 
hierarchies, especially as shown in concrete acts, the nature and effec-
tiveness of power as actually exercised, and the ends, apparent or 
professed, for which power is used. 
Political history in Austiaha has been marked by some remarkably 
forthright statements on such questions, and these wiU be considered 
here in conjunction with the biographical kind of inquiry to which a 
number of writers have restricted themselves.^ In common with Gutts-
man, the term "pohtical elite" is here apphed to Cabinet ministers. 
Because of its federal constitution, Austiaha has not one but seven 
Cabinets, and the state governments are vested with considerable 
powers. Accordingly, members of Cabinet in the six states are included 
in the biographical inquiry, and instances from state pohtical history 
wUl be freely used. 
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CABINET GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA^ 
In his httle book on the British Constitution, Sir Ivor Jennings observes 
that the distinctive British contribution to constitutional practice is 
not representative but responsible govemment, that is to say, the con-
duct of administiation by ministers who are members of and respon-
sible to an elected legislature. In Austialia this principle was intio-
duced from the outset of colonial self-government in the 1850's. To 
conform with the British tradition, the seven written constitutions 
made no express mention of a Cabinet, and to this day they provide 
no more than a legal framework for it. The operations of the ministry 
proper are governed almost entirely by conventions, practically all of 
them adopted from British precedent. As in the case of the other 
countries of the Commonwealth, the working of these conventions has 
been greatly modified by the fact that they have to encounter political 
systems which do not work in the same way as Britain's. Austraha, in 
particular, has been notable for the elaboration of a range of devices 
whose object is to enforce the responsibility of ministers, not primarily 
to one another, but to their party, both inside and outside parhament. 
In the process, the norms of behaviour which distinguish the British 
practice of collective responsibility have sometimes been changed 
almost beyond recognition. In this article we shall be concerned par-
ticularly with those aspects of the Cabinet system involving the 
mechanism of selection for office, and for controlling the behaviour 
of those selected when they are in office. 
The emphasis on relations between the ministry and the governing 
party (or parties) arises from the generally held view that tiie proper 
function of the Cabinet is to act as an instrument of the popular will, 
expressed through the demands of pohtical parties and organized in-
terest groups. The machinery of state, on this view, is simply collec-
tive power in the service of individual rights,^ and true democracy, in 
the words of William Pember Reeves, "consists in the extension of 
state activity".* One of the most stiUcing expressions of such a senti-
ment was given in 1905 by a leading figure in the Labour movement, 
W. A. Holman, who later became Premier of New South Wales. In a 
celebrated pubhc debate with George Reid, then Prime Minister of 
Austiaha, Holman declared: 
We regard the State not as some mahgn power hostile and foreign to 
ourselves, outside our control and no part of our organized existence, but 
we recognize in the State, we recognize in the Govemment, merely a com-
mittee to which is delegated the powers of the community . . . only by the 
powers of the State can the workers hope to work out their emancipation 
from the bonds which private property is able to impose on them today.^ 
Holman was here expressing a view held throughout the com-
munity (and echoed, indeed, by his opponent in the debate). It has 
sometimes been suggested that tihe real difference between a Labour 
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Party and its pohtical antagonists hes m Labour's greater readiness to 
exploit the possibihties of govemment intervention, and not in any 
clash of principle over laissez-faire versus dirigisme. While it is true 
that this situation now apphes, more or less, in aU advanced industrial 
states, it has been characteristic of Austiahan pohtics for two genera-
tions. One notable result has been the perennial insistence by Labour 
spokesmen outside parhament that a Labour govemment is first and 
foremost a "reflex" of the industrial movement. But a similar view-
pomt is embodied in the mles of the Country Party, the "third party" 
in Austiahan pohtics, and although the Liberal Party is less exphcit it 
has been knov^m to act on similar lines. 
An early manifestation of the general behef tihat pohticians must be 
contioUed in the "pubhc interest" was the advocacy of elective minis-
tries which appeared recurrentiy in the pohtical hterature of the 1880's 
and 1890's. One of the most persistent exponents of this proposal was 
the radical publicist David Syme, editor and pubhsher of the influen-
tial daily paper The Age. In a book pubhshed in 1881, Syme aUeged 
that the British constitution, whose true principle was representative 
govemment as described in J. S. Mill's famous essay, had been cor-
rupted by the superimposition of Cabinet or responsible govemment. 
Responsible govemment meant party govemment, with the result that 
the best quahfied men were not appointed to ministerial office. If 
ministers were individually elected by parhament, their abihty was 
more hkely to be taken into account. Motions favouring elective minis-
tries were introduced periodically into various parliaments, and a 
determined attempt was made to provide for the election of the 
Federal Cabinet by both houses of parhament when the federal con-
stitution was being drafted in the 1890's. In 1925 a former Country 
Party minister in the composite federal govemment led by S. M. Bruce 
introduced such a motion into the House of Representatives, urging 
that ministers should be selected only on the grounds of abUity. 
The powers of the Cabinet should be reduced so that its func-
tions became purely administiative, and parhament should control 
pohcy through an extension of the committee system. As late as 1931 
the AU-for-Austiaha League, a conservative group with professedly 
"anti-party" aims, adopted a platform urging elective ministries. 
In the event, what happened was the acceptance by the Labour 
Party of the principle that ministries should be elected by an exhaus-
tive baUot of the parhamentary caucus (although the N.S.W. branch 
of the Party had at one time favoured election by parhament). A 
motion to this effect was intioduced at tihe federal conference of the 
Austrahan Labour Party (ALP) in 1905, but at this stage the Party 
was only prepared to agree that the members of the ministry should 
be the subject of recommendation by caucus. One of the stiongest 
opponents of the elective pruiciple was J. C. Watson, who had been 
Prime Minister of a short-lived federal mmistiy only the year before. 
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At the next triennial conference in 1908, despite renewed opposition 
from Watson and other parhamentarians, the proposal for election by 
caucus was passed, and the method was used a few months later 
when Watson's successor in the federal leadership, Andrew Fisher, 
formed a ministry. 
Non-Labour pohtical opinion has always been divided on the vir-
tues of this system. In 1905 the Argus newspaper issued a waming 
that election by caucus would result in the parhamentary Labour 
party becoming "the Jacobin Club of Austiahan pohtics".® The Age, 
on the other hand, welcomed the conference decision in 1908 as a step 
towards the ultimate goal of ministries elected by parhament, and "a 
great improvement on the old system of secret selection".'^ After the 
election of a state Labour ministry in Westem Austiaha in 1912, the 
leader of the Opposition in the Legislative CouncU, J. W. Kirwan, 
observed that the conduct of the election had almost converted him 
to the principle, adding: "I think that the system of election is valu-
able inasmuch as it relieves the leader of embarrassment, and also I 
should imagine it prevents the jealousy that sometimes exists in par-
ties where a particular individual may not be selected, and there is 
much subsequent irritation."^ On occasion, non-Labour ministries have 
resorted to election to resolve an awkward situation. In 1894, foUow-
ing the resignation of the Premier of Tasmania, the Govemor sent for 
P. O. Fysh, leader of the largest party in the House of Assembly, who 
declined to accept a commission. After negotiations between the two 
"progressive" groups in parhament, a ballot was held to decide the 
election of a leader, who could then be commissioned to form a 
govemment. In 1912 a deadlock arose in Queensland over the appoint-
ment of an Acting Premier during the absence of Denham, the Pre-
mier, in Britain. As there was keen competition for the post, Denham 
decided that any selection made by him might have the appearance of 
choosing an heir-apparent. A ballot was accordingly held, with the 
Clerk of the Legislative Assembly acting as returning officer. 
During the First World War there emerged as a permanent force on 
the pohtical scene a party based on the rural areas. It was originally 
caUed by a variety of names (e.g. the Farmers' Union and the Pro-
gressive Party), but the title of "Country Party" became general in the 
1920's. The Party adopted a series of rigid rules governing the par-
ticipation of its parhamentary members in composite ministries. It 
should be explained that since the appearance of the Country Party, 
it has been virtually impossible for the main non-Labour Party, the 
Liberals (also knov^oi at various times in their history as the National-
ists and the United Austiaha Party), to gain a parhamentary majority, 
and as a result non-Labour administrations, with only rare exceptions, 
have included ministers from both parties. The mles of the Country 
Party were designed to protect its position as a permanent junior 
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partner, and the device of a "composite ministry" rather than a 
"coahtion" was the result. In this situation each party retains its 
separate identity, and the two parhamentary groups regularly hold 
separate meetings. Ministers remain responsible to their own party and 
not merely to the Cabinet, and the choice of ministers by the Prime 
Minister or Premier^ is restricted by the right of the Country Party 
to nominate an agreed number of ministers and usuaUy to specify the 
portfohos they wdU hold. Country Party ministers are bound by 
decisions of the extra-parhamentary party as well as their own caucus. 
The Party's federal constitution lays dowTi that "acceptance of port-
fohos in any other than a piurely Country Party govemment must be 
with the approval of a majority of members of the Federal CouncU". 
From the beginning Country Party ministers have been elected by 
exhaustive baUot on precisely similar hnes to those of the Labour 
Party. 
During the last few years the elective principle has made headway 
in the Liberal Party as well. In 1954 a pubhc opinion poU showed 
that almost half of the voters who normally voted for the Liberal 
Party favoured the election of Cabinet ministers.^** In the following 
year the Liberals were retumed to office in the state of Victoria with 
a majority over both other parties. Some years earlier the state Liberal 
Party had attempted to negotiate a merger with the Country Party, 
which failed in the coimtry at large but led to the entry of several 
Country parhamentarians into the Liberal caucus. After the election 
victory of 1955 the Party, now known as the Liberal and Country 
Party, adopted a set of rules providing for the election of ministers, 
presumably under the influence of the events just described. These 
mles provide that when the leader of the LCP has been commissioned 
to form a govemment, the Party shaU elect all members except two 
by secret exhaustive ballot. The Premier wiU then appoint the two 
remaining ministers, and allot all the portfohos. (The ALP mles also 
provide that the Party leader has a free hand in the allotment of port-
fohos, once the required number of ministers has been chosen.) Vacan-
cies arising in the ministry are dealt with alternately by election or 
through appointment by the Premier. 
The example of Victoria was followed two years later in Queens-
land, where Labour was unseated by a Country-Liberal combination. 
After the parties had agreed on the division of portfohos, the minis-
ters were elected by exhaustive ballot among the parhamentary mem-
bers of each party, acting separately. An attempt has also been made 
to have the system intioduced in Canberra. In 1956 a special commit-
tee of the Federal Parhamentary Liberal Party produced a report 
urging that the possibility of electing part or aU of the Cabinet should 
be the subject of decision by the Liberal caucus. No action, however, 
has been taken on this recommendation. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Cabinet | 9 1 
THE "DEMOCRACY" OF ELECTION BY CAUCUS 
It is not possible in a single article to deal adequately with the 
numerous and complicated struggles that have attended the inter-
minable attempt to make governments directly responsive to the 
wishes of their pohtical supporters. Enough has been said to show 
that the processes by which the members of governments are selected 
—which is the question to which this article is addressed—are an 
integral part of this general context. Indeed, this is true of any pohtical 
system, and criticisms of the elective method are often superficial 
because they fail to take this into account. Lord Attlee, for example, 
is quite sure that the ALP's procedure (which, incidentaUy, was 
adopted by the New Zealand Labour Party in 1940) is wrong.^^ It is 
apparent that what he means is that it is inconceivable in Britain. It is 
not only inconceivable, it is irrelevant. Such a practice would be 
quite out of harmony with the general character of cabinet govern-
ment in Britain, but it is readily exphcable in its native habitat, just 
as the method of electing the Swiss Federal CouncU is the outcome of 
a highly idiosyncratic pohtical system. We may now look more closely 
at the working of the process, beginning with the Labour Party, where 
the situation is most clearly defined and the operation of the 
machinery is open to close inspection. 
Election of the ministry has been attacked not only by Labour's 
political antagonists but by people inside the Labour movement. One 
disgruntled candidate for office wrote that the elective system "was 
productive of destructive and disintegrating influences . . . out of a 
well of barter and intrigue arose a great deal of jealousy and much ill-
feeling (for a time concealed), while some Ministers were burdened 
with preliminary obhgations which they were obhged to honour when 
they would have preferred other courses". Describing the election of 
the New South Wales govemment in 1913, he recounts the activities 
of one individual who "strove to purchase a portfolio by buying drinks 
and dinners for members and by ahnost forcing loans on impecunious 
newcomers". On the day of the baUot this member checked his in-
vestments by "scmtinizmg the ballot papers of his debtors behind the 
roller maps in the Pubhc Works Committee's room where the voting 
took place". The system was a rotten one because it reheved the 
Premier "of aU responsibihty with regard to his colleagues and enables 
him, if so minded, secretiy to select the sycophants and incapables 
best fitted to be his tools".i2 The late Professor Gordon ChUde, who at 
an early stage of his career was private secretary to a Labour Premier 
of N.S.W., wrote causticaUy of the preference shov^ni by caucus for 
faithful party hacks rather than men of abihty: "Such consistency in 
the choice of old favourites is sufficient commentary on the efficacy of 
this check m the hands of caucus."!^ 
Disraeh, writmg in Coningsby about the Tory governments of the 
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1820's, observed that it was not feasible "to gratify so many ambitions, 
or to satisfy so many expectations. Every man had his double; the 
heels of every placeman were dogged by friendly rivals ready to trip 
them up." The elective process encourages manoeuvres both to get into 
office and to eject the least popular of those aheady there. The parha-
mentary party is generaUy anxious to promote a "spiU", i.e. the com-
plete re-election of the ministry. Spills always occur when a Labour 
ministry is retumed at a general election, and frequentiy when a 
casual vacancy arises, although as Labour governments have become 
more and more stable and long-hved during the last generation, this 
tendency has become less marked. The common feature of caucus 
elections is the existence of "tickets" (i.e. lists of preferred candidates), 
promoted by the party leadership or by blocs among the members. 
The two groups most frequentiy accused of bloc voting are the 
organized right-vdng Cathohc faction and the Australian Workers' 
Union (AWU). The AWU is a vast general tmion, by far the largest 
and most influential in the country, and its ability to influence both 
the personnel and the pohcies of Labour governments has been evi-
dent in the federal sphere as well as the two states of Queensland 
and N.S.W., where it is stiongest. At the N.S.W. state conference of 
the ALP in 1913, when the AWU leaders accused the ministry of 
flouting the wiU of the labour movement, they were attacked by 
George Black, who accused them of trying to oust members of the 
ministry by nominating members of the AWU against them at the 
impending general election. Between 1916 and 1923 the party in 
N.S.W. was dominated by the AWU, and a series of struggles took 
place over the composition of the Storey and Dooley governments 
(1920-2). In 1916 the movement had been spht by a violent dispute 
over conscription for military service, and in the process almost the 
entire leadership of the party had been expelled (the press declared 
that Labour had "blovsTi out its brains"). When Labour won the 
N.S.W. general election in 1920, competition for places was corres-
pondingly intense. John Storey had been elected parhamentary leader 
in 1916, but the AWU leadership tried to unseat him before the 
ministry was chosen. According to one of the principal actors in these 
events, a group of parliamentarians under the leadership of John 
Bailey, president of tiie Central Branch of the AWU, met secretly in 
Centennial Park, Sydney, and drew up a "ticket" on which Bailey, 
who was a member of the Legislative Council, was second. Storey got 
wind of the meeting and sent one of his heutenants, W. J. McKeU 
(later Premier of N.S.W. and Govemor-General of Austraha) to report 
on it. He then drew up a counter-ticket, which swept the poU.^ * The 
AWU rationahzed its hostihty to the parhamentary leadership by in-
voking the traditional distrust of pohticians. An article in its weekly 
newspaper. The Worker, declared that the Labour pohtician had 
assumed too much importance. "We leant heavily upon him and he 
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was not stiong enough to bear the burden. Then when he failed us, 
in our rage we struck out furiously, tieating as a bad servant the man 
we had depraved by making him master."^^ A few years earlier a 
famous editorial in this paper had proclaimed that the ALP was 
"infinitely in advance of the days when the workers had to be led'. 
They have no use for leaders. In conference assembled, they formu-
late their pohcies and decide their tactics."^® 
Soberer historians of the Labour movement have suggested a less 
high-minded explanation for these recm-rent confficts, in which minis-
terial office is the prize. ChUde shows that Labour history has been 
characterized by repeated cycles in which the existing leadership is 
overthrown by a trade union faction, whose leaders achieve ministerial 
office by using the "solidarity" on which the movement is based. 
Professor Miller asserts that 
the practices of the Labour Party . . . all tend towards a condition in which 
a Party chque can retain power vdthin its hands . . . dictatorial authority 
in the Labour Party has always been exercised in the name of "the Move-
ment", and has fed upon a widespread suspicion within the rank and file of 
"careerist pohticians" . . . one after the other, a series of Trade Union and 
party chques has at various stages of Australian political history used these 
arguments to destroy its rivals and in turn to be destroyed by them.^ '^  
Discussing the struggles in N.S.W. already described, D. W. Rawson 
points out that most of the AWU leaders were themselves pohticians, 
and that what was sought "was not the domination of politicians by 
the [party] executive but the domination of both executive and poh-
ticians by a particular group of men who included members of 
botii".i« 
The role of the Catholic Church in these struggles is both more 
complex and more subtle. The exact correlation between Cathohc 
behef (usuaUy associated with Irish origin) and Labour pohtical 
affihation has always been a matter of controversy, and careful study 
of the problem is only a recent development.^^ The general indication, 
however, is that about three-quarters of aU Cathohcs consistentiy vote 
Labour (including, since 1955, both the ALP and the ahnost ex-
clusively Cathohc sphnter party, the Democratic Labour Party). As 
Labour votes are generally close to one-half of the total in both state 
and federal elections, it is reasonable to infer that about 40 per cent, 
of Labour support comes from Catholics (who make up 25 per cent, 
of the entire community). With the aid of the pecuhar religious and 
social sohdarity conferred by the Cathohc rehgion, it is not difficult for 
so large a minority to organize itself for gaining power. However, this 
sohdarity must not be exaggerated, and attempts by Cathohc laymen 
or clerics to exploit it for pohtical action have led to considerable 
tension within the Cathohc community. Nor is it possible to show that 
the Church has greatly benefited in any specific way from the un-
deniable fact that a very high proportion of Labour mmisters have 
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been Cathohcs. It is, in fact, m this sphere rather than m poUcy-
makmg that the Cathohc mfiuence has been most notable. The 
exercise of this mfluence has varied from one situation to another. In 
Queensland most of the AWU leaders have been Cathohcs. Between 
1915 and 1957 Labour was continuously m office in that state with a 
smgle intermption from 1929 to 1932. Durmg that period five of the 
eight Labom Premiers were Cathohcs, and only a handful of mmisters 
did not belong to tihe faith. The stabihty of the Queensland Labour 
governments depended greatiy on the close ties between the ministry 
and the AWU, which dominates the powerful "inner executive" of the 
state ALP. It is aU the more interestmg, therefore, that the faU of tihe 
Labour ministry in 1957 was precipitated by a spht between the 
govemment and the party executive on pohtico-rehgious grounds. The 
ministry, with one exception, were sympathetic to the Cathohc faction 
which broke away from the federal and Victorian parties m 1955 to 
form the DLP; the deputy Premier, who was the exception, is also a 
Cathohc, as was Mr. Bukowski, the secretary of the AWU in Queens-
land, who was also president of the party executive. However, the 
AWU leadership had become hostile to the DLP, and it was this 
hostihty that brought about a pohtical crisis. 
In N.S.W. Labour was in office continuously from 1941 to 1965. 
During that period, three out of the five Premiers were Cathohcs, and 
so were aU but a handful of their Cabinet coUeagues. AUegations of a 
Cathohc "ticket" were made when a "spill" took place in 1952 foUow-
ing the resignation of the Premier, J. J. McGirr, and his replacement 
by J. J. CahiU. One of the few non-Cathohcs in the ministry, Mr. C. R. 
Evatt (brother of the then Federal leader. Dr. H. V. Evatt), had been 
involved in a pubhc controversy in the previous year over a scheme 
to estabhsh a Cathohc university in N.S.W., and aUegations were 
made that a ticket had been organized to exclude him from the new 
Cabinet. If the attempt was in fact made, it did not succeed, and Evatt 
was elected to the ministry. In the same year Labour came to office 
in Victoria, and six out of the fourteen members of the ministry were 
Cathohcs. It was later aUeged'^ *' that one of the six, who was a very 
junior member of the parhamentary party, had been elected as a 
result of a ticket. 
In the Federal parhamentary party the number of Cathohcs and 
non-Cathohcs was roughly equal over the period of fifty years follow-
ing the election of the first Commonwealth parhament in 1901.'^ ^ 
However, the conscription schism of 1916 led to a drastic change in 
the rehgious composition of the ministry. Among the 70 men who were 
ministers in Labour governments between 1904 and 1949, 40 were 
Protestants, 27 were Cathohcs, and 3 were freethinkers. In the conffict 
over conscription, the backbone of the opposition to this pohcy was 
the Cathohc Church, under the leadership of Dr. Daniel Mannix, 
Archbishop of Melboume, and previously head of Maynooth CoUege. 
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(Archbishop Mannix, who died in 1963 at the age of 99, continued to 
the end of his life to be a potent force in the Church and in politics.) 
All but a few of the Party leaders who left the ALP on the conscrip-
tion issue were Protestants. Consequently all but 5 of the 27 Cathohcs 
who became ministers held office subsequently to 1916. In the Chifley 
govemment of 1946, 11 out of the 19 ministers were Cathohcs. 
In Commonwealth pohtics there is the added comphcation of a 
federal system, which introduces a geographical bias into the selection 
of ministers, as each state tries to obtain its fair share of portfohos. 
"Tickets" usually take this into account. The combined operation of 
the factors just described may be illustiated by taking the aforesaid 
ScuUin ministry as a case study. When it took office in 1929, the 
federal parhamentary party had 56 members (the combined member-
ship of both houses of the Commonwealth parliament then being 111). 
They were divided between the states as follows: New South Wales, 
22; Victoria, 14; Queensland, 5; South Australia, 8; Westem Austraha, 
2; Tasmania, 4; the Northern Territory, 1. The portfolios were distri-
buted in the following way among these states: Victoria, 5; N.S.W., 4; 
and one each among the four remaining states. Victoria was thus over-
represented at the expense of N.S.W., the reason being that the suc-
cessful ticket in the election had been the one backed by the AWU. 
At this time, the Labour machine in N.S.W. was contioUed by a fac-
tion bitterly hostile to the AWU, headed by the former Premier, J. T. 
Lang, whereas the two leading figures in the Federal parliamentary 
party were J. H. Scullin (Victoria) and E. G. Theodore (formerly 
Premier of Queensland) who were both hnked with the AWU. Only 
one of Lang's supporters, J. A. Beasley, was successful in this election. 
The first "spiU" took place in March 1931, after 5 members of caucus, 
including 2 ministers, had defected to the Opposition. (The chief 
defector, J. A. Lyons, later became leader of a non-Labour govem-
ment.) In the meantime Lang had again become Premier of N.S.W., 
and was espousing a set of fiscal measures to combat the depression 
crisis which were in sharp conffict with Commonwealth pohcy. As a 
result Beasley was defeated in the ballot, but N.S.W. increased its 
representation to 5 ministers. In June Beasley and the other Lang 
supporters refused the Labour whip, and a further "spiU" took place, 
in which N.S.W. representation rose to 6, while Victoria's fell to 4. 
Thus, although N.S.W. representation in caucus had fallen by 7, its 
representation m Cabinet had increased from 4 to 6. This increase 
reflected the growth of AWU mfluence on the selection of ministers. In 
the first ministiy there were 2 men hnked with the AWU; in the 
second there were 4; m the third there were 5. One of them had been 
federal president of the union from 1919 to 1922; another was federal 
president from 1924 to 1938; a third was an official of the South 
Austiahan branch, and became federal president m 1938. A fourth 
was a former state president of the N.S.W. branch, and the fifth had 
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been an organizer for the union in the latter state before entering 
parhament In addition, one of these men was ScuUin's brother-in-law. 
Side by side v^dth the advance of the AWU went an increase in 
Cathohc representation. In the first ministry, 8 out of 13 ministers were 
Cathohcs. Despite the defection of one of them (Lyons) the nmnber 
rose to 9 in the second ministry, and to 10 in the third. 
The influence of Sculhn himself can be traced in these reshuffles. In 
the first "spiU", he was instrumental in having Senator Daly, of South 
Austiaha, dropped from the ministry, and he was also responsible for 
the exclusion of John Curtin, later Prime Minister, from Cabinet. 
Curtin was member for a West Austrahan constituency, and on 
grounds of abUity he should have obtained the one portfoho to go to 
a West Austiahan member. However, Curtin did not commend him-
self to ScuUin because he was an ex-Cathohc who had become an 
active rationahst; he was a heavy drinker; and he was unpopular with 
the AWU.^ A nonentity was chosen instead. 
THE NON-LABOUR PARTIES AND "OUTSIDE 
INTERESTS" 
Although there is no reason to beheve that the internal relations of 
the non-Labour parties are sigmficantly freer from strife than those of 
the Labour Party, they are generally less weU pubhdzed. A similar 
bias is to be found in other countries, but it is accentuated in Aus-
tiaha by the dramatic possibilities inherent in the election of Cabinet 
by Labour caucus. The infiuences which can be studied are those of 
tfie Country Party within a composite ministry, and the role of the 
"outside interests" whose unportance in financing the Liberal Party 
may sometimes extend to a direct attempt to influence the personnel of 
Cabinet, especially the choice of the Premier or Prime Minister. 
From an early stage the Country Party was able to exercise some 
influence on the choice of the leader of a composite Cabinet. In 
Tasmania the Nationahst Premier who had led the govemment since 
1916 was deposed in 1922 as the price of Country Party participation 
in the ministry. In Victoria, after a series of pohtical crises, a com-
posite ministiy was formed in 1925 with the Countty Party leader as 
its Premier, although the Nationahsts were the larger party. In other 
cases the CP has been able to bargain successfully over the number 
of portfohos it is to receive. In 1927 the Nationahst leader in N.S.W. 
offered the CP two portfohos in a composite ministry, but the CP was 
able to hold out for four, vdth its leader as deputy Premier. However, 
the most spectacular instances of the abihty of the CP to affect the 
choice of a Prime Minister have occurred in federal politics. In 1922 
there was a Nationahst govemment led by W. M. Hughes, who had 
been Labour Prime Minister until the great spht over conscription in 
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1916. The Countiy Party, led by Dr. Earle Page, was hostile to Hughes 
and his closest associates. At the general election held in November 
1922 the Nationahsts lost their majority in the House of Representa-
tives, and the CP now held the balance of power. It succeeded in 
driving a hard bargain, by which Hughes was forced to resign and 
give way to his Treasurer, S. M. Bmce, who was persona grata to the 
Countiy Party. Only one other member of the former Hughes ministiy 
was included in the new composite govemment, in which the CP held 
four of the eleven portfohos, although its parhamentaty representa-
tion was weU under half that of the Nationahsts. As these manoeuvres 
took place after an election campaign in which Page had described 
the Nationahsts as "looters and burglars", and Bruce had described the 
Countty Party as "men of paralysed inteUigences", it is no matter for 
surprise that the histoty of the govemment was marked by continuous 
tension and a long series of resignations and pubhc quarrels. In a 
reference to the fact that Page was a surgeon by profession, one 
Labour member accused him of administering an anaesthetic to the 
Nationahst party, "rendering them unfit for further service as His 
Majesty's Govemment, though possibly useful as attendants on the 
Sultan of Turkey".^^ Another Labour speaker observed that Hughes 
had been "taken to the bathroom, where his pohtical throat had been 
cut".24 
Apart from the Countty Party's role in such cases, it has undoubted-
ly restricted the field open to aspiring members of the Liberal Party. 
In 1934 the Minister for Commerce in the outgoing ministty led by 
J. A. Lyons was dropped in favour of Page when tibe Countty Party 
joined a composite govemment. Since the assumption of office by a 
composite govemment under R. G. Menzies in 1949, there have been 
repeated reports of discontent among younger members of the Liberal 
Party at the limitation imposed by the permanent aUocation of port-
folios to the Countiy Party. On the other hand, there have been occa-
sions when the financial supporters of the Liberal Party have been 
able to influence the composition of Cabinet in an even more direct 
way. By contrast to the ALP, the extia-parhamentaty organization of 
the Liberals is relatively inactive, and one important result has been 
to give special importance to the finance committee of the party in 
each state. Such finance committees, whose membership is largely 
co-opted, became characteristic of the Liberal parties after the stiong 
tiend to Labour manifested in federal and state elections in the period 
1910-15. During their histoty these committees have had a variety of 
names—the Constitutional Union, National Union, Consultative Coun-
cU, Liberal Union, and Institute of Pubhc Affairs. Their existence, and 
the aUegedly nefarious character of their activities, become pubhc 
property during internal crises, when dictation by "outside interests" 
is aUeged by dissident groups within the Liberal Party.^^ It has been 
suggested, for example, that the resignation of Hughes in 1923 was 
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brought about not only by pressure from the Countiy Party, but also 
from the National Union, which wanted Bmce as Prime Minister. 
Previously the National Union had been able to constiain Hughes to 
include Bmce m his Cabmet, although the latter had been m parha-
ment only two years. 
Perhaps the outstanding case was the series of events that led to the 
emergence of J. A. Lyons as leader of a new anti-Labour party, the 
United Austiaha Party, m 1931. After his defection from the Sculhn 
ministty, Lyons at first led a sphnter group, but he later became par-
hamentaty leader of the new party in place of J. G. Latham, leader 
of the Nationahsts, who had replaced Bmce when the latter was 
defeated in the general election of 1929. A number of stories are 
current about this manoeuvre. Sir Frederic Eggleston, who had been a 
Nationahst minister in Victoria, describes tihe National Union as a 
"background organization", and is clearly referring to this episode 
when he writes that "on one occasion the leaders of the background 
organization told the head of a party facing an election, who was sup-
posed to have no popular appeal, that unless he handed over the 
leadership to someone else, the funds would not be forthcoming . . . 
the person selected by the organization actually did lead, rather to the 
misfortune of Austraha".^® A similar accusation was made at the time 
by Page, leader of the Countiy Party, who blamed the Associated 
Chambers of Manufactures (Austiaha's equivalent of the British FBI 
or the American NAM) for dictating the high tariff pohcy of the 
UAP.^ '^  According to a recent accoimt by a former Clerk of the House 
of Representatives, Lyons was induced to leave the Labour Party by 
offers to make him leader of a new non-Labour party. These offers 
emanated from the National Union and the Associated Chambers of 
Manufactures, with the key role being played by the editor of the 
Melboume Herald, Sir Keith Murdoch.^^ 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE tlATE 
The above analysis of influences affecting tihe composition of the poh-
tical elite has been pursued at some length in order to provide an 
adequate "setting" for a study of the actual membership of the elite. 
The material that follows is based on two sets of data: a biographical 
analysis of the 196 ministers who held federal office from the opening 
of the first federal parhament in 1901 until the general election of 
1961, and the results of a postal questionnaire sent to all surviving 
members of state and federal ministries who held office between 1945 
and 1958. Out of 138 questionnaires dispatched, 91 completed ones 
were retumed, 63 from state and 28 from federal ministers. It will be 
convenient to designate these two groups separately as the "federal" 
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and "mixed" groups, but for some purposes they will be taken as a 
composite entity, made up of 243 separate individuals. 
We may begin by examining the federal group in terms of the 
representation of the various states. Geographically speaking, Australia 
is unbalanced by the concentiation of population and economic 
activity in the south-eastern comer, occupied by the two states of 
N.S.W. and Victoria. This imbalance is reflected in pohtics, and the 
other four states have been concerned to reduce the dominance of the 
two leading ones by obtaining adequate representation in Cabinet. 
Party interests have sometimes been overshadowed by this concern. 
In 1915 a Liberal member of the South Austrahan parhament pro-
tested at the absence of any South Austrahans in the Hughes Labour 
ministty. In 1904 the conservative press of Queensland, after express-
ing its disappointment with Senator Drake, a Queenslander who had 
been in the first two Liberal ministries, was gratffied at the "com-
bativeness" of two Labour ministers in the Watson govemment on 
behalf of their own state, and in 1929 the Nationalist Premier of 
Tasmania moved that the state parhament should express its pleasure 
at the inclusion of J. A. Lyons, formerly Premier of Tasmania, in the 
ScuUin Labour ministty. The preponderance of the two most impor-
tant states is illustrated by Table 1.^® 
TABLE 1 
Distribution of M.P.s and Ministers, 1901-61 
State 
N.S.W ,. 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Westem Australia 
Tasmania 
Seats in 
parliament 
(7o) 
31 
24 
14 
11.5 
10 
9.5 
100.0 
Ministerial 
posts 
(%) 
31 
28 
12 
11 
8 
10 
100.0 
Federahsm, combined vsdth inter-state rivalty, has produced a fairly 
even geographical spread. With the exception of Tasmania, however, 
the more remote states have been under-represented and Victoria 
correspondingly over-represented. However, there is a striking dif-
ference between the parties, as shown by Table 2. 
Taken together, the tables show that representation of the various 
states is much more even in the Labour Party, which may be attri-
buted at least in part to the elective system. However, one remarkable 
bias produced in Labour ministiies is the under-representation of 
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TABLE 2 
State 
N.S.W. 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Westem Australia 
Tasmania 
Liberal and 
CP. ministers 
(%) 
36 
30 
10 
9 
8 
7 
100.0 (n-120) 
Labour 
ministers 
(%) 
26 
21 
14 
14 
13 
11 
100.0 (n-76) 
N.S.W. In the sixty years under review, members from N.S.W. con-
stituencies held 33 per cent, of aU Labour seats, as compared with 26 
per cent, of ministerial posts in Labour ministries. Westem Austraha 
and Tasmania, on the other hand, have had more than their share of 
ministerial posts in relation to parhamentaty seats (13 per cent, as 
against 10 per cent, in the case of W.A., 11 per cent, as against 9 per 
cent, in that of Tasmania). In the Liberal and Countiy Parties, N.S.W. 
and Victoria are both over-represented by comparison with the 
smaUer states, v^dth Victoria being the more striking example. During 
the period non-Labour members from Victoria held 29 per cent, of all 
non-Labour seats in parhament, compared with 34 per cent, of aU 
posts in non-Labour governments. As Victoria has long played an out-
standing role within the Liberal Party, which has usuaUy been more 
united in that state than in N.S.W., its predominance in Cabinet posi-
tions is hardly surprising. The choice of Prime Ministers also iUus-
trates the greater spread to be found in the Labour Party. Of its seven 
Prime Ministers since Federation, three were from N.S.W., two from 
Queensland, one from Victoria, and one from Westem Australia. In 
the Liberal-Countiy combination, only one of the nine Prime Ministers 
has not come from either N.S.W. or Victoria, and this exceptional case 
(Lyons) was an ex-Labour man. 
"The most convenient indices for the analysis of differences in social 
stratffication are occupation and education. On this point, information 
was available for 147 individuals. Altogether 63 state and 85 federal 
ministers who had held office in this centuty were covered (Table 3). 
It wUl occasion no surprise that more Labour ministers should be of 
working-class origin than non-Labour ministers. It is remarkable, 
nevertheless, that the largest single group among the fathers of 
Labour ministers is the "commercial and clerical" categoty, which may 
be described roughly as "lower-middle class". Twenty of the 89 non-
Labour ministers were drawn from the Countiy Party, and of these 12 
were the sons of farmers and graziers. Eight of those classffied as 
"professional and semi-professional" were men who were members of 
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parhament long enough to make it their major occupation, although 
some of those hsted under other headings had also been pohtically 
active. Six of the Labour ministers whose fathers' occupations are given 
as "other" were in fact orphaned in their early youth or infancy. 
TABLE 3 
Father's occupation 
Rural proprietors 
Professional and semi-professional 
Administrative and business 
Commercial and clerical 
Manual workers 
Other 
Total 
40 
33 
20 
25 
20 
9 
147 
Liberal-CP 
29 
22 
18 
10 
8 
2 
89 
Labour 
11 
11 
2 
15 
12 
7 
58 
Note. The above categories are adapted from those used in the 1947 census of occupa-
tions carried out by the Commonwealth Statistician. The category "administrative" 
includes business managers and proprietors as well as senior government officials, 
ships' officers, &c. 
Without vety careful investigation of these cases, it is impossible to 
say what the signfficance of this curious fact may be, but its psycho-
logical possibihties (a compensatoty search for power [or for iden-
tity?] ) are fascinating. 
TABLE 4 
; 
Father's occupational group 
Rural proprietors 
Professional and semi-professional 
Administrative and business 
Commercial and clerical 
Manual workers 
Other 
1947 
census 
(%) 
17.9 
3.5 
5.6 
16.4 
47.2 
9.4 
100.0 
Fathers of 
business 
men 
(%) 
7 
19 
31 
28 
12 
3 
100 
Fathers of 
government 
officials 
(7o) 
10 
16 
11 
35 
22 
6 
100 
Fathers of 
ministers 
(%) 
23 
18.5 
9 
23 
17.5 
9 
100.0 
It is of interest to compare these results with the figures obtained by 
the same author from studies of business leaders and senior Common-
wealth government officials. 
On the basis of Table 4 it would appear that the opportunities 
for upward social mobihty between generations are somewhat greater 
in pohtical life than in the other two spheres. A somewhat different 
aspect of this question relates to the previous occupations of Cabinet 
ministers, and here the divergence between the parties is vety clear-
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TABLE 5 
Occupational group 
' 
Rural proprietors 
Professional and semi-professional 
Administrative and business 
Commercial and clerical 
Manual workers 
Other 
1947 
census— 
aU 
bread-
winners 
(%) 
8.5 
5.2 
7.0 
20.0 
47.6 
11.7 
100.0 
All 
ministers 
(%) 
(n-259) 
21 
37 
16 
8 
18 
... 
100 
Liberal-
CP 
(%) 
(n-148) 
26 
46 
25 
2 
1 
100 
Labour 
(%) 
(n-101) 
11 
26 
5 
16 
42 
100 
Note. This table gives particulars of a total of 259 ministers—63 state and 
196 federal—who held office from between 1901 and 1961. The 1947 census 
is used for purposes of comparison. 
cut, as shown by Table 5. It may be noted that whereas the first 
column of figures in Table 4 refers only to male breadwinners, in 
Table 5 we are concerned with all breadwinners. 
Before drawing conclusions from these figures, some comments 
should be made. The "manual workers" m liie Labour Party were 
nearly aU trade union officials, as were some of the white-collar 
workers in the "commercial and clerical" category. Altogether 48 of 
the 101 Labour ministers were trade union officials before entering 
parhament, and most of these were full-time officials. The majority of 
them had held one of the leading offices at state or federal level; 12 of 
the federal ministers had been national president or secretaty of their 
union. Another feature is the nmnber of lawyers in the "professional" 
group. Out of 96 individuals, no fewer than 50 were lawyers, 36 of 
tihem in the non-Labour parties, 14 in the Labour party. However, 
only 3 of the Labour men had gone stiaight into the legal profes-
sion after completing their education; the rest had qualified as lavtyers 
by part-time study while working as trade union officials or clerical 
employees. Some of the tiade union officials, therefore, are included in 
the professional group, and not classffied as manual workers. 
It may be thought tiiat virtually all the Countty Party ministers have 
been rural proprietors. In fact, more than one-third came from non-
rural occupations, including three lavtyers. Page, the first federal leader, 
was a doctor, and his successor, Fadden, an accountant. One-half of 
the "rural proprietors" in the non-Labour group have been Liberals, 
indicating that the pohtical importance of the farming community 
spans aU the parties. The Labour Party^** has always included a size-
able farming group in the federal parhamentaty caucus, whose actual 
stiength has oscillated in response to Labour's popularity in the 
wheat-growdng areas. In 1941 the proportion of fanners in the parha-
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mentaty Labour Party reached a peak of 18 per cent., after a decade of 
agricultural depression. The division of rural proprietors among the 
three parties reflects the divisions within the rural community itself, 
but it is also pohtically advantageous to farmers and graziers aspiring 
to office. The two main parties are constantly interested in weakening 
the CFs hold on the rural vote, and one way is to offer ministerial 
posts to members from rural constituencies. 
The other group whose numerical representation in Cabinet is far 
greater than its strength in society at large is that composed of the 
professional men. In this respect Australia conforms to the results 
found in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. In the pre-
ponderance of lawyers, particularly, it resembles the U.S.A. There are, 
nevertheless, two distinctive features. One is the extent to which the 
prevailing phUosophy that parties should act, when in power, as a 
"reflex" of tbe interest groups that support them, affects the representa-
tion of these groups in the Cabinet; the other is the sharpness of the 
cleavage between the two parties in terms of Cabinet personnel. This 
distinction is made even clearer if we compare the parhamentaty 
party and Cabinet, in terms of occupational breakdown. In non-
Labour Cabinets the proportion of professional men is far higher than 
it is among non-Labour parhamentarians—a fact which is on all fours 
vrith the situation in other countries. In the federal Cabinet that was 
in office at the beginning of 1951, 11 out of the 19 members were pro-
fessional men, 5 of them lawyers. Another 5 ministers were business-
men, and the remaining 4 were farmers or graziers. As against this, 
professional men formed 40 per cent, of the parhamentaty party, while 
farmers and graziers accoimted for 37 per cent. In the federal parha-
mentaty Labour Party from 1901 to 1951, 41 per cent, of members 
were manual workers, compared with 48 per cent, of ministers; 20 per 
cent, of members were professional men, compared with 24 per cent, 
of ministers. On the other hand, it should be noticed that the situation 
inside the Labour Party has changed since Federation. As Crisp shows, 
the proportion of manual workers has fallen steadily, and since the 
early 1930's has been less than half. Side by side with this dechne has 
been a fall in the number of tiade union officials, which in 1901 was 72 
per cent., but fell below 50 per cent, in 1917 and has declined slowly 
since then. Before 1941 the proportion of white-collar workers in the 
parhamentaty party was always less than 10 per cent, but it began 
to rise at the 1943 election, and by 1951 it had reached 28 per cent. 
The next federal Labour govemment will undoubtedly be affected by 
this remarkable tiend, which shows evety sign of continuing. (The 
election of a university lecturer to a federal Labour seat ui 1955 may 
perhaps be regarded as a portent) 
The effect of prolonged terms of office also has the effect of diluting 
the manual worker and trade union element in Labour governments. 
In the New South Wales Labour Govemment appointed m 1941, 5 
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members of the original ministiy of 15 were prominent union officials, 
and 5 others had some union background. When the govemment was 
defeated in 1965, an additional 20 ministers had held office, only one 
of whom had been a union official of any importance. 
TABLE 6 
Educational level attained 
Primary 
Secondary... ... 
University 
Other Tertiary ... 
N/A 
All ministers 
% 
n-259 
24 
31 
26 
11 
8 
100 
Liberal-CP 
% 
n-148 
7 
34 
36 
13 
10 
100 
Labour 
7. 
n-111 
51 
25 
10 
9 
5 
100 
Not only the educational level but also the type of school attended 
provides a sharp differentiation. At the primary level, this is largely a 
distinction between state and Cathohc schools. The proportion of 
Cathohcs among Labour men is reflected in the fact that 36 of the 111 
Labour ministers had attended Catholic primary schools, out of 39 
who could positively be identffied as Cathohcs. Out of 76 Labour 
ministers who held Federal office between 1904 and 1949, 25 were 
Cathohcs (as against 36 Protestants, 3 freethinkers, and 12 for whom 
no information was available). 
At the secondaty level, where information was avaUable for aU but 
12, we find that 85 of the 148 non-Labour ministers had been educated 
at private secondaty schools. Sixty-two of these had attended schools 
affihated with the Headmasters' Conference of Austraha, among which 
a handful of the most important ones played an outstanding role. Out 
of the 62, 22 were educated at the four leading "Associated Pubhc" 
schools in Victoria—Melboume Grammar School (8), Scotch CoUege 
(6) , Wesley CoUege (4), Geelong Grammar School (4). Another 14 
had attended a group of leading Sydney schools—Sydney Grammar 
School (7), Sydney C.E.G.S. or "Shore" (3), Newmgton CoUege (2), 
The King's School (2) . Altogether, 11 leadmg private schools 
accoimted for 42 men in the non-Labour group—Melboume Grammar 
School, Sydney Grammar School, Scotch CoUege, Brisbane Grammar 
School, Prince Alfred College (Adelaide), Geelong Grammar School, 
Wesley CoUege, Sydney C.E.G.S., Launceston Grammar School, The 
Bang's School, and Newington CoUege—hi descending order of 
numerical importance. 
Among Labour ministers, 16 had been educated at Cathohc secon-
daty schools, six of them affihated with the Headmasters' Conference. 
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Another four had attended Protestant schools of this type. Most of the 
remainder attended state high schools. 
In Federal pohtics, these social differences have showoi considerable 
stabffity over the 60-year period. The year 1923 provides the most 
convenient point of division for purposes of contiast. A few changes 
may nevertheless be noted. The earlier preponderance of New South 
Wales and Victoria has changed in more ways than one. Up to 1923, 
42 out of 75 ministers had come from the two largest states, 22 from 
Victoria and 20 from New South Wales. From 1923 to 1961, the 
figures were 74 out of 121—42 from New South Wales, 32 from Vic-
toria. Mobffity between state and federal parhaments was markedly 
less after 1923 and has continued to decline. The representations of 
farmers and graziers in both Cabinet and parhament rose sharply in 
response to the emergence of the Countiy Party as a permanent third 
party (it rose by only a neghgible 2 per cent, among ministers of the 
other two parties). The proportion of Cathohcs in Labour ministries 
rose signfficantiy as a result of the great schism over conscription in 
1916. In the earher period, 19 out of 30 Labour ministers were Protes-
tants, and four were Catholics; no information was available about the 
other seven. In the latter period, 21 out of the 46 were Catholics, 17 
were Protestants, three were freethinkers, and information was un-
avaUable about five. In the three Scullin Cabinets (1929-32), there 
were 12 Cathohcs out of 19 ministers, and in the Clufley govemment 
of 1946 there were 11 out of 19. There was a general rise in the stan-
dard of education, manifested principaUy by a threefold increase in 
the numbers of men educated at state high schools. A training in the 
law ceased to be the only form of tertiaty education represented 
among ministers. Before 1923, there had been 28 lawyers in various 
Cabinets. From 1923 to 1961, there were 24 lawyers, 14 other univer-
sity graduates, and 15 other men with some form of tertiaty education 
who sat in Cabinet. The rise of educational standards coincides with 
a dechne in working-class representation in the parhamentaty Labour 
party. 
The last point to be mentioned is an oddity. Among the professional 
men who have attained Cabinet rank, medical men have been re-
markably prominent. Since 1920, 10 doctors and 1 dentist have been 
ministers, mostiy as incumbents of the Health portioho. One of these 
(Page) was Prime Minister for a brief period, and another was 
Premier of Victoria. Women, on the other hand, have not figured pro-
minentiy. Although universal adult suffrage has operated in all Aus-
trahan parhaments since the beghming of the centuty, the first woman 
member of parhament was not elected until 1925, and only three 
women have held Cabmet office, aU of them since the Second World 
War. In pohtical life, as in business, women have not made use of the 
opportunities that are, theoretically at least, open to them. 
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Cabinet, secret but important, has been the subject of a major study 
by Professor Sol Encel,^ but Parhament, open as it is to the pubhc 
gaze with (ahnost) evety word recorded and avaUable for the re-
searcher, still lacks a book-length account. The novice might be intimi-
dated by the complexities of formal procedures, but one suspects that 
experienced pohtical scientists have been diverted by a hasty assump-
tion of the relative unimportance of parhamentaty institutions. The 
"dechne of Parhament" has been lamented in Austialia at least as 
frequentiy as in Britain, yet the detailed programmes for reform which 
Lords and Commons have occasioned are yet to appear. No Member 
has been more energetic in his advocacy of improvement than Mr. H. 
B. Turner, and his history of "The Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Austrahan Parhament" relates to one means of increasing the effec-
tiveness of Parhament through speciahzed committees. 
Professor Anthony Fusaro examines the signfficance of the Senate, 
never the States' House intended and only fitfully the House of 
Review it might have been. Professors Gordon Reid and Geoffrey 
Bolton compare Austiahan procedures and practices with the British 
model which retains a symbohc unportance for Parhament that it has 
lost for Cabinet and political parties. If Parhamentaty debates are 
artificial because party loyalty determines the result, it is still neces-
saty to know what happens before particular pieces of legislation 
enter the final, formal steps to enactment, and Mr. J. Monro provides 
an insider's account of "The Preparation of a Draft Bill". 
New techniques for the study of legislative behaviour have been 
developed in the United States, and are now being applied in Aus-
tralia. In a few years they may have home fmit, but in the meantime 
attention is concentiated on institutions and procedures. 
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AUSTRALIA'S COMMONWEALTH 
PARLIAMENT AND THE 
"WESTMINSTER MODEL" 
G. S. Reid 
I 
AU seven units of govemment in Austiaha are based on the West-
minster model. The model was first used in the design of constitutions 
for five of the Australian colonies in the 1850s, for Westem Austiaha 
in 1890, and finally for the federal compact in 1901. For Australians it 
was the sine qua non of internal seU-govemment. That was to be 
expected. Not simply as a result of the influence of British adminis-
tiation and defence power, but because the people of the several 
colonies were ahnost wholly British in origin, had close social ties 
with the British Isles, were famihar with its traditions, were English 
speaking, and attained self-government through peaceful means. More-
over, by mid-centuty, their pohtical leaders in most cases negotiated 
with a co-operative Whitehall acting under the shadow of a revolu-
tionaty Europe and emergent "democracy". 
When Lieutenant Govemor Sir William Denison opened the first 
Parhament of the Colony of New South Wales in 1856 he explained 
that the new arrangements for govemment were based "on the prin-
cipal characteristics of the British Constitution". The model, presum-
ably, was pohtically acceptable. A constitution based upon it gave the 
impression of a system of self-government both new and old. It satis-
fied the pressures for local autonomy and the fears of instabihty 
through inexperience. In New South Wales, for example, there was a 
bi-cameral Parhament with one House whoUy elected and the govem-
ment, drawn from the Parliament, was accountable to the elected 
House. For Austrahans that was the British system. Ultimately it 
became the common denominator of all seven units of govemment. 
More direct political motives can be discerned in the constitutional 
arrangements of the 1850s. Most of tihe leaders of the day were pas-
torahsts and they saw to it that their interests were not neglected. 
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Provisions such as a property qualffied franchise, plural votmg, no 
votes for women, a nominated upper house, and the requirement of a 
two-thirds majority for constitutional amendments, were used selec-
tively to keep the Parhaments withm their control. Subsequently there 
were pohtical confficts about these provisions. In their defence there 
were many attempts to justify them as part of, or necessaty to pre-
serve, the British-type Constitution (or what today we would caU the 
Westmmster model). Most, however, were abohshed before the end of 
the century—often in advance of Westminster—but their defence illus-
tiated a use to which the Westminster model has been put in Aus-
tiahan govemment. It has frequentiy been injected, in a prescriptive 
sense, into issues relating to the machinety of govemment not simply 
from motives of institutional nostalgia or from considerations of the 
efficacy of the Westminster methods, but from motives that can only 
be called pohtical. 
Whatever the motives may have been, famiharity with his sur-
roundings was what impressed Anthony TroUope when he visited 
Austiaha and New Zealand in the 1870s and attended the sittings of 
several of the Parliaments. "Kings, Lords and Commons" he wrote, 
"prevail in the colonies as they do at home, with some variations".^ 
He went on "In all small forms and ways the imitations of our parha-
mentary practice is generally exact. The ministers sit on the right of 
the Speaker, with their staunch supporters behind them. The Opposi-
tion occupies the opposite benches and there are cross benches or 
benches below the gangway, for those whose party obligations are less 
binding".^ Most visitors familiar with United Kingdom arrangements 
report in the same vein; they comment on the outward manifestations 
of Westminster—the ceremony, the familiar disposition of fumiture, 
the existence of the office of Leader of the Opposition, and the visible 
overlap of the Executive and Legislature. 
It is widely recognised nowadays that the visible, or even the legal, 
features of a system of govemment in any social environment give an 
inadequate understanding of its working. It is necessaty, somehow, to 
penetrate the outward appearances and to measure the contribution to 
the process of govemment made by the human material working with-
in it. For this reason I suggest that TroUope-type comments are defi-
cient; and I think it is the same with the expression "Westminster 
model". We know that the forms of govemment in the Austrahan 
colonies in the late nineteenth century resembled the forms at West-
minster; but whether they functioned in the same way is a question 
that students, so far, have not reaUy tried to answer. 
n 
We can say, however, that by the end of the nineteenth centuty, when 
the time came to prepare for the seventh unit of govemment m Aus-
tiaha, there was no shortage of people who could claun extensive 
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experience in Austrahan politics and Austrahan pubhc administration. 
The popular attitudes of experience in govemment and political self-
sufficiency were the mainstays of the Austrahan nationahsm that forced 
the pohtical pace of the period. The new constitution's provision for 
"an indissoluble federal Commonwealth" exhibits the collective self-
confidence. It is important to remember that the federal arrangement 
of 1901 grew out of local political action and re-action. It was in no 
sense imposed. The pohtical institutions it produced were the product 
of social forces emerging from seU-goveming communities. The design 
of the Constitution and the terms of reference for the new Parhament 
were hammered out at hard fought constitutional conventions in 
Sydney, Adelaide, and Melboume, twelve thousand mUes from White-
haU. It is true that the Constitution was finally enshrined in an Act of 
the Imperial Parhament but oiUy after its approval by a majority vote 
in an Austrahan-wide referendum. 
Although the architects of the Constitution turned to the United 
States for the names of their two parhamentaty assembhes—Senate and 
House of Representatives—they gave the Constitution a preponderance 
of Westminster-Whitehall type provisions. This was not simply in 
obeisance to the Imperial Parhament; it was an acknowledgment of 
the accepted utihty of these provisions in the government of the 
several States. They included, for example, the fundamental provision 
that "No minister of State shall hold office for a longer period than 
three months unless he is or becomes a Senator or member of the 
House of Representatives"; they included two basic British Constitu-
tion-type provisions that "no money shall be drav^m from the Treasuty 
except under appropriation made by law", and that the Parliament is 
autonomous in the declaration of its "powers, privileges and immimi-
ties" (untU so declared, they remain those of the House of Commons 
at the estabhshment of the Commonwealth); and they gave the Con-
stitution the negative characteristic for which Westminster-modelled 
documents are renowned—the omission of reference to pohtical par-
ties, an Opposition, or a Prime Minister. 
The Constitution also estabhshed the Judicial and the Executive 
arms of govemment. There was a major departure from the British 
Constitution in the limitation of the Parliament's sovereignty, by the 
enumeration of its powers, by the High Court's jurisdiction over 
chaUenges to the constitutionahty of Commonwealth Acts, and the 
provision for appeals to the United Kingdom's Privy Council. There 
was also the referendum provision for constitutional amendment. But 
with the Executive, on tihe other hand, the Westminster-Whitehall 
relations were foUowed closely—that is, after one makes allowance for 
the provisions conceming Commonwealth-State relations. 
It is evident, therefore, that any claim that the Commonwealth 
Constitution is based on the Westminster model needs, in almost the 
same breath, some important qualffications. The same can be said 
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about any of the mstitutions of govemment that the Constitution pro-
vided. Let us consider the necessaty qualffications m the case of the 
Commonwealth Parliament. 
The Parhament of the Commonwealth was planned as a national 
representative institution—the legislature. But in its sixty-odd years it 
has become more than an organ for legislation, or for financial control, 
check, enquity, etc. Those are the conventional roles allotted to it. It is 
somethmg else. Ultimately housed in a large and unpressive buildmg 
in the national capital (an even larger building is now mooted) it has 
received widespread pubhcity, particularly through the media of mass 
communication. There has been an overt attempt by governments to 
develop for it a symbohc quahty. The Parhament is presented vddely 
as a symbol of national unity, of representative govemment, and of 
democracy, and also to symbolise the nation's hnks with the United 
Kingdom and the Crovm. These facets of Parhament are impressed 
upon the minds of schoolchildren, they are meant to engender a sense 
of security, an assurance of law and order, and what has been the 
Austrahan conception of ties with the British Commonwealth. For this 
role the Westminster model has been copied extensively. There is 
almost a complete panoply of Westminster-type ceremony, fumish-
ings, and parhamentaty dress. (It is only the ceremonial function of 
Parhament that is televised.) In the Parhamentis histOty both parties 
have fostered this institutional image budding. The conservative par-
ties have developed it most, if only because they have had more 
opportunity. I should hke to emphasise, however, that this function is 
not simply a matter of preserving links with Britain. The parhamentaty 
symbol is an instrument of government, and it is the instrument, as 
weU as the trappings, that Austrahan governments have copied from 
Westminster. 
It was not, for example, merely coincidental that the Common-
wealth govemment claimed an increased recognition in Austrahan 
pohtics and took a more direct role in economic affairs immediately 
after the Commonwealth Parhament moved from its borrowed pre-
mises in Melboume in 1927 to the then imposing Parhament House in 
Canberra. It was when the pubhcity of the tiansfer had subsided—the 
ceremony for the opening of the doors by the Duke of York after a 
nation-vdde tour, the minting of "Parhament House" coinage, and the 
issue of stamps portraying the new Parhament—that one of the few, 
and the most important, of the amendments yet made to the Consti-
tution was carried in all states by referendum (1928). (The Common-
wealth Govemment thereby received the power to manage the debts 
of the States and to control all new pubhc borrovmigs.) In Austiaha 
there is increasing concentration on this kind of parhamentaty image 
budding. 
The main purpose of this article, however, is to consider the 
arrangements for the pohtical process within the Parhament and to tty 
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to relate them to those of the Westmmster model. For this it wiU be 
best to comment briefly on each House, and then consider some of the 
categories of pahamentaty activity. 
n i 
THE SENATE 
This is a singular institution in Austrahan govemment. On the basis of 
nineteenth centuty hberal bi-camerahst philosophy it can be seen as a 
house of review and a vague reflection of the House of Lords; that is, 
so long as we acknowledge its elective basis and the absence of the 
Parhament Acts (which were not in existence when the Senate was 
created). The Senate is the price of Austrahan federahsm—the insti-
tutional safeguard that the States demanded for the surrender of 
enumerated powers to a new central authority. Equal representation 
in a Senate of aU the original States and the provision for it to be half 
the numerical size of the House of Representatives were seen as the 
means for protecting the interests of States small in population from 
the weight of numbers more populous States enjoyed in the lower 
House. But its protagonists, by winning for the Senate substantial 
powers, denied it its vety purpose. They made it too rich a prize to 
escape the attention of nationally-based political parties. In conse-
quence, elected Senators and candidates aspiring to election became 
prey to party blandishments and party dictates. Nowadays the cost 
and the tiouble of Senate contiol tests the finances and the patience 
of parties. The Labor Party now vdsh it death; and whenever non-
Labor governments lose their grasp on it they become equally malevo-
lent. The final say, fortunately, is with the wider electorate. 
The Senate is said to have a "concurrent" power in all legislation. 
"The legislative power of the Commonwealth" runs the Constitution, 
"shaU be vested in . . . the Queen, the Senate and the House of Rep-
resentatives". A "concurrent" power, of course, is a euphemism for a 
"veto" power, and in the field of national govemment this is something 
to be reckoned with. As weU, the Senate can amend any legislative 
proposal providing its amendments do not result in an increased 
charge upon the citizen (a tax) or on public revenue (expenditure). 
In these cases it can merely "request" amendments. But when a 
"request" is backed by a power of veto it is easy to see who holds the 
upper hand. The Senate is a powerful upper chamber. It is true that 
it cannot initiate financial legislation (this seems to be the main con-
stitutional—as distinct from pohtical—influence in keeping the Ministty 
answerable in the lower House) but this limitation has been of httle 
consequence to its ultimate power. It has demanded financial equahty 
and it has been given it; it has won representation on the Pubhc 
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Accounts Committee; it receives the Budget Speech and the Estimates 
simultaneously wdth the House of Representatives, and it begins its 
scmtiny of them without waiting for them to be "tiansmitted" from 
the House. Moreover, it has the power under the Constitution to bring 
the lower House to the pomt of dissolution—though this is tempered 
by the necessity of seeing itself dissolved as well. The Senate, there-
fore, provides a substantial variation from the Westminster model. 
Unless an Austrahan government contiols the Senate it is a govem-
ment in name only. 
The unique nature of the Senate, its frequent use of its powers, and 
its insistence upon the recognition of its equal status, means that con-
sideration of it intmdes into almost evety facet of parhamentaty 
activity. It stands m contiast to the House of Representatives for it 
has not been dominated by the govemment to the same extent. In-
deed, for those who see the role of representative institutions as 
offering restiaint to the excesses of governmental authority the Senate 
must be the main hope in Austiaha. 
T H E HOUSE O F REPRESENTATIVES 
The lower House in the Commonwealth Parhament is well and truly 
under the thumb of the govemment. By pohtical usage governments 
consider themselves responsible to it and, as at Westminster, the 
parrot-cty "responsibihty" has made constructive parhamentaty reform 
impossible. 
When the House first met on 9 May 1901 its seventy-five members 
(now 124) were faced with the task of determining procedural mles 
to guide their dehberations. These were essential to provide the means 
for the use of parhamentaty power and, contraty to general behef, 
were highly pohtical. It is at the point of the original determination of 
procedure that most Commonwealth legislatures fall back on the vds-
dom of Westminster. But not the House of Representatives in 1901. 
The Labor party had sixteen members on the cross benches holding 
the balance of power between thirty-two Protectionists (in office) and 
twenty-seven Freetraders. Agreement about the necessaty limitation 
of debate was virtuaUy impossible and "temporaty" rules had to be 
adopted which the Prime Minister (Edmund Barton) claimed were 
selected "from what appeared to be the most valuable and reasonable 
rules in the various legislative assembhes (i.e. in the States) without 
being too much bound to the strict terms of any one". Rejecting West-
minister as a source of procedural criteria, he claimed "If for instance 
we adopt as a guide for our temporaty standing orders those of the 
House of Commons we should import into our procedure the most 
rigorous of the mles of that House, including those of the closure of 
debate and deahng wdth disorderly members".^ But hberty was short-
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hved. When the Labor representatives backed the Liberals (erstwhUe 
Protectionists) in govemment in 1905 the Prime Mmister (Alfred 
Deakin) moved for the incorporation of the House of Commons 
(1882) closure mle into the Standing Orders. He endured a seven day 
debate (one sitting continued through three days) before the conser-
vative Opposition submitted; but Deakin won for himself and his 
successors in govemment the instrument of absolute control over the 
House. But this was not enough. In 1912 came the original proposal 
to impose time hmits on members' speeches (as yet not acceptable 
at Westminster) and then in 1918 the House gave approval for the use 
of the "guiUotine" procedure (adopted at Westminster in 1887) mak-
ing more finite the degree of control already enjoyed. 
In spite of the early professions of procedural self-sufficiency resort 
to the ruhngs of the House of Commons was inescapable—the pro-
cedures copied from the States were in fact the methods of West-
minster of the 1850s. May's Parliamentary Practice was never far from 
the Speaker's hand. The so-called "temporaty" Standing Orders (which 
were not made permanent untU 1950) included an admirable blend 
of mandatoty and permissive ties to Westminster. The first Order 
read: 
In all cases not provided for hereiaafter, or by Sessional or other Orders, 
resort shall be had to the practice of the Common House of the Imperial 
Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland in force at the time of the adoption 
of the Orders, which shall be followed as far as they can be applied to the 
proceedings of the House of Representatives. 
The words I have itahcised were sufficient to make the Order 
ambiguous. It meant that Westminster procedure was to be used if 
convenient—but convenient to whom? From the first it was clear that 
the pohcy of governments was to be procedural eclecticism, and it has 
prevaUed since. House of Commons procedure has usually been 
acceptable when it bolsters the power of the govemment over the 
House, otherwise the Ministiy's claim is that "each Parhament, of 
course, has its OWTI way to make and its owm problems to resolve".^ 
By this means the Westminster model has provided governments with 
a convenient procedural foil to fend off threatened impediments to the 
official wdU from within the House, while continuing to pose as para-
gons of Westminster procedural virtue. The mysteries of Westminster 
have frequently been invoked to provide a technical smoke screen 
behind which governments have escaped the rigours of the pohtical 
battle. 
IV 
The escape routes will best be Ulustrated by discussing the business of 
the House under three headings (making reference to the Senate 
where appropriate). Finance, Legislation, and Restraint and Enquity. 
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FINANCE 
It is in this field more than m any other that the Westmmster model 
has been coveted. The myth of parhamentaty control of expenditure stiU 
lingers, paradoxicaUy, to evety government's advantage. Governments 
have embraced the Westminster debating mles for financial busuiess 
with alacrity for they take from the members of the House the free-
dom for legislative and pohtical initiative that the Constitution left 
them. Section 56 provided that no proposed law for the expenditure 
of pubhc money should be passed unless it was the subject of a recom-
mendation from the Govemor-General. This gave scope for the intro-
duction of expenditure proposals by private members (and the 
Opposition) and it did not restrict taxation initiative in any way (it 
was plaimed that members should be free to initiate proposals on the 
tariff). At the constitutional conventions it was thought that even the 
expression decided upon "greatiy enhances the power and influence of 
the executive".^ But parhamentaty attitudes and the functions of 
govemment have changed and governments have become increasingly 
sensitive about pohtical ideas other than their OWTI, particularly in 
Parhament, and more particularly if they are hkely to be chaUenged 
to a division. Little by httle through procedural interpretation they 
have pushed the private member and the official Opposition below 
decks in finance. In the new and reformed Standing Orders, adopted 
in May 1963, the House codffied the procedural stage it had reached, 
and, gomg beyond Westminster, surrendered to the Ministty absolute 
monopoly rights for the initiation of increased expenditure and in-
creased taxation proposals, and aU amendments to bills that can be 
mterpreted to have that effect. Thus the House surrendered a large 
area of pohtical mitiative which in these days of cohesive pohtical 
parties is a self-denial not completely necessaty. As a result of these 
changes Senators, stiU free to move "requests" to increase a tax or 
expenditure, enjoy greater legislative freedom in finance than members 
of the House of Representatives. 
Associated with this restrictive trend has been the perpetuation of 
the myth that it is the House's responsibihty-but in no other forai 
than a Committee of the Whole—to scmtinise the minute detaU of the 
expenditure estimates, and not to discuss wider policy issues. The 
pohtical fmstiation this provoked in financial debates made painful 
reading. With the assistance of mles laid dovm in Westminster m the 
1850s (still expressed in May's Parliamentary Practice) and the 
backing of the closure and guUlotine procedures, financial debates 
were reduced to a farce and governments escaped scot free. But since 
1956 a change has been made giving members freedom to mention 
pohcy issues in estimates debates (this was the attitude the House of 
Commons took in 1896) and the situation has improved to a degree. 
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Governments have refused, however, to place "allotted" supply days at 
the disposal of the Opposition. 
At Westminster the House of Commons, in early recognition of its 
financial deficiencies as a whole House, found alternative organs of 
inquity. The existence of these—the Select Committee of Pubhc 
Accounts (1861) and the Select Committee on Estimates (1912)—was 
embarrassing to Australian governments otherwise ready to adopt 
Commons procedures. When the Estimates Committee was estab-
hshed, giving the Commons two financial committees, there was in-
creased pressure for Australia to have one. A choice was made of the 
Pubhc Accounts Committee. Estabhshed in 1913 by statute, which the 
Senate refused to pass until it was given representation, the Commit-
tee did twenty years of good work. JBut when the economic depression 
fell it was abohshed (1932) as "an economy measure". It was reha-
bffitated in 1951, and still operates, but faced with an enormous and 
growing field of public expenditure, a small staff, and a govemment 
party chairman, it has dechning influence. 
There is no Estimates Committee. Suggestions made in 1913 for its 
estabhshment met wdth short and indignant shrift. "No govemment 
would degrade themselves to that extent" said a Labor member in 
Opposition, "no govemment would give up their authority to the 
extent of permitting a Committee to interfere with their estimates".® 
There have been subsequent suggestions for financial reform but how-
ever worthy they have fallen on stony ground. 
Mr. R. G. (later Sir Robert) Menzies in 1929 thought tihat the Par-
hament needed "a Joint Committee of both Houses . . . to view finan-
cial proposals both prospectively and retrospectively".'^ Mr. Harold 
Holt (the present Treasurer) was chairman of the Joint Committee 
on War Expenditure that reported in 1945 that "a Joint Committee 
of Parhament clothed with adequate powers and functions . . . is the 
best means [for] the future control of national expenditure".^ But the 
fiety zeal of parhamentaty reformers runs cold on the Treasury benches 
and there is httle hope of constructive reform in the near future. 
LEGISLATION 
Much the same pattem of behaviour has emerged with non-
financial legislation. The basic Westminster procedures, providing for 
three readings and a committee stage, have been followed and Com-
mons' precedents have been observed to control debate. There have 
been persistent suggestions for the establishment of small standing 
committees for legislative scrutiny, of the kind used at Westminster 
since 1882, but these have met with equally persistent refusal by aU 
governments. Instead, the House has been made to persevere with 
the Committee of the Whole—the procedural arrangement that Bage-
hot saw in England in the 1860s as "one of the most helpless exhi-
31 
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bitions of helpless ingenuity and wasted niind."^ When W. A. Hohnan 
(a former Premier of New South Wales) gave evidence to a Senate 
Select Committee in 1930 on the advisabihty of creatmg some standmg 
committees, he complained that "Parhamentaty methods in Austiaha 
are stiU primitive. Division of function and delegation of authority 
are largely unknown. The original idea of one large councU deahng 
successively with each pubhc question stiU prevails . . ."^^ If he could 
make the same claim today it would have equal vahdity. 
So fmitiess now is the normal legislative process for the considera-
tion of matters of detaU in legislation that members of the House of 
Representatives seldom bother to make other than general contribu-
tions. The contiast with Westminster impressed Sir Gilbert (later 
Lord) Campion when he visited Austraha in 1948. He recorded that 
"the committee stage of a biU in the Austiahan House of Representatives 
is often reduced to a tedious formality, which few members of the 
majority take the trouble to sit through, because it is knovra that evety 
amendment moved by the Opposition wiU be voted down wdthout 
consideration of its merits".^-^ 
I have extracted the figures from the record of the 22nd Parhament 
(1956-58) in an attempt to make a measure of the attention paid to 
the detail of bills at their committee stage. (I was interested when I 
did this (1959) to test Professor J. D. B. Miller's support of the thesis 
that members are "concerned so much wdth the valleys of detail in 
legislation, they do not often enough lift their eyes to the hills of 
principle".^) In summaty the figures are: 
312 bills were referred to the Committee of the Whole for considera-
tion 
235 bUls (75% passed without one word of Committee debate being 
offered 
33 bills (11%) were considered in Committee but not in detail, the biUs 
being "taken as a whole" 
44 bills (14%) received detaUed Committee attention—the Opposition 
moved amendments to 21 of them. 
The effect of parhamentaty broadcasting must be recognised in this 
(see below) and the fact that at the time the Opposition was divided 
and consequently weakened, (though less so than in 1954-55). There 
would be a shght improvement today but not to any signfficant degree. 
Much the same attitude prevails in the Senate. 
I think it is signfficant that in the new Standing Orders adopted in 
May 1963 provision was made, wdthout comment from members, that 
the House without notice, but by leave of the members present, may 
bypass the committee stage of any biU, i.e. proceed from the second 
reading to the third reading "forthwdth".^^ The dangers in a provision 
of this kind are obvious but it is an acknowledgment of the change 
in the legislative process and of the degree to which the whole parha-
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mentaty programme today is left for the management of the party 
leaders. 
It is evident that in the Commonwealth Parliament governments 
are not prepared to foster the legislative capacities of parliamen-
tarians. Yet few members of Parhament in Australia would be pre-
pared to admit that they are no longer "legislators". There is a need for 
the clarification of this position for it is the basis of much confusion 
about Parliament. Sir Edward Fellows told the House of Commons 
Select Committee on Procedure in 1958 that "I am convinced that 
sooner or later the House of Commons will have to approach legisla-
tion from the angle that Parliament lays downi vety general principles 
and that it is the business of the Executive to administer the law 
inside these principles". He agreed, however, that the House was not 
yet ready to accept such a delegation "of its detailed legislative 
power". ^ * In Australia, on the other hand, the delegation appears to 
have been made but the members are not ready to admit it. 
RESTRAINT AND ENQUIRY 
Parhamentaty question time at Westminster would be the most widely 
recognised method by which the Executive is from day to day 
accountable to the representative assembly. A version of the procedure 
has been estabhshed in the Commonwealth Parhament but, without a 
comparable method of supplementaty questions, it is so truncated as 
to restrict its intended effectiveness. Nonetheless the restrictive West-
minster mles as expressed in May are applied with vigour. Members 
may ask questions without notice and they receive answers unprepared 
(or allegedly so) and sometimes ill-informed. And without the supple-
mentary enquity such answers can often be evasive. Questions on 
notice are used extensively and are more profitable. They extract a 
wide range of valuable information. But on Westminster precedents 
Ministers insist that they should not be examined on matters of pohcy 
(the very commodity the House should exploit) and often "policy" 
gets a broad definition. In addition to questions there is the full range 
of Westminster-type procedure such as Address-in-reply debates. Dis-
cussions on Matters of Urgency (widely used), adjournment motions, 
motions of no confidence, private members' motions and, as at West-
minster, methods which permit the success of vety few private mem-
bers' bills. 
There are some interesting departures from Westminster in Select 
Committee arrangements for which credit for originality should be 
given. After Lord Hewart's The New Despotism the Senate estabhshed 
in 1932 by its owm Standing Order a Standing Committee on Regula-
tions and Ordinances (i.e. delegated legislation). Seven Senators strong, 
the govemment providing both the Chairman and the majority, the com-
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mittee languished during its early years. It did, however, have a 
twelve-year start on its counterpart in the House of Commons. More 
recently, helped by a stiong Chairman and a persistent member, it has 
issued several admonitions to the govemment. Reports on such sub-
jects as "Import hcensing by regulation", "the Ordinance making 
powers of the Legislative CouncUs of the Territories", and "the un-
usually wide regulation-making power in legislation" have aU showm 
the govemment to be ultra sensitive to check. There have been hvely 
debates on its reports and, with the committee centied in the Senate, 
the govemment, so far, has been prepared to condone its non-confor-
mity. Its design has been copied in South Australia, and Victoria. 
There is also a Joint Committee on Pubhc Works. First established 
in Victoria and New South Wales in the 1870s, it gave representatives 
an institution to which they could divert constituency pressure for 
local works development. It also gave governments a rational means 
of assessing the merits of the multiphcity of pubhc works proposals 
emerging from a society dependent upon public development. The 
Commonwealth Committee was established in 1913 when the Liberal 
Prime Minister, Joseph Cook, considered that "the methods of con-
ducting enquiries on pubhc works pohcy are crude, inefficient, and 
altogether inadequate for the purpose of securing the taxpayer 
against loss and waste".^^ It now has a membership of three Senators 
and six Representatives and appoints a chairman from its govemment 
majority. Its interests are confined to civil works over which (except 
for 1932-36) it has exercised a continuing scrutiny. Work that wdU 
cost more than £250,000 cannot be begun without some formal 
reference of the project being made to it. 
A more controversial committee is the Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. This was first estabhshed in 1951 and the Opposition refuses 
to nominate members to it. The Committee hves at the whim of the 
Minister for Extemal Affairs who makes available to it information 
"he may consider desirable"; it sits in camera and reports to the 
Minister (informing Parhament that it has reported); it must inform 
the Minister if it calls for witnesses and must have his consent to caU 
for documents; and all its evidence is confidential. It has been caUed 
"a cosy study circle" and receives a fair share of criticism from the 
Opposition side. It is not difficult to be sympathetic wdth the critics 
for, however much they hunger after the confidences of intemational 
pohtics, there would be httie comfort to be fed them by the Minister 
and then to hve wdth sealed hps thereafter. 
CONCLUSIONS 
AU this suggests that, as a result of the mfluence of party, the stiength 
of the Executive's control of Parhament is the principal characteristic 
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of the Austrahan scene. The difference from Westminster in this is 
simply one of degree. If the Westminster model produces stiong 
govemment, and that is one of its attributes, we cannot vety weU 
expect a strong Parliament. What is curious about the Executive's 
power in Australia is the means by which it has been attained. 
The eclectic technique in procedure and the pohtical motives in 
fostering the notion of the Westminster model have been mentioned 
and may weU be paralleled wherever the system has been trans-
planted. But procedural eclecticism might also have been used to the 
advantage of the institution. Members determine their owm pro-
cedures: since backbenchers outnumber frontbenchers, why should 
the front bench wdn? It is evident that something in addition to the 
sheer force of numbers operates. In Austraha there are one or two 
notable techniques. 
The flrst is the practice of making the office of Speaker (and the 
President of the Senate) a party prize. This has had a profound effect 
upon parhamentaty development. WhUe there is a great deal of 
mythology about the independence of the Speaker at Westminster, he 
does not face the pohtical sanctions that confront his counterpart in 
Austiaha. There, all semblance of subtlety is shunned. The Speaker is 
expected to start and finish a party man. A professing non-party 
Speaker would be an oddity (e.g. Mr. Speaker Cameron, 1950-56). 
For Austrahan politicians there are no neutral men. 
When Speaker Sir Littleton Groom declined to vote in Committee 
to save the Bruce-Page Govemment in 1929 he was pursued by his 
own party into his electorate, denied party endorsement, and a party 
nominee was endorsed against him. He lost. Even in normal circum-
stances the Speaker is freely opposed at elections. 
The present Speaker (Sir John McLeay) is the most popular the 
House has had. After the election of 1960 he helped to maintain the 
slender majority of the Menzies' Govemment, either by his casting 
vote or his vote in committee divisions. I have not seen one word of 
complaint against his acts. He was expected, on both sides, to back 
his party. Assured of this the Prime Minister exclaimed that he had 
never felt so secure in Parhament as he has with a majority of one. 
The election of 1963 was not provoked by Parliament's instabihty. 
Bearing in mind that the Chairman of Committees breathes the 
same pohtical air as the Speaker, it is not difficult to interpret the pro-
cedural mlings which have, on balance, over the years considerably 
bolstered the governmental power. 
Secondly, and accruing from the link between govemment and 
Speaker, has been the physical take-over of the Commonwealth Par-
hamentaty building by the Executive. Canberra's Whitehall has con-
quered the Houses of Parliament and this has coloured the attitudes 
of officials towards the institution. The position has best been put by a 
Clerk of the House who held a deep concem for the imphcations of 
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the tiend. "Parhament House", he said, "is nothmg more than a large 
govemment secretariat. Ministers do not work m their departments. 
They occupy rooms round the chamber of the House wdth their staffs, 
whUe the ordinaty members share rooms in the distant wings."i® The 
situation he described has persisted in spite of new and large adminis-
trative buildings m the national capital. It is difficult to see that it wUl 
ever change. In this respect the fusion in Canberra is virtually com-
plete. 
Finally, there is the effect of parhamentaty broadcastmg. Intio-
duced by a Labor govemment in 1946 out of dissatisfaction with the 
reporting of Parhament by the Austiahan press, and stemming from 
Austraha's lack of nationally distributed newspapers, it has changed 
the whole ethos of Austrahan parliamentary hfe. Undoubtedly mem-
bers now speak to their electorates. "I say to the Austrahan people" is 
as common a preface as "Mr. Speaker". 
Some responsibihty for the reluctance to dwell on matters of detail 
must be given to broadcasting—to members it is policy, not adminis-
tiation, that will win votes. At the same time no alternative organs of 
parhamentaty scrutiny have been established. There have been 
sporadic demands for them but they have lacked sufficient strength 
to command governmental attention. The question period provides 
the most popular broadcasting material (it is re-broadcast each 
evening after a sitting and after editing). The knowledge of public 
interest in it promotes members' participation, but it also encourages 
an extreme caution on the part of the govemment towards reforms 
that would increase its effectiveness. 
From the results of a Gallup Poll in 1957 it was asserted that 33 per 
cent of people had listened to Parliament during the preceding month 
—8 per cent hstened for more than one hour. Obviously, that is enough 
to keep the generahties flowing. If Parhament is the forum of the 
nation, then parhamentaty broadcasting is an admirable medium for 
bringing it closer to the electorate, to promote pohtical thinking and to 
foster pohtical education. I consider it essential. I consider it has 
achieved much, but I also beheve that it has changed the whole 
concept of the Commonwealth Parhament. 
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HOUSE OF REVIEW: ANOTHER LOOK 
Anthonj Fusaro 
For many years, the Austrahan senate has been the subject of serious 
debate regarding its usefulness as a house of review. The same argu-
ments, pro and con, appear repeatedly. As the matter is one of current 
interest, it would seem appropriate to take another look at the role of 
the upper house and to re-evaluate its record as a reviewing chamber. 
Naturally, it wUl not be possible in this brief study to consider in 
detaU every case in which the senate has changed or attempted to 
change legislation sent to it from the lower house. Thus, emphasis will 
be given to those cases which seem to be particularly good illustra-
tions, either because of their interesting or controversial nature. The 
study wdll concem the performance of the upper house when con-
trolled by the govemment as well as when controlled by the opposi-
tion. The particular aspect of review to be considered here is primarily 
related to the senate's reaction to proposals of the house of representa-
tives, although some mention wUl be made also of its power to review 
the acts of the executive. 
Finally, the purpose of this study is not simply to rehash old argu-
ments. Rather, it is hoped that they can be presented in more balanced 
fashion than has usually been the case in the past. If, occasionally, 
an even shghtiy different interpretation of theoty or fact appears, then, 
hopefully, this paper may be of some assistance to others who seek a 
fuUer understanding of the senate's role. 
To the supporters of the senate, the first major dispute between the 
two houses of parhament was an exciting interplay between opposing 
political forces. To others, it symbohzed an intolerable delay in the 
decision-making process. Nevertheless, whatever the interpretation 
attached to the event, the fact that parhament could not agree until 
1909 on the site of the federal capital seemed to fufiU the hopes of 
some that the senate would emerge under the constitution as a power-
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ful and determined body, mdependent of the house.^ Later events, 
however, proved that such a conclusion was premature. 
The fact that the senate has not, during most of its histoty, shovra 
any great degree of independence from the lower house and govem-
ment is attributed by many to the existence of strong pohtical parties. 
It cannot be denied that smce the establishment of the party system 
parhamentarians-regardless of the chamber hi which they sat-have 
by-and-large voted in accordance with tihe party positions on the 
issues at hand. Neither is it vety strange that senators have not turned 
out to be the kind of independent legislators many of tihe founders 
expected. In an election, no candidate can ignore the special interests 
of stiong groups in the society. To be ahgned with a major party is a 
distinct advantage. Moreover, the size of the state-wide districts has 
a noticeable effect on the control of senators by national parties. The 
difficulty a candidate has in making himself personally known to a 
large constituency (especially when he shares the limelight with several 
other candidates who are vying for the other senate seats allotted to 
the same constituency), as well as the financial burden of mnning an 
effective campaign, are powerful forces attracting men to the pubhcity 
and support available to them in an established party. 
To the critics, the contiol of the parties over their members, while 
not completely destroying the senate's usefulness as a reviewing 
chamber, has certainly lessened it. The upper house, it is charged, has 
"become largely redundant when its party majority corresponds with 
that in the house of representatives, and obstructive when the vagaries 
of elections give the two houses different party complexions."^ 
Defenders, on the other hand, may argue that an opposition-controlled 
senate is the result of popular election, and is simply another of the 
checks and balances which the constitution allows and which en-
courages pohtical compromise. This built-in feature, which can aUow 
for legislative review by the opposition, is apparently one which many 
people have neither understood nor accepted. It is nevertheless a fac-
tor to be considered when judging the record of the upper house. 
By way of clarification, then, it would seem that any evaluation of 
the senate must concem itself with the foUowdng questions: 
(a) What has been the record of the upper chamber when contioUed 
by the opposition? 
(b) Has revision by opposition-contioUed senates been pohticaUy 
obstructive rather than legitimately constructive? 
(c) Has the senate performed as a house of review when contioUed 
by the govemment party? 
After party organizations became rather firmly estabhshed in parha-
ment, the first instance of spht control occurred as a result of the 1913 
election. The labor party lost control of the govemment when the 
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house of representatives shpped into the hands of the hberals by a 
margin of one. Labor, however, succeeded in increasing its margin of 
control in the senate.^ Inevitably, conffict developed, and in the fol-
lowing year, the commonwealth witnessed the first double dissolution 
of the parhament under section 57 of the constitution. Charges were 
made tiiat labor had caused the crisis by being obstructive in exploit-
ing the situation for party advantage. The govemment, on the other 
hand, was criticized for deliberately provoking the opposition in order 
to create a situation which made dissolution possible. Two questions 
thus arise for our consideration: (1) What was the legislative record 
of the senate just prior to the dissolution? and (2) Was that record one 
of legitimate review, or one of pohtical obstruction? 
Contemporaty articles as weU as studies since 1914 agree in sub-
stance that the govemment did indeed wish to play upon party dif-
ferences in order to provoke a double dissolution.^ How, then, did the 
senate react? 
The measure which was the subject of the double dissolution pro-
ceedings was the govemment Preference Prohibition bill. Its purpose 
was to abolish preferences for unionists in employment wdth the com-
monwealth. Labor, unable to divorce itself from the unions, could not 
accept such a measure, and the senate thus rejected the bill. In 
addition, the senate amended other legislation sent to it by the house, 
including a biU to restore the system of "postal voting". While agreeing 
in principle on postal voting for sick and infirm citizens, the upper 
chamber altered certain of the methods prescribed by the bill.^ In all, 
the senate's record for the session was as follows: twenty-three bills 
were passed and assented to; six bills were passed by the senate alone; 
eighteen of the group of twenty-three biUs were approved by the 
senate wdthout amendment; five of the twenty-three bills were 
approved with amendments, of which three were laid aside by the 
house of representatives; two bills were rejected by the senate.® 
On paper, the record hardly seems to be one of obstruction, 
especiaUy when one considers the fact that the govemment Preference 
Prohibition biU was not a vital measure. As for the legitimacy of the 
senate's vetoes and revisions, perhaps the best evidence to consider is 
the support which the labor party's senate pohcy aroused among the 
people. In the election which followed the double dissolution, the 
hberal govemment of Joseph Cook met its demise. The house of rep-
resentatives was retumed with forty-two laborites, thirty-two liberals, 
and one independent. The new senate was composed of thirty-one 
laborites and five hberals.''^ 
To be entirely accurate, it must be stated here that the election 
campaign did not concentrate solely on the bill which was the subject 
of the dissolution. The results cannot, therefore, be tied directly to 
labor's stand on that particular issue. However, its victoty at the poUs 
certainly demonstiated popular approval of labor's general program. 
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the spokesman for which smce the 1913 election had been the labor 
senate. 
When a party succeeds in winnmg support for itself, as labor did in 
1914, democratic practice has the effect of bestowmg upon it the cloak 
of righteousness. WhUe the senate's behavior might thus have been 
obstmctive m the eyes of the Cook govemment its actions can hardly 
be caUed anything but legitunate, either constitutionally or in terms 
of its representation of the popular wiU. Thus, while party attitudes 
may have determined the course of events—and this wdll never change 
as long as the party system exists—the effects of party affihation did 
not, in this case, nuUify the performance of the senate as a house of 
review. Rather, it would seem that the upper house was more in tune 
with the pubhc than was the supposedly more representative chamber 
of the parhament. 
In 1929, the circumstances of a spht parliament reoccurred. For three 
sessions the Scullin labor govemment was confronted with a non-labor 
senate, which, in the words of one WTiter, ". . . rejected twelve govem-
ment biUs outiight, mutUated or delayed many others including a 
tariff biU, and, most importantly, was able to ensure the strict ortho-
doxy of the government's anti-depression pohcy".^ 
Unlike the hberal govemment of 1914, prime minister Sculhn did 
not make use of the double dissolution provisions of section 57 of the 
constitution. Two elections in less than one year had been a financial 
strain on house members, and a third would have been unbearable 
for some. In addition, many laborites were experiencing their first 
responsibffities as ministers and they feared that a new election might 
cut their terms short. There was also pressure from the unions, which 
sought to convince the govemment to stay in office as long as possible. 
Sculhn, therefore, decided to maintain the govemment as best he 
could—a decision which many think was a pohtical error because it 
served only to put the govemmentis program before a hostile senate. 
From October 1929 to December 1931, the senate passed 131 bUls 
and rejected twelve. Eighty-four biUs were passed without amend-
ment, and forty-seven wdth amendments.^ The varied tactics used by 
the senate, although at times the obvious results of party hostilities, 
were nevertheless constitutionally in hne with the chamber's review-
ing power. For example, the Central Reserve Bank bill of 1930 was 
referred to a select committee on 10 July 1930. ^^^  Although this was a 
perfectly legitimate method of studying detailed legislation, there was 
obviously a partisan purpose behind delaying the bill. When the senate 
received the committee's report, further debate ended wdth the passage 
of a motion that the biU be read "this day six months"—a parhamentaty 
tactic which, in effect, kiUed the measure.^^ 
In considering the Commonwealth Bank biU of 1931, the opposition 
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senate, in an unprecedented move, went so far as to call Sir Robert 
Gibson, chairman of the Commonwealth Bank Board, to the bar of the 
senate in connection with the bill's proposal to transfer contiol of the 
gold reserve from the Commonwealth Bank to the govemment 
treasurer.^^ The move was particularly resented by the government, 
and the senate only added salt to the wound when the bill was finaUy 
rejected. 
In the debates on the Sewing Machine Bounty BiU, those in favour 
of passage argued that the bounty and tariff provided for in the bUl 
would stimulate industrial expansion. Those opposed charged that the 
resulting higher price of sewing machines in Austraha would be 
exploitation of housewives. The vote to reject was strictly along party 
hnes.^ ^ 
In discussion on the Fiduciaty Note biU of 1931, the govemment 
made an appeal to senators to fuffiU their reviewing function. Com-
menting on the govemment leader's request that the opposition give 
the measure serious and unbiased consideration, Senator George 
Pearce (UAP—WA) charged that this was impossible, as the biU 
savoured "a great deal of party, and vety httle of public interest". 
"We consider", he charged, "that it has been framed solely as a move 
in the game of electioneering tactics." The opposition senator, demon-
strating the difference between his party's and the government's 
attitudes on fiscal policy, argued that the administration was wrong to 
think that fiduciaty notes were the only way to raise needed revenue. 
The opposition argued instead that money should be raised by keeping 
national expenditure in line with national income, thus reviving con-
fidence in the economy and encouraging an increase in credits made 
available to spur industrial activity.^* Again, the vote to reject was 
along party lines. 
The senate also prevented the Sculhn govemment from submitting 
to the people in a referendum a proposal to allow the constitution to 
be amended by absolute majorities of both houses of parhament.^^ 
The spirit of the opposition evidenced itself in similar fashion con-
ceming the other measures over which differences occurred between 
the two houses. The votes recorded were time and again almost in-
variably party-hne votes. In the eyes of some observers, the senate's 
record was encouraging because it seemed to be evidence of its 
acceptance of its constitutional purpose. Others doubted this, however, 
arguing that the ". . . Senate has amended and has rejected Bills from 
the other House, not because it has become suddenly conscious of its 
somewhat atrophied constitutional function as a revising chamber, but 
because it stands for a national pohcy fundamentally different from 
the policy of the government".^® 
This contention is obviously trae, for the party differences were 
great, and were perhaps even more noticeable as a result of the 
economic crises of the 1930's. Agam, however, it must be decided 
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whether or not the senate acted simultaneously as a party chamber 
and as a legitimate house of review, or if the latter role was sacrfficed 
to the former. 
It must agam be emphasized that the influence of party can never 
be disregarded. In that sense, the type of mdependent reviewdng 
chamber existmg to consider and revise legislation witihout regard to 
any interest but that of providing sound laws—the kind of dream 
chamber some of the founders may have expected—certamly does not 
exist, and cannot exist while pohtical parties function. There is, never-
theless, a function of review which takes place when one party, which 
represents a sizable portion of the electorate, succeeds in influencing 
the legislative proposals of another party. Of course, it must be remem-
bered that the character of this type of review is naturally tied to the 
fact that the senate, because it has a staggered term system, may well 
be "behind the times", in the sense that the party hneup may be out 
of step with popular sentiment as expressed in the last election. On 
the other hand, it can also be argued that this is not necessarUy a 
disadvantage, and is a factor which was approved by the founders as 
a guarantee against hasty action by temporaty majorities in the house. 
Thus, the senate controlled by the opponents of the Sculhn govem-
ment was in fact acting as a house of review. The question which 
remains is whether the senate's behavior was reasonable and in 
accordance wdth what should be expected of such a chamber. The 
rejection of twelve out of 131 bills does not in itself seem overbearing. 
It must be admitted, nonetheless, that the tactics used, such as the 
caUing of a witness to the bar of the senate, were in some cases 
extreme. In the final analysis, it would still seem that the view of the 
pubhc would be the best measuring stick to determine the reasonable-
ness of the senate's record. Although many factors influenced the vote 
in 1931, not the least of which was the world depression, it is stffi 
possible to relate the defeat of the Scullin govemment in that year to 
the role of the senate. It was, after all, through the senate that the 
opposition since 1929 had kept its program before the pubhc. The 
views made knowm in that chamber were reiterated in the campaign 
and, while the vote did not mean that the people approved of all of the 
activities of the senate, the support given to the general pohcies of 
the party which had controlled that body since 1929 was certainly 
not a repudiation of the party's use of the senate's constitutional power 
of review to try to implement its program. 
After the resignation of the Fadden govemment in 1941, the Curtin 
labor govemment came to power with the support of two indepen-
dents in an evenly divided house of representatives. The govemment 
had a minority of two in the senate and not untU July, 1944, could 
labor claim contiol of both houses. The times, however, were not 
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ripe for protiacted disagreements—party or otherwise—and the govem-
ment was not unduly hampered by the opposition senate. The most 
important conffict concemed the government's handling of the Income 
Tax biU of 1943; but even this disagreement was more procedural 
than substantive, and it was finally resolved by conference. 
In another case, the senate amended the Austrahan Soldiers' Repat-
riation bill of 1943, to give preference in appointments to the pubhc 
service to competent persons who had served in the armed forces out-
side Austraha "in any area prescribed as a combat area".^''' The house 
further amended the provision to include in the preferential treatment 
persons who had served on a ship or civil aircraft "in any zone which, 
in relation to ships or aircraft, . . . is prescribed as a combat zone".^^ 
The senate would not agree to the house amendment, and the house 
did not insist upon it. The upper house therefore was successful in 
revising the bill to its owm satisfaction. 
In general, this period is not sufficiently representative to judge an 
opposition senate's record as a house of review. Although the upper 
chamber did perform that function on occasion, as the above examples 
indicate, it did not do so with any great frequency. Austiaha was too 
concemed wdth the Japanese threat to risk any great pohtical rifts at 
home. The election results which finally gave labor a majority in the 
senate are hkewise no reflection on that chamber's record from 1941 
to 1944 when one considers the usual tendency of the pubhc to sup-
port its govemment when the countty is faced with an extemal threat, 
In 1949, the senate was elected for the first time by the proportional 
representation system provided for in the Commonwealth Electoral 
act of 1948. Proportional representation had long been advocated by 
those who wished to see an end to the lopsided majorities often 
occurring in the upper house. The circumstances under which the bill 
was finally passed, however, left the labor govemment open to 
criticism. Amid signs that the govemment was losing ground among 
the voters, it was suggested that labor was contriving to insure that 
even if it lost contiol of the house of representatives, it would main-
tain its hold on the senate. Because of the staggered system by which 
senators retire, eighteen members of the upper chamber did not have 
to stand for re-election in 1949. Fifteen of these were laborites. Due 
to the increase in the size of the senate from thirty to sixty members 
in accordance with the Representation act of 1948, forty-two senators 
were chosen in the 1949 election. Labor, with the buffer of a majority of 
the non-retiring senators, and with the expectation that proportional 
representation would result in a near-even split among the new sena-
tors, felt assured of keeping its majority in the senate. This is precisely 
what happened, although the labor majority in the upper house was 
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reduced to eight. The new election system thus resulted m another 
spht parhament. 
According to some news reports, the defeat of the labor party 
"shocked members of the cabmet as weU as most of the rank-and-file, 
who had felt the govemment would be retumed with a good workmg 
majority".!^ Be that as it may, the defeat was a reahty, and labor set 
about its business determined to retum to power quickly, while the 
new hberal govemment was preparing to test the opposition with 
certain legislative proposals which it was well aware could create 
constitutional conditions for a double dissolution. 
Govemment successes in the opposition senate were not impressive. 
Only two substantive measures were passed into law by June 1950, 
when parhament rose. One of these created a wool stabilization fund. 
The second, the Social Services act, dealing with chUd endowments, 
was passed only after two unsuccessful attempts in the senate. When 
the parhamentaty session ended, the two houses were deadlocked on 
three major bills: the Commonwealth Bank bill, the Constitution 
Amendment bill, and the Communist Party Dissolution biU.^ Time 
and space make it impossible to cover all of the encounters between 
house and senate prior to the double dissolution which occurred when 
the senate failed to pass the Commonwealth Bank bill. For the pur-
poses of this paper, it will be most useful to detail the facts surround-
ing the senate's consideration of the Communist Party Dissolution bill. 
Early in AprU of 1950, the federal parhamentaty labor party made it 
known that it would not oppose the communist bill—at least in prin-
ciple. By a vote of thirty-four to twenty-seven, it decided that labor 
would support the measure wdth certain amendments.^^ As the vote 
indicated, the group was far from being of one mind on the stand to 
be taken. The party spht into several groups on treatment of the bill. 
Some favored it for practical reasons. Opposition to the measure, it 
was felt by these men, would mean political disaster at the polls. There 
was no choice, in view of the public interest which the bill aroused, 
but to support it. Other laborites favored passage regardless of 
pohtical consequences because of a deep hatred of communism. Those 
who opposed tihe bill did so mainly on two grounds. It was argued 
that the measure violated labor principles, and also that passage would 
only drive the communists underground.^^ 
The amendments which labor favored did not effect the main pur-
pose of the bill, which was to ban the communist party and prevent 
its members from holding office hi tiade unions and in the pubhc 
service. The main area of disagreement concemed the "onus of proof 
clause, whereby the burden of proof of innocence rested with the 
accused person. Labor proposed to shift the onus of proof to the 
commonwealth. 
The senate maintained its position until as late as 27 September, 
when, after the upper chamber had akeady defeated tihe bUl once, the 
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federal ALP executive stUl decided to insist on the onus of proof 
amendment, knowing fuU weU that a double dissolution would surely 
occur i£ the senate refused to pass the measure again.^^ This stand 
was a victory for the leader of the opposition, J. B. Chifley, who was 
faced with growing reluctance on the part of many laborites to press 
the issue to the point of crisis.^* Mr. Chifley's victory was short-hved. 
A few weeks later, labor's pohcy was reversed. The party would allow 
the bill to pass and amend it when it regained control of the govem-
ment. The about face was called by prime minister Menzies the ". . . 
most abject surrender in the history of the once great Australian labour 
party". The govemment was particularly critical of the decision be-
cause it originated not wdth tlie labor senators themselves, but wdth 
the federal executive, "12 outsiders who have aheady succeeded in 
holding up the legislation in the interests of the Communist Party for 
six long months". ^ ° 
Wherever the decision originated, it was implemented in the senate, 
and the Communist Party Dissolution bill became law. Labor had 
backed dowm, but the govemment was not wholly pleased wdth the 
results, for the senate had foiled Menzies' hopes for a double dissolu-
tion.2® In fact, the govemment found more reason for displeasure a few 
months later when the high court declared the anti-Communist bill 
unconstitutional. 
The labor record in the 1950 senate served to increase arguments 
that the upper house had lost sight of its constitutional purpose. The 
opposition's use of the powers of legislative review was branded as 
"capricious, juvenile, and arrogant".^''^ One procedural matter par-
ticularly brought scorn to the labor senate by govemment supporters. 
In ah fairness, however, it cannot be said that the opposition was the 
sole cause of the incident. The govemment, waranghng for a double 
dissolution and a new election which might allow it to win control of 
the senate, was certainly not beyond playing the game of partisan 
pohtics. 
On 25 May 1950, the opposition decided to retahate against a 
govemment action of the previous week when the senate was called 
on short notice for a Friday meeting. Since most senators had planned 
to leave Canberra on Friday morning for their usual weekend away 
from the capital, labor decided to demonstiate its disapproval by 
assembling in the lobby but refusing to enter the chamber. Since 
several govemment senators were also absent, the senate, for lack of 
a quorum, was forced to adjoum.^^ 
Perhaps the govemment had hoped to catch the opposition off 
guard. If many of the labor senators had left the capital and the 
government had been successful in keeping its owm men available, the 
senate might have taken some actions quite displeasing to the opposi-
tion. By boycotting the session altogether, labor prevented such a 
possibility. 
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During the foUowing week, to insure that no such action would be 
taken m the future, labor motions were passed fixing the days and 
hours of sitting m the senate—a matter customarily determmed by the 
govemment Henceforth, the senate would convene as it normally had, 
on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 3 pm, and on Thursdays at 11 am. 
Furtiher, a govemment motion to suspend the standmg orders so that 
new business could be taken up after 10.30 pm was dismissed,^* and it 
was determined that the president should put the question to adjourn 
at 10.30 pm when the senate was not broadcasting and at 11 pm when 
it was.^ ** 
On the previous day, labor had once again flouted the govemment 
by refusing to have the Communist Party Dissolution biU declared an 
urgent measure to facihtate consideration by the senate.^^ It also 
announced its owm intention of intioducing the opposition's bill to 
amend the constitution so as to give the commonwealth the authority 
to control prices, which would thereby take up time which the senate 
would otherwise spend debating govemment proposals. "To some 
extent", declared the Sydney Morning Herald, "they are harvesting a 
fruity revenge for what the anti-labor senate did to the Sculhn govem-
ment in the years 1929-1931, and there is no doubt that this lust for 
vengeance is playing no small part in what is occurring."^® To many 
people the senate did indeed look more and more hke a party house, 
and less and less hke a house of review. 
Perhaps the argument can be made that as long as the parties' 
actions are determined by principle, their fuU use of constitutional 
reviewdng power is to be condoned. Even if such an argument were to 
be accepted, it could not easily be apphed to labor in 1950. As men-
tioned earher, the anti-communist bill was one which aroused pubhc 
feehng. It was perhaps the most important and most newsworthy 
measure proposed during the session. The opposition had indeed made 
a stiong stand for its proposed amendments, but in the eyes of many, 
its final surrender seemed to be an example of principle giving way to 
pohtical expediency. 
r . . The party went through all the motions of fighting to the last ditch for 
what were asserted to be inviolable principles. Then, when the ditch—a 
general election—hove hi sight, the order was given to abandon such im-
pediments as principles and run for cover.^ ^ 
The guide used in evaluating the performance of previous opposi-
tion senates may also be used here. Was the upper house following a 
pubhcly approved pohcy? Agam, pubhc sentiment on the Communist 
Dissolution bUl helps in arriving at an answer to this question. It had 
been suggested that the opposition of a sizable portion of the labor 
party to outiawing the communist party had been an important factor 
in labor's defeat in 1949.^* This contention is strengthened by the 
results of an opinion poU a few months later in which 82 percent of 
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those asked said they favored the ban. This 82 percent included nine 
out of ten hberal-coimtty party voters asked, and seven out of ten 
labor voters asked.^^ Inasmuch as the labor party had decided to 
support the biU in principle, however, this poU does not show pubhc 
opposition to labor's stand m 1950. In fact, a poU taken a short time 
later seemed to substantiate the opposition view when 56 percent of 
those poUed agreed that the onus of proof should be on the govem-
ment and only 34 percent thought it should rest wdth the accused, the 
other 10 percent being undecided. In this case, 65 percent of the labor 
voters took the former position and 25 percent the latter. Among 
hberal-countty party voters, 48 percent sided wdth the first group and 
43 with the last group.^® 
Up to this point, labor seemed to have the support of the pubhc. 
However, after the govemment had revised its position and had agreed 
to accept the onus of proof if a person declared to be a communist would 
give swom evidence in court, the tide turned. In the next poU taken on 
the question, 74 percent of the L-CP voters polled and 52 percent of 
the laborites poUed approved the onus of proof clause as the govem-
ment had amended it.^ '^  Further, to the question of which party the 
persons poUed would vote for if the onus of proof dispute caused a 
double (hssolution, 53 percent said they would choose the L-CP coah-
tion over labor. After dividing the undecided group either propor-
tionaUy or according to how they had voted in the previous elections, 
the government's prospective vote rose to 57 percent, leaving labor at 
its lowest ebb since the depression.^^ 
Labor, regardless of its motives in opposing the passage of the com-
munist biU, had succeeded in creating the impression of being soft on 
the enemy. In the election of 1951, this had a signfficant effect. A few 
months before the election, the pollsters asked a representative sample 
of the electors for which party they would vote and what was the most 
important reason for their choice. Fifty-two percent declared for the 
L-CP, wdth 30 percent attributing their decision to the government's 
stand on communism. Forty-seven percent chose labor, but only 4 
percent of this group made the choice on the basis of labor's policy on 
communism.^ ^ 
It would thus seem that labor had chosen the path which led to 
pubhc disfavor. In the election of 1951, the senate was lost to them, 
and the government majority was increased in the house. If the dis-
cussion could end here, it would then seem to be clear that the labor 
senate failed to act properly as a house of review, both because of the 
obviously partisan tactics used during the session (although it must 
be emphasized again that the use of such tactics was not a one-sided 
matter), and because of the rejection of labor's program at the polls. 
Such a conclusion cannot so easUy be made, however. Although the 
communist issue might have been a major factor in the outcome of the 
election, the people eventuaUy came around to a position against the 
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government's anti-communist pohcy. Support for the program had 
dropped dramaticaUy during 1951, from 80 percent in June to the 
actual 49.4 percent who approved the govemment proposal in the 
anti-communist referendum which was held a few months later. The 
opposition, in that same period, had increased from 12 percent to 50.6 
percent.*<> Thus, if one considers that a proper function of the house of 
review is to educate the pubhc on current issues before the parhament, 
and to delay controversial measures untU the pubhc has had ample 
time to form and express an opinion, then the original stand taken by 
labor would seem to have been justffied. 
One further way remains in which to judge the senate in this period. 
If one of the main purposes of a reviewing chamber is to safeguard 
the principles of the constitution, then the action of the high court in 
declaring the anti-communist biU unconstitutional is further evidence 
that the senate was acting as a chamber of review. Indeed, it failed in 
this case not because it maintained an obstmctive partisan pohcy, but 
because it gave in to the demands of the govemment. 
The conclusion to be made regarding this senate is therefore not cut 
and dried. There is much evidence to show that party was on many 
occasions placed before principle. On the other hand, there are also 
those indications which have been considered here that the senate did 
at times perform a legitimate reviewing function despite the motives 
which may have determined many of labor's actions. The major 
criticism to be made is perhaps that the senate was not consistent, and 
that on the matter conceming which it had the strongest constitutional 
case for obstructing the govemment, it sacrificed the reviewing func-
tion for pohtical reasons. Had it maintained its original position on the 
onus of proof clause in the anti-communist bill, its record as a house of 
review would have been a better one, and opponents of the senate 
would have been left with one less argument on the senate's behavior 
as a party chamber. 
The discussion thus far has concemed the senate's activities as a house 
of review when the opposition was in tihe majority. During most of its 
histoty, however, the parhament has not been so spht, and in these 
years the senate has taken on a calmer, more subdued, and according 
to some critics, a less useful function. When the govemment party has 
dominated the senate, the order of business has been subject to httle 
or no obstruction. This was especiaUy true in the years when the old 
election system resulted in vety heavy majorities for the ruhng party. 
In such circumstances, the govemment generaUy had neither the 
desire nor the need to entertain signfficant revision of its program by 
the opposition. 
There have, of course, been occasions on which party discipline has 
not prevented independent action by senators, with the result that 
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govemment proposals have either been changed or defeated. For 
instance, on a govemment bUl in 1939 providing for a tax on gold 
dehvered to the commonwealth bank or to any agent of that bank, 
enough govemment senators defected to cause a sixteen-sixteen tie 
and to defeat the measure.*^ There were similar occurrences on 
measures such as tariff bills. In some studies, such as Mr. J. R. Odgers' 
detailed works on the senate, the contention is made that the upper 
chamber has frequently amended bUls sent up from the house.*^ A 
closer study of the record, however, reveals that in the great majority 
of the cases, the amendments referred to were sponsored by the 
govemment itself. While it might be argued that this was legislative 
review in a sense, as it afforded the govemment an opportunity to 
perfect its owm proposals, it would not be the usual definition given to 
the concept. The instances when private members, either of the 
govemment party or the opposition, have introduced successful 
amendments are relatively few in number, particularly before pro-
portional representation. To the researcher looking for such instances 
of independent action by a govemment-controUed senate, the task 
becomes unavoidably tedious and disappointingly unproductive. 
Since the proportional representation system came into being, the 
senate has been somewhat more active in making use of its reviewing 
powers. The reason for this apparently is connected with the fact that 
the days when a party could capture an overwhelming majority of the 
seats in the chamber appear to be gone forever. Under the present 
election system, it is almost impossible for a party to obtain more than 
sis of the ten seats in any state, and quite hkely that it will only obtain 
an even spht The margin of control, therefore, has never been more 
than four in the years since the 1951 election, and on some occasions 
the govemment has had to depend on the support of sphnter group 
senators to maintain control. In such circumstances, the absence of 
only a few govemment senators might be signfficant in a situation 
where it is not possible to arrange pairs when votes are taken. Like-
wise, it only takes a small number of dissident govemment senators to 
upset the apple cart, bringing defeat to cabinet bills or forcing accep-
tance of amendments. Since 1952, such instances have been relatively 
frequent as compared with the record of earhor government-con-
trolled senates. 
From 1952, when several govemment senators voted with labor to 
accept a hberal member's amendment to the Land Tax Assessment 
bill,*^ to 1965, when the govemment felt harassed by adverse senate 
votes conceming the Repatriation biU and the Ipec case, there are 
numerous examples of independent action by the senate. During this 
period, a study of the Senate Debates reveals over seventeen instances 
of govemment defeat. In more than thirty-five other examples, party 
discipline faded to maintain sohd party unity, but the defections 
were not sufficient to aUow opposition victories. 
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One of the above-mentioned govemment defeats concemed a biU 
which was not actually labeled a govemment biU, although the cabinet's 
stand on it was no secret. In 1959, the Matrimonial Causes bill was 
proposed. Because the measure dealt with grounds for divorce, a sub-
ject which affected the rehgious convictions of many senators, it was 
decided that a free vote should be allowed. Nevertheless, the govem-
ment made its support knowm, and its prestige rode with the bill. 
In the senate, four amendments were made to the bill. Three of 
these were at the insistence of the minister in charge of the biU. The 
fourth amendment, introduced by Senator R. C. Wright of Tasmania, 
eliminated from the biU a section providing that insanity was ground 
for divorce.** This was a setback for the govemment, which had 
emphasized that the clause was an important part of the measure. 
Nevertheless, the govemment decided to accept the change, and the 
house approved the amendments shortly thereafter.*^ It was one of the 
infrequent occasions on which several members of the house voiced 
praise of the senate for its handhng of a biU.*® 
On another occasion, in 1960, ten govemment senators crossed the 
floor to vote against the govemment in support of an amendment to 
the Sales Tax (Exemptions and Classffications) bill. The amendment 
passed by a vote of thirty-four to nineteen.*'^ More difficulties appeared 
when the govemment was informed that Senator Wright and Senator 
I. A. C. Wood of Queensland would oppose the govemment bill to 
increase the sales tax on cars. When the bill was brought to a vote, it 
was rejected at the second reading stage by a twenty-nine to twenty-
nine tie.*^ 
The senate's refusal to ratify the ten percent sales tax increase 
placed the govemment in "the most embarrassing position it has faced 
in its 11 years of office".*® The embarrassment was caused by the fact 
that the vendors had been collecting the "tax" on cars sold since 16 
November 1960, in anticipation of the biU's passage. The defeat of the 
measure would necessitate a refund of these "taxes". The govemment 
thus decided to tiy again for a favorable senate vote. On the second 
vote. Senator Wright saved face for the govemment by abstaining and 
allowing the biU to pass.^ Criticized for a sheepish performance. 
Senator Wright took the opportunity to explain his conception of the 
senate's role as a house of review. StiU opposed to the biU, he felt, 
nevertheless, that the senate had fuffiUed its task by registering its 
opposition. The govemment not being able to accept the senate view, 
he thought that the upper chamber should yield. 
My oudook is that a deliberate vote in the Senate demands a great sense 
of self-discipline and an objective interpretation of the constitutional 
relations between the two Houses. The Senate is not a rubber stamp but, 
on the other hand, it is not a forum for irresponsible obstruction to legis-
lation of an elected govemment. One must always be conscious of pre-
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serving a proper sense of the relationship of our authority to that of the 
House of Representatives. 
I therefore feel that, as the Govemment, with the support of the House 
of Representatives, is pressing its claim to have this measure passed, it is 
proper to wdthdraw my vote from the division.^i 
Senator Wright's independent spirit has continued to be a thom in 
the government's side. In fact, more often than not, whenever an 
"across-the-aisle" vote is recorded in the senate, it is that of Senator 
Wright. In any case, the number of members who have bolted party 
lines on occasion is small. StUl, under the current system which results 
in frequent ties and close divisions, small defections—perhaps one vote 
—could swdng the tide on any measure. 
Obviously, therefore, the signfficance of senate votes has increased 
greatly. The govemment can no longer afford to neglect the proceed-
ings in the upper chamber. Whether this is good or bad depends, of 
course, on the viewpoint of the observer. For those who sincerely 
desire an active house of review, the signs seem to point to a slow but 
fairly steady change in the direction of independent action by enough 
Senators to make the difference. To others, on the other hand, the 
trend serves only to encourage further talk of eliminating or hmiting 
the powers of the senate. 
To those who desire a meaningful check on executive power, the 
work of the senate's Regulations and Ordinances committee has been 
extremely valuable. The recent Ipec case, which has been so fully 
covered by the press, is only one of many such cases when Senator 
Woods' committee has been applauded for its watchfulness. In 1956, 
two govemment party members. Senator J. A. McCallum (NSW) and 
Senator G. J. Rankin (Vic), voted with the opposition against a regula-
tion under the Leases Ordinance 1918-1955 of the Austrahan capital 
territOty. The regulation provided that grazing, fruit-growing, horti-
cultural, daity or agricultural leases in the capital territory could be 
granted for a period not exceeding fifty years and other leases for a 
period of ninety-nine years. The regulation repealed a previous one 
which had provided that no person would lease land of a greater 
assessed value than 10,000 pounds exclusive of value of buildings and 
other improvements. The govemment contended that the old regula-
tion was too inflexible. The opposition, on the other hand, argued that 
the repeal of the old rule left the way open for monopoly control of 
the land in the territoty. Senator McCallum reminded the chamber 
that ". . . senators are particularly the guardians of the Austrahan 
Capital TerritOty" and argued that the area must be protected from 
control by a few large interests. The motion to disallow was carried in 
the closely divided senate by a vote of twenty-six to twenty-four.^^ On 
this occasion, Herbert Evatt, the labor leader in the house, applauded 
the vote. "The action of the Senate in refusing to rubber-stamp arbi-
trary bureaucratic action", he said, "is some encouragement to those 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
138 I Readings in Australian Government 
who feel that the Senate has a lofty and mvaluable pubhc duty to 
perform."^^ 
Another instance in which the senate used—or, more accurately, 
threatened to use—its power of disallowance concemed certain import 
hcensing regulations promulgated in 1957. Senator Wood gave notice 
to the govemment that he intended to move that the regulations be 
disaUowed. He made the statement after the senate standing commit-
tee on ordinances and regulations had tabled a report recommending 
an end to the mles.^* The committee consisted of four govemment and 
three opposition senators, and its action caught the senior ministers by 
surprise. The four govemment senators were pressured to change their 
mind, but the opposition held. The argument against the regulations 
was based on the fact that the hcensing system deprived a trader of 
the right to import without the minister's consent. There was no pro-
vision for aUowing an appeal to a court if the minister's decision was 
thought to be unjust. 
The senate committee's move was praised in the press, the Sydney 
Morning Herald declaring that ". . . the Senate exists—or should exist— 
for precisely this kind of searching review of the processes of govem-
ment and the imphcations of legislation couched in the broadest and 
most general terms".^^ The govemment finally gave way before the 
senate threat. New import licensing review advisoty boards were 
estabhshed to ensure equitable tieatment of individual cases within 
the framework of govemment policy decisions. With the objections of 
the senate committee satisfied, the motion for disaUowance was with-
drawn.^® 
Senator Wood's committee demonstrated its vigilance also in 1960, 
when three govemment regulations conceming servicemen's pay were 
voided by iiie senate. '^'^  The regulations in question gave the three 
mihtaty service boards retrospective power over pay and allowance 
increases which had been granted over preceding periods of time. The 
senate held that an act of parhament was necessaty to restore vahdity 
to this long hst of unautiiorized expenditures totalhng 100 milhon 
pounds. The senate was again applauded for its role in attempting to 
correct abuses by the government, this time in the use of money 
powers. 
The conclusions to be drawn from this study are by no means clear-
cut. As it was stated earher, the senate's record has been spotty. When 
contioUed by the govemment prior to 1949, it did httle except act as a 
rubber stamp for cabinet decisions. When dominated by the oppo-
sition, it has seemed in the eyes of many to be bent on using obstmc-
tionist tactics for purely partisan motives. The attempt has been made 
here to show that much of the criticism stems from the fact that the 
concept of review may be too narrowly defined. The reviewdng func-
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tion is too often thought of in terms of the ideal—an honorable task 
performed by perfectly dedicated, unbiased, and expert legislators. 
Such an image makes it impossible to rate the practical value of either 
the senate's actions or its potential. If, on the other hand, the concept 
of review is more realistically and more broadly defined, then the 
senate can claim that it has performed that function more often in the 
past than its opponents are wUling to admit. 
An attempt also has been made to show that despite the charge of 
obstmctionism levied against opposition senates, there is no clear 
indication in the election results of 1913 and 1933 that the senate (or, 
more precisely, the opposition which controlled it) was being rebuked 
for the use of reviewing powers. Admittedly, the evidence included 
here to support the conclusions made is hmited by the size of this 
paper. Nevertheless, it is hoped that enough material has been pre-
sented to warrant consideration of this point as a tempering factor on 
the "obstmctionist" argument. 
In the face of continued criticism, the real decisions which must be 
made regarding the usefulness of the Senate can only be made if 
some understanding of the senate's proper role is achieved. What is to 
be required of the upper house? What kind of "review" shall it under-
take? Must it be perpetually active in revising or checking govemment 
and house proposals, or is an occasionally brilliant move sufficient to 
justffy its existence? Also, criticism of the senate should be recognized 
for what it is. Many have argued that the senate has failed to act as a 
house of review. But if these same critics become increasingly annoyed 
when the senate demonstiates a growing abihty and wilhngness to use 
its reviewing power, it becomes obvious that their real objection is not 
that the senate has failed, but that there is a senate at aU. 
Unfortunately, the blame for much of the adverse opinion must be 
placed at the doorstep of the upper chamber itself, for even the 
senators do not appear to have a vety clear understanding of what 
their purpose should be in a parhamentaty system in which the 
govemment is basicaUy responsible to the lower house. Constitu-
tionaUy, the senate could be much more powerful than it is. Much of 
its potential hes dormant, however, intoxicated by party discipline and 
a tiadition of subservience. Proportional representation could be the 
key to a more active and important role. Increasing its activity, how-
ever, wUl inevitably arouse the opposition of the govemment, and 
perhaps the concem of the people (although there has been no great 
popular reaction against the senate in recent years). Nevertheless, the 
time for decision is at hand, and the doors to the senate's future are 
swinging open. What hes beyond those doors only the uncertain 
course of pohtics wdll reveal. 
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THE PREPARATION OF A DRAFT 
BILL 
J. Monro 
I speak tonight as a representative of the Commonwealth Parhamen-
taty Draftsmen, and as an Assistant Parhamentaty Draftsman in the 
Parhamentaty Drafting Division of the Commonwealth Attomey-
General's Department. That Division consists of lawyers who are 
trained in the special skills recognized as necessaty for the drafting 
of legislation. In many countiies, including Australia, England, Canada 
and the United States of America, the drafting of legislation is con-
fined almost exclusively to such specialist lawyers. In the Common-
wealth, the Parhamentaty Draftsman and his officers are under the 
Ministerial control of the Attorney-General and are not officers of the 
Parhament. In what follows, I refer to the draftsman; the draftsman 
may, of course, be the Parhamentaty Draftsman himself, or another 
lawyer in the Division working under his direction and control. 
A new law is rather hke a new-bom baby. It has been in the making 
for a considerable period and must now face the world. It will be 
praised and revUed; it will be tested in the rough and tumble of the 
world and have its character relentlessly probed in an attempt to find 
its weaknesses; it may die an untimely death, be subjected to major 
surgety or hve to a ripe and honourable old age. A baby whose con-
ception is the result of loving thought and planning, whose period of 
gestation has been adequate and competently supervised and who has 
been dehvered by a skilled obstetrician, starts wdth advantages not 
shared by children who have not been so fortunate. In the same way 
the young law that has been carefuUy thought out in the planning 
stage, has not been rushed through the drafting process and has been 
carefuUy considered and dealt with in its passage through the Parha-
ment is more hkely to stand the test than one that has been rushed 
through any of those processes. 
The draftsman may be likened to the mother of a law, but should not 
be expected to be both father and mother of a law. He takes the genes 
presented by the father, adds his own contribution towards the 
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character of the law, nurtures it through its period of gestation and 
hands it over to the Parhament, as the skiUed obstetrician, to see it 
through the pangs of birth. 
BILLS 
Under the existing parhamentaty system in the Federal sphere, bills 
are divided into govemment biUs and private members' bills. A bill is a 
govemment bill if the Federal Govemment of the day accepts respon-
sibffity for the pohcy to which it gives effect. Any other biU is a private 
member's bffi. Wldle there is no law or parhamentary rule that 
requires a bUl to be drafted by the Parhamentaty Draftsman, or under 
his dhection, it is the mle that aU govemment bills should be drafted 
or settled by him. The Parhamentaty Draftsman may, at the request of 
a private member and wdth the consent of the Attorney-General, draft 
a biU for the member if he can do so without delaying the drafting of 
govemment bUls. Although I will be dealing only with the preparation 
of govemment bUls, many of the principles discussed are also apphc-
able to private members' bills. 
A government bill usuaUy has one of four sources. First, there are 
laws that give effect to the pohtical philosophies of the party or coah-
tion of parties having a majority in the House of Representatives. 
Examples of such laws are the Banking Act 1947 and the Communist 
Party Dissolution Act 1950. Secondly, there are laws that stem from 
recommendations made to Ministers of State by members of the Pubhc 
Service. Evety Commonwealth Department administers certain laws 
and fields of Commonwealth activity. The need for amendment of 
existing laws, and for new laws regulating activity in a particular field, 
is frequentiy apparent first to members of the pubhc service in the 
Department concemed. Thirdly, laws result from recommendations 
of committees estabhshed by the Govemment to examine and report 
on particular problems or branches of the law. Example of such laws 
are the Patents Act 1952 and the Trade Marks Act 1955. Reports of 
committees recommending substantial amendments to the Copyright 
Act and the Bankmptcy Act are at present receiving consideration. 
Fourthly, many amendments of the law originate in suggestions made 
to members of the Parhament or to Departments by members of the 
pubhc and private organizations. 
CABINET APPROVAL 
Whatever the source of a govemment bill, the draftsman does not, 
ordinarily, begin drafting the biU until Cabinet has approved the pro-
posal. Approval of Cabinet is obtained by a Minister of State formu-
lating, in a document called a "Cabmet Submission", the proposed 
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scheme, and mdicatmg, generally, what amending or new legislation 
wdU be requhed to implement it. The submission should be in enough 
detaU to enable Cabinet to consider the working of the scheme and aU 
aspects of its effect on the Austrahan community. 
Before the submission is forwarded to the Cabinet Secretariat for 
distribution to members of the Cabmet, the Department concemed 
should discuss the proposal wdth representatives of any other Depart-
ments concemed either generally or m respect of particular aspects. 
For example, proposals that involve the expenditure of pubhc moneys 
should be discussed with officers of the Treasuty, unless they originate 
in that Department. Similarly, proposals that involve the estabhshment 
of new federal courts or the conferring of a new kind of jurisdiction on 
the existing courts should be discussed with officers of the Attomey-
General's Department, if they have not originated there. 
The form that a Cabinet Submission should take is a matter outside 
the province of the draftsman although, not infrequently, the Parha-
mentaty Draftsman is consulted during the preparation of the sub-
mission. A Cabinet Submission in the form of a layman's draft bill is 
likely to create serious difficulties for the draftsman who will sub-
sequentiy have to prepare the bill that is intioduced into the Parha-
ment. First, a part of the draft bill approved by Cabinet may be open 
to two different meanings each of which is consistent wdth other parts 
of the draft biU. The draftsman must then alter the wording of the 
draft to remove the ambiguity; however, he wdll be uncertain how 
Cabinet construed the part when approving the draft. Secondly, it may 
well happen that certain parts of the draft can be omitted from the bill 
because, for example, they deal with administrative practices that do 
not require legislative cover. Thirdly, the draftsman may decide that 
the bUl should follow an entirely different pattem. In any of these 
events, the draftsman's freedom of approach is circumscribed by the 
fact that Cabinet has had what purports to be a draft bill in a par-
ticular form before it, and has approved that form. It may well be 
possible to resolve the difficulties only by a further submission to 
Cabinet. I suggest that, so far as possible, submissions to Cabinet 
involving legislation should be in respect only of matters of principle 
and pohcy; the detaUs should not be included in the Cabinet Sub-
mission. 
Officers of the Attorney-General's Department, including the Parha-
mentaty Draftsman and his officers, are available to assist Departments 
in the planning stages of legislation. In particular, advice is given, 
upon request, conceming constitutional problems arising out of the 
proposals, the effect of the proposals on the existing law and the advan-
tages and disadvantages, from a legal point of view, of adopting one 
or other of various possible means of achieving the aim of the proposed 
legislation. A draftsman is not, however, available to prepare trial 
drafts. 
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Officers responsible for planning legislation should, I suggest, keep 
clearly in mind the fact that the proposed legislation must eventually 
be passed by the Parhament. Cabinet wiU, of course, ordinarily con-
sider the political implications when considering the submission. If the 
submission deals, as I have suggested, only with matters of principle 
and pohcy and not with detail, Cabmet wiU probably consider the 
pohtical imphcations only in relation to the general principles of the 
proposed legislation and not in relation to tiie fuU details. Political 
imphcations must be kept in mind throughout the planning and 
drafting stages when filling out the details of the bill. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DRAFTSMAN 
A mle exists that instructions for the drafting of a bill are to be fur-
nished to the Parhamentaty Draftsman within 48 hours after Cabinet 
has approved the preparation of the bUl. Accordingly, the sponsoring 
Department should have clearly in mind, at an early stage— 
(a) the aim of the bill; 
(b) the administrative stmcture required to achieve that aim; 
(c) the manner in which existing laws wiU be affected; 
(d) the extent to which existing laws should be altered; and 
(e) aU other details necessary for furnishing instructions to the drafts-
man. 
The instmctions to the draftsman should not be in the form of a 
draft biU but should set out, clearly and fully, the aim to be achieved 
and, ui detail, the means by which it is suggested that the aims be 
achieved. Difficulties and problems, whether of a legal, administiative 
or other nature, that appear to be involved should be dealt wdth in the 
instructions. The instmctions should also draw attention to existing 
laws that appear to require modffication as a result of the proposal. 
OrdinarUy, instructions that consist merely of a copy or paraphrase of 
the Cabinet documents are. quite inadequate. Instructions that deal 
comprehensively with the matters I have just referred to greatly assist 
the draftsman in his preliminaty assessment of the task, and in for-
mulating his preliminaty plan. 
In what follows, I have attempted to set out the steps in drafting a 
bill, but it should be remembered that each biU is different and that 
these steps often merge into one another and do not stand out clearly 
as divisions of the task. The work of the draftsman may be summarised 
as foUows. He wiU first study carefully the background, legal and 
otherwise, to the proposals, and reach a clear understanding of them. 
That will, in many cases, involve legal and general research to qualify 
him to deal with the subject matter. For example, if the proposals 
involve tibe establishment of an atomic energy plant, he may have to 
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make himself famihar with the manner in which such plants are con-
stmcted, the safety precautions that should be taken, the dangers 
involved and the technical terms employed in describmg aU those 
matters. That does not, of course, hnply that the draftsman would 
become a qualffied atomic engineer or scientist; but he must prepare 
himself to discuss the problems involved with such an engineer or 
scientist, and be capable of understanding those problems in the lan-
guage in which such an engineer or scientist is accustomed to discuss 
them. 
The next step is to discuss the proposal with officers from the spon-
soring department. The primaty purpose of this discussion is to ensure 
that the draftsman's understanding of the aim and means is the same 
as that of the departmental officers. This stage may seem both tedious 
and unnecessaty to those officers, but it is remarkable how often the 
words we write mean something quite different to the person who 
reads them than they meant to us when we wrote them. 
The draftsman is now in a position to formulate his legislative plan. 
The administrative plan referred to previously is quite different from 
the legislative plan. In order to give effect to the administrative plan, 
the draftsman must determine the persons who are to benefit, the per-
sons who are to be bound, the conditions that are to apply, the effect of 
faUure to comply with conditions, the extent to which legislative pro-
vision is necessary at all, the possible need for subordinate legislation, 
and so on. The legislative plan is discussed with officers of the spon-
soring department and, if necessary, modified. A draft bill is then 
prepared, considered by the Department, modffied and reconsidered 
again and again until both draftsman and Department are satisfied 
that it meets the Department's requirements. This process may con-
tinue, in the case of a difficult bill, over many months. 
The draftsman is often asked to put legislation in a particular form 
in order to emphasize a particular point or even to avoid the placing of 
undue emphasis on a particular point. He endeavours to comply with 
such requests. However, he is ordinarily responsible for ensuring that 
the legislation is legally effective; if the drafting of a provision in a 
particular way, at the request of the sponsoring department, might, in 
the draftsman's opinion, render the provision ineffective, he would 
comply with the request only if the department accepted the respon-
sibihty, and may, indeed, refer the matter to the Attorney-General for 
his instmctions. 
The nature of the drafting process is clearly described in Chapter 
14 of Professional Staffs of Congress, by Kenneth Kofmehl. Dealing, at 
p. 189, wdth the office of Legislative Counsel, which corresponds with 
the office of Parhamentaty Draftsman in the Commonwealth, the 
author summarizes the nature of bUl-drafting. (It should be home in 
mind that in America committees of Congress sponsor biUs in the same 
way Departments of State do in Austraha.) 
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The essence of bffi drafting is placing a legislative proposal in the proper 
legal phraseology and form to achieve congressional intent. It is primarily 
a task of legal analysis and research rather than of composition. Rarely does 
the pressure of work aUow time to pohsh grammar or rhetoric. [This may be 
true in the United States of America, but in the Commonwealth, even if it 
means working for long hours in doing so, a great deal of time is spent in 
achieving precision in grammar and expression.] 
Framing the legal language to embody congressional purpose is not as 
difficult as ascertaining what that purpose is in its entirety. While a com-
DMttee (or individual member of Congress, as the case may be) is in the 
process of working out what it wants to do, the legislative counsel assist it 
by explaining the effect of alternative proposals. Even after the committee 
(or Congressman) has settled upon the major outlines of a measure, sub-
sidiary pohcy questions seem to unfold endlessly. The legislative counsel 
must point up all of those for the committee (or Congressman) to decide. 
To accomplish that, the legislative counsel must envisage the broad appli-
cation of the proposed law in all of its ramifications. And they must con-
sider the precise provisions for administrative structure and procedures to 
be specified in the statute. For policy issues—sometimes relatively major-
inhere in such technical details. Until the legislative counsel have secured 
a determination of those by the committee (or Congressman), they cannot 
know the complete congressional intent. 
To perform their job properly, the legislative counsel have to do extensive 
legal research. In many cases they must check the constitutional hmits on 
legislative authority. On occasion, to anticipate presidential reaction, they 
have to look into a line of veto messages. To predict the legal implications 
of a proposed measure, they must analyse it in relation not only to the 
statutes on the same or cognate subjects but also to the judicial and admin-
istrative interpretations of them. Sometimes this research renders the draft-
ing of a bill unnecessary by revealing that there already is a law covering 
the matter or that its objective can be achieved through complying wdth 
departmental regulations. 
Also, a major aspect of the legislative coimsels' work is probing with 
questions to secure the detailed substantive knowledge of a matter necessary 
to draft a bill on it. They interview congressional staff members, executive 
branch experts, or whomever else the committee (or Congressman) auth-
orizes them to consult. Sometimes groping with their initial queries, they 
learn enough about the subject as they progress to ask intelligent questions 
about it. TTie abihty to elicit in this fashion requisite technical information 
from specialists is a crucial skill for the legislative coimsel. 
Reference has been made to discussions with officers of the spon-
soring Department. I t is not the province of the Parhamentary Drafts-
man to decide what officers will instruct him. Nevertheless, in the 
course of drafting a bill, it is nearly always necessaty to fiU out the 
details of the legislative plan at those discussions. If the drafting is to 
proceed smoothly and without unnecessaty delay, it is essential that 
the instmcting officers should b e equipped, by their intimate know-
ledge of the proposals and by their status, to come to a firm decision 
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on those detaUs without further reference to their Department unless a 
major issue of pohcy is involved. It is particularly exasperating for the 
draftsman, (a) to have two or more instmcting officers arguing about 
the points raised by the draftsman while he is waiting for a clear 
answer that wdll enable him to proceed with the draft; (b) to be in-
stmcted by an officer who is unable to decide even minor detaUs wdth-
out reference to senior officers; or (c) to find that his instmcting officer 
has instmcted him as to the detaUs to be included in the bUl and then 
that the officer's senior officers have later altered the instmctions so 
given. It is most helpful if the instmcting officer, or one of the instmct-
ing officers, is of sufficient status and experience, first, to recognize the 
major matters that might require consideration in his department at a 
high level and to obtain a decision on those matters without undue 
delay, and, secondly, to give a decision on other matters in the course 
of the discussions with the draftsman. 
I shaU not elaborate further conceming the drafting process. Par-
hamentaty drafting can only be learned by trial and error and by 
patient tiaining. There are, however, several matters that arise in the 
course of drafting Commonwealth legislation on which comments may 
be helpful. I propose to deal, briefly, with the following subjects: the 
Constitution, the States, taxes and charges, appropriations, judicial 
power, regulations and forms. 
T H E CONSTITUTION 
The Commonwealth Constitution confers power on the Common-
wealth Parhament to make laws with respect to certain specffic matters 
only. Parhament's powers with respect to a few of those matters, such 
as the power to impose duties of customs and excise and to grant 
bounties on the production and export of goods, is exclusive of the 
States. Laws with respect to other matters may be made by the States 
as weU as by the Commonwealth. However, where a law of a State 
wdth respect to a matter conceming which the Commonwealth Parlia-
ment is competent to make laws is inconsistent with a law of the 
Commonwealth, the law of the Commonwealth prevaUs (the Con-
stitution, section 109). The first task of the draftsman, then, is to satisfy 
himself that the proposed law does deal with a matter with respect to 
which the Parhament may make laws. 
An example may, perhaps, clarify the pomt I am making. The Com-
monwealth Parhament has no general power to make laws with respect 
to education. Accordmgly, if a Department furnished instmctions for 
the drafting of a biU to require aU the children in Austraha to remain 
at school untU they had attained the age of eighteen years, the drafts-
man would be forced to inform the Department that a biU that 
attempted to achieve that result directly would not be vahd. However, 
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it is trite saying that what cannot be done directly can often be done 
indirectly and, in relation to law, often a tme one. Assuming that the 
Commonwealth intended to accept at least some of the expense of 
educating children until they attained that age, a bill that granted 
financial assistance to the States on condition that the States made 
provision for the compulsoty education of children until they had 
attained the age of eighteen years would be valid. However, lest you 
should think that it is always the case that, in Commonwealth legisla-
tion, what cannot be done directly can be done indirectly, I hasten to 
point out that the High Court held as long ago as 1908 (The King v. 
Barger 6 C.L.R. 41) that the Commonwealth could not, under the 
guise of imposing an excise duty on the manufacture of goods, regu-
late the conditions of manufacture of the goods, the regulation of those 
conditions not being within the legislative powers of the Common-
wealth. Officers responsible for planrung legislation should seek legal 
advice, at an early stage of planning, if their legislation breaks new 
ground in order to ensure that it will be within the legislative powers 
of the Commonwealth. 
THE STATES 
Reference has been made earher, both in preparing and drafting a biU, 
to the need to examine the existing legal framework. That involved 
looking at Commonwealth laws and quite often also at State laws. The 
need to look at State laws is two-fold. First, the States may already 
have laws dealing with the matters conceming which it is desired to 
make the Commonwealth law. It is often necessary to decide whether 
certain matters can continue to be dealt with by existing State laws or 
whether the Commonwealth law should be made quite comprehensive 
and supersede the State laws. Generally that is a matter of policy for 
the Department, not the draftsman, to determine. The draftsman will, 
however, assist the Department to reach its decision by hsting the 
advantages and disadvantages involved. An important matter to be 
home in mind is the time that would be required to draft a bill that 
wiU cover the whole field. 
A subsidiaty point that must often be considered is the extent to 
which it is intended that persons or corporations exercising powers 
and performing functions under the proposed law on behaU of the 
Commonwealth are to be subject to State laws. In general, the Com-
monwealth is not subject to State laws such as hcensing laws, factoty 
and shops legislation, building controls and other hke controls. Where 
the Commonwealth law is so framed as to authorize persons to exer-
cise powers and perform functions on behalf of the Commonwealth 
and as part of the executive machinety of Commonwealth govem-
ment, the persons are said to enjoy the shield of the Commonwealth 
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and are not bound by State laws. However, it may be intended to set 
the persons up as persons or bodies mdependent of the executive 
govemment of the Commonwealth and exercismg an mdependent 
judgment. In that case, if it were intended that the persons or bodies 
be free from certam State laws, it would be necessaty to make express 
provision to that effect. It should not, of course, be assumed, from 
what I have just said, that it is, in all cases, legaUy possible to free 
independent persons or bodies from all State laws and contiols. 
TAXES AND CHARGES 
Section 51 (ii) of the Constitution authorizes the enactment of legisla-
tion with respect to taxation. The power is unlimited so far as the 
selection of the subject matter of taxation is concemed. Nevertheless, 
other provisions of the Constitution raise problems for the draftsman 
whenever it is proposed to require persons to pay money to the Com-
monwealth or to other persons or bodies. Section 55 of the Constitu-
tion provides that— 
(a) laws hnposing taxation must deal only with the imposition of 
taxation; 
(b) laws imposing taxation, except laws imposing duties of customs 
or excise, must deal with one subject of taxation only; and 
(c) laws imposing duties of customs must deal only wdth duties of 
customs and laws imposing duties of excise must deal only with 
duties of excise. 
As a result of those provisions, it was necessaty, recentiy, to pass five 
acts in order to impose a small charge on tobacco leaf grown in Aus-
traha and to use the proceeds for research in the tobacco industty, 
namely, three taxing Acts, one tax assessment Act and one Act pro-
viding for the appropriation of the moneys collected to the research 
concemed. The three taxing Acts were necessaty because of the cir-
cumstances of the tobacco growdng industiy and the need to confine 
each Act to a separate subject of taxation. The first taxing Act imposes 
a charge on tobacco grown in Austraha and sold to a manufacturer. 
The second taxing Act imposes a charge on tobacco purchased by a 
manufacturer other than a grower's co-operative. The third taxing 
Act imposes a charge on tobacco grown in Austiaha by a person who 
is also a manufacturer and appropriated for manufacture by himseff. 
The three subjects of taxation were, therefore, tobacco sold by the 
grower, tobacco purchased by certain manufacturers and tobacco 
appropriated for manufacture by the grower. Whenever a tax is to be 
imposed, it is necessaty to examine vety carefuUy all the possible cir-
cumstances in which the tax is to be payable and, if necessaty, to have 
a separate taxing Act for each set of circumstances. 
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Section 55 of the Constitution also provides that, m a law imposing 
taxation, any other provision is of no effect. In an article in 7 Res 
Judicatae at p. 415, F. L. Jones pointed out that the result is that, 
whUe any odd sections included in a taxing Act are void, the Act is 
stUl effective for its purpose; but an odd section imposmg taxation 
included in a non-taxing Act renders all the other sections in the Act 
invahd while it, itself, remains vahd. The draftsman is frequently 
required to resist pressure from Departments to include the provisions 
for collecting the tax in the bill imposing the tax. Sometimes, when 
the provisions for collecting tax are in the simplest form, that has been 
done, although not without doubt as to the vahdity of the provisions. 
Examples are the Wheat Export Charge Act 1958 and the Dairy Pro-
duce Levy Act 1958. 
Taxation has been defined as "raising money for the purposes of 
govemment by means of contributions from individual persons" {The 
King V. Barger (1908) 6 C.L.R. 41, at page 68). Although that defi-
nition is wide enough to cover fees charged by the Commonwealth 
for various services, such as filing documents in the High Court, issuing 
certfficates of seaworthiness for ships, providing facilities for airlines, 
etc, such fees are, fortunately, not regarded as taxes for the purposes 
of section 55 of the Constitution. Accordingly, it is not the practice to 
include provision for the payments of fees for services provided by the 
Commonwealth in a separate taxing Act. It may, of course, call for 
legal judgment of a high order, to decide, in a particular case, whether 
the proposed charge is a fee for a service or a tax. 
It is often intended that fees or charges imposed by an Act be paid 
to bodies other than the Commonwealth and retained by them for 
their own purposes. If the body has the shield of the Commonwealth, 
then the moneys so paid to it are, in ordinaty circumstances, received 
by the Executive Govemment of the Commonwealth and, therefore, 
form part of the Consolidated Revenue Fund (section 81 of the Con-
stitution). If the body does not possess the shield of the Common-
wealth, the question whether the moneys are fees for services or taxes 
crops up again. If the moneys are fees for services, they can be 
retained by the body; however, if they are taxes, they form part of the 
Consohdated Revenue Fund because they are moneys raised by the 
Executive Govemment of the Commonwealth. If the moneys form 
part of the Consohdated Revenue Fund, provision must then be made 
to appropriate them for use by the body. 
APPROPRIATIONS 
Section 83 of the Constitution provides that no money shall be drawm 
from the Treasuty of the Commonwealth except under appropriation 
made by law. Where proposals involve the expenditure of Common-
wealth funds, the expenditure must, therefore, be authorized by an 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
150 I Readings in Australian Govemment 
Act. Appropriations are of two kinds, those for the ordinaty annual 
services, which are effected by the annual Appropriation Act, and 
special appropriations, which are permanent and not reviewed 
annually, and are made by a provision of another Act. 
An appropriation that is for the ordinary annual services should, 
except in an exceptional case, be made in the annual Appropriation 
Act. Only when it is desired to give such an appropriation a special 
degree of permanence, such as an appropriation for Judges' salaries, 
should a special appropriation be included in an Act. The draftsman 
will, of course, have to determine whether an appropriation is for the 
ordinaty annual services. If he is satisfied that it is such an appropria-
tion, it would be for the sponsoring department, in consultation with 
the Department of the Treasuty (if that department is not sponsoring 
the bill), to decide whether or not there should be a special appropria-
tion. 
JUDICIAL POWER 
The judicial power of the Commonwealth is vested in the High Court, 
in federal courts created by the Parliament and in such State courts as 
the Parhament invests with federal jurisdiction. Judicial power was 
described by Sir Samuel Griffith, Chief Justice of the High Court, as 
follows: 
It is the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to 
decide controversies between its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, 
hberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some 
tribtmal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision 
(whether subject to appeal or not) is caUed upon to take action. [Huddart, 
Parker <b Co., Proprietary Limited v. Moorehead (1908), 8 C.L.R. 330, at 
p. 357.] 
However, there are functions, such as the determination of the vahdity 
of parhamentaty elections, the registration of patents, the disallowance 
of rules of industrial organizations, that are capable of being deter-
mined either administratively or judicially. The Chief Justice, Sir 
Owen Dixon, and Sir Edward McTieman, in a joint judgment in 
Queen v. Davison (1954), 90 C.L.R. 353, at pp. 369 and 370, put tiie 
matter this way: 
There are many functions or duties that are not necessarily of a judicial 
character but may be performed judicially, whether because they are 
incidental to the exercise of judicial power or because they are proper sub-
jects of its exercise. How a particular act or thing of this kind is treated 
by legislation may determine its character. If the legislature prescribes a 
judicial process, it may mean that an exercise of the judicial power is 
indispensable. It is at that point that the character of the proceeding or of 
the thing to be done becomes all important. 
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In 1956, the High Court decided in the Boilermakers' Case that 
judicial power could be validly vested only in a Court. {The Boiler-
makers' Case (1956), 94 C.L.R. 254.) That decision was upheld by the 
Privy Council. In the hght of those decisions, it is essential for the 
draftsman to examine carefully any proposal under which a Minister 
or other person is authorized to determine questions affecting a per-
son's rights or liabilities to ensure that the judicial power of the Com-
monwealth is not being invalidly conferred on him. Conversely, pro-
posed legislation must be carefully examined to ensure that purely 
administrative functions are not conferred on courts. Other problems 
arise when it is desired to confer a right of appeal to a court against 
a Minister's decision. Care must then be taken to ensure that the court 
only has to take into account matters that have come to be regarded 
as involving judicial considerations, and is not called upon to exercise 
administrative discretions. For example, section 183B of the Customs 
Act authorizes the Minister to suspend or revoke a Customs Agent's 
Licence if an inquity has showm that the agent has committed an 
offence against the Act or that certain other grounds exist. However, 
the section does not compel the Minister to suspend or revoke the 
hcence. He has a completely unfettered discetion and may apply any 
criteria he chooses in reaching his decision. There is a right of appeal 
to a Supreme Court against the suspension or revocation of a licence 
by the Minister. Section 183c requires the Court to cancel the licence 
if it finds that the agent has committed such an offence or finds any 
other ground proved unless it is of opinion that it is just not to do so. 
The question whether or not a thing is just has long been recognized 
as a question that it is proper for a court to decide. You may think the 
distinction is a fine one but, nevertheless, the Minister's discretion is 
absolute and the court has only a clearly defined and well recognized 
judicial discretion. 
REGULATIONS 
A question that often arises in the course of drafting a bill is whether 
or not to leave some matters to be determined by regulations, and 
what kind of matters are appropriate to be dealt with in regulations. 
The usual practice is for the general principles of the scheme to be 
stated in the Act and for matters of administrative detail, particularly 
matters that may need to be changed from time to time, to be dealt 
with by regulation. The Air Navigation Act 1920 did nothing else than 
authorize the making of regulations giving effect to the Paris Conven-
tion on Aerial Navigation and controlhng Air Navigation in the Com-
monwealth and its Territories. I do not, myself, think that an Act, in 
that form, would be passed by the present Parliament. 
Not infrequently, the draftsman of an Act has found that the regu-
lation-making power is inadequate to allow the regulations required 
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by the Department to be validly made. Indeed, it has been said that 
no bill should be regarded as finally settled until any regulations pro-
posed to be made under it have also been drafted. While that v^^ould 
be an excellent policy, bills are invariably drafted in too much of a 
rush to enable it to be carried out. The comment does, however, point 
the moral that both the instructing oflBcers and the draftsman should 
have a very clear idea of vi^ hat is to go in the regulations before the 
drafting of the bill is completed. There are several reasons for this. In 
the first place, the regulations cannot alter anything in the Act unless 
the Act expressly authorizes the regulations to do so; except in the 
case of regulations fixing the amount of a charge, povs/er to amend an 
Act by regulations is seldom conferred. Secondly, regulations must be 
consistent with the terms of the Act under which they are made; they 
can complete the details of the scheme but cannot add new aims or 
ideas, unless expressly authorized. Thirdly, where it is intended that 
regulations should confer judicial power, provide for the imposition of 
penalties or the charging of fees or require the furnishing of a statutory 
declaration, express power to do so should be conferred in the Act. 
All regulations made under a Commonwealth Act must, after being 
made and notified in the Commonwealth Gazette, be tabled in each 
House of the Parliament, and may be disallowed by either House. 
Regulations tabled in the Senate are examined by a Committee of 
Senators, called the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and 
Ordinances. That Committee has power to report to the Senate con-
ceming matters in regulations that it considers ought to be brought to 
the notice of the Senate. Following several of its reports, the Senate 
has disallowed regulations that the Committee has criticized. 
The Committee has stated, in its reports, that it will examine regu-
lations to ascertain— 
(a) that they are in accordance with the Statute; 
(b) that they do not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties; 
(c) that they do not unduly make the rights and hberties of citizens 
dependent upon administrative and not upon judicial decisions; 
and 
(d) that they are concemed with administrative detail and do not 
amount to substantive legislation which should be a matter for 
parliamentary enactment. 
Departments considering what matters might be dealt with by a bill 
and what left for regulations should bear these criteria in mind, be-
cause the Senate Committee may well criticize regulations notwith-
standing that express power to make them is given by the Act in the 
clearest terms. Of course, if regulations are inconsistent with the 
Statute, they are, whether disallowed or not, invahd. 
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FORMS 
The draftsman is responsible for the set-up of forms that are to be 
included in a bill. He wUl, however, endeavour to draft them so that 
they can be readily completed and used by the persons concemed. To 
do this, he will need detailed instmctions as to the persons who will 
be furnishing them and the use that wiU be made of them. Instmcting 
officers should consider twice, and then again, whether it is really 
necessaty to prescribe a form at all. Unless it is necessaty to establish 
beyond doubt that a document in question is the document that is 
effective for a particular purpose of the Act, it may be unnecessaty to 
prescribe a form at aU. It is usually found that people who need the 
Department's help will, in fact, use an official or approved form with-
out being required to do so by an Act or by regulations. The drafts-
man is always looking for ways in which legislation can be shortened. 
One of these ways is to avoid including forms in Acts and regulations 
unless it is essential to do so. 
THE DRAFTSMAN AND THE PARLIAMENT 
The draftsman has not quite finished with a bill when it is approved 
by the sponsoring department. It then goes to Committee of Cabinet 
for approval to introduce it into Parhament as a govemment bill. Tha^ 
Committee has before it a report from the Parliamentary Draftsman as 
to any departures from the original Cabinet approval and as to any 
other matters that he thinks should be brought to the Committee's 
notice. While the biU is being considered by the Parhament, the 
draftsman is available to advise the Minister in charge of the bill on 
any legal questions arising in the course of the debate, to assist officers 
of the sponsoring department and to draft any amendments that may 
be required. 
I hope that the impression you have now gained is that the spon-
soring department and not the draftsman is responsible for the policy 
expressed in a bill. While that is, generally, tiie position, there are 
some matters of pohcy on which the draftsman does take a firm stand. 
Such matters are the maintenance of the rule of law, evidentiaty pro-
visions and the conferring of jurisdiction on courts. The draftsman 
takes a firm stand on such matters where he considers it appropriate to 
do so, because he is an officer of the Attorney-General's Department 
and that department is responsible for these matters. The draftsman 
may, indeed, draw such a matter (assuming that he cannot reach 
agreement with the sponsoring department) to the attention of the 
Attorney-General for his instructions. If the sponsoring department 
will not accept tihe Attomey-General's decision on the matter, the 
matter must be referred to Cabinet for decision. The draftsman may 
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also suggest to the sponsoring department that it adopt certain pro-
cedures because there is a pattern of legislation along that hne, and 
Parhament has previously approved of similar legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
It Mdll be apparent that drafting a bill can be expected to take a long 
time. I do hope that any of you who may have to instmct the drafts-
man in future will allow for that in planning your legislative pro-
gramme. I have not, myself, kept a record of the time taken to draft 
any particular bill. However, Driedger in The Composition of Legis-
lation does give an example of what he describes as a short normal 
bni that he prepared for the Canadian Parhament. It must have been 
a very short bill indeed as the actual drafting took only one day. He 
states that a departmental committee took three months to consider 
the problem involved and report on it; the department heads then took 
two months to decide to sponsor a bill and obtain Cabinet approval; 
instructions were then given to the draftsman, and the drafting time 
table was as follows: 
Conference with department oflBcers 1 day 
Preparation of preliminary draft 1 day 
Consideration of draft by department 4 days 
Conference with draftsman % day 
Preparation of second draft % day 
Consideration of second draft by department 12 days 
Conference with draftsman 1 day 
Preparation of third draft 1 day 
Consideration of third draft by department 10 days 
Preparation of final draft 2 days 
Printing of draft 3 days 
Total 36 days 
The point Driedger is making is, of course, that the drafting stage 
usually involves lengthy periods of considering drafts in the sponsor-
ing department, often longer periods than the time taken over the 
actual drafting. The drafting of a bill always appears to take longer 
than was expected. That brings me back to the analogy with which I 
started. A bill can be the result of careful preparation and planning 
with a full period for drafting. On the other hand, like a baby, its con-
ception can be the result almost of impulse, and its period of gestation 
reduced to a minimum, so that it emerges pale and weak to face the 
dangers of premature birth. Even when the choice is not solely in the 
hands of the department sponsoring the bill, that department can 
exercise a strong influence in the direction of properly planned 
parenthood. 
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lO THE CHOICE OF THE SPEAKER 
IN AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTS 
GeofFrey Bolton 
Parhamentaty tiaditions nurtured at Westmmster, even the most 
respected of them, have not always survived transportation overseas. 
The legislatures of Canada, Austraha and New Zealand—to go no 
further than those members of the Commonwealth classed by Mr. 
Menzies as the "Crown Dominions"—in a centuty of self-government 
have modffied not a few of the practices and attitudes taken for 
granted in the British House of Commons. One such shift in outlook 
has affected the office of Speaker. In an article in Parliamentary 
Affairs^ Mr. Phihp Laundy has described how the Speaker of the 
House of Commons derives great prestige from the tiaditions lifting 
his office beyond partisanship. Severing his connection with his party, 
the British Speaker refrains from election campaigning, and takes no 
part in debates, even to vote in Committee or to further the particular 
interests of his constituency. Although chosen from the party in power at 
the time of a vacancy usually from among its back-benchers, the Speaker 
is subsequendy re-elected unopposed, no matter what the pohtics of the 
ministty in power. These traditions are supposed to make for an impar-
tial and respected Speaker. Yet hardly any of them have survived out-
side Great Britain. On Mr. Laundy's showing, this might be expected 
to have some effect on the Speaker's reputation for impartiahty, par-
ticularly in Austraha, where one of the major political parties expresses 
an impatient hostihty towards many of the ceremonials tending to 
exalt tliis office. Few Labour Speakers in Australia have worn the wig 
and gown, and several have dispensed with the mace; these and similar 
parhamentaty ceremonials are thought to be a useless residue of 
"fusty precedent".^ Non-Labour pohticians, on the whole, profess a 
respect for these traditions. But the figure of Mr. Speaker is less 
majestic and detached in Austrahan pohtics than in British. 
There are a number of reasons for Australia's divergence from 
British traditions. In the first place, many of the British usages putting 
the Speaker above party were scarcely estabhshed when, between 1855 
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and 1859, five of the six Austiahan colonies attained responsible 
government.^ Even the unmimity of the British Speaker from con-
tested re-elections was a new doctrine; in 1780 and 1835 a govemment 
had used its majority to replace the previous Speaker by a nominee 
from within their owm party, and as late as 1895 a section of the Con-
servatives spoke of ousting Speaker Gully when their party took office. 
If such feeling survived in Great Britain, how could they be avoided 
in the colonial legislatures, where the Speaker took a more active part 
in debate? British Speakers had not yet foregone their right of speak-
ing in Committee. In 19th centuty Australian politics, when so much 
of Parhament's time was occupied with allocating pubhc works and 
the expenditure of loan money, it was not to be expected that a 
Speaker would disenfranchise his constituency by holding back when 
these matters were discussed in Committee. A Speaker who failed to 
make good use of these opportunities risked losing his seat at the next 
elections, and with it one of the few salaried offices open to politicians 
in the era before payment of members. 
Besides voting in Committee, Australian Speakers were often called 
on to exercise a casting vote. This seldom occurred in the British 
House of Commons, whose 658 members worked within a fairly well-
defined party system. In Australian legislatures, numbering less than 
a hundred members (sometimes as few as thirty) a shift in allegiance 
by a vety smaU number often deprived governments of their majority. 
Since many members had an ill-defined sense of party loyalties, a tie 
in voting often made the colour of a Speaker's pohtics important. 
Although Speakers claimed to cast their votes in conformity with the 
British practice of leaving the question open to further discussion, in 
effect they tended to favour their owm faction. In New South Wales 
the first Speaker (Sir Daniel Cooper) was elected in 1856 by a com-
bination of independents and oppositionists by a majority of one over 
the govemment nominee. Within three months he had exercised his 
casting vote against the ministty on the issue of the right of judges to 
sit in the Legislative Council, and in consequence the govemment fell. 
Other Speakers were no less influential. In November 1868 the Queens-
land Speaker exercised his casting vote four times in one day to save 
a ministty from defeat, and between 1871 and 1873 one of his succes-
sors was the constant mainstay of the govemment of his time. Except 
in South Australia—where, despite a succession of short-hved minis-
tries, usage conformed to the British example—Speakers soon ceased to 
be regarded as above party warfare. Opposition parties in Tasmania 
in 1863 and Victoria in 1866 ran a candidate for the chair against a 
retiring Speaker whose ruhng they considered partisan, but neither 
attempt was successful. After the Victorian elections of 1877, Speaker 
McMahon refused to submit himself for re-election because the in-
coming govemment, resenting his rahngs during their period in oppo-
sition, had determined to replace him by a nommee from within their 
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ovm party. And in 1883 Sir George Wigram Allen, who had been eight 
years Speaker of New South Wales, was defeated by an Opposition 
nominee, not because he was personally unpopular, but because the 
choice of Speaker provided the first opportunity to test the strength 
of parties after a general election, through which his party had lost 
seats, but had not yet resigned office. 
Although the absence of a sufficiently disciplined two-party system 
during the 19th centuty sometimes tempted politicians to use the 
Chair as a pawn in securing party advantages, or in furthering their 
owm ambitions, it was only when the Speaker's election was a test 
issue to ascertain the strength of parties that voting followed obvious 
party lines. The feud against Speaker McMahon was an isolated piece 
of vindictiveness. When one party had a decided majority, it was not 
usual to oust the Speaker, even if he came from another faction. With 
the improvement of party discipline towards the end of the 19th 
centuty, fewer occasions arose when the alignment of parties had to 
be determined by a contested Speakership. (Queensland was an 
exception. After 1871 the Chair always went to the stronger party at 
the beginning of each parliament, and there were several heated 
contests on party hnes on these occasions.) In the absence of serious 
party conflict, it sometimes happened when a new Speaker had to be 
chosen—as in Victoria in 1887 and 1892—that a free vote was con-
ducted between two or three candidates, without much respect to 
normal party allegiances. The Chair, wdth its good stipend, pubhc 
dignity, and promise of a handsome pension on retirement attracted 
a variety of aspirants, not all of whom were remarkable for judgment 
or experience. In such circumstances, and in the absence of any set of 
conventions such as the British had evolved, it was sometimes possible 
to impugn the motives behind a Speaker's election, and the Chair 
could not always command respect or decorum. It was long believed 
that one Victorian Speaker had lost the mace in a house of iU repute, 
whUe the Speakers of New South Wales during the eighties and nine-
ties were so ineffectual that the House was knowm as "the Macquarie-
stieet bear-garden". It remained to be seen whether the more respon-
sible outlook of a Federal Parliament, and the stability imposed by the 
rise of the Labour party, would advance the standing of the Speaker-
ship in the twentieth centuty. 
Although the Labour party is sometimes regarded as the first to bind 
its members to systematic caucus discipline, it did not regard the 
Speakership as a party office during its early years. In State politics 
Labour members tended, whenever a contest occurred for the Chair, 
to back the candidate from outside its own ranks whose politics 
seemed more favourable to working class interests.* The older non-
Labour groups must bear the responsibility for makmg the Speaker-
ship a party issue. In September 1903, with a Conservative ministty^ 
m office, the Legislative Assembly of Victoria chose W. D. Beazley 
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for Speaker by unanimous vote. Beazley was an experienced member 
with a good record of service as deputy-Speaker; he was also a Labour 
stalwart. Nine months later, after a general election, the same Conser-
vative ministry used its majority to eject Beazley from the Chair, 
replacing him by one of their own supporters. No dissatisfaction with 
Beazley's conduct as Speaker was alleged, and the ministry's change 
of front looked like a deliberate attempt to bring his office into the 
spoils system. One section of the non-Labour members (the Liberals) 
supported Beazley, and in January 1909, when the ministry was being 
re-constituted to include this faction, they made it a condition of their 
support that a free vote should be taken for the Speakership. At this 
point, however, several of the Labour members abstained from voting, 
and Beazley's opponent was again elected Speaker by a substantial 
majority. The spokesman for the abstainers said: "Whilst the Labour 
Party is in a minority in this Chamber, I cannot vote in such a way as 
to diminish its power."^ This doctrine, implying that Labour would 
consent to provide a Speaker only when the party held a majority of 
seats in the Assembly, cannot have improved the prospects of main-
taining the Speaker's impartiality. 
Later in 1909 events in the Federal parliament confirmed this 
trend. Since its inauguration in 1901, the Speaker had been Sir 
Frederick Holder, a widely respected South Australian chosen with 
the unanimous support of all parties. On 23rd July 1909, after a session 
of unprecedented bitterness and turbulence. Holder collapsed in the 
House with a murmur of "Dreadful, dreadful", and died a few hours 
later. Following a practice which had by now become almost standard 
in the State legislatures, each party held a meeting of its caucus to 
consider the vacancy. The Labour party nominated Charles Mc-
Donald, one of their number who had been deputy-Speaker since 
1906. The Liberals took it for granted that McDonald must be 
opposed, and agreed that there should be only one ministerial can-
didate. By seventeen votes to fifteen their caucus decided to nominate 
Carty Salmon, who became Speaker the next day on a straight party 
vote. The Liberals claimed the right, as government party, to choose 
the Speaker, and rejected without consideration the Labour leader's 
suggestion that there should be a free conference between parties 
before the Speaker's election. Labour claimed that they would have 
withdrawn McDonald's nomination if the Government had put for-
ward any one of a number of other members, but they could not 
accept a candidate like Salmon, who commanded the barest majority 
in his own caucus. It was not a graceful period in Australian politics, 
and the opportunity of placing the Speakership above party was 
missed. The next year when Labour took office McDonald displaced 
Salmon, and since that time it has been usual, both in Federal and 
State politics, for the Speaker to change with the party in power. 
It was not long before the impression formed in at least one State that 
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it was an act of disloyalty to one's party to accept the Chair under a 
ministiy of a different colour. In 1911 the New South Wales Labour gov-
emment found itself wdthout a majority during two unexpected by-elec-
tions. The Labour Speaker resigned to sit on the Govemment benches, 
and Henty Willis, a Liberal, was persuaded to accept the vacancy. WU-
hs, "hke a good party man", laid down the condition that if Labour lost 
the by-elections and were dependent on him for continuing in office, 
parhament should be dissolved. But his feUow-Liberals denounced this 
transaction. After his nomination he was abused in scandalous terms 
for the whole of one night by his owm party; one member "said that 
Wilhs was 'a rogue', a 'vile worm', a 'political leper', a 'ragbag 
Speaker' and a 'scrap heap Speaker', and then hurled two coppers 
across the House as an ocular demonstration of the price of honour 
betrayed".'^ No other member having been nominated, Wilhs was at 
last hustled to the Chair, and amid cries of "Judas!" declared elected. 
Although the Liberals impugned his election as irregular, and spoke of 
taking legal action to eject Willis, he continued in office two years, 
during which he was under constant fire from the Opposition, while 
his eccentricities displeased the Labour party. He resigned in July 
1913; the govemment then found an Independent Liberal to take the 
Chair for a few months, and jettisoned him in favour of a Labour 
man after a general election had increased their majority. Milder but 
sunilar scenes occurred in 1920, when a Labour ministry was formed 
at a time when there were forty-five members on each side of the 
House. The non-Labour Speaker agreed to continue in office until 
such time as the Opposition—then divided between two parties—could 
combine to provide a stable alternative. Although this Speaker 
was also heckled by his owm party, he had an easier time than Willis. In 
December 1921 he resigned the Chair to test whether the non-Labour 
parties could form a ministty; on their faUure, he resumed office untU 
the next general elections, acquitting himself so impartiaUy that he 
was chosen Speaker in four later parliaments, thrice wdthout 
opposition. 
Outside New South Wales Speakers who kept office after a change 
in ministty have not been regarded so severely. During the Second 
World War a non-Labour Speaker (Nairn) retained the Chair in the 
Commonwealth House of Representatives for twenty months after 
Labour took office in October 1941. It was only in June 1943, when 
his party decided to launch a motion of no confidence, that Nairn 
resigned the Chair and took his seat on the Opposition benches. In 
Victoria, where the balance of power for long shifted unsteadily be-
tween three or four parties, such a situation has been quite common. 
Between 1927 and 1947 three Labour ministries supported the election 
of a non-Labour Speaker, each time wdth the active support of the 
Opposition, while for a few months in 1933-4 a Labour Speaker took 
office—again by unanimous choice—whUe his party's opponents were 
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in power. This appears to have been one of the rare occasions when 
the issue was not decided in advance by party leaders or caucuses; the 
Speaker in question (Maurice Blackburn) was chosen after several 
hours of apparently unrehearsed discussion. An even more tolerant 
state of affairs existed between 1955 and 1959 in Tasmania, where a 
proportional representation voting system led frequently to a House 
composed equally of Labour and Liberal members. By an act of 1954 
it was provided that when the two parties found themselves equal in 
numbers, the party with the higher aggregate of votes should form 
the ministry, and the minority party should have the right of nomi-
nating the Speaker and Chairman of Committees. For four years the 
Liberal Opposition exercised this right, but the enlargement of the 
House to thirty-five members removed the necessity for this arrange-
ment, and since 1959 Tasmania has reverted to normal Austrahan 
practice. (The only apparent deviation in later years occurred in 1962, 
when Sir Thomas Playford obliged Speaker Teusner, a member of his 
own Liberal and Country League, to step dov^ Ti in favour of an Inde-
pendent, Mr. T. C. Stott. This move, however, was dictated not by 
any belated respect for the principle of impartiahty, but in order to 
secure Mr. Stott's casting vote, which was required to keep the Play-
ford ministry in oflBce after losing seats at a general election.) 
With these exceptions, Austrahan Speakers both for Federal and 
State legislatures are pre-selected by a caucus of their own party. In 
the main the Chairman of Committees is supposed to have a strong 
claim to the succession if a vacancy occurs, but this previous 
experience is not regarded as essential; in New South Wales for at 
least the past forty years no Chairman of Committees has risen to be 
Speaker. Sometimes the govemment prefers to nominate a respected 
elder statesman of the party; but there are several examples of a young 
Speaker for whom the office was a preliminary to holding cabinet 
rank. There have been govemments—the Bruce-Page ministry of 1923-
9 was one—who found the Chair a convenient means of disposing of 
colleagues who, perhaps through ineptitude, perhaps through their 
independence or potential rivalry to the party leader, could not be 
conveniently retained in the Cabinet or left on the back benches. 
Other Speakers have been poachers turned gamekeepers—members 
who distinguished themselves in opposition by their abihty to 
embarrass die goverrmient and Speaker by a fertile knowledge of 
procedure and points of order. However chosen, the Speaker is a 
party nominee and is expected to behave as such. Federal pohtics 
have set the example. In 1921 Sir Elhott Johnson several times saved 
the Nationahst ministry by his casting vote. A decisive test case arose 
in 1929, when a group of malcontent Nationahsts joined with the 
Labour Opposition in overthrowing the Nationahst-Country party 
govemment. On a cmcial division in Committee, Sir Littleton Croom, 
the Nationahst Speaker, abstained, citing British precedent as his 
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guide. The govemment feU, and was defeated at the ensuing election. 
Groom was hotly attacked by his owm party, on the grounds that by 
abstaining he disenfranchised his constituency, and that by accepting 
Nationahst endorsement at elections he bound himself to vote for the 
party. No pains were spared to ensure his defeat in a constituency 
which he and his father had represented for sixty-seven years, and 
although he later came back to Parhament, his party never appointed 
him to another post. Groom's experience showed clearly that British 
precedent would not be accepted in Austiahan pohtics. A recent dis-
turbing example of a Government's readiness to override the 
Speaker's rulings arose in December 1953, din±ig the regime of 
Speaker Cameron. A Liberal who forcefuUy upheld the dignity and 
independence of the Chair—he declined to attend party meetings 
while Speaker of the Commonwealth Parhament—Cameron ruled that 
it was unparhamentaty for the Prime Minister (Mr. R. G. Menzies) to 
state that a Labour member had "communist associations". The 
Liberals at once used their parhamentaty majority to cany a motion of 
dissent wdth this ruhng. A British Speaker, after such a snub, might 
have resigned. Cameron seems to have acquiesced, as he remained 
Speaker until his death in 1956, and no conffict has since occurred 
between a govemment and an over-independent Speaker. 
Although the Speaker is thus the creature of his party, it would be 
misleading to suppose that minority or Opposition groups have no 
redress against bias or inadequacy in the Chair. It has been suggested 
that Austiahan pohticians prefer their present system, as the Opposi-
tion's capacity for attack would be impaired if one of its members were 
responsible for the conduct of the House. If an Opposition feels 
aggrieved at partisan conduct by the Chair, it may always reheve its 
feelings by a motion of no confidence. This is not so uncommon or 
momentous as it would be in Great Britain. Four such motions were 
moved in the Federal Parhament between 1944 and 1950, the Speaker 
defending himself on one occasion from the govemment front bench. 
It is also usual for the Opposition to go through the motions of 
nominating one of their own number against an unsatisfactoty incum-
bent. Even although such a gesture is doomed to defeat—especiaUy in 
the Commonwealtii House of Representatives, where standing orders 
allow the leader of the House to move the closure at any time during 
a debate on electing the Speaker—it sometimes appears to cany weight 
with the ministry; as when in 1959 the Labour govemment of New 
South Wales dropped the contioversial Speaker Lamb in favour of a 
nominee whom aU parties accepted unaiumously. A fair and popular 
Speaker wdU, however, be re-elected wdthout opposition as long as his 
party remains in power. In Westem Austraha, a State where party 
strife is muted, no Speaker has been opposed or made the subject of a 
want of confidence motion since 1917, and the Chair appears to be well 
respected. Here the party nature of the Speakership has done no 
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harm; but it may be otherwise in Federal pohtics. Unassisted by any 
official similar to the Speaker's Council in Great Britain, and bound by 
stronger party ties than his British counterpart, the Speaker in Aus-
tralia may be handicapped in forming impartial decisions. Many 
occupants of the Chair have succeeded in doing so; but it cannot 
benefit AustraHan parUamentary traditions for minority groups to have 
plausible grounds for questioning the credentials of the man appointed 
to guide and interpret the rules of debate and business. In departing 
from past tradition, and placing the Speaker above party. Sir Robert 
Peel stated a view worthy of consideration in modem Australia: 
. . . it seems to me more becoming to a great party to act upon its own 
principle and even apply it against itself, than to say to its opponents, 
"Though our principle was the right one, yet by way of retaliation, we will 
adopt yours".^ 
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II THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
OF THE AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT 
H. B. Turner 
The "Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs", more sunply the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, is relatively new and certainly anomalous both m 
the context of the Austiahan Parliament and in relation to the Parha-
mentaty system of govemment. It is not, therefore, surprising that it 
should be the subject of controversy. 
The birth of the idea is to be found in the new situation confronting 
Austraha at the conclusion of World War II. In the first place, the fall 
of Singapore jolted us out of our mother's arms, from colonial in-
souciance into a sense of national responsibility, into the realisation 
that our foreign relations and defence were no longer the sole con-
cem of our imperial protector, but matters for our own initiative. And, 
in the second place, it happened that these new and vital respon-
sibihties fell into the hands of a Minister for Extemal Affairs who was 
a brilliant individuahst, a bird capable of "changing plumage in mid-
ffight", the late Dr. H. V. Evatt. In this atmosphere it was felt that 
Parhament required more knowledge in this unfamiliar field, and that 
pohcy should be based on greater stabUity and continuity. Moreover, 
Canada and New Zealand, sister dominions under the Parhamentaty 
form of govemment, had recently led the way. 
So it was that in November 1949, on the eve of an election that 
removed the war-time Labour govemment from office and replaced it 
for sixteen years with administrations headed by Mr. (later Sir Robert) 
Menzies, the joint policy speech of the victorious coalition Parties 
promised a Foreign Affairs Committee. At this stage it was merely an 
idea, bom of tihe circumstances of the time, vague, indefinite, adopted 
in principle. 
In Februaty 1950 the Govemor-General, outlining the new Govem-
mentis programme, said: "It is proposed to estabhsh a Parhamentaty 
Standing Committee on foreign affairs to give opportunities for full 
study and to serve as a source of information to Parliament." Elabor-
ating upon this, the new Minister for Extemal Affairs, Mr. (later Sir 
Percy) Spender, said in March: "The Govemment . . . proposes to 
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estabhsh . . . a Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs which can give 
constant attention to the broad issues of foreign policy . . . [It] should 
have a broad mandate to study Extemal Affairs in the widest sense . . . 
[It] wdll be able, because of its special studies and information, to 
give a lead to the House in debates on foreign affairs, but it wdll not 
itself 'make' pohcy since that is, and must remain, the responsibihty 
of the Executive. Its great value will be in its ability to give detailed 
study to the great problems of the day and to pass on to the Parlia-
ment the expert knowledge which it will in the course of time acquire 
. . . [It] should not be too large since much of its value will depend 
upon the depth of the studies it undertakes . . . [It] should be 
authorised also to inquire into matters referred to it by the Minister." 
From this general statement it may be gathered that the basic 
concept was the study "in depth" of "the great problems of the day" 
and the "passing on to Parhamenti' of this "expert knowledge" by "giv-
ing a lead to the House in debates". It was not to be the function of 
the Committee to "make" pohcy, this being the prerogative of the 
Executive. 
What were the implications of this general statement? If there 
was to be study in depth and the acquisition of expertise on the part 
of the proposed Committee, obviously it must have access to as wdde 
a range of information as possible, both from the Department of 
Extemal Affairs and from outside sources; and this immediately 
raised the question whether and, if so, under what conditions, secret 
and confidential information could be made available to the Commit-
tee by the Department. A further question concemed the staffing 
of the Committee if it was to pursue researches effectively. Again, 
if information was to be "passed on to the Parhament", this could be 
done in one or more of several ways—by the content and quahty of 
speeches made by members of the Committee in the course of 
relevant debates, by open inquiries conducted by the Committee, and 
by reports laid on the table. Finally, if the Committee was to study 
"the great problems of the day" and "pass on to the Parhament" the 
results of its investigations, how was this to be reconciled with the 
sole prerogative of the Executive to "make" policy? What seems to 
be implied in this statement is that the Committee should concem 
itself with the "broad" issues rather than detailed decisions—for 
example, the principles upon which our foreign aid should be based 
rather than the desirability or otherwise of a particular project. But 
it is difficult to see how the Committee could study a topic and pre-
sent the fmits of its study to Parhament without influencing, or 
tending to influence, if not to "make", pohcy. 
In Febmaty 1952, two years after the general statement of mtent 
by his predecessor, it feU to the lot of Mr. (later Lord) Casey, the then 
Minister for Extemal Affahs, to put specffic proposals to the Parha-
ment. 
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The tentative approach to the experiment was exemphfied at the 
outset by the impermanent basis selected to give authority to the 
Committee. Whereas the other two major committees of the Parha-
ment, tihe Pubhc Accounts Committee and the Pubhc Works Com-
mittee, were estabhshed by statute, the Foreign Affairs Committee 
was constituted by a resolution of the Houses requiring renewal at 
the commencement of each Parhament. It may of course be argued 
that this was inevitable in view of the refusal of the Opposition to 
serve on the Committee. Be this as it may, uncertainty about the 
future, particularly in the event of a change of govemment, and 
consequential staffing problems, particularly in respect of research 
facihties, have inevitably been a handicap. 
The terms of the original resolution setting up the Committee 
were debated at length in the Parhament and require consideration 
in some detaU because they highhght the problems associated with 
the integration of a Foreign Affairs Committee into a Parhamentaty 
system of govemment. 
The more important terms were as follows: 
That a joint committee be appointed to consider such matters conceming 
foreign affairs as are referred to it by the Minister for Extemal Affairs. 
That twelve members of the House of Representatives be appointed . . . 
That the Minister . . . shall make available . . . information within such 
categories and on such conditions as he may consider desirable. 
The Conunittee . . . wiU sit in camera and their proceedings shaU be secret. 
The Committee shaU, for considerations of national security, . . . forward 
reports to the Minister . . . , but on every occasion it shaU inform the Par-
hament that it has so reported. 
The Committee shaU have no power to send for persons, papers or records 
without the concurrence of the Minister . . . and aU evidence . . . shaU be 
regarded as confidential to the Committee. 
Dr. Evatt, the then Leader of the Opposition, indicated in a series 
of amendments the terms upon which the Opposition would presum-
ably accept membership of the Committee, because he expressed 
himseff as being in favour of the idea. 
Firstly, he proposed that the Committee should consider matters 
referred to it by either House, as weU as by the Minister, and such 
matters as might be decided upon by the Committee itself. This was 
rejected by the Minister, but in 1954, upon the reappointment of the 
Committee, the relevant term of reference was altered to read: "That 
a Joint Committee be appointed to consider foreign affairs generally, 
and in particular, to inquire into matters referred to it by the Minis-
ter . . ." This conceded half of what Dr. Evatt had sought two years 
earher. 
Secondly, he moved that six of the twelve members to be appointed 
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from the House of Representatives should be drawm from the Opposi-
tion. It is difficult to beheve that this indicated any genuine desire 
to see the Committee firmly estabhshed on a basis that would be 
acceptable to either party in govemment. When in 1956 the Com-
mittee was enlarged to a total of twenty (thirteen from the House 
of Representatives and seven from the Senate), the intention was 
made clear that there should be twelve Govemment members and 
eight Opposition members. 
No exception was taken to the Minister's determining what cate-
gories of information he would make avaUable to the Committee and 
on what conditions he would supply it. 
Thirdly, however, objection was raised to the provision that meet-
ings of the Committee should all be held in camera and that the 
proceedings should all be secret. In 1953 this point was met by an 
amendment enabling the Committee to meet in public if the Minister 
should in particular cases give his consent. 
Fourthly, the Opposition moved that, when the Committee submit-
ted a report to the Minister, either House might require it to be pub-
hshed. The Govemment insisted that this should remain a matter 
for the Minister's discretion. However, in 1959 it was provided that, 
where a report was furnished to the Minister on his request and the 
Opposition was serving on the Committee, a copy of the report should 
be supphed to the Leader of the Opposition for his confidential in-
formation. And it was further provided that the Committee might 
communicate with the Minister but that all such communications and 
the fact that they had been made should be confidential to the Com-
mittee and the Minister. This of course operates in the reverse direc-
tion from pubhcity. 
Fifthly, subject to the safeguard that the Minister might deter-
mine what categories of information should be made avaUable to the 
Committee, it was maintained by the Opposition that the require-
ment that the Committee should not be empowered to send for per-
sons, papers and records was unduly restrictive. This provision has 
been hberahsed on three occasions since 1952, and on the last, in 
1964, the Committee was given power to invite persons to give evi-
dence before the Committee and, with the consent of the Minister, 
to call for official papers and records; but evidence submitted in 
camera was to remain confidential to the Committee and the Minister. 
FinaUy, in 1964, to meet a subsequent objection raised by the 
Opposition, Sir Garfield Barwick, the then Minister for Extemal 
Affairs, made a further concession, aUowing for the expression of a 
dissenting opinion in any report or communication submitted to the 
Mmister. But the reasons were to be summarised by the Chairman 
and agreed upon between him and the dissenting member. The 
Opposition expressed itself as bemg dissatisfied with this compromise. 
The official objections of the Labour Opposition to service on the 
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Committee have centred upon two principal matters: first, lack of 
autonomy—for example, the power to hold open meetings, to call 
for persons, papers and records, and the right of Parhament to call 
for the pubhcation of reports; and, secondly, the proposed balance 
of representation between the Parties—both the preponderance of 
govemment members, and the inclusion of a representative of the 
Democratic Labour Party. 
However, it has been questioned whether the reasons advanced 
are the true ones. The Govemment has made important concessions; 
and sceptics are dubious whether Labour in office would be as keen 
on autonomy for the Committee as Labour in opposition professes to 
be. It is behoved in some quarters that the basic reason for Labour 
abstention is the fear that participation could lead to a bipartisan 
approach to foreign affairs that might blunt the edge of a distinctive 
pohcy possessing an appeal to the electors. But in fairness it should 
be added that some minds, darkly suspicious, see the present impasse 
as favourable to the Govemment, because it can accuse the Opposi-
tion of not being serious about foreign affairs while denying it an 
opportunity to influence pohcy. Be all this as it may, the absence of 
the Opposition from the Foreign Affairs Committee immeasurably 
weakens its prestige, its irffiuence and its voice, or maybe two voices, 
and imprints upon it the character of impermanence. 
However, whatever differences may have been expressed when the 
Committee's charter was being framed, debated and modffied, it re-
mains to consider the actual results achieved over the past fourteen 
years and the extent to which failures may have been due to defects 
in the terms of reference and how far to other causes. 
Certainly membership of the Committee has been coveted by Gov-
emment members and the competition for places has been keen. Al-
though technicaUy, in accordance with the usual practice in respect 
of Parhamentaty committees, the members are appointed by the 
leader of the Govemment (and of the Opposition in the event of its 
participation), in practice the members have been elected by ballot 
in the respective Party rooms (Liberal and Countty Party, Senate 
and House of Representatives). And the reasons why particular per-
sons are chosen are as various as the number of voters who participate 
in the selection. But it is a fair generahsation to say that the success-
ful candidates represent a cross-section of Govemment members both 
in age and abihty and as between the States. At one time or another 
it has proved a useful experience for men who subsequendy became 
Mmisters: for example, A. R. Dowmer, F. M. Osborne, H. S. Roberton, 
D. A. Cameron, A. J. Forbes, F. C. Chaney, D. E. Fairbaim, B. M. 
Sneddon, L. H. E. Buty and J. G. Gorton; and it has mcluded former 
Ministers, and men who have been or have become a General, an Air 
Vice-Marshal and a Judge. 
The Committee early adopted the practice of meetmg at 10.30 on 
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Tuesday mornings prior to the sitting of the Parhament and, when 
thought expedient, from time to time during adjournments of the 
Houses. The normal venue for meetings has been Canberra, but on 
some occasions during recess it has met, to suit the convenience of 
members, in Melboume. 
The usual procedure for the full Committee is to hear evidence, 
sometimes recorded and sometimes not, from a great variety of ex-
perts. It has of course drawn extensively on the resources of the 
Department of Extemal Affairs. When particular issues have been 
"hot", it has had backgrovmd briefings from the relevant officers; and 
it has had the advantage of hearing from ambassadors returning to 
Canberra for consultation or at the conclusion of tours of duty in 
foreign capitals. But it has by no means confined itself to the Depart-
ment. It has frequently been addressed by visiting pohticians and 
diplomats, besides ambassadors and high commissioners and their 
officers resident in Canberra. It has cast its net wide to include 
academics, joumahsts and others who have had opportunities to 
study and observe developments in various countries overseas. From 
time to time it has profited from the commentaries of its owm mem-
bers or other members of the Parhament who have travelled with 
official missions or under private arrangements. Witnesses have in-
variably submitted themselves to questioning at the conclusion of 
their statements. In addition. Ministers have supplied the Committee 
with official papers and have discussed with it a variety of mat-
ters. Observers from the Committee have attended conferences 
within the field of intemational affairs held on Austiahan soil or in 
the South Pacffic region, and from time to time the Committee has 
entertained distinguished visitors from abroad. 
The more detailed studies have been made by sub-committees prior 
to consideration by the fuU committee and over the years have in-
cluded such topics as AUied pohcy in the Far East, Antarctica, the 
Colombo Plan, Disarmament, West New Gumea, Extiadition, Trade 
with Communist Chma, South-East Asia, Regional Economic De-
velopment, the future of the United Nations, New Guinea and the 
South Pacffic, Laos and South-East Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East, Economic Relations, Economic and Technical Assistance, 
S.E.A.T.O., and Berhn. 
GeneraUy, the Minister has not referred matters in set terms to 
the Committee for study, but in the course of discussions wdth it he 
has indicated the kinds of topics that he considered worthy of atten-
tion. And, in turn, the Committee has from tune to time put certain 
views before him. In short, the relationship has been in the main 
one of informal consultation. The Committee has m fact reported 
to the Parhament on only five occasions. In 1952 it produced a re-
port on the Peking Peace Conference, and this was printed as a 
Parhamentaty paper; in 1953 it submitted a report on the Commit-
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tee's activities and functions and in 1954 a report on Indo-China, but 
neither of these was tabled. In 1956 it made a report relating to ex-
tradition arrangements between Australia and Communist countries; 
this was tabled later in the year, but no motion for its printing was 
made and it was not debated. In 1963 a report on Berhn was tabled 
and printed as a Parhamentaty paper. 
Throughout its life the Committee has been fortunate in having 
as its secretaries able and devoted officers of the Parliament, drawm 
from the Senate, and a succession of haison officers from the Depart-
ment of Extemal Affairs who have rendered indispensable assistance. 
They have of course been available on a part-time basis only, and 
the Committee has never had the services of a research assistant. 
It may be concluded from what has been said that the Committee 
has not been without an infusion of able members and that it has not 
lacked adequate sources of information. It may or may not have 
influenced pohcy: because the fact and the nature of communications 
with the Minister are confidential, no data on this point are avaUable. 
The only ways in which it could have served as "a source of informa-
tion to Parhament" are through the speeches of members in the 
course of debates on foreign affairs, through pertinent questions 
ehciting answers that would not otherwdse have been given, and of 
course through pubhshed reports, especially if made the subject of 
debate on the technical motion "that the paper be printed". In fact, 
fuU dress debates on foreign affairs, usually initiated by a minis-
terial statement, sometimes on a motion seeking approval of a treaty, 
have been infrequent; and it is a matter of opinion whether the 
standard has improved and, if so, whether this is due to any better 
understanding derived from the studies of the Committee. It is the 
impression of this writer that the contiibutions of members have 
gained over the years in reahsm and a better appreciation of the 
Austrahan interest and that this is not unrelated to the contact and 
discussions that have taken place between the Committee and those 
who have come before it. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether these 
improvements, even if conceded, can be regarded as "a source of in-
formation to the Parhament". What appears incontestable is that 
the reports tabled, or even submitted, have been few in number and 
in general have dealt with topics of peripheral importance to this 
countty. In summaty, it may be concluded that the Committee has 
been a useful study group but has done httle to analyse the great 
issues of the day and to enhghten the Parhament and the people in 
the field of foreign relations. And this can be traced to the deter-
mination of the govemment to safeguard the security of Extemal 
Affairs information and Ministerial responsibihty for policy. 
The question, then, is squarely posed whether under the Parha-
mentaty system of govemment the legislature can have any effective 
voice in the formulation of foreign pohcy. Must this be a close 
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preserve for Ministers and officials whUe Parhament beats the air 
in benighted ignorance? 
Inevitably the mind of the simple inquirer wiU gravitate to the 
prestigious Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the Congress 
of the United States; and he will recall the rigorous questioning of 
Secretaries of State and other high officials by this Committee, its 
vety great power in regard to the terms of treaties and appropria-
tions designed to implement the Administration's foreign policy, and 
the pubhcity accorded to its reports and to the pubhc statements of 
its Chairman. WhUe he will know that the President, advised by the 
Secretaty of State and others whom he chooses to consult, generaUy 
has the last word on issues touching foreign pohcy, he wUl also know 
that Congress, holding the purse strings, is not without influence, 
led by the relevant Committees. Why, he will wonder, is Parhament 
so utterly impotent in this field? 
If he seeks an answer from a constitutional lawyer, he will be told 
wdth some degree of smug satisfaction that the difference is due to 
the fact that under our form of govemment the Executive is within 
and part of Parliament itself. Ministers are also members of the 
legislature, whereas members of an American administiation, pre-
siding over its various departments and agencies, are simply chosen 
and appointed by the President from outside Congress. This wiU be 
described as the principle of "separation of powers", the legislative 
and executive, alien to our superior system. 
What are the reahties of Parhamentaty control stemming from 
the fact that Ministers are members of the Parhament? True, they 
can be questioned upon their administiation on any day of the week 
when Parhament is sitting. Although they can refuse to answer a 
question, they seldom do this in plain blunt terms. They can ask 
that the question be put on the notice paper, and may neglect to 
answer it for months. They can give an evasive answer, which they 
frequently do, whether oraUy or in writing. In short, it must can-
didly be confessed that the American system of summoning "officials" 
—that is. Ministers in our terminology, as well as other members of 
the pubhc service, as we should describe them—before Congres-
sional Committees to make statements and submit to cross-examina-
tion upon them at pubhc hearings is a far more searching and 
efficient method of ehciting information and defence of a pohcy than 
is possible through questions under our system. 
Again, the constitutional lawyer wiU point out that under the 
Parhamentaty system a govemment that loses the support of a 
majority in the House of Representatives must inevitably resign. 
Surely this is a most salutary contiol by Parhament over the Execu-
tive! On the other hand, a President and his officials are not amen-
able to this powerful control by Congress. Perhaps the only satis-
factoty answer to this hne of argument is: "Poppycock". Once only 
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within the memoty of the present generation has an Austrahan 
govemment been dismissed from office by Parhament. This was 
when in the early phase of World War II two members of the House 
of Representatives withdrew their support from the then Prime 
Minister, the Rt. Hon. R. G. Menzies, instalhng an administration 
drawm from the opposing Party in his stead. Otherwise, Party dis-
ciphne in the modem age ensures that Ministers may "get away with 
murder" before a Parliamentary majority is prepared to dismiss them 
and their govemment from office. This is the hard reahty of Parha-
mentary life. 
What is the lesson to be derived from American procedures? It 
is not that a Committee should set itself up in opposition to a Minis-
ter so that responsibility for pohcy is blurred and divided, but rather 
that thinking should be stimulated by the constant posing of per-
tinent questions and the canvassing of fresh initiatives. This is 
pecuharly difficult in the field of foreign affairs where dehcate 
negotiations may be prejudiced or fragile relationships imperilled 
by brash statements at inopportune moments. And this is especially 
the case where a foreign countty believes, however mistakenly, that 
a point of view put by some members of Parhament supposedly in 
possession of confidential information is either prompted by or re-
presents the attitude of the govemment. In short, it may well be 
that the too close association of a Foreign Affairs Committee with a 
Minister and Department of Extemal Affairs precludes it from the 
function that it can best perform. It may weU be that it would serve 
its purpose better by deriving its information from public sources, 
using this as a goad to compel a govemment into fuller explanations 
and a sterner defence of its policies or by force of reason to modify 
them. Indeed, it is the vety openness and uninhibited candour of 
pubhc debates, stimulated by inquiries of Congressional committees, 
rather than the direct power of the legislature over appropriations, 
too often stultifying firm govemment, that Parhament might weU 
emulate and adopt if it is to survive as something more than a rubber 
stamp whose members are httle more than messenger boys between 
their constituents and govemment departments. But if committees 
are to be sufficiently informed to pose the right questions and sug-
gest alternative solutions, they require, as the American committees 
have, a competent research staff and an adequate Legislative Refer-
ence Service. This depends upon the recognition by members of their 
situation and their need. 
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The study of electoral behaviour, after a belated start, has become 
estabhshed in Austraha, and studies by Mayer and Rydon,^ Rawson 
and Holtzinger,^ Carboch,^ Rawson,* and Bums^ are available. How-
ever the electoral system has attracted less attention, and two articles 
by Dr. Joan Rydon are reproduced here, both to provide factual data 
and to iUustrate techniques whereby the mechanics of voting may be 
shidied. Dr. B. D. Graham's "The Choice of Votmg Methods m 
Federal Pohtics, 1902-1918" gives the definitive account of the adop-
tion of preferential voting in Australia, and supphes a useful correc-
tive to erroneous versions of the decision. The papers by the late 
Chris Masterman and the editor on donkey voting and compulsoty 
voting are included wdth a similar consideration in mind. Both topics 
occasion much Ul-informed comment, and education in pohtical 
science has to disabuse ahnost as often as it has to inform. 
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12 ELECTORAL METHODS AND THE 
AUSTRALIAN PARTY SYSTEM, 
I9IO-I95I 
Joan Rydon 
It is not my intention in this paper to discuss general questions of the 
extent to which the electoral systems of any countty determine the 
character of the party systems. Some writers have probably over-
stiessed the connections—e.g., E. E. Schattschneider, who has baldly 
stated:^ "The American two-party system is the direct consequence of 
the American electoral system." Some of the weaknesses in such a view 
have been clearly revealed in Leslie Lipson's study of "The Two-Party 
System in British Pohtics".^ He behoves there is as much evidence to 
show that the parties are the prime determinants of the electoral sys-
tem as that the latter determines the parties. This hen and egg ques-
tion—which is the cause and which the effect—is irrelevant for my 
purpose. 
Whether or not we accept the view that pohtical parties arise 
primarily because of the need to organise the electorate, it is clear that 
elections are a focal point in the working of any party system. What-
ever its origins, a pohtical party concentiates on winning elections, and 
becomes to a great extent an organisation formed around elections. 
If, then, we are setting out to study the working of any particular 
party or party system, it will be necessaty to consider the interaction 
between the particular party or system and the prevailing electoral 
system. This paper is a vety limited and vety elementaty attempt to 
do this for Austraha. I may forestall some obvious criticism by empha-
sising with Maurice Duverger that "the factors conditioning the 
political hfe of a countty are vety closely inter-related so that any 
study of the effects of any one of those factors considered in isola-
tion is necessarily artificial".^ 
It is not surprising that, in the general social and pohtical atmos-
phere of Austiahan democracy, there should have been great variety, 
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novelty and experimentation in electoral laws and voting systems. 
Austiaha was to the fore in the extension of the franchise—particularly 
to women—and in the intioduction of the secret ballot. There have 
been frequent changes in the electoral laws, and Australian Parlia-
ments have spent considerable time debating the methods by which 
they should be elected. Evety detail of the elaborate electoral appar-
atus—the qualffications required of electors and candidates, the mach-
inety for compUing rolls, the rules governing the distribution of pro-
paganda, the provisions for postal and absentee voting, etc.—has doubt-
less had some effect on political life, and most would be well worth 
investigating. I will, however, limit what I have to say to the operation 
of compulsoty voting and to the methods of division into electorates 
and counting of votes used in the Lower Houses of Australian Parlia-
ments. I will concentrate on the general elections for the Federal 
House of Representatives (which are the only ones I have been able 
to look at in any detail) and the working of preferential voting there-
in. Thus I wUl not touch upon the varied and complex methods used 
in the election of State Upper Houses, though it is obvious that these 
have been of far-reaching importance in the political life of Aus-
tralia and the development of the party system. 
The study of any aspect of Australian politics is complicated by the 
federal system. Political parties are organised not only to fight elec-
tions on the basis of Federal and State electorates (and, sometimes, 
local govemment areas), but also to fight Senate elections on a State-
wide basis and, occasionally, referenda on a nation-wide basis. Any 
thorough study would need to include analyses of all these different 
elections and referenda. Since all Australian parties are organised 
primarily on a State rather than a national basis, the absence of 
analyses of State elections renders difficult the study of Federal 
elections. 
There are, and have been, considerable differences between the 
electoral systems of the Commonwealth and the various States. One 
might think that this would facihtate the comparisons between the 
working of these different systems. To some extent this is probably 
true, but the Federal factor intervenes. The whole countty must 
operate under Commonwealth laws, and the same pohtical organisa-
tions operate at Federal and State elections, hence there will always 
be interactions between the different systems; they cannot be tieated 
as isolated cases of particular electoral systems. A good example of this 
can be seen in the operation of compulsoty voting, which was intio-
duced by Queensland in 1915, the Commonwealth in 1924, and at 
scattered intervals by other States, South Austraha being last in 1944. 
Between 1915 and 1924, the Queenslanders, who were compelled to 
vote at State elections, did so m mcreasing numbers at Federal elec-
tions. SimUarly, after compulsion was intioduced in the Common-
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wealth sphere, the percentage poUs in those States retaining voluntaty 
voting showed signfficant increases. 
Compulsoty voting is an aspect of Australian elections which would 
merit detailed study. It is not easy to generahse as to the reason be-
hind its introduction, nor to distinguish clear-cut party attitudes. Per-
haps the root cause of its adoption can be found in the desire to 
increase the honesty of elections and the accuracy of electoral roUs, 
for it was regarded by many as a logical coroUaty to compulsoty 
enrolment, introduced by the Commonwealth in 1913. 
The results of compulsion are clearly seen in the increase of enrolled 
electors who vote—the figure which had fluctuated between 45 per 
cent, and sixty per cent, in early Commonwealth elections rose to 
over ninety per cent, once compulsion was introduced. The actual dif-
ference may be somewhat greater than these figures suggest, for they 
represent the percentage of electors enrolled, not the percentage of 
the adult population, and the significant increase in the numbers on the 
rolls which followed compulsoty enrolment suggests a considerable 
difference between the two. 
One would expect that compulsion would increase informal voting, 
yet the election of 1925 produced extremely few informal votes, and 
there was no evidence of protest casting of informal votes. There has, 
however, been some increase in the average informal vote since 1925, 
but this may in part be due to more complex systems of voting—it is 
certain that the greatest increases have occurred after the introduction 
of such complexities; e.g., preferential voting and Proportional Repre-
sentation in the Senate. In referenda the complexity factor would 
operate less, though even here Professor Parker has observed that the 
percentage of informal votes increases with the number of questions 
asked.* One might, however, consider the extent to which compulsoty 
voting enables the adoption and continuance of complex systems of 
voting. Without compulsion, it is possible that the numbers voting 
would have fallen heavily in protest at difficult and complicated voting 
methods: e.g.. Proportional Representation in Senate elections. 
Parhamentaty debates on the introduction of compulsoty voting 
showed that neither party was at all sure as to the effects on its elec-
toral fortunes. It seems improbable that it has favoured either party, 
though it has raised the percentage poU in countiy and "blue-ribbon" 
seats. It may well have tended—in conjunction, of course, with other 
factors—to strengthen the two-party system; to operate in favour of the 
larger parties against lesser knowm candidates, small groups or Inde-
pendents, and perhaps at times in favour of sitting members. It may 
also have increased the trend to almost equal division of the votes be-
tween the two major parties—an examination of the overaU party 
figures for the House of Representatives and the Senate would be 
useful in this regard. The figures for referenda show no clear effect of 
compulsoty voting. 
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Compulsion has, however, affected methods of campaigning. 
Emphasis has shifted from getting the voters to the polls to the issuing 
of "How to Vote" cards. The swinging voter has probably assumed 
greater importance, for parties—more assured than ever of the votes 
of their regular supporters—direct their campaigns to the middle 
group. They probably, therefore, tend to broaden their appeals, adopt 
moderate pohcies, and often come close to the pohcies of their 
opponents. Professor Crisp has suggested that 
the decline in party effort seriously and permanently to convert voters to 
their general philosophies and programmes may be attributable to compul-
sory voting. For, full converts or not, people wiU turn out on election day 
and will vote one way or another. . . . Certainly compulsory voting has not 
contributed to the serious pohtical education of the electorate, it may even 
have discouraged it.^ 
Other results have been to increase the accuracy of electoral roUs and 
facihtate the prediction of election results—swdnging seats, etc.—and 
the study of pohtical behaviour, thus assisting party organisers, gerty-
manderers, Mr. Morgan and his Pubhc Opinion Pollsters, and also 
pohtical scientists. 
Compulsoty voting has thus probably reinforced tendencies already 
operating in the electoral system. Elections for the majority of Lower 
Houses in Austraha are based on single-member electorates. This 
means of course that election results are determined not only by the 
size of party votes but also by their geographical distribution. The 
drawing of electoral boundaries is therefore vety important-
it may be possible for shght changes to effect great alterations 
in the composition of a Parliament. One condition of electoral 
equahty is that the number of electors in each electorate 
should be approximately equal, and be kept that way by frequent 
redistribution to keep abreast of population change. Such a condition 
has in the past been approached only by Tasmania and the Common-
wealth, and even in the Commonwealth there is some discrepancy 
since—in deference to the federal principle—the Constitution provides 
that no State shall have less than five seats. (Therefore the quota for 
Tasmanian seats is lower, and Tasmanian votes have greater value, 
than those of the mainland).® In all States except Tasmania the quota 
for electorates has usually been less in countty than in city areas; e.g.. 
New South Wales 1950: city electorates averaged 23,000 voters, coun-
tty 17,000; Westem Australia: metiopohtan elector's vote worth only 
half that of a countty voter. Over-weighting of the countty areas has 
generaUy helped the non-Labor parties {e.g., Victoria, where there 
have been three types of electorates—metiopohtan averaging 26,000 
voters, urban, 20,000, and countiy, 14,000; South Austiaha, where the 
inequahties have been exaggerated by population changes and the 
faUure to alter boundaries over a long period). In Queensland, how-
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ever, over-representation of pastoral and sugar-growdng areas operates 
in favour of Labor. The distribution of the electorates affects not only 
the relative stiength of the parties in Parliament, but also their nature 
and organisation; e.g., the importance of the Countty Party in Vic-
toria has been related to the electoral system, while the governing 
parties in South Australia and Queensland have doubtless been 
affected by the lasting hold they have maintained over those States.''^  
However, even when the distiibution is fair in the sense that the 
votes of electors have equal values, the position of the electorates in 
relation to the concentrations of people with particular pohtical views 
may favour one party against another. The margins by which seats are 
won will determine the extent to which party votes are lost in the 
overall value of the votes. In the Commonwealth, Labor has generally 
been slightly under-represented because it tends to win its seats by 
greater majorities than do other parties {e.g., R. H. Barrett has esti-
mated that, since 1928, Labor has won its seats by an average of 59.1 
per cent., whUe the Liberals—in the sense of aU major non-Labor 
parties such as Nationahsts and U.A.P.—have averaged 58.2 per cent., 
and the Countty Party 57.4 per cent. The general average by which 
seats have been won over this period is 58 per cent. Labor has won 
44 per cent, of its seats by more than this, the Liberals 43 per cent 
and the Countty Party only 38 per cent.).^ There is always the pros-
pect that the non-Labor parties will wdn more seats than Labor even 
though the latter has received more in total votes. This actually hap-
pened in 1940 (see Table 1) when the non-Labor parties, with 44.9 
per cent, of the first preference votes, won 51.3 per cent, of the seats, 
and Labor, with 48 per cent, of the votes, won only 48.6 per cent, of 
the seats. 
Quite apart from whether the accidental geographical distribution of 
the electorates favours one party against another, the most signfficant 
feature of the single-member electorate system is that it always tends 
to exaggerate the representation of the winning party, and the greater 
the victoty, the more wdll it be exaggerated proportionately. This is 
usually regarded as the virtue of the system, since it "finds majorities" 
by accentuating the dffierences between the winners and losers. 
In general terms, this is an iUustiation of the influence of the "swing-
ing" electorates: that is, as the percentage total vote for a party in-
creases, it wins "swinging" seats (by small majorities) and hence the 
average majority for all the seats it wins diminishes. The party poUing 
the greatest percentage vote thus tends to win its seats more cheaply 
in terms of votes than do the other parties.® 
Table 1 shows how this operates in Commonwealth elections—e.g., 
in 1917 non-Labor, with 54.2 per cent, of the votes, won 70.7 per cent, 
of the seats; Labor, wdth 44.5 per cent, of the votes, won only 29.3 per 
cent, of the seats. Thus a difference of 9.7 per cent, of the votes 
resulted in a difference of 41.4 per cent, in the seats won. Again, in 
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1946, Labor, wdth 51.8 per cent, of the votes, won 59.5 per cent, of the 
seats, while non-Labor's 47.4 per cent, of the votes secured for it only 
39.2 per cent, of the seats—a difference of 4.4 per cent, of the votes 
becoming a difference of 20.3 per cent, of the seats. Barrett has esti-
mated that since 1928 winning parties have averaged 9.2 per cent, 
more seats than votes—though here again there is the difference that 
Labor Governments have secured an average of 8.7 per cent, more 
seats than votes, whUe non-Labor Governments obtained 9.7 per cent, 
more seats than votes.^° 
Of course there will be a limit to the way in which the system finds 
majorities—in theory it should be when the party votes are equal, and 
thus a deadlock of equal representation should result. Owing to the 
accidental under-representation of Labor, such a deadlock did in fact 
occur in 1940 but the Labor vote was higher than the non-Labor. 
As a coroUaty to its exaggeration of the victory of the strongest 
party the single-member electoral system discriminates against the 
weaker parties. This discrimination is moderate against the second 
party, but against the third, fourth, etc., parties it becomes pro-
gressively stronger until it extinguishes their chances of winning seats 
altogether. The odds against a minor party are always vety great 
since it can be no more than a third party, unless its strength is 
strongly concentrated in one region or section. Table 1 shows that in 
Commonwealth elections. Independents have usually received a 
smaller percentage of seats than votes. In this Table, other candidates 
have been grouped under the two main headings. Labor and Non-
Labor. A break-dowm into specffic parties shows that most mushroom 
parties such as the People's Protestant Party, the One Parliament for 
Austraha, the various women's parties, the Liberal Democrats and 
the Services and Citizens Party have failed to gain any representation 
at all, though it must be admitted that these groups have never poUed 
a significant proportion of the votes. In 1937, however, the Social 
Credit Party contested a large number of seats and in 1934 polled 
almost five per cent, of the votes without winning any seats. Between 
1931 and 1940, when the Labor Party was spht, the minority group 
was always under-represented in relation to its total vote, and the 
under-representation would probably have been greater if the group 
had not been helped by the fact that its support tended to be concen-
trated regionally. 
One would expect that the only kind of minor party which would 
not be drastically discriminated against by the single-member elec-
torate would be one which has stiongly concentrated itself in certain 
regions. A smaU, locahsed party which contested a lunited number of 
seats might survive because, wdthin its region, it might become one of 
the two major parties, and within this region one of the major, nation-
wide parties might be forced into the position of third party and 
suffer accordingly. This has been tme to some extent of tiie Countiy 
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Party and the minority Labor parties. Alternatively, a regional party 
may serve more or less as the local wing of a major party—probably 
that which it has displaced in its owm region. In Canada, under single 
electorates, there are four parties, but Duverger emphasises that two 
of these are locahsed, and there are generaUy only two parties com-
peting in any one electorate. It has been suggested that the reason why 
sectional parties do not manage to survive in the U.S.A., even when 
they have strong regional support, is to be found m the predominance 
of Presidential elections which tend to influence the behaviour of 
parties much more than do Congressional elections, and to force 
regional groups to coalesce into two main parties. In Australia we have 
nothing, of course, to compare with Presidential elections, but we do 
have Senate elections fought on a State-wide basis, and it is noticeable 
that, while the Countty Party can exist as an independent party in the 
local elections for the Lower House, to gain any representation in the 
Senate it is almost inevitably forced to aUy itself with the major non-
Labor party.^^ 
There is no evidence of the system discriminating against the 
Countty Party. It has not only fared better than any minor party, but 
has always been over-represented in relation to the two major parties. 
Whether the non-Labor parties have been in or out of office, its per-
centage of the total vote has remained remarkably stable, and it has 
always been over-represented in that it has secured a signfficantiy 
higher percentage of seats than votes. This favourable position of the 
Countiy Party would seem to account ahnost entirely for the over-rep-
resentation of non-Labor in relation to Labor. 
A partial explanation of this favourable position of the Countiy 
Party can be found in the working of preferential voting. Doubtiess it 
is also helped by the fact that its support is concentrated in certain 
States, and in certain parts of those States. We have seen that it tends 
to win its seats wdth smaller majorities than do other parties. DetaUed 
studies of electoral geography might supply the basic reasons for the 
Countty Party's stiength. The break-dowm of Commonwealth election 
figures by States might also supply some clues to the problem. It may 
indeed be argued that my analysis means little because it does not 
include such a break-down. There are also other problems—e.g., un-
contested seats, the importance of personahties, regional differences, 
and decisions re party affiliations. 
Granted these limitations, there is stiU striking evidence of the ten-
dency of the single-member electorate system to over-represent the 
winning party, and to swamp most minor parties. If for the moment we 
consider the Countty Party as part of one non-Labor party, we can 
say that single-member electorates have bolstered the two-party sys-
tem in Australia. 
If, however, a system of single constituencies tends to swamp minor 
parties, the question arises as to why it does not cmsh the second 
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major party also—in other words, why it does not tend to produce a 
one-party rather than a two-party system. Schattschneider has argued 
—and I think fairly convincingly—that there are two main reasons tor 
this. First, that the second major party is not easily wiped out because 
it is hkely to have sufficient sectional stiength to protect itself against 
annihilation even in a crushing defeat—in some areas it will always be 
the first party, and it is thus certain to wdn substantial representation 
even in times of national defeat. Thus each Austiahan party always 
retains certain "blue-ribbon" seats in the House of Representatives. 
(We may compare this wdth the old system of Senate elections where, 
before the intioduction of Proportional Representation, State-wide 
multiple electorates could give one party an almost complete monopoly 
of representation.) 
Second, the power of the second party to recover from defeat de-
pends in part on the fact that it has a monopoly of the Opposition. 
Discontented elements, dissatisfied with their treatment by the party 
in power, attach themselves to the second major party, as it alone 
has a chance to get into power. Moreover, a stiong Opposition is 
necessaty to tihe survival of the party in power, for it is held together 
by the fact that disunity means defeat, by the fact that the Opposi-
tion is strong enough to take advantage of any failure of the party to 
maintain unity. If a party becomes too successful, reducing the Oppo-
sition to unimportance, it will usually suffer disunity and splits. Be-
cause great majorities tend to disintegrate, there wdll be a tendency 
for the party system to right itself, and re-establish an eqmhbrium 
whenever the party in power becomes too strong. 
Thus it is noticeable that the two parties tend to divide the elec-
torate equally between them. We have aheady seen that it is only by 
exaggerating the difference between the parties by representing the 
winner in greater proportion than the loser that the system finds 
majorities. The percentage votes of the two parties in the Common-
wealth have not shown any violent variations. Since 1910, Labor's 
average has been 47.0 per cent., non-Labor's 48.9 per cent. The lowest 
the Labor vote has dropped was to 38.2 per cent., the lowest for non-
Labor 35.8 per cent. The greatest majority won was by non-Labor in 
1917, 54.2 per cent. There has been much talk about landslides in 
Commonwealth elections, but it would be a mistake to assume that 
these represent vety great changes in the overall votes of parties—e.g., 
the election of 1929 is generally described as an overwhelming defeat 
for the Bmce-Page Govemment, yet non-Labor poUed 44.6 per cent, 
of the total votes against Labor's 48.8 per cent. The greatest swings 
have occurred ui 1917, 1931, and 1943-at tunes when there had been 
sphts in the major party organisations-but ahnost immediately the 
pendulum commenced to swing back. 
The character of the parties is doubtless related to the fact that they 
operate m such a two-party system. Because each needs to win the 
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support of a great variety of interests, and to attract some support 
from all groups, they will tend to make national appeals, and concen-
tiate on the swinging voter. Therefore they will tend to adopt 
moderate and broadly similar policies. (Again the exception will be 
a sectional third party, which alone wdll be able to afford to adhere 
to narrower policies reflecting particular regional and sectional 
interests.) 
In this accoxmt of the single-member electorate system no attention 
has yet been paid to the actual voting methods within the electorates. 
I want now to consider whether preferential voting has modffied the 
working of the system, and the trend to a two-party set-up—and this, 
of course, brings back the problem of the Country Party. 
NaturaUy the failure of the single-member system to give an ade-
quate representation of overall voting has evoked criticism. The vety 
procedure by which it "finds majorities" and discriminates against 
minority parties has caused it to be bitterly attacked. The many 
schemes for electoral reform proposed since the latter part of the last 
centuty fall into two main categories: 
First, various systems of proportional representation, which aim to 
ensure a correct representation of voting by providing that minority as 
well as majority opinion is represented, but it is clear that this can be 
done only through multiple constituencies. A form of Proportional 
Representation has operated in Tasmanian State elections since 1907. 
Multiple constituencies do not here present the difficulties that they 
would in larger States. There has been no tendency for a multiphcity 
of small parties to emerge. In fact, it is noticeable that the Countty 
Party has been unable to exist there. Majorities for Tasmanian Gov-
ernments have, however, been small as a rule, and Governments have 
frequently been dependent upon the support of Independents. In re-
cent years, considerable attention has been given to the possible 
methods of avoiding deadlocks. New South Wales' experiment with 
Proportional Representation from 1919 to 1926 tended to stiengthen 
the Countty Party, and to place the balance of power in Parhament 
either wdth that group or the Independents. The system aroused great 
hostility on account of the difficulties created by enormous electorates 
and the "pohtical cannibahsm"^^ it encouraged among members of the 
same and alhed parties. The introduction of Proportional Represen-
tation in the Senate in 1949 ended the uneven representation of parties 
which had characterised the old system of Senate elections, but it 
intioduced the danger of deadlocks, or of the balance being held by a 
minor party. 
Second, there have been schemes for electoral reform which have 
endeavoured to retain the single-member electorates, but to ensure 
that withm each electorate, the member is retumed by an absolute 
majority of the votes. The simple majority or "first past the post" method 
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of coimting votes places great pressure on the parties to nominate onty 
one candidate for each constituency. It operates against a contest 
between more than two candidates, reinforcing the trend to a two-
party system, and placing great emphasis on the machinety for party 
nomination. It is clear that the various Austrahan schemes to ensure 
a majority poU in each electorate were instituted in an endeavour to 
aUow more than two candidates to compete. They were usually direct 
attempts to offset the development of rigid pre-selection machinety. 
The Labor Party quite early developed pre-selection methods which 
prevented the nomination of more than one Labor candidate per elec-
torate. The other parties were usuaUy unable to disciphne their fol-
lowers so effectively, and therefore endeavoured to alter the electoral 
machinety to eliminate the dangers of sphtting the vote. Queensland 
introduced a limited form of contingent voting^^ in 1892; New South 
Wales experimented with a second ballot, or run-off election, between 
1910 and 1918, and wdth a contingent vote m 1926. From 1911 on, 
most of the States gradually adopted preferential voting as we know 
it today. Usually the introduction of preferential voting followed some 
degree of spht in the non-Labor parties. In the Commonwealth, its 
introduction in 1919 was directly linked with the rise of the Countty 
Party. The new organisation agreed to withdraw its candidate from a 
by-election, thus avoiding a three-cornered contest between Nation-
ahst, Labor and Countty Party—in retum for a promise from the 
Nationahst Govemment to legislate for preferential voting. Preferen-
tial voting has operated in elections for the House of Representatives 
ever since; and I want now to make some tentative suggestions as to 
the effects of this system of voting in the period from 1919-51. 
First, while the preferential system does not do away with the 
mechanism of the single-electorate system, which operates against 
minor parties, it does lessen the psychological factor operating against 
them—i.e., a voter may cast his vote for a candidate who has littie 
chance of winning without feehng that his vote has been wasted, since 
his preferences may be counted, and may still have some irffiuence 
on tiie final result. Between the fusion of non-Labor parties, about 
1910, and the introduction of preferential voting, in 1919, independent 
candidates were extiemely rare, and practicaUy evety contest was a 
stiaight-out fight between one Liberal and one Labor candidate. Since 
then the number of candidates putting up for election has vastly in-
creased.^'* The system may have encouraged minor parties which use 
the elections as a means of agitation and propaganda—e.g., the Com-
munist Party—though it has not improved their prospects of securing 
representation. The increased number of candidates cannot of course 
be attributed solely to preferential voting. The Coxmtry Party, the 
Communist Party, the Social Credit Movement, dissident groups with-
in the Labor parties in the 'thirties, and within the non-Labor ranks 
in the 'forties, have clearly not been the products of the electoral 
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system, but they have probably aU polled somewhat better under pre-
ferential voting than they might have under "first past the post". 
Secondly, the system permits the same party, or alhed parties, to 
put up more than one candidate in an electorate, knowdng that the 
exchange of preferences wdll to some extent avoid "splitting the vote". 
But because it cannot do this entirely, since there is never a tiansfer 
of 100 per cent, of preferences from one candidate to another, it is stiU 
important to achieve electoral pacts to prevent multiple contests, or at 
least to ensure a rigid exchange of preferences. 
It is important, however, to reahse that, despite the increased 
number of candidates since 1919, most electorates have still been won 
on an absolute majority of first preference votes. Independents and 
members of splinter groups have tended to contest "blue-ribbon" elec-
torates, and it is only rarely that their preferences have been distri-
buted. Preferences have been counted in only just over one-fifth (22.7 
per cent.) of all contests in general elections. Even more stiUdng is 
the fact that the distribution of preferences has caused the defeat of 
the candidate polling the most first preference votes in only 6.9 per 
cent, of all contests, and in less than one-third (32.5 per cent.) of those 
contests in which preferences have been counted. 
The non-Labor parties have made far more successful use of the 
preferential system than has Labor. In ahnost evety election, the 
changes which have been produced by the distribution of preferences 
have lost more seats for Labor than for non-Labor. 
Of the total 73 seats which have been won on the distribution of 
preferences, non-Labor has won 58 and Labor fifteen. Moreover, 
Labor has won five of these fifteen seats from rival Labor candidates, 
whUe a considerably smaller proportion—eight out of the 58—of the 
seats won by non-Labor have been won from other non-Labor can-
didates. The number of seats won by the Countty Party on preferences 
(22) represents over ten per cent, of the total seats it has won in 
Federal elections. This suggests that the Countty Party has gained 
more from preferential voting than any other party. Four seats have been 
won on preferences by Liberal Independents—two of these having 
been assisted by A.L.P. preferences to defeat the official Liberal 
candidate. Similarly, Liberal preferences have twice assisted Indepen-
dent Labor candidates (J. T. Lang and Mrs. Blackburn) to defeat the 
official A.L.P. candidates. (Preferences of A.L.P. candidates have 
twice enabled one Countiy Party candidate to defeat another, and 
have once enabled a Liberal to defeat a rival Liberal, but have three 
times helped official Labor to defeat minority Labor candidates.) 
We can also analyse the percentage of seats won by each party 
and the percentages they would have won if only first preference 
votes had been counted. By comparing these figures wdth the per-
centage of the total votes cast for each party it becomes clear that the 
under-representation of Labor previously mentioned would have been 
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considerably lessened if only first preference votes had been counted. 
The over-representation of the Countty Party would have also been 
considerably reduced though in ahnost evety case the percentage of 
the total votes cast for that party would stiU have been less than the 
percentage of seats won. 
It may be argued that the method used in e.g., Table 1, of com-
paring overall votes cast for a party with the number of seats it wins, 
is unsatisfactoty since only first preference votes are included whereas 
second and later preferences may help to determine the number of 
seats won. There is no simple way of overcoming this difficulty.^" 
Since, as we have seen, the Countty Party wins a greater proportion 
of its seats on preference votes than do the other parties, first preference 
votes cast for its alhes (usuaUy the other non-Labor candidates) will 
count towards its final majority in some seats. In other words the per-
centage of votes which are finally recorded for the Countty Party wdll 
normally be somewhat higher than that showm in the Tables which 
thus provide a further iUustiation of the fact that the Countiy Party 
uses the preferential system of voting more successfully than do the 
other parties. 
This analysis of cases in which distribution of preferences changed 
the result which would have been achieved by the "first past the post" 
system is, however, only part of the stoty of the working of preferen-
tial voting. It is also necessaty to consider the cases when preferences 
were counted but the results left unaltered—to see how rigidly dff-
ferent parties have exchanged preferences, and how often seats have 
been lost by a faUure to exchange preferences. There are obvious 
difficulties here—first, because it is vety difficult to decide just what a 
"leakage" of preference means: second, where there are many candi-
dates as e.g., happened in 1940, and preferences of four or five candi-
dates were often distributed, it is impossible to say with any certainty 
after the second count just whose preferences are going where. With 
these limitations, it is possible, however, to observe the foUowdng 
general tendencies: 
First, among the non-Labor parties: 
Where seats have been contested by Labor, Liberal and Countiy 
Party candidates, the highest exchange of preferences between non-
Labor candidates has been about 98 per cent. But this is by no means 
typical. In only abqut one-third of the cases where preferences have 
been distributed has the leakage to Labor been less than ten per cent., 
and on average it has been 16.8 per cent. The most interesting fact is 
that Liberal voters have tended to give their preferences far more 
faithfuUy to Countty Party candidates than have the Country Party to 
Liberals. When Liberal preferences have been distributed, the leakage 
to Labor has averaged 10.5 per cent., but when Countty Party pre-
ferences have been distributed, it has averaged 22.0 per cent. There 
are two qualffications to be made here. First, there is some difference 
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between the States. Countiy Party leakages to Labor have tended to 
be noticeably higher in Victoria, particularly in the early years. But 
even if Victorian figures are omitted, the average leakage is stUl 
considerably greater than that of Liberal preferences. The second 
quahfication is that, where there have been four or more candidates, 
there has been a tendency to a considerable leakage from Liberal to 
independent candidates. 
On the whole, exchange of preferences between Liberal and Coun-
tty Party candidates has worked fairly well since, in thirteen elections, 
there have been only about half-a-dozen seats won by Labor because 
of the faUure of the non-Labor candidates to exchange sufficient pre-
ferences. (It must be recognised, however, that election pacts may 
have often prevented three-cornered contests where this was likely to 
happen.) 
In cases of multiple endorsement, Countty Party preferences have 
showm an average leakage of twelve per cent, to Labor, compared with 
12.7 per cent, in cases of multiple Liberal endorsements. The latter 
figure is probably particularly high because most of the cases occurred 
in 1940, when there was an unusually large number of candidates. 
Small non-Labor parties and Independents have tended to transfer 
preferences less rigidly than endorsed candidates—the average leakage 
to Labor being nearly 25 per cent. 
Where non-Labor preferences have decided between several Labor 
candidates, they have tended to favour the more conservative, or 
Right-wdng; e.g., in 1931 both Countty Party and U.A.P. preferences 
went fairly rigidly to Federal Labor against State Labor, though, as 
we have seen. Liberal preferences enabled Lang to win Reid from the 
A.L.P. candidate m 1946. 
Second, Labor preferences: 
Labor candidates have rarely exchanged preferences as effectively 
as non-Labor candidates. The A.L.P. has endorsed multiple candi-
dates only in a few isolated cases in Tasmania and South Austraha. In 
oidy two cases have preferences been distributed, and in each there 
has been considerable leakage to non-Labor (over fifteen per cent.) 
and one seat in South Australia went to the U.A.P. because of the 
failure of the three A.L.P. candidates to exchange preferences rigidly. 
In the election of 1931, five seats in New South Wales and one in 
Queensland were lost by Labor because of the failure of State and 
Federal Labor candidates to exchange preferences rigidly. The most 
interesting feature here is that State Labor candidates gave their 
preferences to Federal candidates far more rigidly than did Federal 
Labor to State Labor. The average leakage to non-Labor from State 
Labor preferences was 11.75 per cent, (and wdthin New South Wales 
it was only 7.4 per cent.), whUe that from Federal Labor candidates 
averaged 31.5 per cent. The most glaring instance of the failure of 
rival Labor groups to exchange preferences was in East Sydney, where 
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55.8 per cent, of the Federal Labor preferences enabled the U.A.P. 
candidate to defeat E. J. Ward, the State Labor candidate. 
In subsequent sphts within the Labor Party in New South Wales, 
however, preferences were exchanged more rigidly. In 1940, fhe 
average leakage to non-Labor of the non-Communist Labor pre-
ferences was 12.04 per cent., that of the New South Wales State group, 
15.6 per cent. 
Neither the Communists nor the Social Credit candidates have given 
their preferences to the Labor Party as sohdly as one might expect. On 
average, 77 per cent, of Communist preferences and 61 per cent, of 
Social Credit preferences have gone to Labor candidates.^® In the case 
of Social Credit, it was noticeable that there was a larger leakage to 
Countiy Party than to Liberal candidates. 
Third, Independent preferences: 
Where the preferences of Independents have been distiibuted, it is 
only in a minority of cases that they have spht more or less evenly 
among Labor and non-Labor candidates—they usuaUy clearly support 
one or the other, and in well over half the cases counted, they favour 
non-Labor. It must be stressed, however, that Independent votes are 
usually smaU, and that they rarely decide elections. 
From aU this I think we can draw a few conclusions as to the 
working of preferential voting. Although it has modffied the trend of 
the single-electorate system to produce a rigid two-party system, it has 
not encouraged the multiphcity of parties, nor the emergence of a 
third centie party. It has, however, cushioned the effects of sphts wdth-
in the two main parties. Even in the 'thirties and 'forties, we have 
tended to have two groups of parties rather than several independent 
ones. Insofar as candidates of one party have been able to decide be-
tween rival candidates of another, the system has tended to favour 
moderate candidates. 
Preferential voting has not abohshed pre-selection but it has often 
enabled alhed parties to engage in three-cornered contests and the 
Countiy Party to engage in multiple endorsement wdthout losing 
seats. In the non-Labor parties there have always been conflicting 
opinions as to the advantages of running more than one candidate 
against Labor. In "swdnging" seats the danger of "sphtting the vote" 
must be weighed against the fact that each candidate wUl attract a 
number of personal or local votes regardless of his party. If non-Labor 
parties can exercise a tight exchange of preferences it may be to their 
advantage to have more than one candidate to "maximise" the vote 
against Labor. This is particularly tme in large countiy electorates 
where local loyalties and the idea of a local member are stiU stiong. 
By nominating candidates from different areas, a party may be able to 
benefit from the locahsed support each receives.!^ On the other hand 
in a "blue-ribbon" seat multiple endorsement may merely mean that a 
party which refuses to pre-select one candidate leaves it to the sup-
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porters of an opposing party to do this for them. There have, for 
example, been a number of cases where the Coimtty Party has 
endorsed two or three strong candidates in a safe seat and the pre-
ferences of a Labor or an independent candidate have decided which 
one of fliem secured the seat. 
Preferential voting has undoubtedly benefited non-Labor more than 
Labor. It helps to explain the continued existence of the Countiy 
Party, and the pecuhar two-and-a-half party system operating in 
Federal pohtics—though it only partially explains the over-representa-
tion which the Countty Party has always enjoyed. 
Preferential voting must also have had important effects on party 
organisation. In campaigning methods, it, of course, enhances the 
importance of "How to Vote" cards. It may also offer some clue to the 
pecuhar organisation of the Cotmtiy Party. To a greater extent than 
other parties, this group has been able to risk cannibahsm among mul-
tiple candidates. This fact is probably hnked wdth the extreme loose-
ness of the party organisation, and the scope thereby offered for 
regional and local divergences at the branch level. 
TABLE 1 
Elections for House of Representatives 1910-1951 
Comparison of Votes Cast and Seats Won by Main Political Groupings 
Election 
1910 
1913 
1914 
1917 
1919 
1922 
1925 
1928 
1929 
1931 
1934 
1937 
1940 
1943 
1946 
1949 
1951 
Non-Labor 
% Votes 
45.1 
48.9 
47.2 
54.2 
53.8 (8.4) 
50.9 (12.9) 
53.7(11.6) 
51.9 (12.0) 
44.6(11.3) 
53.2 (10.6) 
49.8 (13.5) 
49.7 (16.2) 
44.9 (13.8) 
35.8 (8.4) 
47.4 (16.4) 
50.3 (10.9) 
50.3 (9.7) 
% Seats 
41.3 
50.7 
44.0 
70.7 
62.7 (14.7) 
60.0(18.7) 
69.3 (20.0) 
57.3 (18.6) 
33.2 (14.6) 
74.6(21.3) 
63.5 (20.3) 
60.8 (23.0) 
51.3 (18.9) 
32.4(13.5) 
39.2 (16.2) 
61.1 (14.0) 
57.1 (14.0) 
Labor 
% Votes 
49.6 
48.5 
50.9 
44.5 
41.5 
43.8 
44.7 
44.8 
48.8 
38.2 
48.2 
45.9 
48.0 
53.0 
51.8 
47.6 
48.6 
% Seats 
56.0 
49.3 
54.7 
29.3 
34.7 
38.7 
29.3 
41.3 
61.3 
24.0 
36.5 
39.2 
48.6 
66.2 
59.5 
38.8 
43.8 
Independent 
% Votes 
5.3 
2.6 
2.0 
1.3 
4.7 
3.4 
1.7 
3.3 
6.1 
7.8 
2.0 
4.4 
7.0 
11.1 
0.6 
2.1 
1.0 
% Seats 
2.7 
1.3 
2.7 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
5.3 
1.3 
— 
— 
— 
1.3 
1.3 
— 
— 
Note.—1. First preferences only are given from 1919. 2. No allowance has been made 
for uncontested seats. 3. Non-Labor includes all clearly anti-Labor candidates, e.g., 
Fusionists, Liberals, Nationalists, U.A.P., Country Party, unendorsed Liberals, etc. 
Figures for the Country Party alone are in brackets. Labor includes A.L.P., State 
Labor, Non-Communist Labor, N.S.W. Labor, Lang Labor, Independent Labor, 
Communist and Social Credit candidates. 4. The table is based on election figures, 
unofiBcially classified by party by the Commonwealth Electoral Ofiice, in the National 
Library, Canberra. 
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TABLE 2 
Preferential Voting in General Elections for House of Representatives 1919-1951 
1919 
1922 
1925 
1928 
1929 
1931 
1934 
1937 
1940 
1943 
1946 
1949 
1951 
Total 
Number of 
Electorates 
75 
75 
75 
75 
75 
75 
74 
74 
74 
74 
74 
121 
121 
1062 
Number of 
Candidates 
187 
199 
165 
151 
159 
229 
258 
190 
270 
239 
229 
345 
285 
2906 
Number of 
Multiple 
Contests 
27 
42 
12 
13 
13 
53 
63 
36 
54 
66 
46 
67 
42 
534 
Number of 
contests in 
which 
preferences 
counted 
15 
28 
3 
6 
6 
32 
26 
14 
28 
32 
13 
22 
6 
231 
Number of contests 
in which counting of 
preferences changed 
first result 
5 
11 
2 
2 
2 
4 
7 
5 
7 
10 
5 
9 
2 
73 
Summary, 1919-51: 
Multiple contests = 50.03 per cent, of all elections*. 
Preferences counted in 22.69 per cent, of all elections and 43.25 per cent, of multiple 
contests. 
Preferences changed results in 6.872 per cent, of all elections and 13.67 per cent, of 
multiple contests and in 32.47 per cent, of cases where preferences counted. 
*Includes uncontested seats. 
In his study of the effects of electoral systems on pohtical hfe, 
Maurice Duverger^^ concentrates on the most common electoral 
methods and does not consider the type of preferential voting we have 
in Austraha. He does, however, deal with the use of the second or 
"run-off" baUot in single-member electorates. This is in some ways vety 
simUar to preferential voting (though there are important differences 
which I have no space to explain here). Duverger argues that with the 
second baUot one would expect sphts (or "proliferation") of the major 
parties unless such parties were aheady extremely weU and tightly 
organised. I think this argument is applicable to Austiaha. The party 
organisation would seem to be a determining factor in the working 
' ^^referential voting. The rigid organisation of the A.L.P. has tended 
to prevent the multiphcity of candidates one would expect under 
preferential voting. The nature of the party has meant there can be 
littie divergence within it. When sphts do occur, the party tends to be 
completely rent in two—great hostihty results and preferences are often 
not tightly exchanged. The less rigid disciphne of the non-Labor 
parties enables them to make better use of preferential voting—the 
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extreme case being that of the Countty Party which, in those States 
where it engages in multiple endorsement, has rarely suffered impor-
tant sphts. Rather the looseness of its organisation has enabled it to 
give scope to rivahy and divergence within the party. 
TABLE 3 
Preferential Voting in General Elections for House of Representatives, 1919-1951 
(i) Analysis of Contests in which Counting of Preferences Changed the First Result 
Of 73 seats where preferences changed result: 
Non-Labor won 58 49 from Labor candidates 
9 from other non-Labor candidates. 
Labor won 15 10 from non-Labor candidates 
5 from other Labor candidates. 
(ii) Further Breakdown into Party Groupings 
Non-Labor (58) 
Liberals won 31: 29 from A.L.P. 
1 „ LIB. 
1 „ S.C. 
Labor (15) 
A.L.P. won 12: 
Liberal 1 3 
Splinter >-won 5: 1 
Groups J 1 
CP. won 22: 17 
1 
1 
2 
1 
LIB. 
U.A.P. 
A.L.P. 
A.L.P. 
L.S. 
NAT. 
CP. 
IND. 
6 from LIB. 
3 „ CP. 
1 „ L.S. 
1 „ L.NC 
1 „ L.L. 
Labor "1 
Splinter >-won3:l „ LIB. 
Groups J 2 „ A.L.P. 
NOTE—(a) In this Table Labor and Non-Labor are used as in Table 1. Liberal is 
used to cover the major non-Labor parties. 
(b) Abbreviations: S.C, Social Credit; L.S., State Labor (1931-4); L.NC, 
Australian Labor Party (Non-Communist); L.L., Lang Labor. 
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13 THE RELATION OF VOTES TO 
SEATS IN ELECTIONS FOR 
THE AUSTRALIAN HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, I949-I954 
Joan Rydon 
After each recent Federal election there has been something of an 
outcty that the Australian Labour Party is under-represented and that, 
on occasions, it has polled a majority of the votes without obtaining a 
majority of seats in the House of Representatives and the consequent 
opportunity to form the govemment. 
This article is an attempt to examine the figures of the three elec-
tions of 1949, 1951, and 1954 considering the charges of Labour 
"under-representation" and the general relation between votes cast 
for and seats won by pohtical parties in the hght of recent studies of 
election statistics in other single-member constituency systems.^ 
Any comparison of the working of the Austrahan electoral system 
with that of Britain or New Zealand is, however, rendered difficult 
by three particular features of the Austiahan system: compulsoty 
voting, preferential voting and the existence of the Countty Party (or 
the absence of a clear two-party system).^ Compulsoty voting does, 
nevertheless, facihtate the study of election statistics by making varia-
tions in the size of the poU fairly insignfficant and consequently prac-
tically eliminating the influence of "abstainers". But, in conjunction 
with preferential voting, it does alter the signfficance of the voting 
process. No longer is it a question of an elector voting for the candidate 
(or party) that he supports, or, in the absence of such candidate or 
party, not voting. Instead it compels evety elector to indicate his order 
of preference for the available candidates or parties, even though he 
may support none of them. An active supporter of the Liberal Party 
must vote even if the only candidates in his electorate are A.L.P. and 
Communist Party candidates. In such a case the voting figures may 
give httle indication as to the number of electors voting for or against 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Elections I 193 
the govemment in power. Compulsion may thus inflate the votes 
polled by Communists, members of other minor parties, or Indepen-
dents, in seats which are not contested by one of the major parties. 
It is not my intention here to discuss whether the Austrahan party 
system can be properly regarded as a two-party, three-party or "two-
and-a-haff party" system, but there are two points to be stressed. 
Firstly, in the three elections to be considered, the Liberal and Coun-
tty Parties did campaign in coahtion. Secondly, there were not many 
cases where Liberal and Countty Party candidates contested the same 
seat, and, where this did occur, preferences usually had to be counted, 
so that the final decision was between one Labour and one non-Labour 
candidate. This is linked with the more general point that preferential 
voting usually operates so that evety election in a "close" seat either is, 
or is reduced to, a two-way contest. 
The three elections here studied were chosen because of the obvious 
advantages that they were all held under the same electoral boun-
daries (redistribution of constituencies occurred in 1948 and 1955) 
and wdthin an unusually short period of time. The fact, though, that 
the same party won all three elections and that changes in voting were 
small, tend to be disadvantages for a study of this kind.* 
If we take the raw figures—that is, the first preference votes^ cast in 
all contested constituencies—the percentage of the total polled by each 
party in each election is as follows: 
1949 
1951 
1954 
A.L.P. 
45.98 
47.61 
50.03 
Liberal 
39.40 
40.67 
38.56 
Country 
10.86 
9.68 
8.52 
Com-
munist 
0.89 
0.97 
1.24 
Inde-
pendents' 
2.87 
1.07 
1.65 
In 1949 evety seat was contested by the A.L.P. and the Liberal and/ 
or Countty Party. In 1951 and 1954 this was not so, and it is necessaty 
to make allowances for uncontested seats and seats not contested by 
either the A.L.P. or the Liberal-Countty Party. These allowances have 
been made on the basis of previous voting for both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives in the seats concemed and changes in voting 
in electorates in the same state where voting was previously shnilar.''^  
The percentages for 1951 and 1954, after the adjustments have been 
made are: 
1951 
1954 
A.L.P. 
47.99 
49.55 
Liberal 
40.72 
39.10 
Country 
9.89 
9.67 
Com-
munist 
0.98 
1.13 
Inde-
pendent 
0.82 
0.55 
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These figures are still, however, only first preference votes. Since, 
in each of the three elections, preferences were counted to determine 
a number of seats, more useful figures can be obtained by using the 
"final" figures rather than the first preference votes for these seats. 
The percentage of final adjusted votes poUed by, and the percentage 
of seats won by, each party is then as shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
A.L.P. 
Liberal 
Country 
Liberal plus 
Country 
Communist 
Independent 
1949 
Votes' 
46.63 
40.41 
9.84 
50.25 
0.75 
2.37 
Seats 
38.85 
45.45 
15.70 
61.15 
1952 
Votes 
48.21 
40.79 
9.66 
50.45 
0.94 
0.40 
Seats 
42.97 
42.97 
14.06 
57.03 
1954 
Votes 
49.67 
39.50 
9.34 
48.84 
1.09 
0.40 
Seats 
47.09 
38.85 
14.06 
52.91 
No Communist or Independent candidates won seats in any of the 
elections, and we can consider what would have happened if their 
votes had been distributed among the major parties according to 
second or lower preferences. Actual distribution of preferences 
between parties varies greatly, but it has been assumed here that 
roughly 90% of Communist votes, two-thirds of Lang Labour and 
Independent Labour votes and one-third of other Independent votes 
would go to the A.L.P. and the remamder to the Liberal-Countty 
Party coahtion.^ On this basis the figures become as in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Labour 
Non-Labour 
19 
Votes 
48.60 
51.40 
49 
Seats 
38.85 
61.15 
1951 
Votes 
49.21 
50.79 
Seats 
42.97 
57.03 
19 
Votes 
50.78 
49.22 
54 
Seats 
47.09 
52.91 
From either Table 1 or Table 2 it is clear that m 1954 the A.L.P. 
(or Labour) poUed more votes than the Liberal-Countty Party 
coahtion (or non-Labour)^*' which, nevertheless, retained a majority 
in the House of Representatives. In 1954 then, the "under-representa-
tion" of the A.L.P. is clear. What of the two earher elections? In both 
cases the Liberal and Countty Parties each won a greater percentage 
of seats than of votes whereas the Labour percentage of votes ex-
ceeded the percentage of seats won. Yet this is, apparentiy, a normal 
feature of a single-member electorate system—that it exaggerates 
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majorities. The A.L.P. was "under-represented" m 1949 and 1951, 
because it won fewer votes than tihe Liberal and Countty parties com-
bined. But this "under-representation" may have been exaggerated by 
a bias in the electoral system, since such a bias clearly existed m 1954. 
It is noticeable from Table 1 that the expected relationship between 
the percentage of seats won and percentage of votes polled was always 
reversed in the case of the Country Party. If the three parties are 
considered as separate entities, the principle of exaggeration of 
majorities cannot explain this "over-representation" of the Countiy 
Party which, as the smaUest of the three mam parties, should have 
fared worse than the other two. It has, however, been shown else-
where^^ that this "over-representation" of the Countty Party is a 
constant feature of Commonwealth elections. The Countty Party, 
unlike the two nation-wide parties, does not normally contest seats 
which it has httle chance of wdnning,—thus its total votes do not 
usually include any wasted in hopeless seats. 
In considering the more general question of whether there was a 
bias in the electoral system operating against the A.L.P. in 1949 and 
1951, and, if so, what was its nature, we may look at some of the 
attempts to find a relationship between seats and votes in other 
single-member constituency systems. 
It has been suggested that in such a system wdth two major pohtical 
parties, when the votes cast for the wdnning party to those cast for the 
losing party are in the relation A : B then the proportion of seats won 
by the winning party to those won by the losing party wiU be in the 
ratio A^: B*. It has been claimed that a number of elections in 
Britain and New Zealand roughly conform to this formula.^^ Table 3 
shows the apphcation of this formula to the Australian elections here 
discussed. Column (i) shows the number of seats (of the total of 
121) each party would have won if the cube rule was apphed to the 
adjusted A.L.P. and Liberal -{- Countty Party votes (i.e. the figures 
in Table 1); column (u) shows the same when the final Labour and 
non-Labour votes (i.e. the figures in Table 2) are used. 
TABLE 3 
1949 
1951 
1954 
Labour 
Non-Labour 
Labour 
Non-Labour 
Labour 
Non-Laboiu: 
Theore 
resu 
(i) 
54 
67 
56 
65 
62 
59 
tical 
Its 
(ii) 
55 
66 
58 
63 
63 
58 
Actual 
results 
47 
74 
52 
69 
57 
64 
Dif-
ference 
7-8 
4-6 
5-6 
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Dean McHeruy has suggested that the apphcation of the cube mle 
to the elections we are discussing showed that the electoral system 
gave the Liberal-Countiy Party coahtion an advantage over the 
A.L.P. of from 5 to 6 seats.^* He considered only first preference votes 
in contested seats; the figures used here suggest that the A.L.P. was 
at a somewhat greater disadvantage in 1949. If the A.L.P. was "under-
represented" by the number of seats shown in the difference column in 
Table 3, we can calculate the approximate percentage of the votes it 
would have needed in each election to secure a majority (61) of 
seats.^* For aU three elections this necessaty percentage would be over 
51 and in 1949 it may even have been over 52. 
It is interesting to compare the apphcation of the cube mle with 
results obtained from an adaptation of the method employed by 
D. E. Butler. In the statistical appendices to the Nuffield studies 
Butier assumes that, when there is a change in overaU voting, one 
may impute the same change to each electorate—that is, that 
divergences tend to cancel out so that the effect would be the same 
as if an equal change occurred in each electorate. Thus, if the Labour 
vote increases from 48% to 49% of the over-all figures, then the 
Labour vote should be considered as raised by 1% in each electorate.^^ 
Labour should wdn seats equal in number to those it previously held 
plus those in which it previously poUed between 49% and 50%. Thus, 
from any election result, it should be possible to calculate how many 
seats would change hands for any given percentage change in the 
overaU voting. 
An adaptation^* of this method has been used to calculate the 
number of seats which the A.L.P. might be expected to win, if it 
poUed various percentages of the overaU vote, on the basis of the 
results of each of the tiiree elections. These are given in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 " 
Percentage of total 
votes 
polled by Labour 
48.60 
49 
49.21 
49.5 
50 
50.5 
50.78 
51 
51.5 
52 
52.5 
53 
53.5 
54 
Number of seats expected to be 
1949 
47 
48 
50 
52 
53 
55 
58 
58 
60 
60 
63 
65 
65 
67 
won by Labour 
1951 
48 
Ml 
33 
J3 
53 
53 
55 
55 
56 
57 
60 
64 
67 
71 
1954 
50 
51 
51 
51 
53 
55 
57 
57 
61 
61 
63 
64 
66 
67 
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As a means of prediction, the Butler method seems more accurate 
than the cube rule. If we assume that the overall voting had been 
accurately predicted in each case, then, on the basis of the 1949 
figures, we could have calculated the A.L.P. result in 1951 wdth an 
error of 2 seats and that in 1954 with an error of 1 seat. Using the 
1951 figures, we could have calculated the 1954 result with an error 
of 2 seats. The same method used to "predict" backwards from 1954 
would give the 1951 result within 1 seat and 1949 within 3 seats. 
1949 "predicted" from 1951 would be within 1 seat of the actual 
result. 
Butler's method is similar to that used by newspaper commentators, 
pollsters, party officials etc., and it is probably as accurate as we 
could expect any such method to be. The problem in its apphcation 
is, of course, the accurate prediction of the change in the over-all 
voting^^—a subject which is not being discussed here. 
Since the method used in Table 4 works fairly weU for prediction, 
it may be expected to throw some hght on the question of Labour 
"under-representation". AU three columns of the table show that, 
when Labour polled 50% of the over-aU vote, it would have won only 
53 out of the 121 seats: it would have been "under-represented" 
to the extent of some 7 to 8 seats. At other points, though, there is 
considerable divergence between the columns. In 1954, something 
between 51% and 51.5% would have been required to secure an 
A.L.P. majority, whereas in 1949 between 52% and 52.5% and in 1951 
between 52.5% and 53% would have been needed. Everything suggests 
that, in 1949 and 1951, there was a bias agamac the A.L.P. perhaps 
even greater than that shown so clearly in 1954. 
Such bias in the electoral system may be related to one or both of 
the foUowing factors :^ ^ 
(a) Uneven size of electorates (in tihe sense of the number of voters 
in each); 
(b) Concentiation of majorities (where one party wdns a large num-
ber of "blue-ribbon" seats with large majorities, thus "wasting" 
votes which, if they were situated in other electorates, could be 
helping to win more seats). 
The effect of variations in the size of electorates can be indicated 
in the foUowing way. If, in each electorate, there were the same 
number of formal votes cast^" and the votes for each party were 
expressed as a percentage of the electoral total, then the simple 
(unweighted) average of these percentages for any one party would 
equal the overall percentage vote poUed by that party. Since 
electorates are not, as a mle, equal, any difference between the 
over-aU percentage and the shnple average of percentages reflects the 
effect of variations in electorate size. If the simple average of 
percentages exceeds the overaU percentage, then the effective vote 
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for the party—in the sense of seat-wdnning votes—is greater than 
the overaU percentage indicates: the party is benefiting from the 
unevenness of the electorates. The differences for each election can 
be seen in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
Subtraction of OTerall from simple average Labour vote 
Year 
1949 
1951 
1954 
(i) 
Simple average 
% 
48.61 
49.18 
51.06 
(ii) 
Over-all 
% 
48.60 
49.21 
50.78 
(iii) 
Difference 
% 
+0.01 
-0.03 
+0.28 
In aU three elections the difference was shght, though the general 
tendency was, from almost complete insignfficance immediately after 
the 1948 redistiibution, shghtiy in favour of Labour. It is probable 
that this derives from the observed movement of population from 
the stiong inner city Labour electorates to the new outer suburbs, 
particularly in Sydney and Melboume. The change in favour of the 
A.L.P. is refiected in the average size (in thousands of total formal 
votes cast) of seats which did not change hands throughout the 
three elections, e.g.: 
Always won by: 
A.L.P. 
Lib.-CP. 
1949 
38.5 
37.6 
1951 
38.6 
38.5 
1954 
38.6 
40.7 
While variations in the size of electorates do httle to explain the 
"under-representation" of the A.L.P. over this period, they do throw 
some small hght on the "over-representation" of the Countiy Party. 
Usuig the figures of Table 1 (the "final" figures, but before the 
uncounted preferences have been distributed), we get, in Table 6, 
the differences (simple average percentage less overaU percentage) 
for each party, and for the independent group. 
TABLE 6 
Simple average percentage less overall percentage votes 
Party 
A.L.P. 
Liberal Party 
Country Party 
Communist Party 
Independents 
1949 
+0.15 
-0.36 
+0.50 
-0.03 
-0.26 
1951 
-0.02 
-0.47 
+0.49 
+0.06 
-0.06 
1954 
+0.20 
-0.80 
+0.61 
+0.02 
-0.03 
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In aU three elections, the Countty Party obtained an advantage of 
about 0.5% on a total poll of the order of 10% of the overaU votes cast, 
due entirely to the variations in electorate sizes: mainly because 
Countiy Party electorates tend, on the average, to be considerably 
smaUer than those won by other parties.^^ It must be emphasized, 
however, that electorate size explains only a small part of the "over-
representation" of the Countiy Party showTi in Table 1. 
Since the explanation of the bias against the Labour party does not, 
to any signfficant extent, he in the sizes of the electorates, it is 
probably explained by what we have called "concentration of 
majorities". Table 7 shows the distribution of seats won by each 
party classffied according to the winning percentage of the vote.^ 
The figures in brackets in the L.C.P. columns show the number of 
Country Party seats included among the unbracketed figures. 
TABLE 7 
Winning 
percentage 
of the vote 
85+ 
80 — 84.99 
75 — 79.99 
70 — 74.99 
65 — 69.99 
60 — 64.99 
55 — 59.99 
50 — 54.99 
Totals 
Number of seats 
1949 
A.L.P. L.C.P. 
2 
2 
4 
8 
8 
9 
14 
47 
4 
1 
8 
18 
25 
18 
74 
(1) 
(1) 
(3) 
(5) 
(6) 
(3) 
(19) 
1951 
A.L.P. L.C.P. 
1 
1 
2 4 (1) 
5 2 (2) 
7 5 (2) 
13 18 (4) 
6 23 (5) 
17 17 (3) 
52 69 (17) 
1954 
A.L.P. L.C.P. 
1 
5 
8 
5 
11 
11 
16 
57 
2 (1) 
3 (1) 
6 (1) 
12 (5) 
24 (5) 
17 (4) 
64 (17) 
It is obvious that the party which wins the election will normaUy 
win more seats with smaU majorities than will its opponents, since 
it is the possession of those "swinging" seats which decide the election. 
Nevertheless, the number of seats won wdth vety large majorities by 
any party wiU give some indication of the extent to which the 
concentration of its voters means "wasted" votes. If, in the above 
table, we consider the seats won with over 65% of the votes, we find 
that the number of these held by the A.L.P. always exceeded those 
held by the L.C.P., m spite of the fact tihat, over all, the L.C.P. won 
more seats than did Labour. The same is tme of seats won with over 
70% of the votes, and only the A.L.P. won seats wdth over 80% 
of the votes. 
A rough indication of the extent of "wasted" Labour votes can be 
given in the following way: there were 23 seats in which the Labour 
vote was over 60% m each election, and shnUarly there were 23 seats 
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in which the non-Labour vote was always over 60%. The total of the 
votes poUed by the parties m these "safe" seats was (in thousands): 
Year 
1949 
1951 
1954 
A.L.P. 
893.7 
906.7 
944.0 
L.C.P. 
867.0 
867.3 
855.4 
A.L.P. surplus 
26.7 
39.4 
88.6 
The A.L.P. surplus shows the extent of labour votes "wasted", in the 
sense that they were in excess of the number of non-Labour votes 
expended in holding the same number of seats. 
The explanation of the bias against the A.L.P. thus seems to be 
that Labour voters are more concentrated in safe seats than are the 
supporters of the non-Labour parties. The "over-representation" of 
the Countty Party appears due partly to the smaller size of the 
electorates it contests, partly to the size of the majorities with which 
it wdns its seats, but mainly to the fact that it contests vety few seats 
which it has no chance of winning.^^ 
It is interesting to look at the "under-representation" of the A.L.P. 
on a state basis. The following table hsts the cases where the Labour 
vote exceeded 50% of the votes in a state, but non-Labour won a 
majority of the seats in that state. 
N.S.W. 
Victoria 
Victoria 
South Australia 
1949 
1951 
1954 
1949 
Labour 
vote 
50.04 
50.61 
50.80 
50.52 
Labour 
seats 
23 
15 
15 
4 
Total 
seats 
47 
33 
33 
10 
By the method used in Table 4, the percentage of votes Labour 
required to wdn a bare majority of seats in each state in each election 
has been calculated. These are: 
1949 
1951 
1954 
N.S.W. 
51.09 
51.15 
51.16 
Vic-
toria 
52.60 
52.18 
52.44 
Queens-
land 
50.51 
50.19 
50.23 
South 
Aust. 
53.51 
54.08 
49.81 
West 
Aust. 
49.52 
55.23 
50.52 
Tas-
mania 
51.62 
51.67 
50.34 
There is considerable fluctuation in the figures for the smaUer states, 
where the smaU number of seats means that erratic changes in voting 
in one or two seats can change the over-aU pattem, but in the three 
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largest states the figures are fairly consistent. The bias against Labour 
appears consistently greatest in the most industriahsed states—in 
Victoria, where all the seats which Labour wdns with large majorities 
are in Melboume, in New South Wales, where Labour 'Iblue-ribbon" 
seats are in Sydney, the Newcastle area and Darhng (westem New 
South Wales including Broken Hill) and in South Austraha, where 
three Adelaide seats are Labour strongholds. 
The fact that a similar bias against Labour has been showm to 
operate in recent elections in both Britain and New Zealand suggests 
that it may be an almost inevitable feature resulting from the 
concentiation of Labour voters in industrial areas^* and that 
re-drawing of boundaries is unlikely to eliminate it completely. 
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14 THE CHOICE OF VOTING METHODS 
IN FEDERAL POLITICS, I902-I9I8^ 
B. D. Graham 
The myth of tihe "Flmders deal" dies hard.^ In May 1918, when a by-
election was held for the federal seat of Flinders in Victoria, Labor, 
Nationahst and Victorian Farmers' Union candidates entered the con-
test. However the VFU man withdrew his nomination after the 
National Party, afraid of the consequences of a spht vote, had pro-
mised to introduce a biU providing for preferential voting in elections 
to the House of Representatives. Six months later such a measure was 
passed through parhament and apphed to the Corangamite by-election 
of December 1918, won by a Farmers' Union candidate after the dis-
tribution of preference votes. Certainly these are the facts, but his-
torians have given them a misleading signfficance. There are no sohd 
grounds for tiie claim that the Hughes Govemment brought in pre-
ferential voting only because of the Flinders deal and without careful 
consideration of the possible consequences of the change. The gov-
emment, in fact, appears to have had more important motives than 
that of repaying an obhgation to a rural pressure group. The Fhnders 
by-election is a key event in the histoty of the 1918 Electoral Act, but 
it belongs to a much wider background. 
It is necessaty to regard the Electoral Acts of 1902 and 1918 as 
carefuUy weighed pieces of legislation. They were passed, not as 
casual expedients, but as a means of providing what were considered 
to be appropriate conditions for the interaction of parties at the 
electoral level. The men who prepared them had some knowledge 
of the ways in which electoral metiiods may influence the working of 
a party system, and they made their choices to achieve certain positive 
results. On both occasions, it is true, their pohtical and technical 
judgement proved to be faulty, and they were unable to predict 
accurately how the methods selected would work in practice. Their 
uncertainty is perhaps the most interesting thing about this subject. 
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/.ustraha's first experiments with transferable-vote methods took place 
in the 'nineties. In 1892 Queensland adopted a form of optional pre-
ferential voting^ which became knowm as "the contingent vote". Four 
years later, the Tasmanian parhament provided that elections in the 
towns of Hobart and Launceston should be conducted under a method 
of proportional representation, named the Hare-Clark system in 
honour of Thomas Hare, who in 1859 proposed the first systematic 
scheme of proportional representation, and of Inghs Clark, Attorney-
General in the Ministiy responsible for the Tasmanian measure. It was 
discontinued in 1901, chiefly because of pressure from the Legislative 
CouncU.* 
Discussion about the Queensland and Tasmanian acts centred 
mainly on their possible eflFects on the party system, for Austraha at 
this time was alive with debates on a whole range of pohtical ques-
tions. Again and again, the arguments about the federation movement, 
the function of constitutions, and the devolution of authority to the 
electors through voting reforms, would all come back to the under-
lying problem—what sort of pohty was Austraha to have in the 
twentieth centuty. Our concem is with the debates on electoral 
systems as agencies of social change, and in this field three bodies of 
opinion had taken shape by the turn of the centuty. On the one side 
were the champions of proportional representation, whom we shall 
call the proportionahsts; matched against them were two powerful but 
affied groups, the conservatives and the "dualists".^ 
Prominent amongst the proportionahsts were such liberal politicians 
as Alfred Deakin and Sir George Turner, who were concemed about 
the growing power of party organisations, and middle class intellec-
tuals influenced by the ideas of John Stuart Mill. From their point of 
view, the pohtical community would be stable only when all signfficant 
social groups were given an effective voice in parliament. They advanced 
proportional representation as an electoral system suited to the needs of 
a plurahst society. Only when the legislature had become a microcosm 
of the whole society, in aU its variety of interests, could real pohtical 
integration be achieved. On the other hand, majority voting methods 
and excessively powerful party organisations would frustrate the will 
of the people, and produce political disequihbrium. Miss C. H. Spence, 
one of Adelaide's leading proportionahsts, put the case thus; 
In order that govemment should be honest, intelligent, and economical, 
it needs helpful criticism rather than imqualffied opposition, and this criticism 
may be expected from the less compact and more independent ranks in a 
legislative body which truly represents all the people. 
Party discipline, which is almost inevitable in the present struggle for 
ascendancy or defeat, is the most rmdemocratic agency in the world. It is 
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rather by hberating all votes, and aUowdng them to group themselves 
according to conviction tibat a real government of the people, by the people 
can be secured.^  
The conservatives did not agree that the free functioning of political 
plurahsm would serve the nationahst interest; taking a pesshnistic 
view, they argued that proportional representation would encourage 
groups and classes to pursue their narrow sectional concems and to 
ignore their wider obhgations within the community. For this reason, 
the conservatives chose to defend the simple-majority voting system 
as the best means of hiducmg electors to thmk in general terms and to 
identify themselves with broad pohtical movements. They maintained 
that as soon as a voter reahsed that his vote would be wasted on a 
sectional candidate, he would vote for a man affihated wdth a large 
party whose pohcies were conceived in the national interest. The 
interplay of two large parties, each concemed wdth the general good, 
was accepted by the conservatives as a natural and desirable state of 
affairs, and anything which might clog this interplay, such as propor-
tional representation, earned their hostihty.'^  
By the turn of the centuty, however, true Burkeian conservatives 
had become a rarity in Australia. Their arguments had been taken 
over and transmuted by right-wdng thinkers and pohticians who 
equated virtue with organisation and who saw the two-party system 
not as an expression of a natural order in society, but rather as a crude 
forcing ground for Progress. Unhke the conservatives, these men 
(whom we shaU call the duahsts) welcomed rapid social and 
economic change but claimed that the resultant breakdown of the 
old social stmcture had enabled certain groups to pursue their self-
interest in an aggressive and irresponsible manner. Effective govem-
ment could not be obtained, in their view, unless the number of 
parties was hmited to two—His Majesty's Govemment and His 
Majesty's Opposition. A third party, they claimed, would use the 
balance of power strategy to extort concessions from whichever party 
happened to be in power. They suggested that proportional represen-
tation, by sanctioning the pohtics of sectional bargaining, would 
destioy the sense of community in a nation and would undermine 
the two-party system. In this claim, as in their defence of the simple-
majority voting method, the dualists appeared to be agreeing wdth 
the conservatives, but in reahty the two groups approached the sub-
ject from quite different directions. The conservatives assumed that 
the two-party system was a normal form of govemment, and that it 
would evolve naturaUy in a free society; the duahsts beUeved, on the 
contraty, that sectional interests, given complete freedom of action, 
would create a Hobbesian state of nature, in which evety group 
fended for itself—order, in their view, had to be imposed consciously, 
if needs be wdth the aid of coercion. 
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In Proportional Representation Applied to Party Government, pub-
hshed m 1900, the brothers T. R. and H. P. C. Ashworth presented the 
duahst case with considerable force. Avowed Social Darwinists, they 
studied politics from what they described as "the dynamic point of 
view", as an unending struggle for existence between confficting social 
groups.* The metaphors of battle and armed combat recur through-
out their writings. They argued that pohtical disciphne would be 
produced only by inspired leadership and organisation, through which 
people would be persuaded "to subordinate their class prejudices to 
the general welfare".* Having stressed the need for preserving the 
two-party system as the proper agent of Progress, the Ashworths con-
demned the Labor Parties as threats to stable govemment, mainly 
because of their allegedly imscrupulous use of the balance of power 
strategy. 
These so-called Labour "parties" are neither more nor less than class 
factions . . . The worst effect is that they prevent the main parties from 
working out definite pohcies on public questions, and cause tiiem also to 
degenerate into factions.^ <' 
Much more was involved in this controversy than the practical 
question of choosing a voting method. Whereas the proportionahsts 
stood for the utffitarian faith in the virtue of an open society and a 
hberal pohty, the dualists represented the view that politics was a 
matter of power, organisation and electoral manipulation. By the out-
break of the First World War, when the fusion of the non-Labor 
parties had been accomphshed at the cost of hberahsm and the sohd-
arity of the Labor Party had been achieved at the expense of doctrinal 
contioversy and ideological vitality, it seemed as though the ideas of 
the duahsts had become the faith of the new Commonwealth. 
At the turn of the centuty, however, the issue was stUl in doubt. The 
proportionahsts were hoping that proportional representation would 
be used in the elections to the Commonwealth parhament, and, at the 
Australasian Federal Conventions of 1897 and 1898, several prominent 
delegates had suggested that the Hare-Clark system might be used 
to elect the federal Senate.^^ In the event, the elections to the first 
federal parhament, held on 29 and 30 March 1901, were conducted 
under the laws applying to state elections, but the possibility of adopt-
ing proportional representation for future elections was considered 
seriously by the first federal govemment, a Protectionist cabinet 
headed by Sir Edmund Barton. Sir Edmund himself, during the pre-
liminaty work on the Commonwealth Electoral Bill, went to the 
trouble of studying the proportional representation scheme which 
Belgium had adopted in 1899,^^ but his interest may weU have been 
insphed by practical considerations. The block-voting method which 
had been employed in the first Senate poU by all states except Tas-
mania had harshly penahsed the Protectionist teams, whUe in Victoria 
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there had been several mstances of spht-votmg between Protectionist 
candidates under the simple-majority votmg system used for the 
election of Representatives. In the end, the federal cabmet decided 
that the Electoral BiU, drafted finally late in 1901, should provide for 
proportional representation m the election of Senators and for optional 
preferential voting in the election of Representatives. Sir Wilham 
Lyne, the Minister for Home Affairs, had wished to put forward only 
the latter scheme, in keeping with the advice of a conference of 
experts, but he had been over-mled by his coUeagues.^^ E. J. Nanson, 
the Professor of Mathematics at Melboume University, evidently had 
a great deal to do with the framing of those clauses of the biU which 
dealt wdth voting methods proper, and the proposal that the Droop 
quota be used in the proportional representation scheme was probably 
made at his suggestion.^* 
When tihe biU was made pubhc in Januaty 1902,^ 5 the govemment 
seemed unlikely to obtain parhamentary approval for its proposed 
voting methods. Even its own Protectionist Party was divided; such 
prominent figures in the party as Thomas Playford and Sir John 
Downer were actuaUy defending the use of simple-majority voting 
while the Melboume Age, Victoria's powerful Protectionist newspaper, 
was attacking the proportional representation scheme.^® Most of the 
Free Traders declared their support for traditional voting methods, 
but the Federal Labor Party, which had formerly left its members free 
to vote according to their conscience on issues of preferential voting,^^ 
provided unexpected backing for the govemment. The Labor caucus 
meeting of 5 Februaty, for reasons which remain obscure, agreed to 
support the voting methods proposed in the biU.^ ® This left the govem-
ment soundly placed in the House, which contained 32 Protectionists, 
16 Labor members and 27 Free Traders, but it was stiU uncertain of 
being able to contiol the Senate, where 11 Protectionists and 8 Labor 
men were balanced by 17 Free Traders. 
Unfortunately, as the House was busy, the govemment had to intio-
duce the bill in the Senate, where it received a rough handhng. The 
speakers in favour of proportional representation, such as Senators R. 
E. O'Connor (NSW), R. W. Best (Victoria), E. A. Hamey and N. K. 
Ewdng (both from Westem Austiaha) argued wdthout conviction. 
Hamey spoke of the system placing in parhament "evety phase of 
pohtical opinion in its vatying stiength and character (sic) that is to 
be found in the countty", thus producing "a pohtical picture of the 
people".^* The biU's critics, especially Senators Symon and Playford, 
were much more effective in debate. Their conventional defence of 
simple-majority methods, however, contrasted wdth the arguments 
used by the duahsts. Senator E. D. MiUen (NSW) was particularly 
interested m the effect of first-past-the-post voting m forcuig the elec-
tors into two blocs. 
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The more opportunities . . . are afforded to different sections of the com-
mimity to mn a candidate, the more sphtting of votes wiU take place when 
each body of electors think they have an opportunity of readjusting or cor-
recting any mistakes upon the second votes. But under the system in force 
to-day, ff there are four or five candidates running for one constituency, 
every elector knows the risk he runs of losing a representative of the ideas to 
which he desires to give effect if he aUows his vote and those of electors 
agreeing wdth him to be spht up. The result is that party organization and 
the common sense of the electors come in, and there is no splitting of votes 
and no retum of the representative of a minority.^o 
On 19 March 1902, the Senate rejected the proportional representation 
clause by 18 votes to 9.^ ^ The majority was composed of ten Free 
Traders and eight assorted Protectionist and Labor Senators; four of 
the latter group had been members of the election team sponsored by 
the Age during the 1901 campaign. 
When the bill came before the House of Representatives later in 
the year, the clause providing for optional preferential voting in the 
election of Representatives came under scrutiny. The Labor Party 
decided to vote against the proposal on this occasion, ostensibly be-
cause it felt that the electors would be confused if they had to vote 
with crosses on their Senate voting paper and with numerals on their 
Representatives paper.^ Lyne, the Minister in charge of the bUl, 
arranged during the proceedings in committee to have the clause 
amended so that it provided in the end for simple-majority voting.^^ 
The bffi was later approved by the House and received the Governor-
General's assent on 10 October, 1902. 
n 
The duahsts of 1902 had hoped that the simple-majority voting 
method would force the Federal Labor Party to unite with the Pro-
tectionist Party, and that the latter and the Free Traders would then 
constitute a conventional two-party system. Things worked out quite 
dffierently. The Protectionist Party, caught between two extremes, 
went into a sudden dechne; its share of the vote dropped from 45.96 
per cent, in 1901, to 28.42 per cent, ui 1903 and to 23.69 per cent, hi 
1906, while the seats it won in those years feU from 32 to 25 to 17.^* 
FinaUy, in 1909 it joined forces with the Free Traders to form the 
Fusion (later Liberal) Party, which held power under Deakin's leader-
ship for a year. Even so, the Labor Party quickly estabhshed a com-
manding electoral position. It won the 1910 election with 41 seats to 
the Liberals' 31 (three Independents were retumed), lost that of 1913 
by one seat only, and won that of 1914 with 42 seats to the Liberals' 
32 (one Independent was also elected). The new two-party situation, 
closely balanced and tense, was certainly not to the hking of the 
Liberals. 
The years between 1910 and 1913 saw a nation-wide attempt on the 
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part of the Liberals to build up their local organisations and to 
strengthen, as their federal body, the Austrahan Liberal Union. As far 
as electoral discipline was concemed, the Liberal leaders appear to 
have assumed at first that the constraint of simple-majority voting 
would be sufficient to produce sohdarity amongst non-Labor electors. 
After their defeat hi 1910, they showed little interest m changing the 
voting method; in 1911, for example, the parhamentaty Liberal group 
did not support an attempt made by W. J. McWUhams to mtroduce 
preferential voting in the election of Representatives.^^ However, the 
state Liberal Parties, more closely concemed wdth the problem of 
estabhshing electoral discipline, were forced to consider the use of 
more flexible voting methods than first-past-the-post. An interest in 
preventing Labor from winning seats because of spht non-Labor 
majorities was one reason for the restoration of proportional repre-
sentation in Tasmania in 1907, for the adoption of preferential voting 
in Westem Austiaha (optional in 1907, compulsoty in 1911) and Vic-
toria (compulsoty in 1911), and for the introduction of the second-
baUot system in New Soutli Wales in 1910 (see Table 1). Even the 
challenge of Labor's electoral victories of 1910 and 1911 failed to raUy 
the state Liberal Parties, which remained unstable and faction-ridden 
groups, torn by disputes between Free Traders and Protectionists, 
moderate hberals and conservatives, farmers and merchants. It was 
obviously unreahstic for the federal Liberal Party to insist on organi-
sational disciphne in Commonwealth politics while the state parties 
were unable to solve their local problems. The interdependence of the 
two levels—state and federal—of the Australian party system was being 
impressed on the Liberal leaders, who became convinced that their 
party, since it was based on such disparate interests, needed a decen-
tiahsed and flexible organisation rather than a tightly-knit one of the 
Labor model and that, in addition, a preferential voting system might 
actuaUy assist rather than hinder non-Labor unity. 
It is not suiprising, therefore, that the federal Liberal Party changed 
its pohcy on voting methods. Sir Joseph Cook's short-hved Liberal 
govemment (1913-14) appointed a Royal Commission to enquire into 
electoral matters, and Cook promised the electors during the 1914 
campaign that if his ministty were retumed to office it would bring in 
a preferential voting law.^ ^ However, his party was defeated at the 
polls and the subsequent Labor govemment took httle interest in the 
Royal Commission's recommendation that preferential voting and 
proportional representation be used in elections for the House and 
Senate respectively.^'' 
Inside the Liberal Party, the farm groups were now the spearhead 
of the campaign for voting reforms. During the brief term of the 
Cook ministiy, farmers had complained that the Liberals were ignor-
ing mral demands for tariff reductions, marketing reforms and pubhc 
works development. Farm groups such as the Queensland Farmers' 
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Union (QFU) and the New South Wales Farmers' and Settlers' Asso-
ciation (NSWFSA) had already nominated candidates in several state 
elections, while the more adventurous Westem Austraha Farmers' 
and Settiers' Association (WAFSA) had in 1914 formed an eight-
member Countty Party in the Westem Australian Legislative Assem-
bly. Each of these organisations had helped Liberal candidates during 
the 1913 and 1914 federal election campaigns but their members' fear of 
sphtting the non-Labor vote had prevented them from nominating 
independent farmers' candidates.^* After 1914 these three farm groups 
were content to trust the Liberal Party to change the Electoral Act 
once it was retumed to power, but the Victorian Farmers' Union 
(VFU), a mffitant organisation formed in 1916, favoured a much 
stronger line. At the first conference of the Austrahan Federal 
Farmers' Organisation (AFFO), held in September 1916, the VFU 
delegates refused to accept the principle of an electoral alliance with 
the Liberals. According to VFU records, 
a strong move was made by New South Wales and Westem Austraha to 
swing the organisation behind the Liberal Party imtil preferential voting or 
proportional representation was secured in Federal politics. Mr. Cook had 
promised the New South Wales delegates this reform as the first plank in 
the Liberal platform. The visiting delegates from the other States recognised 
and admitted that the Liberal Party was far from perfection, and declared 
that they had no intention of supporting it further in Federal pohtics when 
the electoral reform was secured. Then the Federal Farmers' Organisation 
could proceed to nm their own candidates as in State pohtics. The proposi-
tion [ie, to back the Liberals until preferential voting was secured] was 
opposed by, and postponed through, the representations of the delegates 
representing the VFU.^* 
Within six months of this conference the political situation had been 
completely altered, firstly by the split in the Labor Party which fol-
lowed the conscription referendum of October 1916, and, secondly, by 
the formation in Januaty 1917 of the Federal National Party, an 
amalgam of the former Liberal Party and the conscriptionist wing of 
the Labor Party. A National Coalition govemment was formed in 
Febmaty by W. M. Hughes, the former Prime Minister of the Labor 
cabinet. In the federal elections of May 1917 the Nationalists won 53 
seats to Labor's 22. 
The new govemment appeared to be anxious to give effect to the 
Liberals' undertaking to alter the Electoral Act. Before the May elec-
tion, Cook, now Minister for the Navy, had said that "the time [was] 
ripe for the practical treatment of the question of proportional rep-
resentation",^" and Hughes himself gave two separate assurances that 
he would consider the introduction of preferential voting, once in a 
cable to the president of the WA FSA,^^ and again before an election 
meeting at Launceston.^^ The Nationahsts had httle cause for optimism 
about their electoral security, for although they had won 70.7 per cent. 
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of the seats m the 1917 election they had actually poUed only 54.2 per 
cent, of the total vote.^^ Twelve of their seats, moreover, had been won 
wdth votes m the vulnerable range of 50 to 55 per cent.^* Even if the 
govemment had been reasonably confident of maintaming the 
National Party's organisational and electoral discipline m post-war 
pohtics, and of queUmg the threatened revolt of the farm groups, it 
still could not have mled out the possibihty that a recurrence of non-
Labor vote-sphtting, coupled with a mUd mcrease hi Labor support, 
might have led to its defeat at the next election. The cabmet wisely 
gave early attention to the possibffity of instituting a less rigid vothig 
method than the first-past-the-post system. Patrick Glynn, the Mmister 
for Home and Territories, later pointed out that he could have brought 
forward a preferential voting biU early m 1918 had it not been neces-
saty also to alter those sections of the Electoral Act dealing wdth postal 
voting procedures.^^ 
MeanwhUe, the farm groups took evety opportunity of unsettling 
the govemment. On 22 Januaty 1918, J. J. HaU, the VFU general 
secretaty, wrote to remind Hughes that the National Party was in no 
position to temporise. 
I would also take the hberty of pointing out that without this reform [pre-
ferential voting and proportional representation for House and Senate elec-
tions respectively] your pairty will be in serious jeopardy at the next election. 
It was wdth difficulty that organisations such as ours were restrained from 
nmning candidates at the last Federal election, when, with three candidates 
in the field your cause would inevitably have suffered with the split vote. 
We cannot guarantee, and are not likely to give further immvmity; in fact, 
our Organisation at the last Federal election decided to nm candidates in 
aU future elections.^^ 
Hughes received similar warnings from the WA FSA '^^  and from the 
AFFO, which held its third conference in March 1918,^* but he left 
for England without having taken any action. The Fhnders by-election 
of May 1918 gave the VFU an opportunity for a stronger protest and 
it nominated Hall himself as the farmers' candidate, despite the fact 
that strong Labor and Nationalist nominees were also in the field. The 
Nationalists were especially concemed about this comphcation be-
cause their candidate. Captain S. M. Bmce, was regarded as a good 
potential recruit for a party notoriously deficient in young talent. The 
Acting Prime Minister, W. A. Watt, attempted to persuade HaU to 
wdthdraw his nomination by making a personal offer to intioduce a 
preferential voting bill at the next parhamentaty session, but the 
Union refused to wdthdraw Hall until they received, two days before 
the poll, a guarantee from the National Party as a whole that Watt's 
undertaking would be honoured.** In the event, Bmce won the con-
test by 14,445 votes to the Labor candidate's 7,740. HaU's name re-
mained on the ballot-paper but drew only 382 votes. 
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The Flinders deal was a more definite undertaking than those given 
by Hughes and Cook in 1917, and it seems unhkely that the Nation-
ahsts would have committed themselves so firmly had they not con-
sidered that such a change was necessaty in their own interest. In-
deed, Patrick Glynn's statement referred to above suggests that the 
govemment was considering a change in the voting method before the 
Fhnders by-election occurred. As factional dffierences increased wdth-
in the party, it is probable that the govemment became less confident 
of maintaining a united non-Labor front under the simple-majority 
voting method. 
The urgency of the matter was forcibly brought home to the gov-
emment in September and October, when a by-election was held for 
the Westem Austrahan seat of Swan, occasioned by the death of Lord 
Forrest of Bunbuty. Four candidates offered themselves—E. W. Cor-
boy (Labor), B. L. Murray (WAFSA), W. N. Hedges (National) 
and Wilham Watson (Independent)—in spite of Watt's frantic cables 
from Melboume urging that two of the non-Labor nominees withdraw 
their candidatures.*" As a result, when the poll was held on 26 
October, Corboy was able to win with only 34.36 per cent, of the 
votes, while his three rivals divided the remainder between them, 
Murray gaining 31.39 per cent.. Hedges 29.61 per cent, and Watson 
4.64 per cent. While Labor's cheap victoty was being lamented by 
the conservative press, the year's third federal by-election, for the 
Victorian seat of Corangamite, appeared about to follow the same 
pattem. James Scullin, the Labor candidate, had no fewer than four 
rivals—a Nationahst, an Independent Nationahst, a Retumed Soldier 
Nationahst and a VFU candidate; again it seemed likely that a non-
Labor majority would be hopelessly spht between two or three power-
ful candidates. 
This prospect certainly affected the government's attitude towards 
its Electoral BUl, which it had brought before the House on 3 October. 
The biU had moved slowly through its early stages. However, after the 
announcement of the Swan result and the Corangamite nominations, 
the Nationahsts made certain that the measure should be passed by 
both chambers in time for it to apply to the Corangamite by-election. 
Glynn, the responsible Minister, had the preliminaty clauses amended 
to permit the proclamation of those of the act's provisions governing 
preferential and postal voting before proclamation of the whole act, 
which incorporated many other detailed amendments to the existing 
electoral laws.*^ The necessaty proclamations were made promptly*^ 
and apphed to the Corangamite poll, which was held on 14 December. 
Scullin obtained the highest total of primary votes but his VFU 
opponent, W. G. Gibson, attracted most of the Nationalist preferences 
and was able to defeat him on the final count by 14,096 votes to 
10,944.** Gibson thus became the first Countiy Party member of the 
federal parhament 
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The debates on the 1918 Electoral BUl** show clearly that the 
duahst view of the party system, which had still been a matter for 
dispute in 1902, had by this date become orthodox. Both parties, 
although they differed in their approach, subscribed to its basic prin-
ciples wdthout question. A few proportionahsts, such as Edmund 
Jowett (Grampians), were left to argue a lost cause, and one or two 
men such as Hemy Gregory (Dampier) were prepared to suggest that 
the existence of more than two parties would not threaten the stabihty 
of the party system,*^ but the great majority of the speakers took for 
granted the idea that the two-party system was both just and desir-
able. The Labor Party favoured this system because it wanted the 
parties of reaction and progress clearly defined before the electors, a 
condition it regarded as essential for good govemment. One Labor 
member (Richard West—East Sydney) asked: 
Has the intelligence of the House sunk so low that it believes it possible 
to do away with party machinery and party govemment? Without the assis-
tance of outside party associations, the National Parliament could not hope 
to solve the great problems with which we are confronted. It is for parties 
outside to lay down principles, and for the Parhament to give legislative 
effect to them. We shall never be able to do without the party system, but I 
hope we shaU never have in this Parhament more than two parties.*^ 
The Nationalists also, although they claimed that parties had become 
so highly organised that the electors were being deprived of their 
legitimate freedom of choice as regards men and pohcies, made clear 
their liking for the two-party system. They welcomed preferential 
voting mainly because they hoped that it would enable their party to 
function in a more decentralised and flexible fashion, for, they 
reasoned, if their restless supporting groups were enabled through 
preferential voting to run their OWTI candidates for election when they 
felt inchned, the tensions which were threatening to disrupt the 
Nationahst movement would be relieved. 
"We know," said one Labor member during the debate, "that the 
Govemment are apprehensive of the farmers nominating candidates at 
the next general election."*'^ In fact, the govemment would have been 
even more alarmed had it realised how independent the farm groups 
would become. Its main concem was to prevent the sphtting of the 
non-Labor vote at the actual time of the poU, for it fuUy expected that, 
once election day rivalries were over, any farmers' representatives who 
were retumed would work closely witih the National Party in the 
House, and that a separate farmers' group, were one estabhshed, 
would behave as if it were in fact a Nationahst faction. It should be 
emphasised that, while the Countty Party movement was gathering 
momentum in 1918, this was not vety obvious to the contemporaty 
observer. The state Countiy Parties of that time were either small 
and insecure, as in Victoria and South Austiaha, or closely bound to 
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the Nationalists, as in Queensland and Westem Austraha. They had 
aheady won a reputation for sectional mihtancy because of their 
campaign for improvements in the admuiistration of the wartime 
wheat pools, but few suspected that they would become any more 
stable or independent than the weak, ineffective countty factions of 
pre-war pohtics. 
m 
During the debates on the Electoral BUls of 1902 and 1918, several 
speakers did predict that preferential voting would remove the neces-
sity for the pre-selection of candidates and also prevent minority can-
didates from winning seats by simple majorities. It was on no occasion 
suggested, however, that the use of the preferential voting method in 
single-member constituencies would work to the advantage of centre 
rather than extreme candidates. The failure to foresee this led to 
serious consequences in both cases, and it certainly merits separate 
investigation. 
The outcome of a closely contested election, involving three or more 
candidates, depends to an important extent on the type of voting 
method used. Under both preferential voting and simple-majority 
mles, of course, a candidate is elected automatically if he obtains 
over 50 per cent, of the votes; where, however, the vote is evenly 
divided amongst several candidates none of whom can obtain an 
absolute majority, the two systems can produce quite different results. 
This may be illustrated with reference to the simplest example, that of 
a three-way contest between candidates A, B and C. Under simple-
majority rules candidate A could win a contest wdth votes in the range 
of 33.4 to 49.9 per cent., the closest possible result being by A's obtain-
ing 33.4 per cent, of the votes and B and C 33.3 per cent. each. How-
ever, under preferential voting ndes, before candidate A can win he 
has first to survive exclusion on the first count and then to gain suffi-
cient preference votes to bring his vote to an absolute majority on the 
second count. He is assured of surviving the first count if he obtains, 
in a three-way contest, a primaty vote of at least 33.4 per cent, (for 
one of his rivals must in that case have polled a lower vote), but he 
has a chance of survival should he score a primaty vote of between 
25.1 and 33.3 per cent, (for example, given a result of A 25.1, B 25.0 
and C 49.9 per cent, of the votes, B would be the excluded candidate). 
If he manages to remain after the first count, A's next problem is to 
attract sufficient of the excluded candidate's preferences to bring his 
total vote to an absolute majority, and thus to defeat the other sur-
viving candidate. He now rehes for success on his preference-assurance, 
that is, the proportion of the excluded candidate's votes he is able to 
obtain. Suppose that C is the excluded candidate, and that A and B 
are the contestants remaining at the second count. If both A and B 
have a 50 per cent, preference-assurance from C, then their relative 
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positions on the first count will remain unaltered on the second. Thus 
a primaty result of A 34, B 36 and C 30 per cent, of the votes wiU 
produce a final result of A's having 49 and B 51 per cent, of the votes, 
the numerical gap between A and B having remained unaltered by the 
distribution of preferences. As A's preference-assurance from C rises 
above 50 per cent., so his abihty to wdn from low primaty votes wUl be 
increased proportionately, while to the extent that it falls below 50 
per cent., his ability to wdn, even from primaty votes in the 40-50 per 
cent, range, will be lessened. A preference-assurance of 75 per cent, 
from C would enable A to defeat B from primaty votes as low as 28.6 
per cent, (for example, a primaty result of A 30, B 42, and C 28 per 
cent, would then produce a final result of A 51 and B 49 per cent, of 
the votes). B's handicap in this example, a low preference-assurance of 
25 per cent, from C, iUustiates the opposite point—that unless a can-
didate can attract more than one quarter of the excluded candidate's 
preferences he wdU have no chance of winning a second count if he 
has primaty votes of less than 42.9 per cent. While under the 
preferential voting method all candidates have an equal chance of 
exclusion on the first count, those candidates who survive exclusion, 
and have a high preference-assurance from the excluded candidate, 
can wdn seats wdth primaty votes which would bring them certain 
defeat under simple-majority rules. Conversely, a minority candidate 
with a low preference-assurance finds himself placed at a greater dis-
advantage under the preferential voting than under the simple-
majority voting method in which, as we have seen, he could win with 
a vote as low as 33.4 per cent. 
The factor of ideology may now be introduced by classifying A, B 
and C as right, centre and left candidates respectively. In this case, 
under preferential voting, right-wdng electors would usuaUy vote AI, 
B2 and C3, while left-wing electors would vote in the reverse order. 
As a result, the centre candidate, B, would usually have a high pre-
ference-assurance from each of his two rivals and would thus stand 
an exceUent chance of winning evety contest from which either A or 
C was excluded and his preferences distributed. The apphcation of 
the preferential-voting method in a system of right, centie and left 
parties, therefore, results in a high proportion of centre victories in 
constituencies where pohtical forces are evenly balanced. In the long 
run, such victories could have the cumulative effect of exaggerating 
the electoral and parhamentaty stiength of the centre party—or of a 
minor party treated by the electors as if it were a centre party.** 
Had the Barton govemment appreciated this fact in 1902, and had 
it persisted with its original intention of introducing a preferential 
voting method for the election of Representatives, the Protectionist 
Party might have fared better in the 1903 and 1906 elections. On both 
these occasions it lost seats because of split voting: a divided Protec-
tionist vote gave simple-majority wdns to several Free Traders (Fhn-
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ders, Grampians and Corangamite in 1903, and Corangamite in 1906) 
and to some Labor nommees (Southern Melboume 1903, and Mel-
boume Ports 1906). A preferential voting method would not only 
have enabled the Protectionists to retain these seats, it would have 
checked the defection of their voters to the extremes and, as seen 
above, have enabled the Protectionists to win many of those contests 
in which votes were evenly divided between the three parties. 
SimUarly, when the 1918 Act was passed, no one suggested that it 
might encourage the emergence of a centre party—or a party which 
the voters assumed to be a centie party. Despite the fact that, except in 
Victoria, the Countty Party's component farm groups were conserva-
tive in outlook and pohcy, both National and Labor voters gave 
Countty Party candidates their second preferences in the 1919 and 
1922 elections. As a result, in triangular contests in which the Countty 
Party candidate survived the primaty count, his high preference-
assurance from whichever of his rivals was excluded gave him an ex-
ceUent chance of victoty. During the course of the 1919 and 1922 
elections, there were ten such contests of which the Countty Party 
won nine, in several cases from primary votes of less than 33.33 per 
cent. The relevant figures are given in Table 2. Of special note is the 
Corangamite contest of 1922, won by the Countty Party candidate 
wdth a low primaty vote of 28.52 per cent, and 94.20 per cent, of the 
excluded Nationahst candidate's preferences. The farm groups them-
selves were probably surprised and delighted by this unexpected effect 
of the preferential voting method. They had pressed for the change 
not because they had anticipated such an advantage but because they 
wanted to remove the fears of vote-sphtting which had hitherto dis-
couraged farmers from supporting sectional candidates. 
Nevertheless, a federal Countiy Party would certainly have been 
formed even had the simple-majority voting method been retained. 
Farmers were turning to sectional pohtics because they were dis-
satisfied with the mnning of the marketing pools, with the drift to-
wards higher protective tariffs and because they wanted to promote 
tiade decentrahsation. Had first-past-the-post voting still obtained at 
the time of the 1919 and 1922 elections, the stiongest of the farm 
groups would probably have mn their owm candidates, and they 
could well have captured such seats as Wimmera and Echuca in Vic-
toria, Riverina in New South Wales, the Swan and Dampier in 
Westem Austiaha. In the event, however, the operation of preferential 
voting did help the party to make a decisive, rather than a partial, 
electoral breakthrough. 
IV 
As attempts to demonstrate a definite casual relationship between 
certain electoral methods and certain types of party systems are now, 
happUy, out of favour, pohtical scientists have shown a greater wilhng-
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ness to regard electoral and voting methods as being only two of 
several factors infiuencing the development of a party system, and as 
being decisive only in exceptional circumstances. But the task of 
estimating the extent of their iiffiuence remains. It has been suggested 
above that the simple-majority voting method provided by the Act of 
1902 probably hastened the declme of the Protectionist Party, but it is 
nevertheless true that this dechne was essentially the product of 
economic and social causes which lay outside the party system itself. 
AU that can be done in this regard is to point out that the voting 
method adopted m 1902 did work against the Protectionists, just as 
preferential voting would in fact have worked for their survival as an 
electoral force. 
Up to the present, insufficient attention has been given to the cir-
cumstances under which Australia's electoral laws have been con-
ceived. More information is needed about the attitude of politicians 
towards voting methods; are they considered as weapons for electoral 
combat, or as a means of maintaining the status quo, or as a means of 
encouraging the party system to develop in a certain direction. Any 
such attitudes, of course, arise from a wider theoty of pohtics. In the 
enactment of the electoral laws of 1902 and 1918, the politicians made 
a dehberate attempt to assess the actual state of their party system 
and to predict the lines along which it would evolve. They were-
making the choice between different electoral methods in terms of 
their divergent views of what was happening, and what was likely to 
happen, to their party system. 
In 1902, for example, the supporters of preferential voting and pro-
portional representation wished to arrest the drift to authoritarianism 
and organisational discipline in Australian pohtics, to hberahse elec-
tions and to promote the growth of flexible and dynamic parties sym-
pathetic to electoral trends. The men who opposed these methods, and 
who finally secured the inclusion in the Electoral Bill of simple-
majority voting mles, wanted to prevent the existing parties from 
disintegrating into factions and to impose constiaints which would 
ensure that aU groups and interests were worked into the structure of 
a firm two-party system. Neither side in the debate, however, appre-
ciated the force which lay behind the emergent Labor Party, whose 
subsequent electoral expansion completely upset their calculations. 
Had the Barton govemment correctly estimated Labor's potential 
stiength and reahsed that the Protectionists would definitely remain 
a centie party, they might not have abandoned the preferential voting 
proposal so hghtly. It was their assessment of the situation which was 
at fault. In 1918 the Nationahst govemment was equaUy mistaken in 
its estimate of the farm groups' intentions. It apparently assumed that 
the introduction of preferential voting would both prevent Labor from 
wdnning seats because of split non-Labor majorities and at the same 
time make possible some degree of independent electoral action by 
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restless groups wdthin the National Party. They had not foreseen that 
this voting method would prove so helpful to centre candidates and 
thereby facihtate the emergence of the Countty Party, or that the farm 
groups would have the resources and the determination to sustain in-
dependent electoral action. 
TABLE 1 
Voting Methods in Force for Lower House Elections, 1896-1920 
Abbreviations: sm = simple-majority voting method 
cpv = compulsory preferential voting method 
opv = optional preferential voting method 
pr = proportional representation 
sb = second ballot 
(Numbers refer to the principal Acts dealing with voting methods) 
Years 
1896-1900 
1901-05 
1906-10 
1911-15 
: • 
1916-20 
Comm. 
H o f R 
No. 19 
1902 
sm 
No. 27 
1918 
cpv 
NSW 
LA 
No. 38 
1893 
sm 
No. 33 
1902 
sm 
No. 41 
1906 
sm 
No. 18 
1910 
sb 
No. 41 
1912 
sb 
No. 40 
1918 
pr 
Vic 
LA 
No. 1075 
1890 
sm 
No. 2321 
1911 
cpv 
No. 2632 
1915 
cpv 
Qld 
LA 
No. 7 
1892 
opv 
No. 13 
1915 
opv 
SA 
Hof A 
No. 141 
1879 
sm 
No. 667 
1896 
sm 
No. 971 
1908 
sm 
WA 
LA 
No. 31 
1895 
sm 
No. 20 
1899 
sm 
No. 20 
1904 
sm 
No. 27 
1907 
opv 
No. 44 
1911 
cpv 
Tas 
Hof A 
No. 13 
1890 
sm 
No. 49 
1896 
sm + pr 
No. 57 
1901 
sm 
No. 6 
1907 
pr 
Critics of Maurice Duverger's theories on the interaction between 
electoral methods and party systems have clahned in the past that 
since parhaments make laws, including electoral laws, a particular 
group of parties wiU usually obtain the voting method best suited to 
its needs. This hne of argument has sometimes been pursued to the 
conclusion that electoral laws, being themselves a product of the party 
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TABLE 2 
Preference Counts and the Country Party, 1919 and 1922 Federal Elections 
1919 Election 
Corangamite 
ALP 
Nat 
VFU 
Echuca 
ALP 
Nat 
VFU 
Indi 
ALP 
Nat 
VFU 
Swan 
ALP 
Nat 
FSA 
1922 Election 
Corangamite 
ALP 
Nat 
VFU 
Gippsland 
ALP 
Nat 
VFU 
Indi 
ALP 
Nat 
VFU 
Gwydir 
ALP 
Nat 
CP 
Riverina 
ALP 
Nat 
CP 
CP 
CP 
Wilmot 
ALP 
Nat 
CP 
CP 
CP 
Percentage of Valid Vote at : 
Count 1 
31.17 
37.41 
31.42 
23.59 
33.13 
43.28 
36.37 
31.44 
32.19 
39.14 
22.40 
38.46 
44.53 
26.95 
28.52 
27.44 
33.15 
39.41 
35.01 
25.67 
39.32 
46.33 
17.27 
36.40 
41.11 
20.74 
8.75 
26.51 
2.89 
32.22 
23.91 
22.66 
17.46 
3.75 
Count 2 
38.62 
61.38 
35.98 
64.02 
37.39 
62.61 
41.95 
58.05 
46.10 
53.90 
37.15 
62.85 
36.78 
63.22 
50.08 
49.92 
41.25 
21.17 
9.59 
27.99 
32.63 
24.77 
23.84 
18.76 
Count 3 
41.63 
23.92 
34.45 
34.74 
28.65 
36.61 
Count 4 
45.66 
54.34 
38.81 
61.19 
Percentage Distribution 
of 
To ALP 
3.24 
12.54 
5.80 
6.87 
21.72 
16.87 
14.21 
Preferences: 
To Nat 
3.88 
12.08 
14.57 
T o C P 
96.12 
87.92 
96.76 
87.46 
94.20 
85.43 
93.13 
78.28 
83.13 
85.79 
•Sources: Statistical Returns for Elections, CPP, General, 1920-21, vol. 4, pp. 307-
478; 1923 and 1923-24, vol. 2, pp. 113-320. 
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system, cannot be regarded as extemal factors influencing the develop-
ment of that system. However, parties rarely obtain voting methods 
entirely appropriate to their needs, for they generally lack the com-
bination of experience and foresight necessaty to assess correctly their 
own situation, and further, to make predictions on the basis of such an 
assessment. Even should they do so, they still have to cope with con-
tingencies and unforeseen events. The best that they can do is to hope 
that the electoral method which they have chosen will produce the 
results which they have in mind and meet the needs they consider 
important. Once an electoral law is placed on the Statute Book it 
becomes part of a formal structure of rules and institutions within 
which parties have to operate and to which they have to conform; 
their control over it has ceased. The voting method thus brought into 
being will form one of the constants bearing on their party system 
untU such time as the act is amended. 
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15 THE EFFECT OF THE "DONKEY 
VOTE" ON THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 
C. J. Masterman 
From time to time, the question of the "donkey vote" for the House of 
Representatives is raised—most recently in a monograph by an 
economics graduate of the University of Sydney, published by the 
Austrahan Pohtical Studies Association.^ This convincingly demon-
stiated that a donkey vote does exist in elections for the House. The 
monograph analysed the vote for minor parties and independents: on 
the one hand when they headed the ballot paper and thus derived 
benefit from the donkey vote, on the other when they did not. It 
suggested that there was roughly a 3% advantage to be gained from 
holding the top position on the paper. I propose to look at the donkey 
vote from a somewhat different point of view. The APSA monograph 
has showm that it exists. How far has it affected the membership of the 
House of Representatives by favouring the election of members wdth 
advantageous names? 
The distribution of names in the population as a whole can easily be 
estabhshed by analysing an electoral roU or a telephone directoty. The 
hst of names can be divided up into roughly equal quarters: the 
dividing points seem to occur at approximately the same place in any 
Austrahan electorate or telephone directoty. Here, for example, is how 
the electorate of Fawkner, Victoria, divides up. 
Distribution of names in an electorate 
Initial 
A-D 
E-K 
L-Q 
R-Z 
Prahran 
22871 
U516 
2229J 
21831 
^4473 
2291J 
South Yarra 
29551 
^5869 
2914J 
27901 
>-5740 
2950 J 
Armadale 
22311 
^4442 
2211J 
21431 
^4464 
2321J 
Toorak 
18061 
^3524 
1718J 
16581 
^3425 
1767J 
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The half-way mark, the point at the centre of each hst of names, 
occurs as follows: Armadale: La, Prahran: Kr, South Yarra: Kn, 
Toorak: Kn. 
We find similar results by counting the pages of a telephone 
directoty. 
Distribution of names in Telephone Directories 
(No. of pages) 
Initial 
A-D 
E-K 
L-Q 
R-Z 
Sydney 
3171 
ysis 
258 J 
2571 
^540 
282j 
Melboume 
2171 
U58 
241J 
2001 
U30 
230J 
The half-way point comes a httle earher in these telephone books— 
at about Ke in both cases. So in a random sample of Australian sur-
names, the mid-point wdll occur somewhere between Ke and La, and 
the sections of the alphabet A-D, E-K, L-Q and R-Z inclusive will be 
roughly equal, with 25% of names each. For convenience, we .can take 
it that the mid-point of the alphabet occurs between K and L. 
In the Senate, the normal population distribution is fairly accurately 
reflected: there are 28 Senators in the A-K group and 32 in the L-Z 
group. It appears that the Senate's composition is no longer much 
affected by the alphabetical hsting of candidates before 1940: now 
that there is no alphabetical advantage on the Senate ballot paper, the 
distribution of the population at large applies. But in the House, there 
are 84 members in the A-K group, and only 40 in the L-Z group. The 
distribution of the House elected in 1963 is: 
Distribution of names, House of Representatives, 1964 
Initial 
A-D 44 
E-K 
L-Q 
R-Z 
1 )-84 
40j 
2n 
19j 
The present House has more than twice as many members in the A-K 
group than m the L-Z group: and furthermore, each group is smaUer 
than the one before it. Such a disproportion can scarcely be explained 
away as the result of chance. We find a shnUar disproportion if we 
examine the names of aU the members of the House of Representatives 
since Federation. However, the difference is smaUer: the A-K group 
is only 43% larger than the L-Z group. 
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istribution of names. House of Representatives, 
Initial 
A-D 
E-K 
L-Q 
R-Z 
Federation to 1959 
148' 
148, 
118" 
98. 
-296 
•216 
WTiy has the disproportion grown larger, so that over the whole 
period it is 43% while at present it is 110%—apart from the possibihty 
that voters care less about the results of elections than they used to? 
The introduction of compulsoty voting may have aggravated the 
donkey vote problem, for the typical donkey voter is assumed to be 
the voter who has no interest in the election but who, being com-
peUed to vote, votes straight dowm the ballot paper. If we divide the 
years since federation, 1901-1959, into two periods, pre- and post-
compulsoty voting, we can see that the figures do suggest that com-
pulsoty voting has increased the effect of the donkey vote. 
Distribution of names. House of Representatives, before and after the introduction of 
compulsory voting 
Initial 
A-D 
'R-Z 
Before 1924 
56-1 
yi26 
70j 
601 
V112 
52j 
After 1924 
921 
V170 
78 J 
581 
M04 
46j 
The A-K group, before compulsoty voting was introduced, was only 
about 12% larger than the L-Z group. But among members elected 
since the adoption of compulsoty voting, the A-K group was 65% 
larger. The preponderance of A-K over L-Z is as follows: 
1910-1924 12% 
1924-1959 65% 
1964 110% 
There are two ways the donkey vote could have worked to cause 
this marked disproportion in the House of Representatives. 
1. The donkey vote gives the candidate with an advantageous name 
—not necessarily at the top of the hst, but the major-party candidate 
highest on the paper—a signfficant advantage. 
2. Candidates may be pre-selected for their favourable names by the 
parties. 
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We can be reasonably certain that the first factor operates, both from 
the research in the APSA monograph on the vatying size of the vote 
for minor parties and independents, depending on ballot-paper posi-
tion and from the distribution of names of members of the House of 
Representatives. The point is emphasised by comparing the names of 
successful candidates in an election, with the names of the main un-
successful candidate in each electorate. For the 1961 election, the dis-
tribution was as follows: 
Distribution of names. House of Representatives candidates, 1961 
Initial 
A-D 
mm. 
Successful 
441 
^82 
38j 
221 U2 
20j 
Unsuccessful 
321 Ui 
29j 
331 
^63 
30j 
Do the parties deliberately choose candidates with suitable sur-
names? Certainly the minor parties appear to be aware of the advan-
tages of the donkey vote: in New South Wales in 1961 "no less than 
20 of the DLP's 39 candidates for the House of Representatives had 
names beginning wdth A, B or C. Similarly no less than five of the 
Communist Party's ten candidates for the House of Representatives 
had names beginning with A, B or C. . . . [In 1961] of the 124 [Aus-
tralia-wdde] ballot papers 62 were headed by a minor party candidate 
or by an independent, 33 by a Liberal or Countty Party candidate and 
29 by an A.L.P. candidate."^ 
These figures, incidentally, suggest why, despite the donkey vote, 
the candidates at the top of the list did much worse in the election 
than those lower dowTi. The really important question is the relative 
position of the two major-party candidates. 
Do the major parties dehberately choose candidates for their sur-
names? The idea is not unheard-of: in 1937, the New South Wales 
Labor Party nominated the celebrated "Four A's" (Amour, Armstrong, 
Arthur and Ashley) largely for the purpose of securing top place on 
the Senate ballot paper. They were all elected. The APSA monograph 
suggests: "Selection of candidates by alphabet is not common among 
the major parties. There are, of course, cases in marginal seats in which 
the party which is endeavouring to wrest the seat from the opposing 
party wiU select a candidate higher alphabetically than the sitting 
member m order to get the 3% bonus which this wiU yield. But these 
cases are rare."^ 
It is difficult to be certain that they are rare. It would certainly be 
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strange if the parties were to ignore this important factor in making a 
choice between two equaUy-quahfied candidates for a marginal seat. 
And if they have considered this factor, it is no wonder that over the 
years this has had a cumulative effect on the composition of the 
House. For usuaUy the candidates in marginal seats are young men 
just starting their federal pohtical careers: when they become estab-
hshed in the party and are valuable to it, they may be transferred to 
safer seats. If they are defeated, they may be discarded by the party 
in favour of another candidate—one, perhaps, with a more favourable 
name. The marginal seats are often the start of a pohtical career: if the 
parties choose candidates for these seats partly on the basis of their 
names, it wiU in time affect many members of the House. 
The donkey vote is by no means a trivial problem. In 1961, an alter-
ation of the order of the names on the ballot paper would have 
changed the result in seven seats (Bennelong, Evans, Bowonan, Lilley, 
Cowper, Robertson and Moreton). If the development since 1924 
continues, can we look forward to a time when only the most excep-
tional MHR's will have names in the L-Z group? Since no-one suggests 
that having a name falhng in the first half of the alphabet is a par-
ticular quahfication for pohtical office, the situation seems to be a 
totally irrational one. We cannot ehminate the donkey vote: but by a 
random arrangement of names on ballot papers we can at least ensure 
that the field from which pohticians are drawn is not artificially and 
unnecessarily restricted. 
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16 COMPULSORY VOTING 
Colin A. Hughes 
For many years compulsoty voting has been a feature of parhamentaty 
govemment in which Austrahan experience departs from that of the 
Anglo-American democracies. However, it is a feature which has been 
httle discussed, and such discussion as has taken place has invariably 
been critical of its imphcations or its consequences. It is probably time 
to introduce a few new facts to the discussion, to review the argu-
ments for and against compulsoty voting used at the times when it 
was intioduced to the various electoral systems of Austraha and to 
ascertain how fifty years of experience has dealt with them. 
Compulsoty voting was introduced to Austraha by the Denham 
Liberal Covemment of Queensland in time for the 1915 general elec-
tion. The measure followed closely after major amendments of elec-
toral law, and appears to have been the last desperate attempt of a 
govemment on the skids to save itself; in the event the attempt was 
unsuccessful. Over the next 28 years the other States and the Com-
monwealth followed suit: the Commonwealth in 1924, Victoria in 
1926, New South Wales and Tasmania in 1928, Westem Austiaha in 
1936 and South Austraha in 1942. As the necessaty legislation was 
intioduced in each of the various legislatures, arguments for and 
against the principles and the consequences of compulsoty voting were 
adduced. A cumulative hst can be constructed from the debates (ex-
cluding Tasmania because of its lack of a Hansard) as follows. 
ARGUMENTS FOR COMPULSORY VOTING 
1. Democratic govemment means majority rule and the expression 
of an opinion by a majority of electors: ". . . If you have 25 per cent, 
of the people who are entitled to vote not voting, you can never tell 
how the majority really goes . . . We want the biggest poU possible, 
so that the people once for aU wiU understand that the majority of the 
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people of Queensland who vote are in favour of the pohcy of the 
Liberal party or of the Labour party." 
2. Voting is analogous to other duties society requires of citizens, 
such as giving evidence in court proceedings, jury service, paying 
rates, compulsoty education or mihtaty service. 
3. Voting is the most important civic duty, yet the burden is ex-
tiemely hght: once or twice evety three years. 
4. The voter is not compelled to vote for anybody; he can always 
spoil his ballot. He is merely compelled to go to the polling booth 
". . . and the chances are vety strong that once an elector is at the 
poUing-booth he will feel disposed to exercise his right". 
5. Compulsoty voting is a necessaty coroUaty of compulsory enrol-
ment without which the expense and penalties of compulsory enrol-
ment would be pointless. This argument was introduced primarily to 
estop Labor criticism of compulsoty voting, for the federal Labor 
Party had already intioduced compulsoty enrolment. 
6. Compulsoty voting would stop the growing demand of voters 
who had "got into a loose way of voting" for motor-car transport to the 
polls. 
7. Social pressure applied by the trade union movement had 
already enforced compulsoty voting of Labor supporters. 
8. Turnout figures were too low, particularly in the post-war period 
(see Tables 3 and 4 below). 
9. The quahty of legislation coming from legislatures elected by a 
minority vote would deteriorate, whereas "the fact that legislation was 
considered by members representing a greater number of people than 
hitherto would have a good effect upon the community". 
10. Compulsion would enforce pohtical education. 
11. The franchise had been fought for, and therefore should be 
used. 
12. As individual liberty consists in exemption from legal control, 
so pohtical hberty consists in participation in legal control. The 
opinion was Bryce's.^ 
13. Those who most readily criticise legislation are the least 
zealous in exercising the franchise; they would be taught to be good 
democrats by becoming responsible for pubhc acts. 
14. Compulsoty voting helps cleanse the rolls by checking on non-
voters. 
15. When most States had adopted compulsoty voting, this was 
taken to be evidence that it must be beneficial. 
16. Once voting at Commonwealth elections was compulsoty, non-
compulsoty State elections would suggest that the State Parhament 
was inferior to the Commonwealth Parliament. 
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17. Compulsion would emphasise their responsibihties to electors: 
"I always feel that the fact of voting being compulsoty adds to the 
prestige of the performance, as it is obhgatoty rather than a matter 
of choice." 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPULSORY VOTING 
1. Compulsion cannot ensure a formal vote or an intelligent vote. 
2. Compulsoty voting is an infringement of liberty. The State does 
not have the right to compel a man to vote for a candidate with whom 
he does not agree or in whom he does not believe. (Until exemptions 
for persons with rehgious scruples were provided, their difficulties 
were sometimes cited.) 
3. It would be difficult to decide what constituted a sufficient or 
vahd excuse for not voting, and to give enforcement officers sufficient 
discretion. 
4. Compulsoty voting was not the same as compulsory enrolment. 
The latter could be effected at any time, and did not interfere wdth 
conscience: "Compulsoty enrolment provides that a man shall hold 
himseff in readiness to cast a vote at the proper time if he shall be so 
minded. Why should he be compelled to cast a vote if he is not so 
minded?" 
5. In early years it was argued that compulsion would not work. 
The burden on electors in remote areas would be excessive. There 
would be too much work in following up non-voters. No govemment 
would have the courage to prosecute 10,000 non-voters. No court 
would ever convict. 
6. There was no justffication for such an important change, no 
compUation of evidence warranting it. 
7. How can a man educate himself politically? By reading the 
Melboume press or attending the Yarra bank? 
8. A member has a duty to aU his constituents, whether or not they 
voted for him, or whether they voted at all. 
9. The cost of administering elections will be increased. 
10. The proportion of informal votes cast will increase. 
Some of the arguments against compulsoty voting have long since 
faUen by the wayside, and today the two most commonly advanced 
are that it infringes the hberty of the individual elector and that, in 
Senator Gardiner's oft-quoted words, the "opinions of the negligent 
and apathetic section of the electors are not worth having". However, 
nowhere in Austiaha have there been signfficant attempts to abohsh 
compulsoty voting once it had been introduced. One explanation is a 
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tacit agreement by all pohtical parties to retain a device which assists 
them: 
. . . It is evident that our representatives in parhament, whether they belong 
to the govemment party or not, are impressed by the usefulness of these 
laws in getting in the vote with a relatively small expenditure of energy and 
party funds; they are persuaded that it suits their more sinister interests not 
to remove this morbid appendix from the body pohtici^  
Another may be that compulsoty voting is accepted by the great 
majority of electors, and offends vety few. It is now a settled pohcy or 
"democratic rite".^ 
The case for the abohtionists usually begins wdth the interference 
with hberty; compulsoty voting "subtiacts from the area of conduct 
that should be governed solely by the adult person's owm conscience".* 
Morris Jones suggests that membership of pohtical society confers 
rights—some of which are universal, such as the right to vote, and 
some are not—and duties—some of which are universal and some are 
not, such as the duty to vote. In the parhamentaty debates and in the 
survey answers reported below there is frequent and muddled use of 
"right" and "privilege", sometimes synonymous or nearly so, sometimes 
distinguished. It appears that those who are opposed to compulsoty 
voting invariably start wdth the assumption that voting is a right. If it is 
a privilege to which society could attach conditions, their opposition 
would be less soundly based. 
What parhamentarians and electors find repugnant about compul-
sion in practice, wdth which they are primarily concemed, is that it 
forces voters to support or endorse candidates or parties of whom they 
do not approve. The vote is seen as a positive act committing the 
voters to approval of that voted for. If, however, voting is seen as an 
ordering of preferences, this difficulty is substantially reduced. There 
may weU remain a group who have equal preferences, and are un-
wdUing to make the effort necessaty to secure additional information 
to alter them, but it seems likely that the repugnance of a voter spoU-
ing his ballot because he beheves that either party wiU provide him 
wdth equal benefits wiU be less than that of tiie voter who wdU not 
declare his support for a party which he beheves unworthy of support. 
Those outside Austiaha who argue that compulsoty voting is in-
compatible wdth hberal democracy also make much of guilt by asso-
ciation in that a number of totalitarian or non-democratic countries 
have intioduced compulsoty voting or apphed substantial socio-
economic pressure to vote, llius Mayo: "A prima facie distmst of the 
universal duty to vote is also engendered by the example of the 
totahtarian states, where voting is regarded as a duty and non-voting 
as disloyalty."^ Morris Jones: "It needs no demonstration that a totah-
tarian view of pohtical hfe easily involves an obhgation not only to 
vote, but to do much more—and do it all, moreover, in the 'right' 
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TABLE 1 
Commonwealth— I^nformal Votes 
Year 
1901 
1903 
1906 
1910 
1913 
1914 
1917 
1919 
1922 
1925 
1928 
1929 
1931 
1934 
1937 
1940 
1943 
1946 
1949 
1951 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1958 
1961 
1963 
1964 
Comm. 
H R Sen. 
1.6* ? 
2.5 3.6 
3.7 6.4 
2.0 4.6 
2.8 5.6 
2.3 4.2 
2.6 3.9 
3.5 8.6 
4.5 9.4 
2.4 7.0 
4.9 9.9 
2.6 — 
3.5 9.6 
3.4 11.3 
2.6 10.6 
2.6 9.6 
2.9 9.7 
2.4 8.0 
2.0 10.8 
1.9 7.1 
— 4.6 
1.3 — 
2.9 9.6 
2.9 10.3 
2.6 10.6 
1.8 — 
— 7.0 
N.S.W. 
H R Sen. 
1.9 
2.8 
3.3 
1.6 
3.1 
2.4 
3.0 
3.8 
4.5 
1.9 
4.8 
2.8 
3.6 
3.3 
2.3 
? 
4.9 
7.3 
4.7 
6.7 
5.0 
3.8 
9.4 
10.0 
6.4 
8.8 
9.4 
13.2 
8.9 
2.9 11.6 
3.1 12.0 
2.4 8.4 
2.0 12.0 
1.9 
1.3 
2.8 
2.8 
7.9 
4.0 
— 
8.8 
12.5 
2.4 12.7 
1.6 
— 
— 
6.2 
Vic. 
H R Sen. 
0.8 
1.8 
3.8 
1.6 
2.0 
1.8 
2.1 
2.4 
3.2 
1.6 
? 
2.2 
6.2 
4.6 
4.4 
3.3 
3.2 
7.8 
7.9 
7.6 
3.2 10.0 
1.4 — 
2.8 
3.0 
1.9 
1.8 
2.7 
2.0 
9.0 
9.7 
13.4 
8.9 
8.5 
7.3 
1.6 10.7 
1.6 
— 
1.2 
6.8 
5.6 
— 
2.6 13.5 
24 
2.3 
1.5 
— 
9.9 
10.7 
— 
8.4 
Qld. 
H R Sen. 
2.5 
2.6 
4.2 
3.0 
2.7 
2.7 
2.1 
3.3 
4.8 
3.3 
5.5 
4.0 
2.9 
2.6 
2.6 
2.1 
2.3 
2.7 
2.1 
1.9 
— 
1.1 
2.2 
3.0 
2.7 
2.2 
— 
? 
3.7 
5.9 
5.2 
5.1 
4.2 
4.8 
8.0 
10.7 
6.4 
8.8 
8.6 
5.5 
6.9 
5.3 
7.3 
6.7 
7.1 
4.7 
2.6 
— 
4.1 
7.2 
8.5 
— 
7.1 
S.A. 
H R Sen. 
1.6 
2.7 
5.0 
5.0 
4.8 
2.3 
3.5 
5.4 
6.7 
2.3 
2.2 
3.9 
3.3 
5.7 
3.8 
4.4 
9.1 
9.3 
4.3 5.9 
9.4 11.9 
4.1 — 
5.3 12.6 
6.3 14.5 
5.0 13.4 
3.6 
3.0 
3.1 
8.2 
7.4 
9.1 
2.2 11.6 
2.1 
— 
2.5 
4.1 
3.3 
3.1 
2.7 
5.8 
4.9 
— 
8.9 
7.7 
5.6 
— 
7.5 
W.A. 
H R Sen. 
1.0*20.2 
4.9 
4.2 
2.1 
3.1 
3.2 
3.6 
3.8 
6.3 
3.1 
3.8 
2.3 
3.5 
3.7 
3.5 
3.0 
3.5 
2.9 
2.3 
2.5 
— 
1.7 
3.5 
3.6 
6.0 
6.7 
5.4 
6.2 
5.3 
5.2 
9.0 
9.2 
7.4 
12.3 
9.4 
12.8 
12.7 
9.5 
8.0 
7.7 
10.0 
8.9 
7.2 
— 
10.0 
9.4 
3.2 10.0 
2.4 
— 
— 
6.0 
Tas. 
H R Sen. 
2.9 2.2 
3.1 3.9 
3.9 4.5 
2.5 3.3 
3.2 6.2 
2.4 4.7 
3.1 3.7 
5.0 9.7 
6.4 9.3 
4.9 11.3 
6.4 15.7 
1.9 — 
4.7 13.9 
3.9 16.3 
2.8 12.6 
3.1 13.0 
3.6 13.5 
2.6 11.8 
2.6 10.5 
3.1 11.6 
— 5.1 
1.0 — 
4.2 12.6 
4.1 11.2 
3.2 10.0 
1.2 — 
— 3.5 
•approximate ? not ascertainable 
— Introduction of Commonwealth compulsory voting. = Introduction of State com-
pulsory voting. 
direction."^ Students of totahtarian systems might think that greater 
emphasis was placed on the right direction of voting than on the act 
itself. The argument is partly the obverse of one used by supporters of 
compulsoty votmg in the 1930s that electoral apathy bred totahtarian 
pohtics; their opponents had answered by pointing out that feverish 
electoral activity can precede collapse into dictatorship, as illustrated 
by Weimar Germany. Despite Whitington's strictures, it is difficult to 
show that Austraha has edged noticeably nearer to dictatorship or a 
totahtarian society over the past thirty or forty years, and this writer 
prefers Robson's view that it is "a great mistake to argue for or agamst 
a proposal of this kind on the abstract plane of what is or is not 
theoretically justified m the life of tihe state. The whole question 
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should resolve itself into what is practically expedient or the reverse: 
that is to say, mto a weighing of actual advantages agamst actual dis-
advantages".'^ The practical considerations might be stated to be, first, 
has compulsoty voting inflated the informal vote, second, has it in-
creased the total vote, third, has it been widely regarded as oppres-
sive, fourth, has it promoted pohtical education, and fifth, what effect 
has it had on pohtical participation generaUy? 
The first consideration is dealt with in Tables 1 and 2. Infonnal 
voting shows only a minute increase after the introduction of compid-
soty voting in most electoral systems. In New South Wales the average 
actually falls from 2.9 per cent, for the nine elections in the 20th 
TABLE 3 
Commonwealth—Turnout^  
Year 
1901 
1903 
1906 
1910 
1913 
1914 
1917 
1919 
1922 
1925 
1928 
1929 
1931 
1934 
1937 
1940 
1943 
1946 
1949 
1951 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1958 
1961 
1963 
1964 
Comm. 
56.7 
46.9 
50.2 
62.2 
73.7 
72.6 
77.7 
71.3 
57.9 
91.3 
93.6 
94.5 
95.0 
95.0 
96.1 
94.7 
96.3 
94.0 
96.0 
96.0 
94.9 
96.1 
95.0 
95.5 
95.3 
95.7 
94.5 
N.S.W. 
68.3 
47.2 
51.7 
61.4 
69.3 
64.8 
70.7 
66.5 
54.5 
90.3 
93.2 
94.5 
95.0 
95.8 
96.6 
94.5 
96.5 
94.5 
96.4 
96.0 
94.6 
96.1 
95.2 
95.2 
95.2 
95.3 
93.7 
Vic. 
56.6 
51.2 
56.7 
66.6 
75.5 
79.1 
83.9 
76.2 
56.2 
93.0 
94.7 
95.8 
95.7 
95.1 
96.1 
95.6 
96.4 
93.7 
95.9 
96.0 
94.9 
95.9 
94.5 
95.7 
95.5 
96.3 
94.8 
Qld. 
62.5 
54.8 
45.9 
61.1 
77.3 
75.1 
89.0 
84.8 
82.7 
90.8 
93.5 
94.6 
94.3 
94.6 
95.7 
93.9 
94.6 
92.7 
94.5 
95.3 
94.7 
96.0 
94.4 
95.0 
94.7 
95.3 
94.9 
S.A. 
40.8 
32.6 
36.5 
53.2 
80.1 
80.1 
71.9 
66.4 
53.2 
92.8 
94.2 
94.9 
95.9 
95.0 
96.7 
95.7 
96.9 
95.0 
96.8 
97.1 
96.5 
96.8 
96.1 
96.5 
96.1 
96.6 
95.8 
W.A. 
31.9 
28.3 
36.2 
62.1 
73.5 
71.5 
77.8 
63.1 
46.7 
89.7 
90.3 
89.0 
91.3 
90.3 
92.9 
92.8 
97.4 
92.9 
95.4 
95.6 
94.3 
96.2 
95.0 
95.4 
94.7 
95.3 
94.0 
Tas. 
47.6 
45.0 
54.2 
58.5 
75.3 
77.6 
76.0 
58.7 
45.6 
88.7 
92.7 
95.2 
96.4 
95.8 
96.0 
94.8 
97.0 
93.7 
96.0 
96.7 
96.2 
96.3 
96.3 
96.2 
95.7 
96.0 
96.1 
1. When House of Representatives and Senate both contested, then calculated for Senate 
to avoid uncontested seats. 
= Introduction of State compulsory voting. 
— Introduction of Commonwealth compulsory voting. 
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centuty prior to compulsoty voting to 2.2 per cent, for the 13 elections 
subsequent to its introduction—but the obvious iiffiuence is the brief 
experiment with proportional representation antedating compulsoty 
voting. In four other States the absolute increase in averages is 1 per 
cent, or less: 0.3 per cent, in Victoria, 0.2 per cent, in Queensland 
(which retained first-past-the-post voting until 1963), 1.0 per cent, in 
South Austiaha and 0.8 per cent, in Western Austiaha. Only Tas-
mania shows an increase greater than 1 per cent., 1.6 per cent, to be 
exact, and this is better seen as a steady rise: 2.2 per cent, informal 
vote average up to the time proportional representation became State-
wide, 3.6 per cent, under non-compulsoty P.R. voting and 4.5 per cent, 
with compulsoty voting and P.R. At Commonwealth elections informal 
voting for House of Representatives seats rises on average only 0.2 
per cent, after the intioduction of compulsoty voting. In Senate voting, 
however, it rises by 3.2 per cent, and it is this increase which most 
critics of compulsoty voting appear to have in mind. Their case does 
not survive careful scrutiny of the figures: informal Senate voting prior 
to compulsion and preferential voting averaged 4.7 per cent., after 
the introduction of preferential voting but before compulsion (two 
elections only, admittedly) 9 per cent., and after compulsion with first 
preferential voting and then proportional representation—both making 
similar substantial demands on the voter—9 per cent. The rate of in-
formal voting is consistently highest for those elections demanding 
elaborate selections in multi-member constituencies: Tasmania since 
1909, New South Wales briefly, and the Senate. The contribution of 
compulsoty voting to informal voting appears to be shght, and never 
greater than 1 per cent. 
Conceming the second consideration there can be Utile contioversy. 
(See Tables 3 and 4.) Compulsoty voting has certainly increased the 
total vote by bringing perhaps 15 or 20 per cent, of the electorate to 
the polls when, to judge from earher turnout figures, they might not 
otherwise have voted. Some State returns prior to compulsion indicate 
that turnout could faU to a vety low figure indeed. 
TABLE 5» 
Enforcement of Compulsory Voting 
Commonwealth— 
H. Reps. 
Senate 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1964 
1963 
1965 
No. "please 
explain" 
notices sent to 
non-voters 
178,417 
238,535 
no recoi 
19,783 
38,436 
14,316 
No. penalties 
imposed and 
fines paid 
forthwith 
4,393 
16,247 
ds kept 
87 
378 
284 
No. cases 
taken 
to court 
165 
487 
0 
28 
31 
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There is httie evidence that compulsoty voting is felt to be oppres-
sive by any substantial element of the population. There is a total 
absence of complaint in the legislatures, and complaints in letters to 
newspapers are infrequent. Taking the five largest electoral systems, 
it would appear that substantial numbers of individuals are dealt wdth, 
but relatively few are punished (Table 5). 
Such survey data as is available provides for further corroboration. 
Prior to the 1963 State election in Queensland a survey was conducted 
in three Brisbane electorates (Ashgrove, Baroona and Ithaca); 500 
names were drawn at random from the electoral rolls and 348 inter-
views effected. Respondents were asked: 
a. Some people say that if you're not happy about any of the parties 
or candidates at an election, you should hand in a blank ballot 
paper, or spoil it in some way. Do you think people should do that, 
or not? 
h. Why, especially, do you say that? 
c. If voting were not compulsoty, do you think you'd stiU bother to 
vote on election day? 
TABLE 6 
Readiness to Cast a Blank/Spoiled BaUot 
n = 348 
Yes 12.6% 
No 82.5% 
Undecided 4.9% 
TABLE 7 
Readiness to Vote if not Compulsory 
n = 348 
Yes 76.1% 
No 20.4% 
Undecided 3.5% 
These figures are supported by an Austiahan Callup Poll survey,^ ** 
while a semi-seU-selected panel interviewed in Canberra before the 
1963 federal election^^ produced less prospective abstentionism: woiJd 
vote 91 per cent., would not 6.7 per cent., don't know 2.2 per cent— 
the difference might well be accounted for by the element of self-
selection in the Canberra study. 
From the arguments advanced against compulsoty voting, one 
would expect that two groups would be susceptible to abstentionism 
or the substitute which ballot-spoUing provides: those electors who are 
indifferent between the parties being low on party identification, i.e. 
their partisanship scores are equal whether the scores be positive, 
negative or neutral, or doubt that the results of the election matter vety 
much, and those who are low on information (Tables 8, 9, 10). 
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TABLE 8 
Partisanship and Readiness to SpoU and Abstain 
(scores range from +7 to —7) 
Score on: 
Labor Party 
Liberal Party 
Party diiferential 
A.L.P. 
Total 
group 
+3.1 
-0 .5 
3.6 
Liberal 
Score on: 
Labor Party 
Liberal Party 
Party diflFerential 
Total 
group 
-1 .7 
+4.0 
5.7 
Voters 
Prospective 
spoilers 
+ 1.9 
+1.2 
0.7 
Prospective 
abstainers 
+2.6 
-0 .5 
3.1 
Voters 
Prospective 
spoilers 
-2 .0 
+4.4 
6.4 
Prospective 
abstainers 
-1.9 
+2.9 
4.8 
TABLE 9 
Importance of Result and Readiness to Spoil and Abstain 
n 
Election results matter: 
A great deal 
Little 
Hardly any 
Can't say/N.A. 
Total 
group 
348 
44.5% 
11.2% 
31.9% 
12.3% 
Prospective 
spoilers 
43 
32.6% 
9.3% 
41.8% 
16.3% 
Prospective 
abstainers 
66 
30.3% 
12.1% 
36.4% 
21.2% 
TABLE 10 
Information Scores and Readiness to Spoil and Abstain 
n 
Information scores: 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
**** 
Average scores 
Total 
group 
348 
18.1% 
21.0% 
21.6% 
14.4% 
8.8% 
11.2% 
3.4% 
1-7% 
2.3 
Prospective 
spoilers 
43 
30.2% 
23.2% 
9.3% 
16.3% 
4.7% 
7.0% 
7.0% 
2.3% 
**** 
2.0 
Prospective 
abstainers 
66 
28.8% 
25.8% 
24.2% 
13.6% 
6.1% 
1.5% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
qCSfCifC :fC 
1.5 
(The information score was compiled on knowledge of political figures: the maximum 
score of 7 would indicate correct identification of the name and party of sitting Federal 
member and Brisbane City Council alderman and of the names of the A.L.P., Liberal 
and D.L.P. candidates at the current State election.) 
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In each case, save for the high partisanship of Liberal potential 
baUot-spoilers, the expectations prove correct, but whUst the results 
are significant, one may ask whether the differences are suflBcient to 
prove that the opmions of "the neghgent and apathetic section of the 
electors" have been unwisely ehcited. Nor are the differences on a 
scale which could be expected from American studies, e.g. at the 
1956 presidential election when 86 per cent, of those who cared vety 
much about the result voted, compared with 76 per cent, of those who 
cared somewhat, 69 per cent, of those who did not care vety much, 
and 52 per cent, of those who did not care at aU.^ ^ 
Some rehef agamst any feeling of oppression is provided by the 
opportunity to cast an informal vote. How widely this is used can be 
tested by an examination of the New South Wales State election 
results, constituency by constituency, since the intioduction of com-
pulsoty voting. On 148 occasions electors have been confronted with a 
contest lackmg the candidate of one of the two major parties (i.e. the 
Austrahan Labor Party and its non-Labor rival, U.A.P.-Liberal or 
Countty Party). In a dozen of these it is impossible to estimate a 
"normal" vote for the missing party because of long periods of absence 
from the poUs. In the 136 cases remaining, there appeared to be no 
significant dehberate spoiling on the part of frustrated voters in 73 
contests—just over one-half. Often this can be accounted for by the 
presence of an Independent candidate who was readily acceptable 
to partisan voters, perhaps even a crypto-party man, although it can 
be shown from other constituencies that some Independents are 
definitely unacceptable substitutes. In another 35 cases the proportion 
dehberately spoiling can be estimated at 10 per cent, of the frustrated 
or less. Thus, in only one-fifth of the constituencies lacking a major 
party candidate did more than 10 per cent, of the frustrated group 
feel sufficiently stiongly about the alternatives offered them to spoil 
their ballot-papers, always supposing that the writer's estimates of 
"normal" party and informal votes are approximately correct. 
These remaining cases faU into three main groups. There are the 
safe Labor seats, mining or inner urban, which are contested only by 
a Labor candidate (often left-wing himself) and a Communist or left-
wing Independent Labor candidate: Cessnock, Kurri Kurri and Sturt 
in 1930, Redfem in 1935 when the choice was State Labor or Com-
munist, BuUi in 1941 contested by the A.L.P. and N.S.W. Labor; Banks-
town and Leichhardt in 1944 with A.L.P. and Independent Labor, Pad-
dington and Redfem in 1953, Redfem again in 1956, Hartley in 1959. 
But, it must also be noted, many such contests pass without a notice-
able reaction on the part of the smaU minority of anti-Labor voters, 
as the record of the Newcastle mining seats shows. The second group 
involves safe non-Labor seats in which the A.L.P. voter is confronted 
with two strongly anti-Labor candidates: Homsby and Lane Cove in 
1935 when the U.A.P. was opposed by Campbell's Centie Movement, 
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Neutral Bay that same year with a right-wing Independent and 
WooUahra with two U.A.P. candidates only, Homsby in 1938, and 
more recently Liberal-D.L.P. contests in Mosman and Vaucluse in 
1962 and 1965, and Lane Cove in 1965. The third group consists of 
more marginal seats which one of the major parties may not be con-
testing for some special reason: Nepean in 1932, Burwood and Croy-
don in 1938, Canterbuty in 1944, Bankstown, Fairfield and GranvUle 
(each contested by A.L.P. and Communist) in 1953. Aubum should 
perhaps be in a class of its own: successive contests between State 
Labor and Federal Labor could push up informal voting by potential 
U.A.P. voters, but they could also sort themselves out quite effectively 
as in the Lang-Chifley contest of 1935. 
In only seven contests does the proportion dehberately spoihng 
apparently exceed 20 per cent.: Neutral Bay in 1935, Burwood in 
1938 and Aubum in 1941 when it appears to have been about 25 per 
cent., and Kurri Kurri and Sturt in 1930 and Homsby and Lane Cove 
in 1935 when it appears to have reached 35 per cent. New South 
Wales voters do seem to have been able to make a choice when they 
go to the polls. 
Further evidence may be found in the answers given to the second 
question asked respondents in the Brisbane panel, from which it 
would appear that there is a general willingness to vote, although a 
variety of reasons for voting are supplied. The great majority (82.5 
per cent.) of voters were opposed to dehberate ballot-spoiling. Their 
reasons can be sorted into eight classes: (a) 24 per cent, argued that 
a decision could be reached if an effort was made: the elector "should 
pick the best of a bad lot", or, more helpfully, "study candidates more 
carefully" or "people should educate themselves", or, rather vaguely, 
"should vote for one or the other"; (b) 17 per cent, stated in general 
terms that there was an obhgation to vote, among them 8 per cent, 
saying that voting was a right or privilege which should be used or 
not wasted, whilst 4 per cent, expressed general disapproval of 
spoihng—"not right" or "must vote fair dinkum"; (c) following on this 
last group, 12 per cent, condemned spoilers as deficient in courage or 
intelhgence or both; (d) 7 per cent, saw voting as an opportunity for 
the citizen to play a part in govemment, including several who saw 
compulsoty voting operating to prevent people grumbhng about 
decisions taken and one who saw it preventing govemment by a 
minority; (e) 3 per cent, saw that some result was inevitable: "some-
one has to win"; (f) 11 per cent, believed evetyone should have an 
opinion; (g) 12 per cent, regarded spoihng as a waste of time, some-
times on the assumption that one had to go to the polls in any event; 
(h) 2 per cent, referred to the fact that the franchise had been fought 
for. The balance offered miscellaneous answers or gave no answer. 
Those who were prepared to see baUot-spoihng did not provide 
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such a variety of reasons—nor by and large were they so well ver-
balized, suggesting that slogans about voting were more a part of 
Austrahan civic culture than slogans for non-voting. These answers 
fell into four main groups: (a) if you did not know who to vote for, 
you should not vote; (b) if you did not care who won, or had no faith 
in any candidate, you need not vote; (c) a spoiled ballot was a form 
of "protest"; (d) in general terms, there should be no compulsion: "it's 
a free country". 
The contribution of compulsory voting to political education is 
much harder to assess. Crisp^^ concludes, rather hesitantly, that the 
influence has possibly been harmful through "an apparent latter-day 
decUne in party efforts in season and out of season seriously and per-
manently to convert voters to their general philosophies" and reliance 
instead on 'Tiectic campaign appeals based usually on a few super-
ficial scares, baits and catchcries". He wrote before the Liberal Party 
was converted to what its backroom planners like to call "continuous 
campaigning", and the A.L.P. began reluctantly to follow suit. Until 
Australian civic culture has been properly studied it is impossible to 
be definite on this point. The present writer's impression is that the 
apathetic, uninformed, bottom-of-any-scale element is less numerous 
in Australia than in, say, Britain or the United States, but this may be 
attributable in large part to the greater vitality of a working-class sub-
culture in the past. 
On the fifth and final consideration, however, it must be admitted 
that compulsory voting has probably had a deleterious effect on party 
organisation and participation. One recent exercise^^ showed Aus-
tralian political parties at the bottom of a scale of party expenditure 
measured as: 
Total Expenditure 
Number of Votes Cast 
Average Hourly Wage 
of Male Industrial Workers 
TABLE 11 
Index of Expenditure 
Country 
Australia 
Britain 
Germany 
United States 
India 
Japan 
Italy 
Philippines 
Israel 
Data year 
1958 
1959 
1961 
1960 
1961 
1960 
1958-60 
1961 
1960 
Index of expenditure 
.45 
.64 
.95 
1.12 
1.25 
1.36 
4.50 
16.00 
20.50 
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Another^^ estimated barely 1 per cent, of Brisbane electors actively 
participated in the 1963 State election campaign, whilst American 
sources report 3 per cent.^ *^  and 5 per cent.^ "^  participation. 
One function of party organisation is to "inform" or "educate" the 
pubUc, it being supposed that two flows of biased "information" and 
"education" will cancel out and leave a worthwhile residue. Indeed, 
Morris Jones bases much of his case against compulsory voting on 
this: 
. . . Parliamentary democracy is distinguished by its love of trial and its 
willingness to admit error; it demands expressions of interests which need to 
be adjusted, and it requiies discussions of viewpoints which are to be 
exchanged and where possible reconciled. Participation and consent may be 
useful and desirable, but only as aids to a complete and adequate debate. 
WTiere compulsor\^ voting prevails, the parties do not have to produce 
the volume and intensity of propaganda which is necessary to ensure 
turnout. Because the campaign can be played pianissimo without 
obvious ill-eflFect evidenced in turnout figures, much of it may not be 
heard. There is no need for the large and active branch organisation 
necessary- to operate the canvass and get out the vote on election day. 
In so far as large and active branch organisations are helpful to in-
ternal party democracy and to party communication with the com-
munity, AustraHan political life is the poorer. That is not to say that 
compulsory voting should be aboUshed forthwith. It is probable that 
the dysfunctions of compulsory voting have gone too far. The major 
parties have reached a state of flabbiness which renders them incap-
able of coping with the problems of a "free" vote, and any attempt 
to restore them to ruder health would have to be carefully planned. 
We cannot now compare the level of poUtical sophistication, in-
terest or information of Australian voters of one or two generations 
ago, before the introduction of compulsory voting. It has been argued 
here that it is unwise to project the attributes of American or British 
non-voters into a potential sector of the Australian electorate. What 
we can do is compare the attributes of those who say now that they 
might not vote with those who say they would and try to decide 
whether they fall so far short of average or some absolute standard 
that they should not be voting without raising any question about the 
wisdom of letting many who come happily to the polls of their own 
volition vote at all. The differences reported above do not seem suffi-
cient justification for altering a settled poUcy which has been built in-
to the Austrahan political system. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
part five I FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 
Austiahan pohtical science cut its teeth on constitutional law and 
federahsm, and until the mid 1950's these parts of the discipline were 
far better developed than the rest. A series of monographs, symposia 
and tracts—Canaway's The Failure of Federalism,^ Gordon Green-
wood's Future of Australian Federalism,^ Studies in the Constitution^ 
and Federalism: A Jubilee Study* come particularly to mind—debated 
the merits and demerits of federal systems in general and tihe Aus-
tiahan in particular. Recently Richard H. Leach's Intergovernmental 
Relations in Australia^ surveyed a smaU part of the field of inter-
governmental relations, those between the States, but the rapid evo-
lution of Commonwealth-State relations has so far escaped major 
research. 
Fortunately a few of the major federal institutions have been 
described in articles, five of which are reprinted here. Professor Sawer 
characterizes the process of judicial interpretation of the Constitution, 
the framework within which the Austiahan federal system subsists. 
An early article by Professor La Nauze recounts the short and unsuc-
cessful hfe of "The Inter-State Commission". Mr. Headford and Mr. 
May describe two more recent creations, the Loan CouncU and the 
Grants Commission, stiU vety much with us and of great importance to 
the States. Mr. Grogan provides an account of one of the several major 
specialized organs of Commonwealth-State consultation, "The Aus-
tiahan Agricultural Council". Together these articles show how a 
federal system can develop through constitutional amendment, ad-
ministiative agreement, and changing custom. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
17 THE RECORD OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
Geoffrey Sawer 
It was contemplated from the first that the Austrahan constitutional 
system should be subject to judicial review. The arguments urged in 
the U.S.A. in Marbury v. Madison^ against judicial invahdation of 
legislative Acts were never urged before any Austialian court either 
before or since federation. Our constitutional structure is a complex of 
British statutes and of local statutes made under powers conferred by 
those British statutes. It was probably always sufficient to say that the 
formal sovereignty of the British Parhament made policing of this 
constitutional structure by the courts inevitable. Doubtless if any 
special considerations had been urged after federation, by reference to 
the fact of Austrahan national autonomy, they could have been 
answered not merely by reference to the continuing formal British 
sovereignty but also by reference to the American example and to the 
vety cogent arguments in favour of judicial review advanced in 
Marbury v. Madison itself.^  
A consideration of the record of judicial review of the Austrahan 
Constitution must take into account chiefly the work of the High 
Court of Austraha and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
It would be appropriate to consider what these courts have decided 
not only in relation to the Commonwealth of Austraha Constitution 
Act 1900 (in which the federal structure is embodied), but also in 
relation to the series of British and local statutes comprising the con-
stitutions of the States. At this Seminar we are chiefly concemed with 
federahsm; for this reason and also for reasons of space I confine my-
seff to the Federal Constitution. 
The materials for a comprehensive assessment of the work of the 
Austrahan and British courts do not at present exist. Such an assess-
ment would need to take into account doctrinal analysis of the usual 
legal character, criticism of results in terms of sociological and ethical 
standards, and a detailed examination of the personal character and 
actions of each of the individual judges who have taken part in the 
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relevant decisions and of the "group psychology" (assuming it to 
exist) of the courts as collectivities. An approach to critical assess-
ment of this kind has been begun m the U.S.A. The work of the courts 
is not there regarded as in any sense immune from the most merciless 
analysis and discussion. The almost total absence of a law relating to 
contempt of court has doubtless contributed to this state of affairs.^ 
Owdng to their unitaty Constitution, the Enghsh have not needed to 
embark upon criticism of the judiciaty in a similar way, while we 
Austiahans who do need such criticism have not in fact embarked on 
it. Why? 
In the debates on the establishing of the High Court,* some of the 
leading statesmen of the Commonwealth expressed clearly the view 
that the High Court, in interpreting the broad words of the Constitu-
tion from decade to decade and under changing social conditions, 
would perform a constructive and quasi-legislative function. This was 
expressed particularly clearly by Alfred Deakin and Senator Hamey. 
Hamey said: "I notice that Senator Barrett, by interjection, objected 
to the word 'develop' in this connection. It is for the parliament and 
not the judges, he thinks, to develop the Constitution. I entirely dis-
agree witih him. It shows that he has not grasped the fundamental 
principle underlying written constitutions, which is that in proportion 
as the action of parhament in the way of amendment is impeded or 
excluded, in hke proportion the assistance of the jurist in the way of 
an enlarging construction must be invoked." There were several, like 
Senator Barrett, incapable of appreciating the nature of judicial re-
view. Since then, there has been something of a conspiracy between 
the Bench and the Bar in Austialia to maintain the fiction that the 
judicial function is a mechanical one. At Bar dinners. Law Council 
conventions and such like festivities, judges and leaders of the pro-
fession vie with each other in explaining to the general pubhc that 
judges are in no way concemed with the wisdom or pohcy of the laws 
they administer, and that their sole task is to "discover llie law". 
(Quotations to the same effect from judgments of the courts could 
be multiplied indefinitely. The following is an interesting one because 
of its setting. In Sickerdick v. Ashton,^ the High Court had to consider 
whether the defence power enabled the Commonwealth to make laws 
having extra-territorial effect, so as to control the armed forces when 
abroad; the question arose only indirectly, since the appeUant had 
been convicted of issuing pacifist propaganda in breach of regulations 
under the War Precautions Act 1914-16, and claimed that the Act 
was totally invalid because of extra-territorial provisions not applying 
to his case. Barton J. said inter alia: "We have nothing to say as to the 
wisdom or otherwise of any regulation: that is a matter for the Legis-
lature. We have said this on many occasions—it may as well be said 
once more—that any objection to the propriety of any regulation is 
quite beside the question. This court is not concemed with any such 
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matters. It is concemed only with the question of legahty." Isaacs J., 
however, considered it proper to include in reasoning deahng with 
this question of legahty the following proposition: "The German ideal 
is world mastety, and its ideal method of attaining its end is terrorism, 
inspired by mthless and cynical disregard of all human rights and 
sufferings and of national honour." His Honour was doubtless correct 
in this statement, but the appellant probably considered that the court 
had not drawn its conclusions from any narrow conception of the 
matters relevant to "the question of legality". 
I must add that not all the judges have expressed themselves in 
such terms. Some have recognised the creative function of the court. 
Thus Isaacs J. said in Commonwealth v. Kreglinger ir Fernau 
Limited: "As a hving co-ordinate branch of the Govemment" the 
court "cannot stand still and refuse in interpreting the law to recog-
nise the advancing frontiers of public thought and pubhc activity."^ 
In Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth, Dixon J., replying to an 
argmnent that the doctrine of implied immunity of instrumentahties 
was pohtical in character, said: "The Constitution is a political instru-
ment. It deals with govemment and governmental powers. . . . It is not 
a question whether the considerations are pohtical, for nearly evety 
consideration arising from the Constitution can be so described, but 
whether they are compeUing."'^ Dixon J. has usually attempted to turn 
constitutional slogans into reasonably determinate legal rules, not 
always with the happiest results, but I beheve that he has never been 
a party to the iteration of traditional incantations conceming the nature 
of the judicial function. 
There was a discussion of the general problem at the jubilee Law 
Council convention in Sydney in 1951; it arose out of the debate as to 
whether the House of Lords would be hkely to decide a certain prob-
lem arising out of the common law of neghgence in one way or 
another. The precedents are ambiguous and a number of the speakers 
considered questions of social morality, practical convenience and so 
forth. Lord Chancellor Jowitt, one of the distinguished Enghsh visitors 
present, hstened to this discussion with lengthening jaw, until finaUy 
he could stand it no longer and gave the audience a short lecture on 
how the House of Lords works, the burden of his remarks being that 
their Lordships would be concemed only to "discover the law," not 
to find out what would be a good or a bad law. The audience was 
suitably repressed, except for Dean Griswold of Harvard University 
Law School, who was heard to mutter: "That's just what my old 
granddad used to beheve." For the reputation of English legal 
scholarship, I am glad to say that the Master of the Rolls, Sir Ray-
mond Evershed, whom nobody could accuse of radical tendencies, 
intervened in a later discussion to say that he dissented from the 
extreme conservative ("not, of course, in any pohtical sense") view of 
judicial function expressed by the Lord ChanceUor. Sir Raymond 
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said that there were many circumstances when judges had to pay 
regard to questions of value. Dean Griswold has suggested that the 
constructive function of judges is now acknowledged by a majority of 
the profession in the U.S.A.; my observations there led me to beheve 
that the profession still cultivates the syllogism theoty of judgment 
and that the more enlightened view is confined to the major law 
schools and the judges of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal. 
The tiaditional view on these matters is doubtiess due in some 
degree to simple ignorance or refusal to think. To some extent, it is 
due to a theory that pubhc confidence in the judiciaty requires the 
maintenance of a general behef in the automatic and impersonal 
character of judgment. It is thought that the masses wiU accept the 
operation of legal control in the community more cheerfuUy and wiU 
exhibit less desire to use their pohtical power in order to influence 
the composition of the judiciaty and the profession, if the general 
impression remains that personalities have only a minor and incidental 
influence on the judgments of courts. To some extent, there is a 
genuine desire on the part of the judges and the legal profession to 
circumscribe as far as possible the political, economic and ethical 
element in judgment; this is a worthy desire, though it is questionable 
whether it is best achieved by encouraging a fiction. Somewhere be-
tween the gross political bias which nobody wants, and the mechanical 
inference, which is impossible, there lies an area of value judgments 
which are inescapable and should be regarded as legitimate. One of 
the functions of legal scholarship is to explore this field and to en-
deavour to estabhsh the sort of value propositions which we can 
frankly recognise as appropriate in the development of the law 
generally and of constitutional law in particular. In Austiaha, we are 
only just beginning to develop legal scholarship of this standard, and 
a periodical legal hterature above the level of practice notes.^ 
The task of tiie courts is to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution 
and apply that meaning to the particular cases that come before them. 
This simple sentence conceals a multitude of difficulties. The meaning 
of the relevant words in the Constitution can be affected by syntax, 
grammar, punctuation and word-usage; by the prepositional context; 
by the historical context; by the sociological context at the time the 
case arises; by expectations of the context in which the interpretation 
will in future operate; by the ethical climate; by the atmosphere 
created at the actual trial as a result of the behaviour of advocates, 
judges and parties. The "particular case" is a more or less comphcated 
narrative of circumstances leaving room for diverse characterisations 
of persons, acts and issues. The traditional British theoty of judicial 
function does not allow the courts to recognise frankly that they have 
to make pohcy decisions by which the existential situations are 
brought into a rough relation with the broad generahsations of the 
constitutional document; hence the judges have had to devise a legal 
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formula. The formula is that the Constitution is a British Statute, 
which has to be interpreted in accordance with the estabhshed rules of 
statutOty interpretation.^ These rules include the general rule that the 
courts must have regard to the kind of statute they are interpreting; 
this is a constitutional statute, which must be expected to use words 
of broad denotation and which should be construed so as to produce 
a workable system of govemment. ^ ^^  This formula merely introduces 
sociological evaluation by a back door. Other rules of statutoty inter-
pretation, apparently more specffic in character, turn out on apphca-
tion to have httle more precision, and are readily ignored ff incon-
venient. For example, take the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
and its variants. There is great conflict between dicta of High Court 
Justices as to whether this rule should ever be apphed to a constitu-
tion.^^ It was used by the Privy Council in Webb v. Outrim^ to ex-
clude the American implication that the States cannot tax Federal 
instrumentalities, but was ignored by the High Court majority in 
Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth^^ when the express pro-
vision of s. 51 (xiii) was tieated as insufficient protection for the 
States against Commonwealth control of their banking activities.^* 
There is a general theoty widely held in the U.S.A. that all judicial 
opinions are rationalisations for decisions arrived at on digestive and 
similar grounds. Without going this far, we can agree that the 
"ordinary rules of British statutory interpretation" provide far too 
ambiguous and mutually contradictoty guides to construction to pro-
vide, except in cases unlikely to reach appellate courts, a convincing 
explanation of constitutional decisions. As indicated above, the 
materials for a comprehensive account of what has determined judicial 
attitudes do not exist. In what follows I shall take a few types of 
cases and indicate possibihties. 
Notwithstanding what is said above, there are cases in which 
ordinaty rules of grammar, syntax and logic and a consideration of 
historical probabihty lead to a highly probable result. Possibly the 
number of disputes reaching the higher courts which could be put 
under this head has been small not only because htigants and even 
their legal advisers do not care to fight hopeless cases, but also be-
cause the courts have denied themselves one source which might 
sometimes have supplied them with fairly certain answers to questions 
of the meaning of words. The source in question is the debates of the 
Federal Conventions which sat m 1891, 1897 and 1898, in which there 
is a certain amount of contemporaty discussion of expressions which 
were or have since become ambiguous or obscure. It is possible that 
the lack of reference to this source has been due more to tiie timorous-
ness of the bar than to any firm exclusion of such material by the 
courts. The only two discussions of the question of any length occur 
in 1904, the first year of the High Court's existence, in Municipal 
Council of Sydney v. The Commonwealth^^ and Tasmania v. The 
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Commonwealth and Victoria.^^ The latter case was later by two 
months only, and the relevant discussions took place during argument. 
The dicta in the first case would suggest that the debates could be 
referred to in order to explain the general context of the constitutional 
expression, while the dicta in the second case suggested that only 
changes in the wording of the draft Bills could be used and that the 
debates had to be ignored. The latter ruling has since been treated by 
the profession as ff it were final. 
It is important not to over-emphasise the possible consequences of 
this attitude to the Convention debates. The Founders were much 
more concemed vdth pohtical manoeuvring on behalf of their respec-
tive States than they were with arriving at a precise understanding of 
each word in the drafts put before them. To take a typical example, 
one might have expected the debates to indicate clearly whether the 
Commonwealth was intended by Sections 81 to 83 of the Constitution 
to have a general power of expending its money, or whether its appro-
priation power was intended to extend only to matters more or less 
directly related to its other legislative, exhaustive and judicial 
powers.^'' In point of fact, there was some discussion at the 1891 Con-
vention on this question, but the debate on the point lapsed before any 
clear conclusion was reached and was never renewed.^® Similarly one 
might have expected the Convention to discuss whether or not the 
general American doctrine of imphed restrictions on governmental 
powers thought necessaty to preserve the structure of federahsm 
should apply to the Austiahan draft, having regard to the greater 
detaU of our instrument and the specffic provision for some of the 
matters covered by the American judge-made doctrme. In fact, there 
was not a single reference to the subject in the whole of the debates, 
though Sir Robert Garran has told me that he rather thinks that the 
drafting committee took it for granted that something like the 
American doctrine would apply. Mention of Sir Robert reminds me 
that it is sometimes possible, if you are quick enough, to get informa-
tion about the Convention debates before a court by referring to the 
exceUent summaries of those debates noted to each section of the 
Constitution in a monumental work written by two comparatively 
young men before any decisions of the High Court were avaUable; I 
refer, of course, to Quick and Garran's "Annotated Constitution". 
One of the few cases in which what I might call "verbal proba-
bihty" has been the determining factor is the construction of Section 
80 adopted in R. v. Archdall and Roskruge.^^ On a first reading, the 
section might appear intended to guarantee trial by juty in the case of 
the more serious crimes, and indeed in R. v. Federal Court of Bank-
ruptcy, ex parte Lowenstein,'^*' Dixon and Evatt JJ. indicated hnes 
along which such an interpretation might be reached. However the 
prevailing view, adhered to in the latter case by the rest of the Court 
that Section 80 performs only the rather trivial function of ensuring 
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trial by juty if the procedure known to lawyers as "indictment" is 
specffied by parhament, seems irresistible on the actual wording of the 
section. It is one of those cases where a different intention could so 
easily have been clearly set out that even the most incompetent drafts-
man could scarcely have failed to give effect to it if so instructed. Of 
course, speculations of a grammatical or semantic character occur 
in a great many of the cases, but they have scarcely ever been suffi-
cient on their own to explain the decision arrived at. A particularly 
elegant example of reasoning based on verbal arrangement is to be 
found in the joint judgment of Latham, C.J., Dixon, McTieman and 
WUhams JJ. in Morgan v. The Commonwealth,^^ where the court held 
that the prohibitions against the giving of preferences contained in 
Section 99 of the Constitution relate, in so far as they apply to laws of 
trade and commerce, solely to laws made under Section 51 (i) of the 
Constitution. The verbal considerations, however, received powerful 
support from an argument relating whoUy to expediency and pohcy, to 
the effect that it would be undesirable if the defence power were to 
be restricted by the sort of inhibition contained in Section 99. 
When verbal considerations are not sufficient to determine a ques-
tion, the attempt to base a decision upon them is at once seen to be 
pedantic and unworthy of a great constitutional tribunal. I beheve 
there is only one majority judgment in the books which incurs this 
criticism; it is that in Le Mesurier v. Connor,^^ invahdating an attempt 
of the Commonwealth to attach Commonwealth officers to State courts 
in order to assist the latter to carty out federal judicial functions vested 
in them. The case also contained some obiter dicta, equally pedantic, 
denying power to the Commonwealth to delegate to the executive the 
function of vesting federal jurisdiction in State courts. The decision 
was easily overcome by minor changes in the language of the relevant 
legislation, but the vahdity of the obiter dicta is stUl an open question. 
Dixon J.'s dissenting opinion in King v. Brislan, ex parte Williams,^^ 
hi which he denied that the posts and telegraphs power extended to 
radio broadcasting, is another example of such narrow constructions, 
surprising in view of His Honour's usual preference for broad con-
stmctions of positive grants of power and his statement in the Airlines 
Case: "It is a Constitution we are interpreting, an instrument of 
govemment meant to endure and conferring powers expressed in 
general propositions wide enough to be capable of flexible apphcation 
to changing circumstances." 
The proposition last quoted, repeated by the judges many times 
in various forms, has been a dominant consideration in both High 
Court and Judicial Committee decisions. The courts cannot of course 
initiate the measures by which constitutional powers are explored, 
adapted to changing needs, given new setting or emphasis, at times 
stiained to the hmit of the relevant language syndromes. The legis-
latures initiate, compeUed by the various forces which influence 
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pohtical affahs. The courts come in only when asked to restrain the 
relevant activity.^* In the many papers published this year on our first 
fifty years, there is general agreement that judicial interpretation has 
been for the most part expansive, and has enabled the politicians to 
bring about larger changes in the balance of the Constitution than 
those expressly approved by the electors at referenda. This is tme not 
only of the interpretation of powers, but also of the mterpretation of 
prohibitions, with the one exception of Section 92. The practical effect 
of the expansive attitude has been to mcrease the strength of the 
Commonwealth at the expense of the States, since the Constitution 
operates by way of grant to the Commonwealth. There is no need to 
examine the general statement at length, since the landmarks in the 
process, such as the Builders' Labourers Case,^^ the Bread Price 
Case,^^ the Engineers' Case,^'' the Goya Henry Cases,^^ the Uniform 
Tax Case^ and the Airlines Case,^^ are becoming common knowledge. 
It is sometimes said that the Commonwealth's inter-State commerce 
power has been interpreted more narrowly than the interpretation 
accorded by the U.S. Supreme Court to the corresponding U.S. sec-
tion; in particular, the High Court has not adopted the view that a 
"commingling" of inter-State and intra-State commerce involved 
Commonwealth power to regulate both. However, the truth is that 
the economic co-ordination of Australia has not yet produced a situa-
tion in which the American principle has been found necessaty, and 
our Constitution gives to the Commonwealth in express terms a good 
many general powers, not expressly given to the central govemment 
by the American document, which the U.S. Supreme Court has had to 
squeeze under the commerce power. I am prepared to predict that as 
the economy develops, the courts will expand the federal commerce 
power; they will not lack dicta from which to draw assurance in doing 
so.^^ 
This prevalence of broad constructions was not achieved im-
mediately nor without dissent. The first three Justices of the High 
Court drew from their direct historical experience of the movement 
for federation, from their interpretation of American decisions, and 
from their pohtical conception of federahsm, a technique of interpre-
tation which tended to produce narrow constructions of Common-
wealth powers. In the case of Griffith C.J., and Barton J., a strong 
individuahst bias against industrial arbitration was evident in opinions 
restricting the scope of the industrial arbitration power, though there 
was also historical justffication for this view.^^ But the ebulhent 
nationahsm of Isaacs and the mordant radicahsm of Higgins, operating 
on other new judges who had no strong pohtical attachments and few 
memories of the struggle for federation, wrought a great change be-
tween 1906 and 1920. Since 1947, there has been some revival of the 
earher tendency to draw restrictive rules from a general pohtical 
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theoty of federalism, but the doctrinal consequences of this develop-
ment have been slight.^^ 
Instead of dealing with the development of the arbitration, defence 
and financial powers and other such familiar examples of the expansive 
interpretations, I shall give two specific examples in lesser known 
spheres, one of power and the other of restriction. The power example 
is Huddart Parker v. Commonwealth^* which dealt with regulations 
under the Commonwealth Transport Workers Act 1928-9 providing for 
the licensing of waterside workers employed on inter-State and over-
seas ships, and for preference in such employment to the members of 
a particular trade union. Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ. held the regulations 
to be a vahd exercise of the Federal commerce power; Gavan Duffy 
C.J. dissented on a narrow ground relating to the authority conferred 
on the executive by the particular legislation.^^ Starke J. also dissented 
in a closely reasoned opinion which drew from the context of the 
commerce power, from American decisions, from Privy Council de-
cisions on the Canadian Constitution, and from an unstated 
but pretty evident presumption in favour of commercial individuahsm, 
a view restricting the commerce power to general regulation of the 
formal rules governing trade and commerce.^® The majority were in 
substantial agreement that laws choosing the persons to carry on an 
essential part of trade and commerce can properly be described as 
"laws with respect to" such trade and commerce, and therefore 
answer the description required by Section 51 (i) of the Constitution, 
and that the industrial policy governing the choice of workers was irrele-
vant to such characterisation. Rich and Dixon JJ., however, were clearly 
rather bothered by the policy inspiring the regulation, and sought 
refuge from its apparent irrelevance to "trade and commerce as such" 
by drawing distinctions between the "direct" operation of the law— 
(regulating the employment relations of persons engaged in trade and 
commerce)—and its "indirect effect"—(advancing the interests of a 
trade union).^''^ The opinion of Evatt J. in this case is not completely 
characteristic; it was not until later that His Honour began to develop 
the broad sociological approach which is so typical of U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions since the introduction of the Brandeis brief. But His 
Honour showed an awareness that there is no magic in the words 
"with respect to"; his answer to the argument that this was legislation 
with respect to employment was: True, but the legislation is also 
with respect to trade and commerce.^* He also cited a dissenting 
opinion of Holmes J. to show that tiade union considerations are not 
foreign to the nature of trade and commerce, but closely relevant. 
For an illustration of the treatment of constitutional prohibitions, 
consider Elliott v. Commonwealth,^^ in which the Court had to con-
sider another set of regulations made under the Transport Workers 
Act 1928-29, this time dealing with the licensing of seamen for employ-
ment on inter-State ships. The regulations in question applied only to 
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the ports of Sydney, Newcastie, Melboume, Brisbane and Adelaide. 
Thus many ports in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and 
South Austiaha were omitted, and the regulations did not apply to aU 
in Westem Austraha and Tasmania. The plaintiff claimed a declara-
tion that the regulations were invahd, because contrary to Section 99 
of the Constitution they gave a preference to some States or parts of 
States over other States or parts of States. Latham C.J., Rich, Starke 
and McTieman JJ. held the regulations did not offend against the 
prohibition, either because they did not give any preference at all, or 
because they did not give any preference to States or parts of States as 
such, but merely to certain ports because of their local characteristics. 
Dixon and Evatt JJ. dissented. Latham C.J. considered all the sections 
of the Constitution which require formal uniformity or absence of 
discrimination in Commonwealth laws, and by grading their degrees 
of stringency arrived at the conclusion that Section 99 requires the 
giving of a benefit in a pretty direct and obvious way. This is a careful 
piece of semantics. It is backed up by a sensible assumption on which 
His Honour has acted throughout his judicial career, namely, that the 
court should as far as possible avoid situations in which it has to pass a 
value judgment on a statute. Whether a licensing scheme such as this 
is an advantage to the ports that have it over the ports that have not, 
or a disadvantage to those ports, is not a question that courts can easily 
determine, and in this vety case the evidence on that question con-
fficted sharply. Deahng then with the distinction between "locahty 
preference" and "State preference," His Honour admitted frankly that 
on his view Section 99 will be almost worthless, since the Common-
wealth vdll always be able to evade it by avoiding reference to States 
as such in the relevant legislation, but he points out that on any view 
the section is easily evaded and that a good deal of existing legislation 
would be invalidated by a stricter rule. The judgment is an admirable 
blend of tiaditional legal casuistty and common sense consideration 
of the practical problems of govemment. The judgment of Rich J. 
foUows similar lines but is characteristicaUy brief. His Honour men-
tions one of the techniques by which the courts reserve to themselves 
a wide discretion in deahng with cases as they arise, namely refusal to 
embark upon definitions. "It is much easier to say whether a particular 
thing is or is not a preference than to define the characteristics which a 
preference must possess." This sort of empiricism is particularly preva-
lent in the common law and gives it greater flexibihty than might be 
expected of a system relying so much on authoritative precedents; it 
also helps to keep leading counsel in the prosperity to which they are 
accustomed. Starke J. in an even shorter judgment gives a typical dis-
play of robust common sense which ignores the difficulties: it is in-
credible that the Commonwealth should be unable to regulate where 
conditions require it and leave unregulated where conditions don't 
require it, and Section 99 must be read accordingly. This overlooks 
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the circumstance, pointed out by Dixon J. in his dissent, that the 
operation of the regulations in no way depended on whether any par-
ticular conditions of unrest, etc., existed in the ports prescribed. Mc-
Tieman J. stressed the absence of any indication in the regulations 
whether the ports regulated had been chosen "as parts of States." But 
the contiast between the dissents is most interesting. Dixon J. con-
sidered that an ordered regulation of a branch of commerce must be 
regarded as an advantage to that commerce, and hence that the ports 
regulated were preferred to those not. Evatt J. examined at length the 
pohtical and social character of the regulations, adopted the trade 
union evaluation of them as "dog collar" regulations intended to dis-
cipline the unions and lower the status of their members and con-
cluded that the ports not regulated were preferred. It is unnecessaty to 
go any further into the vast difference between the pohtical assump-
tions of the dissentients, sufficiently explained by their personal back-
grounds. Both dissentients held that the choice of the main ports in the 
four States regulated amounted to a choice of States as such, a view 
which seems more in accordance with the probable intention of the 
Founders than the majority view, but one which would reduce un-
desirably the freedom of action of the parliament. The ambiguity of 
the constitutional section, the conflict between the few precedents, 
and the complexity of the social and pohtical factors, made this a case 
where the court had a free choice. The majority decision cannot 
possibly be described as a thorough exploration of the problem, but 
the result of reducing Section 99 to an almost insignfficant restiiction 
on Commonwealth powers is typical. 
Behind both the cases just discussed there lay a great deal of 
pohtics. The Transport Workers Act was passed by the Bruce-Page 
Govemment in order to break the hold of the militant maritime unions 
on the major ports and on inter-State shipping. The Act was in form a 
very sweeping delegation of power to the Executive; in upholding this 
aspect of the legislation, the High Court rejected any general principle 
of separation between legislative and executive powers.*" The Act in-
volved extensive exercise of discretions, and the court dealt with this 
aspect of the matter on a presumption against wide discretionaty 
power to interfere with the hberty of cartying on ordinaty advoca-
tions.*^ The Act was used by Conservative governments to fight 
unions, and by Labor governments to build unions up. There were 
disputes between the Senate and the House of Representatives, lead-
ing to a High Court decision that tended to protect the power of the 
Houses to disallow regulations, as against an Executive anxious to 
avoid such disallowance.*^ Some decisions operated to favour Labor 
Party pohcy, others to favour anti-Labor pohcy. Vety httle of the 
politics of the situation is even hinted at in the decisions, yet it seems 
impossible to beheve that the judges were entirely unaffected by the 
general chmate of opinion in which they hved, and as indicated above, 
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there were certainly judgments of social value in the broadest sense 
underlying some of the rationahsations in the opinions. Would it be 
better if the courts brought all these considerations into the open? If 
the courts won't or can't, is it possible for social scientists to do it after 
the event? 
The one case in which it is generally agreed the courts have not 
made a good job of constitutional interpretation, on any standard of 
judgment, is Section 92. Professor Stone, Professor Beasley and myseU 
have recently published papers discussing various aspects of that 
problem.*^ None of these papers go into the doctrinal histOty of the 
matter in detail, so I shaU give here a summaty of that histOty as I see 
it. I should, however, warn the reader that there is the greatest diver-
gence of opinion off as well as on the bench even on the comparatively 
simple matters I shall mention. Section 92 is a pohtical slogan, the 
reference of which was reasonably clear to the Founders. "Protection" 
in those days had clear and usually uncomphcated motivations. The 
courts did not begin to experience difficulties with the section until the 
first World War, when owing to the vety slow assumption of "total 
war" powers by the Commonwealth, States began to control the flow 
of foodstuffs. They did so for many reasons, not aU of which were 
apparent in the relevant Acts. There was a genuine desire to aid the 
war effort by ensuring export of what was needed; there was a less 
exphcit desire to ensure that high prices in States short of wheat, meat, 
etc., did not result in speculation and denudation of supplies in States 
with an exportable surplus; there were difficulties in maintaining price 
contiol where it was attempted; there was the necessity for keeping 
farmers in production when shipping shortages made it impossible to 
export their surpluses in the accustomed manner; there were jealousies 
and personal hostihty between Commonwealth and State Ministers. 
These and other circumstances would have been relevant to any com-
prehensive assessment of the Queensland and New South Wales com-
modity control statutes attacked under Section 92. But such an enquity 
would require techniques quite beyond the competence of the courts, 
including cross-examination of Members of Parhament, Ministers and 
civil servants. The courts inevitably attempted to develop tests which 
would enable them to judge the presence or absence of the prohibited 
protective pohcy by the terms of the statutes themselves; since such 
an attempt was bound to fail, or to turn Section 92 into something 
either more or less far-reaching than the Founders intended, it is not 
surprising that the relevant decisions should have been in conflict. 
The Wheat Case** laid down a dogmatic rule that acquisition of 
goods by governments can never infringe Section 92, but later ex-
perience has made it necessary to graft material exceptions on this. In 
the New South Wales Meat Case*^ a standstill order intended to pre-
vent the movement of stock to other States was held invahd, but in the 
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Queensland Meat Case*^ this was over-mled on the ground that the 
relevant statutes were mainly and genuinely concemed to make meat 
available for the forces. In this tangle of cases, nearly aU the views 
subsequently developed, from the simplest, (Section 92 invahdates 
only legislation specially aimed at inter-State trade) to tihe widest, 
(Section 92 requires the minimum of legislative interference with pri-
vate enterprise in inter-State commerce consistent with ordered free-
dom), were put forward. Isaacs J., who was always happy to adopt 
theories which would strengthen Commonwealth power and estabhsh 
national regulation of commerce, then took up a suggestion made by 
Starke in argument in the second meat case, and in 1920 {McArthur's 
Case*'') persuaded the rest of the Court to escape all these difficulties 
by tieating Section 92 as binding only the States, and as excluding 
them completely from the field of inter-State commerce. This could 
have been worked out as a satisfactoty solution, though certainly not 
contemplated by the Founders. It would, however, have required the 
Commonwealth to act much more vigorously and promptly than the 
governments of the day were prepared to act in order to supply the 
complex laws for inter-State commerce required by the total exclusion 
of State laws from such transactions. Higgins J. always thought this 
solution both impracticable and undesirable in the then state of Aus-
tiahan economic development, and it may be doubted whether the 
doctrine was ever fully understood by any judges except Isaacs and 
later Dixon JJ. Certainly it was never applied. Exceptions were grafted 
on to it at the same time as hp service was paid to it. 
Unfortunately, the matter first came before the Privy Council in 
James v. Cowan*^ at a time when the situation was still very fluid. 
That case on its facts looked vety hke the penalising of a dried fruits 
grower solely because he wanted to send his fruit to other States; the 
High Court held by majority that since the method of acquisition had 
been used, Section 92 was not infringed. Isaacs J., dissenting, empha-
sised both the discrimination against inter-State trade on the facts and 
the necessary invahdity of any State laws affecting inter-State trade, 
applying the rule in McArthur's Case. The Privy Council upheld 
Isaacs' view in a judgment so ambiguous that it gives adequate sup-
port to all the theories since put forward. Some passages emphasise 
the discriminatoty features in the case, others the practical effect 
(whether "intended" or not) of the legislation on persons in fact en-
gaged in inter-State commerce. 
I need not pursue the stoty further since subsequent decisions of the 
High Court and the Judicial Committee have merely rung the changes 
on the two themes: is the legislation in substance aimed against import 
or export: whatever its substance, does the legislation actually burden 
individuals engaged in inter-State commerce? As I see it, the innumer-
able formulae put forward in the judgments can be classffied under 
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one or other of these general heads. The "substance" or "characterisa-
tion" approaches are nearer to the original purpose of Section 92, but 
they all contain at least imphcitly a guess at and judgment upon the 
motives of the legislature or executive concemed. The "direct effect" 
approaches escape this difficulty but turn the section into a sort of due 
process clause, a guarantee of die continued existence of "ordered free 
enterprise" in inter-State commerce. The Bank Nationalisation Case 
rather supports the latter view, but with so many escape clauses as to 
leave the High Court sharply divided and the future apphcation of the 
section quite uncertain. It would have been better if the Judicial Com-
mittee, having decided that the Bank appeal was incompetent, had left 
the matter at that. But as I have tiled to show, the basic difficulty has 
been the sheer impossibihty of any court, confined within the ordhiaty 
limitations of judicial function, cartying out the range of mvestigation 
needed to pohce a broad pohtical slogan like Section 92. 
I excepted only Section 92 from the proposition that the courts have 
adopted broad constmctions of powers and narrow constmctions of 
prohibitions. From the point of view of the States, however, the High 
Court has also adopted a construction of the expression "excise duties" 
which is wider than it need have been and may be considered unfor-
tunate. Section 90 of the Constitution prohibits the States from levying 
excise duties. The first High Court, relying on Austiahan legislative 
use of "excise" and on the Court's historical knowledge of the purpose 
of the prohibition,*^ laid down a definition which would have confined 
the prohibition of taxes imposed directly on the manufacture or pro-
duction of commodities and measured by reference to the value or 
volume produced.^" After the disappearance of the assumptions on 
which the first Justices operated, the way was open for "excise" to be 
given a wider meaning, and the prohibition a correspondingly wider 
range, so as to include sales taxes and levies to support marketing 
boards. The history of the cases is traced by Dixon J. in the latest of 
them—Parton v. Milk Board.^^ In my view it is an unfortunate histoty. 
The old definition was clear, easily apphed and such that the States 
were left some fields of indirect taxation and consequential fiscal flexi-
bUity. 
A particularly ironical feature of the decisions on State marketing 
boards is that they permit withholding of a charge on proceeds by a 
Board which acquires and sells an ou^ut , but do not permit separate 
imposition of a levy to cover the costs of a Board which merely regu-
lates, except on a fiat rate basis which would be unfair to the smaU 
grower. Possibly the States have not fully explored the various possible 
standards for separate levy which might escape the mling in Parton's 
Case, but as the decisions stand they tend to encourage Qie States to 
adopt outright socialisation of distribution rather than regulative 
Boards. This is what Victoria has in fact done with metropohtan miUc 
distribution, after its regulative scheme had been held to involve an 
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excise. In Mathews v. Chicory Marketing Board,^^ Dixon J. suggested 
that unless the courts adopted a flexible definition of excise, corre-
sponding to the wide use of the term in British legislative histoty, the 
States would easily evade the prohibition of Section 90. It is arguable, 
however, that evasion of Section 90 is a lesser evU than a situation 
where the States cannot predict with certainty the validity of such 
imposts and may be forced into more drastic measures of social contiol 
than a situation requires. The interpretation of Section 92 is also tend-
ing to produce the same kind of undesirable result; at least on one of 
the "free enterprise" theories of that section, marketing schemes based 
on acquisition may be vahd whUe those based on regulation may be 
bad. 
I suggest above that the States may not have explored to the full 
the possibihty of evading the broad judicial constmction of Section 90; 
there are doubtiess pohtical difficulties in the way of them imposing 
fresh taxes, as there are in the way of resuming the imposition of State 
income taxes. Our discussions at the first of these Seminars have sug-
gested to me the foUowing two methods which the States might adopt. 
First there is the suggestion of Dixon J. in Parton's Case that a levy 
measured by reference to the output of a previous year would not be 
an excise. With respect, I suggest that this is a thoroughly unsatisfac-
toty doctrine; there is just the same probabihty in most cases of such 
a tax directly entering into the purchase price of commodities cur-
rently sold as there was in the case of the acreage tax held invalid in 
the Chicory Case. Secondly, there is the possibihty suggested by such 
Canadian decisions as A. G. British Columbia v. Kingcome Navigation 
Co.^^ and Atlantic Smoke Shops v. Conlon,^* that a tax can vahdly be 
imposed by States if expressed to be on the consumer in respect of 
consumption, even though he is required to pay the tax to the retailer 
and the latter is required to pay to the govemment. This too is a some-
what unreal device, but the analogy of the Canadian decisions might 
be sufficiently powerful to support it.^ ^ 
At our previous Seminar on Federahsm, Professor Mackintosh made 
a few tienchant remarks about the poor quahty of Privy CouncU de-
cisions on the Canadian Constitution and the lack of any great sorrow 
in Canada, even amongst earnest Anglophiles, at the abohtion of 
appeals to the Judicial Committee. The Privy Council had a long, con-
tinuous contiact with the Canadian problem; cases were numerous, 
and the sole reason for the tiend of the decisions being so unsatisfac-
toty was the lack of first-hand knowledge by most Board members of 
the histOty and purposes of Canadian Federation and of the pohtical 
and economic conditions imder which that Constitution worked. The 
Austiahan Founders were weU aware that the Privy Council had not 
made a good job of Canadian appeals, and this was one of the main 
reasons why they sought to exclude the appeal to the Privy Council 
altogether.^ * The compromise arrangement arrived at between the 
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Australian negotiators and Chamberlain in 1900, embodied in Section 
74 of the Constitution, was intended to make the High Court normally 
the final court of appeal on what were considered the most important 
types of constitutional question. The section has received from the 
High Court and the Judicial Committee an interpretation which has 
probably made appeals to London even less frequent than the drafts-
men of Section 74 contemplated. 
I think it is not unfair to say that lacking both frequent experience 
of Australian problems as represented in cases and first-hand know-
ledge of the countty, the Judicial Committee has inevitably made an 
undistinguished showing in this field. It certainly cannot be said that 
the Committee has blundered in the same specific sense as it did with 
Canada. Its anxiety to pay due respect to Australian judges has indeed 
probably prevented it on some occasions from giving a positive lead 
which individual members of the Committee were capable of giving. 
I think that the decision in James v. Commonwealth^'' in particular 
would have put an end to a good many of the disputes over Section 92, 
instead of starting a fresh crop of disputes, if Lord Wright had been a 
httle more ruthless in his tieatment of doubtful precedents. But it cer-
tainly cannot be said that any of the eleven^^ principal cases on the 
Federal Constitution decided by the Judicial Committee are entirely 
satisfactoty and some of them are quite disappointing in the standard 
of their reasoning. 
Webb V. Outrim,^^ the first one of importance, rejected the doctrine 
of implications from Federalism then being developed by the first 
High Court, and some of its reasoning entered into the ultimate similar 
decision of the High Court itself in the Engineers' Case.^ But parts of 
the reasoning suggested that the Privy Council had a vety imperfect 
reahsation of the meaning of dominion status, even as it existed at that 
date, and no knowledge of U.S. constitutional law, on which the Aus-
trahan Founders had dravsm heavily. Nobody has yet supphed a satis-
factoty explanation of what the Board meant by its observations on the 
incidental power in the Royal Commissions Casef^ incidentaUy the 
Board in that case (the only one in which the High Court has given a 
certificate for appeal under Section 74) failed to answer the specffic 
questions which the High Court had stated for its opinion, and which 
alone it should have dealt with. Dixon J. has vahantly laboured to 
extract an intelhgible principle from the observations of the Board in 
the Builders' Labourers' Case^ on the meaning of the expression 
"question . . . as to the hmits inter se of the constitutional powers of 
the Commonwealth and those of any State" in Section 74; His 
Honour's ov^ m views are clear and easy to apply, but it is vety doubtful 
whether the Board had such a ctystalhne vision as Dixon J.** The Shell 
Case^* has introduced a conception of judicial power which makes the 
interpretation of Section 71 of the Constitution needlessly complex.®^ 
Moran's Case^^ opens the way for Commonwealth evasion of the 
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several constitutional sections intended to procure uniformity in taxa-
tion, yet fails to establish a clear and simple rule that the grants power 
can be exercised in entire disregard of the limitations on the taxation 
power. 
The three decisions on Section 92*'^  have failed to estabhsh any 
certainty in that field, but James v. Commonwealth does approach 
more nearly to a solution than any High Court decision and the Privy 
Council lost the opportunity of rendering a major service when in the 
Bank Nationalisation Case it elected to distinguish instead of clarffying 
the reasoiung in James v. Commonwealth. 
The Nelungaloo Case^^ contains a good summaty of the dogmatic 
mles developed in the cases as to the nature of an inter se question, 
but it also has some irritating ambiguities and one egregious error as 
to the signfficance of the opinion of Dixon J. in ex parte Nelson 
(supra).®® Indeed, the only Privy Council decisions on the Common-
wealth Constitution which could be described as completely satisfac-
toty are the first two—P. 6- O. v. Kingston""^ and C.S.R. v. Irving;''^ the 
latter in particular laid dovvm in vety clear terms the difference be-
tween "discrimination" and "unfairness of incidence" in relation to 
taxation statutes. All of the above criticisms are matters of opinion, 
and in several cases it can at least be said that the Judicial Committee 
has done no worse than the High Court and that tiie real trouble has 
been the inherent difficulty of relevant sections of the Constitution. I 
think, however, that the abohtion of appeals to the Privy Council in 
1900 would have made httle difference to the course of constitutional 
interpretation and that the preservation of the appeal is not justffied. 
In conclusion I wish to mention some points about the procedure by 
which constitutional htigation is determined. In Re Judiciary and 
Navigation Acts,''^ the High Court held that the terms of Chapter III 
of the Constitution preclude the Court from giving "advisoty opinions" 
by reference of the Attomey-General of the question whether a statute 
is constitutional. Hence the procedure frequentiy used (and frequently 
criticised) in Canada for getting prompt decisions on "marginal" legis-
lation is not available here. However, the High Court has greatly faci-
litated the raising of important constitutional disputes by its hberal 
attitude to declaration procedtures. There is usually little to prevent 
Commonwealth and State Attorneys-General and parties hkely to be 
affected by legislation from getting the matter before the Courts; there 
is usuaUy either a State or an individual sufficiently interested in 
having Federal legislation invahdated, and either the Commonwealth 
or another State or an individual sufficiently interested in having State 
legislation invahdated, to provide the basis for a genuine dispute. The 
method of determining complex major constitutional issues, however, 
is open to criticism on at least two grounds. Firstly, cases are too fre-
quently determined on demurrer, or on motion for injunction treated 
as the hearing of an action, so that tbe facts of the situation are set 
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before the Court only by affidavit evidence. It might be better if the 
American rule were foUowed that whenever possible there should be a 
trial of facts preceding argument of the constitutional law. This would 
require greater versatihty of leading constitutional counsel than they 
have hitherto been required to display, but they could rise to the 
necessity. Secondly, the arguments themselves are usually presented 
orally. Occasionally counsel put in a woitten summaty of their argu-
ment, or of some part of it, but the art of presenting complete argu-
ments in vmtten form is almost unknovim in Austiaha (as of course it 
is in most British countries). This leads to prolixity, to excessive 
judicial interjection, to the practice of letting the argument follow the 
direction suggested by minute-to-minute judicial reactions, and to an 
excessive emphasis on the personahty of the advocate. In my view the 
procedure in U.S. appellate courts, and particularly in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, errs in the other direction, by attaching too much 
importance to the written "brief" and giving insufficient t ine for dis-
cussion between Court and counsel. Some intermediate system would 
be better, so that counsel would be compelled to work out a sys-
tematic, coherent written argument, but so that there would also be 
adequate opportunity for a true meeting of minds. Perhaps the steady 
increase in the volume of htigation wUl eventuaUy compel our courts 
to introduce a written argument system, but the difficulty of over-
crowded hsts may well tend to confirm the practice of deciding cases 
on inadequate and badly presented affidavit evidence. 
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18 THE INTER-STATE COMMISSION 
J. A. La Nauze 
The ancestial voices which prophesied war when "a httie bit of lay-
man's language" was included in Section 92 of the Constitution have 
been amply justified. The cynic might be tempted to suggest that they 
have seen to it that they were justified. Our present subject also takes 
us back to the days when the Fathers of the Constitution met to frame 
the document which, in Mr. Deakin's words, made Australia a union, 
"a union with strong foundations set deep in justice, a union which 
wiU endure from age to age, a bulwark against aggression and a per-
petual security for the peace, freedom, and progress of the people of 
Australia, giving to them and their children and to their chUdren's 
children through aU generations the priceless heritage of a happy and 
united land."^ At the Convention Debates many columns of words 
were expended on the Inter-State Commission. Now that there is some 
talk of caUing it to life again it is appropriate to inquire into its origins 
and to examine its brief and rather fruitless existence which 
. . . would seem an after-birth. 
Not conceived in the beginning 
(For God blessed his work at first 
And saw that it was good), 
But emerged at the first sinning 
When the gromid was therefore curst.. . . 
In the Life of George Swinburne, Mr. Eggleston says "The Constitu-
tion was full of safeguards to maintain its federal character; the States 
did not give up their independence; they surrendered certain powers 
to central authority; the arrangement of powers could not be altered 
without their consent and must be mterpreted by independent authori-
ties. One of these authorities was the High Court and the other was the 
Inter-State Commission" (p. 307). It is tme that as it was constituted, 
thhteen years after Federation, the Inter-State Commission was in-
tended to be such an authority in the sphere of trade and commerce; 
but its inclusion m the Constitution was due to less sublime intentions. 
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The main reason for setting up such a body was the clash of State in-
terests in the sphere of railway and river transport, an acute question 
of debate among New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia in 
the nineties. It is ironical that ff the Commission is reconstituted its 
work wUl, it seems, be largely concemed with the grievances of States 
which originally had little or no interest in its creation. 
There was considerable argument at the Melbourne Convention as 
to whether the appomtment of the Commission should be mandatory 
or not. It was on the motion of Mr. Kingston (S.A.) that the words 
"Parliament may make laws constituting an Inter-State Commission" 
were struck out and the words "There shall be . . ." substituted. There 
was difference of opinion regarding the usefulness of such a body. 
Mr. Dobson (Tas.) said: "I can quite understand that as the Federal 
spirit and the desire for harmony increases, we shall hardly, if ever, 
desire to call into play an inter-state commission."^ Mr. Reid (N.S.W.) 
did not agree. "I do not think," he said, "we will ever be in such a 
position that such a body's services will not be required. In the mani-
fold ramifications of trade and enterprise of all kinds I feel sure that a 
number of matters are bound to arise."^ He was, of course, right. 
In the final version of the Constitution the provisions relating to the 
Inter-State Commission are included in Sections 101-104. Section 101 
states: 
There shaU be an Inter-State Commission with such powers of adjudica-
tion and administration as the Parliament deems necessary for the execu-
tion and maintenance, within the Commonwealth, of the provisions of this 
Constitution relating to trade and commerce, and of all laws made there-
xmder. 
It is provided in Section 102 that the members shall hold office for 
seven years except in case of misbehaviour or incapacity, and that 
their remuneration shaU not be diminished during their term of office. 
Sections 102 and 104 refer to their powers in connection with railway 
rates. The layman could hardly be blamed if he drew the conclusion 
that an Inter-State Commission should have been established at the 
beginning of the Commonwealth and shoiUd be operating now. In the 
first Parliament a biU to establish a commission was brought in, but it 
lapsed at the end of a session. The project was revived in 1909, when 
an elaborate bUl was introduced by the Deakin Govemment. This was 
the basis of the Inter-State Commission Act of 1912; but it contained 
provisions relating to industrial disputes which were probably ultra 
vires the constitution. It was strongly opposed by the Labour party 
and it also lapsed. 
At the end of the session in 1912 the Attomey-General, Mr. W. M. 
Hughes, introduced the Inter-State Commission BUl, which, some 
members complained, was rushed through all stages very quickly. 
However, it was in principle accepted by both parties. The BiU was 
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(as Mr. Hughes acknowledged) largely based on Deakin's abortive 
measure of 1909. In introducing it he said, "Shortly, the functions of 
the Commission under this BiU are: It wiU be a standing Commission 
of Inquity, with power to investigate on reference by Parhament, or 
on its ovm motion, practically all matters knowledge of which is 
directiy necessary to Parliament and the public. It wiU be a Board of 
Trade, an mdependent critic, not only of social, industrial and com-
mercial events but of the operation and administration of laws. . . . I t 
will be an active guardian of the Constitution with power to reach out 
and deal with violations of the Constitution with respect to trade and 
commerce."* This formidable infant was welcomed from the other side 
of the House by Mr. Deakin. "I look upon it," he said, "as the eyes 
and ears of the Commonwealth Govemment," and he expressed the 
hope that "the always abstract, the always vague, the occasionally 
tortuous expressions of legal procedure will be simplified by its study 
of facts."® This hope was ferventiy echoed in the Senate. "I do not 
see why on the Commission there should be a lawyer," said Senator 
Stewart. "As a matter of fact, lawyers are probably the worst class 
of people who could be chosen. Lawyers usuaUy confuse and con-
found matters."® Several members were quite frank in their views 
on the composition of this impartial body. "I hope that if the Commis-
sion is created it wiU be of the right fiscal colour," said one. "I will not 
say that there should not be one free-trader on the Commission, but I 
sincerely trust that two of the three Commissioners wUl be strongly 
convinced that the industries of Australia require to be safeguarded."'^ 
The Inter-State Commission Act, set up, or as lavtyers afterwards 
said, purported to set up, a body armed with wide and formidable 
powers of inquity into, and adjudication upon, matters affecting tiade 
and commerce within the Commonwealth. It could hear and deter-
mine complaints, award damages, inflict heavy fines for disobedience 
of its order and commit to prison for faUure to pay. It could compel 
witnesses to attend and examine them on oath. Appeals from its deci-
sions could be made to the High Court, but on matters of law only. 
Specifically its duties were laid dovm in Part III, Section 16 of the Act. 
This mentioned a vmle range of subjects which the Commission was 
"charged with the duty of investigating from time to time" if in its 
opinion the public interest required such investigation. They included 
production of and trade in commodities; manufactures; markets; 
tariffs; prices; profits; wages; employment; population; immigration; 
and any matters referred to tiie Commission by Parliament. 
Owing to a Farliamentaty election some time elapsed before the 
first appointments were made. Mr. Cook was the new Prime Minister. 
He announced the names of the Commissioners early in August 1913. 
They were a redoubtable trio, armed with wide knowledge and experi-
ence in various spheres of Australian life. The legal member and 
Chairman was Mr. A. B. Piddington, K.C., whose career needs no 
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summaty. Among his many qualifications was a considerable experi-
ence of mdustrial matters. The Hon. George Swmburne was a leadmg 
figure m Victorian politics, who, as Minister for Agriculture and Pubhc 
Works, had successfuUy dealt witii the difficult question of the Murray 
Waters. He was a business man of vety wide experience. Mr. Lockyer 
was one of the ablest civU servants in Australia, with considerable 
experience of taxation and customs. He was at the time Federal Comp-
troUer-General of Customs, and, as it had been announced that the 
first task of the Commission would be to undertake an mquity into 
tihe tariff, it is interestmg to note that "in private hfe Mr. Locltyer was 
a keen fisherman, if a man who devotes the whole of his skill to the 
destruction of sharks can be classed m that category."^ The comment 
of the Adelaide Register on the appointments showed that in some 
matters the spirit of 1937 is the same as that of 1913. The first words 
of its sub-leader ran: "Much disappointment wdll naturally be occa-
sioned m this State by the omission of a South Australian from the 
personnel of the Inter-State Commission. . . . South Australia wUl 
rightiy consider that her peculiar position and claims have been 
treated with scant respect by the Federal Government." It added 
modestiy, "this State . . . is more truly continental and less parochial 
than either of its neighbours". 
At this point a brief summaty of the Commission's work wUl be use-
ful. In 1915 its powers of adjudication were shorn from it by a decision 
of the High Court. Thereafter it acted in effect as a standing Royal 
Commission. It performed much valuable investigating work, but its 
practical influence was for various reasons almost negligible. The work 
performed by the Commission (whose members also assisted in the 
Govemment in other capacities) comprises a vety thorough investiga-
tion mto the Tariff in 1913-14; the hearmg of the Wheat Case in 1915, 
on appeal from which the judicial powers of the Commission were 
declared to be unconstitutional; an inquiry into new industries in 1915; 
an inquity into trade in the South Pacific in 1916; an inquiry into 
prices in 1917; and several minor investigations. 
The most valuable work is probably that done in the Tariff inquity. 
The Commissioners were asked to report in particular on industries in 
urgent need of tariff assistance, anomalies in existing Acts, and "the 
lessening where consistent wdth general policy of the costs of the 
ordinaty necessaries of life". They proceeded to examine these ques-
tions in considerable detaU, and heard hundreds of wdtnesses in 
hundreds of sittings. The Tariff Reports on particular industries com-
prise two enormous volumes of the Commonwealth Parhamentaty 
Papers, and include masses of statistics and reports of evidence. 
Volume is no criterion of quality. But the Commission performed 
valuable and searching work which was unfortimately too soon for-
gotten. The type of investigation was entirely new. By 1914 the 
Tariff was accepted almost without question as "Austraha's national 
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policy". It is significant that the terms of reference of the inquity were 
concemed with "the necessity for new or increased duties". The Com-
missioners, although they were not perhaps fully aware of the less 
obvious repercussions of tariffs, brought to the investigation wide 
experience and critical powers which are not always possessed by 
political defenders of protection. They accepted protection, but not 
naively. One can imagine their thoughts upon this brUliant little 
example, mutatis mutandis, of a speech before any Tariff Commission: 
I caimot go into figures of the cost of local and imported. . . . Ten or 
fifteen years ago I did five times the business I do now. At first I thought it 
was ten times, but I really think it was about four times more ten years ago, 
or perhaps twofold. 
I am not aware of our profits for the past three years. I do not know any-
thing about finance. I leave that all to our bookkeeper. I attend to the 
cutting. . . . We are doing well, but not as well as we should do ii we had 
increased duty.^ 
It did not do to forget the position which the Commission held 
under the Constitution, as this incident shows: 
Witness: I thought you had finished—I am very sorry. 
Chairman: Whether it is pubhshed in the press is nothing to do with it. 
Witness: I really thought you had finished. 
Chairman: I had not. 
Witness: I am awfuUy sorry. 
Mr. — (speaking from the body of the Court): As a director of the com-
pany, may I be allowed to ask a question? . . . 
Chairman: Will you please take your seat, sir, I do not know your name. 
Witness: He is Mr. — , a director of the Company. 
Chairman: (to Mr. — ) : You are not a witness. Neither a director of a 
company nor any other person has any right whatever to interrupt the 
proceedings of this Commission. . . . 
Mr. Swinburne: I wish to say— 
Chairman: One moment please. 
Mr. Swinburne: I should hke to say something— 
Chairman: With so many interruptions on both sides— 
Mr. Swinburne: I have a word to say—I wish to say something—1<* 
The general report contained a number of pertinent observations on 
Austrahan industty which may stUl be read with profit. "We are com-
peting with countries whose industrial methods are marked by the 
application of scientific research and knowledge and the close observ-
ance of efficiency and the avoidance of waste, whether in power, 
labour or material, and it is imperative that we should not lag behind 
in any of these respects." . . . . "It is not reasonable that taxes on 
the community should be increased on the plea of unprofitableness of 
manufacture unless this plea can be made good by something more 
than mere assertion." Some notes sound curious to-day. "Fortunately, 
Australia offers the possibility of unlimited expansion in agricultural. 
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mining and pastoral industries, for the products of which the world's 
demand is practicaUy unlimited."^^ 
But on the whole one feels obliged to endorse Mr. Eggleston's 
words. "In 1914 the tariff conflict was settled in principle and a body 
of investigators was bound to accept protection and ascertain how it 
could be made as efficient as possible. If the Commission had sat con-
tinuously from that date to the present it would have developed even 
more sldU in penetrating the views put before it, and would as time 
went on, have become an instrument of great efficiency in correcting 
the crudities of Parliamentary protection.^^ 
It took the Tariff Board, which began the task all over again, nearly 
ten years to divest itself of the crudest approach to its subject matter. 
To the economic historian this investigation is the most valuable 
part of the Commission's work, although their conclusions do not 
seem to have convinced Parliament that Protection involved anything 
else but protection. But the Inter-State Commission was intended to 
be much more than an inquiring body. The great powers of investiga-
tion and capacity to enforce decisions in matters relating to trade 
and commerce were meant to be used. That the Commission for the 
greater part of its life was little more than a standing Royal Commis-
sion was due to a decision of the High Court in 1915 in what became 
known as the Wheat Case. Under a war-time Act the State of New 
South Wales compulsorUy acquired the wheat crop at a fixed price. A 
farmer had contracted to sell part of his crop inter-state; it was seized 
by the Government; and a complaint was made to the Inter-State 
Commission that this action violated Section 92 of the Constitution. 
The Commission rejected the contention advanced on behalf of the 
Govemment of New South Wales that it had no jurisdiction to hear the 
case; and held by a majority (the Chief Commissioner dissenting) that 
the Wheat Acquisition Act infringed Section 92, and was, therefore, 
invalid. An appeal on questions of law was made to the High Court 
and inter alia the Court was asked to decide whether the Commission 
had "jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition, to grant the in-
junction or to make the order for costs". It was held by Griffith, C.J., 
and Isaacs, Powers, and Rich, J.J. (Barton and Gavan Duffy, J.J., dis-
senting), that Section 101 of the Constitution did not authorise the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth to constitute the Inter-State Com-
mission a Court, nor to give it judicial powers nor to confer upon it 
the general power to restrain contraventions of Inter-State trading 
rights, and that, therefore, as the provisions of Part V. of the Inter-
State Commission Act, 1912, were ultra vires the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth, the Inter-State Commission had no power to deal 
wdth the complaint. 
This judgment is a matter of considerable interest both historically 
and in regard to the question of what form a reconstituted Inter-State 
Commission is likely to take. The majority judgment depended on an 
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interpretation of the word "adjudication", and its distinction from 
"judicial" powers which, it was held, were vested solely in the High 
Court and such other Courts as Parliament might create, but of which 
the Inter-State Commission could not be held to be one. A layman 
can hardly criticise the judgment. The comment of Mr. Eggleston, a 
lavtyer, is that it "defied the known intention of the framers of the 
Constitution and resembles vety much the action by which some medi-
eval court of law endeavoured to stultify a rival court". It is true that 
the High Court is debarred from using the Convention debates as a 
guide to the interpretation of the constitution. In this case, for some at 
least of the majority judges, it was just as weU, as these debates would 
certainly have made them feel uncomfortable. In the Second Report 
of the Commission the judgment is commented upon. An impressive 
series of quotations from the Convention debates is given, and a lay-
man's impression, after reading these and their context in the original, 
is that the Commissioners are justified in saying that "evety member of 
the Convention who described the powers of the Commission, includ-
ing the members of the Drafting Committee who spoke, considered 
that the Inter-State Commission was to discharge just such judicial 
duties as are laid upon it by the present Act".^^ 
The Commission now became merely a body of inquity wdthout any 
power of enforcing its decisions. In its subsequent annual reports it 
repeatedly drew attention to the crippling effect upon its activities of 
this loss of judicial powers, but to no avail. It was announced towards 
the end of its term that the Government would introduce legislation 
to remedy the position (how, is not quite clear) but this was not done 
before the Commission's term ended. The Commission itself suggested 
two methods of remedy: (i) that a court wdth powers simUar to its 
own should be created under the Judicature Chapter of the' Constitu-
tion; but this probably involved conferring life-tenure on its members; 
(u) an amendment of the Constitution. Mr. Eggleston says, "Possibly 
it was a mistake of the Inter-State Commission Act to make it a court 
and derive the validity of any of its actions from that fact; if the 
Commission itself were given specifically and in detaU, the powers 
of adjudication and administration which were necessaty to protect 
the provisions as to inter-state commerce, it is difficult to see how they 
could be held invalid."" 
In the remaining years of its life the commission conducted several 
extensive inquiries, but like most inquiries, their resiUts were not vety 
significant. Its members were increasingly engaged on other admini-
strative work in connection with the war. One permanent result of the 
utmost importance sprang from the Report on New Industries pre-
sented in November, 1916. In previous tariff reports reference had 
been made to the lack of knowledge of scientific processes in 
Austialian industty. Here an explicit recommendation was made: 
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" . . . while the Commonwealth encourages mdushry by Tariff Taxa-
tion and by bounties, it has no recognised organ for the discovety of 
new methods of using local products or for diffusing a knowledge of 
scientific processes amongst our producers and manufacturers . . . 
a Commonwealth Department, operating upon the problems of 
secondaty as weU as primaty industty, might weU be constituted with 
a view to the systematic application of science to Australian 
mdustty."^"^ 
The suggestion was taken up by the Government and a Council for 
Science and Industty was formed. The Chairman of the Inter-State 
Commission became a member of the executive. This temporary body 
was later transformed into the permanent CouncU for Scientffic and 
Industrial Research. 
In 1916, an inquity was made into the future of British and Aus-
tralian trade in the South Pacific. The report is an able and interesting 
document, accompanied by a mass of evidence. It is now completely 
forgotten. 
An inquity into the cause of increased prices, particularly of food-
stuffs, foUowed in 1917. In view of the heavy fog which hangs over 
govemment finance in war time, it is perhaps not surprising that 
whUe the Commissioners found a number of reasons such as drought, 
crop failures, higher costs, higher wages and so on, for increased 
prices, the thought that the effects of war-time finance on the mone-
taty system might be a factor does not seem to have struck them vety 
forcibly. 
Mr. Swinburne, who was heavUy encumbered wdth other duties and 
who considered that the Commission lost much of its usefulness follow-
ing the High Court judgment, resigned in 1918. It is possible that at 
the end of its term the Govemment considered that the Commission 
was serving no vety useful purpose, although it had previously 
announced its intention of bringing in a new Inter-State Commission 
BUl to remedy the loss of powers. The Chief Commissioner had been 
serving as Chairman of a Royal Commission on the Basic Wage, which 
reported in 1920 that the wage required for reasonable standards of 
comfort for man, wdfe and two children was £5/16/- per week. The 
Harvester equivalent at the time was not much above £,4/-/-, so that 
the report was vety embarrassing to the Government. At any rate the 
terms of appointment of the remaining members of the Inter-State 
Commission lapsed in 1920, and no new appointments were made. 
There is no doubt that when the Commission was set up it was 
anticipated that it would play a most important part in the constitu-
tional machinety of Australia. It had wide powers, and its members 
were men of great ability and experience. Yet, despite some valuable 
inquity work, useful to the economic historian, its record is almost 
fruitiess, and it is doubtful whether many people, except lawyers and 
others interested in the constitutional question, remember its existence. 
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Several factors contributed to this result. First, no doubt, we must 
place the loss of its judicial powers. This undoubtedly circumscribed 
the sphere of its activities, and there is no means of telling what ques-
tions might have come before it if its original powers had continued 
undiminished. But quite probably, in any case, it would not have had, 
in this period, a great amount of work to do. For it was war-time and 
the ever-present State and Federal friction had, to a large extent, 
ceased during the emergency. In other times more public and parha-
mentaty feeling might have been aroused by its relegation to a body 
of inquity. 
There has been some talk lately of reconstituting the Commission. 
What work would such a body be engaged upon? It is clear that its 
main work, for some time to come, would be concerned with a wider 
sphere than trade and commerce. For the grievances which an Inter-
State investigating body would examine are those general ones, real or 
aUeged, arising out of Federation. Westem Australia and Tasmania, 
which originaUy thought that the Inter-State Commission concemed 
them httle or not at aU, would now be the first to invite attention. The 
kind of investigation which the original Commission undertook into 
the tariff is now done by the Tariff Board. The Grants Commission's 
fimctions—for which there wdll presumably be necessity for some time 
to come—might be taken over by an Inter-State Commission, though 
such a function was never contemplated for the Inter-State Commis-
sion, either of the Constitution or of the Act of 1912, and the Grants 
Commission, in fact, operates under Section 96. The Inter-State Com-
mission would, however, need to have a wider scope than the Grants 
Commission whose recommendations are regularly assaUed by the 
pohtical leaders of the aggrieved States, and whose establishment has 
done littie to change the situation which Professor Hancock regarded 
with some forebodhig in 1930. "The aggrieved States," he wrote, "are 
encouraged to believe that it pays them to weep and bully. The other 
States are prone to suspect their poor relations of blackmaU and 
bribety. There is an urgent need to re-establish the Inter-State Com-
mission or else to set up some other body fit to act in this matter as 
'the eyes and ears of Parhament'. Otherwdse, Federal politics must re-
come deeply infected with cynicism. Democracies, when they are 
enthusiastic, are often glorious and sometimes dangerous; when they 
become cynical they are repulsive."^® Certainly, in 1936, the continual 
battles of State v. Commonwealth and State v. State, whether it is a 
matter of tariffs, grants, aeroplane factories, secondary industty or 
organised marketing are, to some observers, becoming repulsive. 
Whether the existence of a powerful Inter-State Commission would 
help to end the strife is not a matter on which any vety useful judg-
ment can be formed. 
The constitution of such a body would present some difficulty, un-
less it is to be a mere commission to inquire and make recommenda-
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tions. So would the question of its relationship to Parliament. Recent 
histOty has shown that moral and, to an ordinaty reading, legal obliga-
tions to consult a body set up by Parliament (the Tariff Board) may 
be brushed aside under a plea of national policy. An Inter-State Com-
mission would be of little use if its fate were to have its recommenda-
tions ignored or its existence forgotten when it suited the Govern-
ment of the day. 
The author wishes to remind readers of the original date of this article (1937), 
the first he ever wrote; to stress that it must be read "E. & O.E."; and to sug-
gest diat the subject is worth pursuing further, perhaps in a Master's thesis. 
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19 THE AUSTRALIAN LOAN COUNCIL-
ITS ORIGIN, OPERATION AND 
SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FEDERAL 
STRUCTURE 
C. G. Headford 
It has been claimed that the "financial relations between the com-
ponent States and a Federal Government . . . are the chief deter-
minants of the character of the Federation".^ The claim is wide, but it 
is not surprising, as the power of the purse is the main means of 
power: the main means of gaining control over men and materials; of 
translating ideas and desires into action; of promoting and realising 
interests. 
In Australia, pubhc borrowing has played an unusually prominent 
part in federal finance and has led to a notable experiment in the 
creation of a constitutional hybrid—the Loan CouncU. This significant 
role of governmental borrowdng is largely due to the fact that the 
economic exploitation of undeveloped natural resources, including the 
provision of adequate communications, has been undertaken more 
than in any other federation by public rather than by private enter-
prise.^ 
There are three major questions to be decided, and each gives rise 
to the likehhood of conflict. Firstiy, which of the various public pro-
jects competing for the expenditure of loan money should be selected? 
Secondly, what total amount should be borrowed? Thirdly, what share 
should each government receive of the total? The full significance of 
the second of these questions has only recently emerged with the 
assumption by the Commonwealth Government of responsibility for 
regulating the level of economic activity in Australia, and, specifically, 
for maintaining "fuU employment". This shift in emphasis has made 
it more necessaty than ever to investigate the role of the Loan CouncU 
—to see why it was created, how successful it has been, and whether it 
StiU aids governments in meeting the "felt needs of the time". 
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This unique institution—the model of innovation in the sphere of 
pubhc borrowing—has many unusual features, not the least of them 
bemg the secrecy of its operations. Her Majesty's Opposition meets a 
consistent refusal in attempts to obtain information; yet it is possible 
to attempt to piece together its stoty from a variety of sources. 
Because of the close interrelation between revenue resources and 
the need to borrow, the general financial framework established by the 
Constitution m 1901 is important. The framers of the Constitution "left 
the settiement of the financial scheme vety largely to the future. They 
admitted that it was quite an impossible task for them to lay dovm the 
whole financial basis of the Commonwealth. They made provisional 
arrangements for temporaty periods, and . . . left the rest almost 
entirely, if not quite entirely, to the discretion of the Parliament."* 
The crux of their problem was that customs and excise duties were 
necessarUy granted exclusively to the Federal government, yet these 
had been the chief sources of State revenues prior to Federation. The 
States' annual interest liabUity was alone greater than the revenue they 
were accustomed to raise, or were likely to raise, by direct taxes.* This 
inherent pattem of financial power was not fully realised by either the 
Commonwealth or the States at the time and has only gradually un-
folded. Yet it has profoundly affected the character of the Federation, 
and has been of basic importance in determining the power structure 
of the Australian Loan Council. 
By section 105 of the Constitution, the Commonwealth was em-
powered to take over the States' debts existing at federation, and in 
1910 the electors approved an alteration to that section which per-
mitted the taking over of all State debts, whether incurred before or 
after federation. In fact, no attempt was made to use this power until 
the Constitution was again amended in 1928.^ 
UntU 1911 the Commonwealth met capital expenditure out of 
revenue. In that year a Loan Fund was created, but it was not until 
1914 that the Commonwealth entered the public loan market.^ The 
first world war wrought a big change in the financial positions of the 
Commonwealth and the States. The former entered new (concurrent) 
fields of taxation to finance war expenditure and incurred a large war 
debt. The problem of repayment of this debt, superimposed upon 
State borrowings, was basicaUy the cause of the creation of the Loan 
Council. During the war the Commonwealth Govemment entered into 
an agreement with the States other than New South Wales under 
which aU loans in London were to be raised by the Commonwealth.'' 
This continued from 1915 tUl 1919, when the parties reverted to inde-
pendent arrangement of their loans. After 1920, the States were com-
peting with one another on the loan market in London, and co-ordina-
tion of borrowing was badly needed.* 
By 1923 the first of the internal war loans raised by the Common-
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wealth became due.® When arranging for the large conversion 
requhed, "Commonwealth Ministers could not get the States wholly 
off the market while the operation was in progress. In the long run, 
such a state of affairs could not fail to bring disaster."^" As early as 
March, 1923, the Prime Mmister had pointed out that because of the 
loans and conversions required up to 1930, the credit of Australia 
should be placed upon the vety best possible basis. In the mterests of 
Austraha as a whole, the "best policy . . . would be to have one 
borrowdng authority". Further pomts requiring united action (he 
claimed) were the needs for uniform sinking funds and for some uni-
form basis of taxation on loans—the States exempted, but the Com-
monwealth did not exempt government loans from taxes.^^ 
As a result of a conference called by the Commonwealth, the States 
agreed to constitute the Australian Loan CouncU in May, 1923, to act 
in an advisoty capacity to co-ordinate internal borrowing and to stop 
competition for loans. At meetings of the Council in June and July, 
1924, "a unanimous desire was expressed to limit borrowing. The 
Treasurers placed the Loan CouncU's proposals before their respective 
Cabinets, and all the governments accepted the Council's recommen-
dation for a reduction of their contemplated loan programmes''.^^ 
The foUowing year the CouncU decided to extend this arrangement 
to all overseas borrowing.^* With the advent of Mr. Lang as Premier 
of New South Wales, that State withdrew from the CouncU. He gave 
two reasons. Firstiy, because they Avere under-written, one large con-
certed loan would be dearer than smaU raisings by individual States, 
and secondly, because New South Wales had not experienced any 
difficulty in arranging conversions or new loans.^* A more fundamental 
reason, and one that coloured his whole approach to the Loan Council, 
was the fear that it would be an instrument of Federal domination.^^ 
About this time, oversea borrowing became more difficult. Britain's 
return to gold in 1925 meant that obstacles were placed in the way of 
lending abroad, and it also meant higher interest rates and dearer 
money for Australia. In addition, because of the privUeged position 
held by Australian Government bonds as trust securities in the British 
market, a great deal of criticism was directed against Australian loan 
policies. ^ ^ 
During 1925 a loan of £20 mUlion was placed in New York by the 
Commonwealth because London could not raise the amount required 
immediately and a sinking fund was insisted on as being part of the 
contract for loans raised there.^'' The weakening of Australian credit 
was shovm by the fact that loans raised by the Commonwealth as weU 
as the States were "rated lower than those of other British dominions 
with less natural resources and potential wealth".^* At this time the 
whole question of loan policy was arousing considerable interest in 
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Austraha and there existed "a vety general feeling that the increase m 
tihe debt has been out of proportion to the growth of development".^' 
The operation of the CouncU over this period had been along non-
party lines and was smoothly co-operative apart from the withdrawal 
of New South Wales because of the personal convictions of Mr. 
Lang.^° Nevertheless circumstances were assisting or perhaps engen-
dering a feeling that the CouncU needed more authority. 
It remains to be shovm how the Loan CouncU became part of the 
Fmancial Agreement of 1927. In 1926 the question of control of public 
borrowing and the taking over of State debts was linked with the more 
general question of the financial relations of the Commonwealth and 
the States, and the suggestion was seized as a possible compromise 
solution of an intractable problem. 
Negotiations had taken place intermittently over the whole of the 
period subsequent to federation in attempts to arrive at some basis for 
regulating future financial relations.^^ A stumbling block in various 
attempts to reallocate tax fields was the States' insistence that they 
were morally entitled to a share of customs and excise revenues, and 
that this was a condition of their consent to federation in 1901. A more 
compelling reason for the States' resistance is clearly brought out in a 
statement by a Premier rejecting a scheme proposed by the Common-
wealth. Under the scheme it was claimed that "the States woidd be in 
the position of an Aunt Sally, for every income taxpayer to have a shot 
at," and that the States would have to impose "all the odious direct 
taxation while the Commonwealth wdU be freed from such an obliga-
tion".22 
Several important points were made in a debate in the House of 
Representatives of July, 1926, which had a direct bearing on the 
Financial Agreement of 1927 and on the place of the Loan CouncU in 
that agreement. It was argued that the right to a share of customs 
revenue was a condition of federation, "the alternative being that their 
[the States'] debts would be taken over by the Commonwealth". This 
subject had not been mentioned at either of the 1923 or 1926 con-
ferences. The suggestion was made that the per capita proposals be 
linked with a constitutional amendment to gain Commonwealth con-
trol of State debts. The Treasurer argued that it would be "impossible 
wdthout constitutional alterations, for the Commonwealth to control 
State borrowing, and unless some binding agreement on that is arrived 
at, how could we deal satisfactorUy witih the transfer of State debts"?^* 
These suggestions were incorporated by the Commonwealth in a 
scheme submitted to a conference in June, 1927. The proposal was to 
take over existing State debts; to estabhsh the Loan CouncU as a 
statutoty body with defined powers to determine the amount and 
terms for future govemmental borrowing; to pay interest on State 
debts equivalent to the per capita payment for 1926-27; to establish 
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sinkmg funds to redeem existing debts within fifty-eight years and 
future debts within fifty-three years, the Commonwealth making a con-
tribution to these sinking funds; and to pay interest at 5 per cent, per 
annum on the value of properties transferred to the Commonwealth 
under section 85 of the Constitution. 
The Premiers' reactions to the scheme were generally favourable, 
although Mr. Lang of New South Wales and Mr. CoUier of Western 
Australia were dubious about surrendering their power to borrow to 
the Loan Council.^* However, Mr. Lyons (Tasmania) pointed out that 
"it is my experience . . . on the Loan CouncU . . . that there has been 
no antagonism between the States, or between the Commonwealth 
and the State representatives". Mr. Collier agreed that if "I were 
sure that the proposed CouncU would work as smoothly as the one 
now in existence, I would have no objection to offer".^^ Conflicts, it 
was claimed, could only arise when the amount of money said to be 
avaUable for the Commonwealth and the States, was less than was 
considered necessary, and a formula for resolving such conflicts was 
set out.2® The Prime Minister insisted that there would be no inter-
ference with sovereign rights by the CouncU. "AU it could do would be 
to lay dowm the rate at which money is to be obtained by a first-class 
borrower."^'' After a number of modifications^* the scheme was 
accepted subject to ratification by the various Parliaments.^® Ulti-
mately it was, in effect, written into the Constitution by the approval 
at the subsequent referendum of the insertion of S.IOSA in the Con-
stitution. 
The origin of the Australian Loan CouncU can, then, be attributed 
mainly to the peculiar historical circumstances of Australian condi-
tions, particularly the tradition of government action. Difficulties in 
raising and converting internal loans and the desire for cheaper rates 
led to the creation of a voluntaty council which worked smoothly. 
Criticism of Australian loans abroad and the insistence on sinking funds 
led to the extension of its operations to cover overseas loans. Some 
years of experience, the absence of New South Wales, and the need 
(voiced by many) for some restriction of borrowing, aU led to a desire 
to make the CouncU a permanent, fully representative body. The 
opportunity to realise this desire arose as part of a compromise solu-
tion of the perennial wrangle over the financial problem at Premiers' 
Conferences. 
As a result, a new unit of govemment was created by the Financial 
Agreement of 1927 to co-ordinate public borrowings of the Common-
wealth and the States. A brief description of its formal structure may 
be useful. It consists of the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth as 
Chairman and the Premier of each State, or his nominee. Each govem-
ment submits annuaUy a loan programme for the following year, 
including any revenue deficit to be funded. Loans for defence pur-
poses are not subject to Council supervision. If the CouncU decides 
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tiiat the total of the loan programmes cannot be raised at reasonable 
rates of mterest and conditions (the latter being determined by the 
CouncU), it then decides the amount which shall be borrowed. Each 
of tihese decisions is by majority vote in which the Commonwealth 
has two votes and a casting vote, and each State one vote. It may then, 
by unanimous decision, allocate that amount between the members. 
Fading a imanimous decision, the Commonwealth is entitled to one-
fifth of the total, and each State to a proportion of the remainder.*" 
The Commonwealth acts as tihe executive agency for the CouncU for 
the purpose of borrowing and enforcing its decisions. 
Although the Commonwealth does not appear to have considered 
that it could use the Loan CouncU as a means to ensure that "inju-
dicious" borrowing did not take place,*^ the formula for resolving 
conflicts was designed to act as a deterrent to any State that might 
seek in any one year to make unduly large increases in its loan 
programme.*^ One by-product of this has been to promote conflicts 
between States as to their relative shares of the total loan funds. 
Events of the depression years stretched the passions and the 
ingenuity of men, and under these conditions the Loan Council 
assumed an increasing importance. At its first meeting as constituted 
under the Financial Agreement, the CouncU was faced with the 
problem of the dtying up of loan funds,** and the members "had the 
advantage of a discussion with the Chairman of the Commonwealth 
Bank Board (Sir Robert Gibson) and the Governor of the Common-
wealth Bank (Mr. E. C. Riddle) regarding the financial position".** 
This change in emphasis of the function of the councU gradually grew 
more marked. From the time of the visit of Sir Otto Niemeyer the real 
centre of political interest was in the Premiers' Conference and the 
Loan CouncU rather than in any of the Parliaments.*^ The CouncU 
decided to reduce loan works, to mobilise London exchange, and to 
adopt the principle of balancing budgets. A sub-committee co-opted 
economists and Under-Treasurers who produced a report which was 
the basis of the Premiers' Plan. In this manner the Council afforded 
the means by which common problems could be aired and a national 
approach considered and even enforced—as the Premier of New South 
Wales was to leam to his cost. Mr. Lang attempted to pursue an inde-
pendent financial policy, but after a rather dramatic struggle he found 
that his independence had been severely restricted by the Financial 
Agreement and his faUure to meet interest payments led to the pass-
ing of the Financial Agreement Enforcement Acts which finaUy led to 
his dismissal.*^ 
Attitudes of the various governments towards loan expenditure 
graduaUy changed. Up to 1935 Victoria and South Australia showed a 
strong deflationaty bent, whUe New South Wales and Queensland 
showed an opposite tendency. Labour governments gained power in 
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Western Australia and Tasmania and this favoured a move for expan-
sion in government finance. More important was the feeling of the 
Commonwealth Govemment that, faced wdth a general election and 
with 20 per cent, of unemployment, there was a need for positive 
action, and in the 1934 Federal elections Mr. Lyons finaUy turned to 
the course of increased loan expenditure.*^ 
The experiences of the depression years and the slow recovery dur-
ing the 1930's Ulustrate the importance for public borrowing of the 
superior financial position of the Commonwealth under the Constitu-
tion. From 1931-1932 tiU the second World War, the Commonwealth 
was in surplus and the States in deficit on their budgets for aU years 
but one. The Commonwealth was able to use its revenue surplus for 
capital works, whereas the States were obliged to go to the Loan 
CouncU to borrow for public works, unemployment relief, and revenue 
deficits. The market was usually unable to satisfy the demands made 
on it, and whether sufficient funds were raised to meet the amount 
agreed upon by the Council, was to a significant extent, dependent 
upon action by the cential bank.** The events of the post-war years 
are even more striking as Ulustrations of the effects of the division of 
powers and resources, and the issues arising wUl be considered later. 
Firstly, the effect of the formula on different States wUl be con-
sidered. At the May, 1935 meeting, the possibility of applying the 
formula arose for the first time, and showed that New South Wales 
would have received more than it wanted, whUe Victoria would have 
received vety much less than she claimed.*® The Premier of Victoria 
in June, 1935, claimed that a new formula was required as his Govern-
ment wanted to apply a new approach to loan spending. Because 
Victoria's loan expenditure in the past five years had been "exceed-
ingly moderate", its formula aUocation was low.*" His need was urgent 
as he depended for his continuation in office on the amount he 
obtained from the Loan Coimcil. If he did not obtain sufficient to 
carty out relief works at award rates the Labour party keeping him in 
office would wdthdraw its support.*^ In 1939 and 1951 Victoria and 
New South Wales again clashed, and it is clear that a State may be 
restricted in its works programme for a particular year and over a 
period because of previous low yearly expenditure from loan funds. 
Another source of inter-state conflict and at the same time an Ulus-
tration of gradual co-operation under the pressure of events, is pro-
vided by the problem of semi-governmental borrowing. As early as 
1925 the voluntaty CouncU agreed to the principle that as far as prac-
ticable the requirements of semi-governmental bodies should be 
arranged so as not to interfere with the loan raisings of the Common-
wealth and the States. The Treasurers agreed to exercise supervision 
in accordance with this decision.*^ In 1929 they agreed to advise the 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
278 I Readings in Australian Government 
CouncU from tune to time of the programme of aU such bodies under 
their control for each financial year m order to stop competition for 
loan moneys and to prevent issues clashmg.** In 1934 a borrowmg 
board was created by New South Wales for the relief of unemploy-
ment and, although not legaUy necessary, the Premier obtained 
CouncU approval for its loan raising.** In 1936 a "GenUemen's Agree-
ment" provided for "the submission of annual loan programmes in 
respect of semi-governmental authorities proposmg to raise £100,000 
or more in a year, for the consideration of such programmes in con-
junction with the loan programme of the Government concemed, and 
for the fixing of the terms of individual semi-governmental loans com-
ing within the scope of the annual programme".*^ 
At various times protests were raised, by the smaUer States particu-
larly, against the relatively large semi-governmental spendmg of New 
South Wales and Victoria. In 1938 one Premier declared that he had 
now learned that the manner in which to finance State public works 
was by the establishment of semi-governmental authorities.** When 
he went back to his State he intended to profit by the lesson and 
establish more of those authorities. The following year the Prime 
Minister announced that it had been decided "for the first time in the 
histOty of the Loan CouncU, that semi-governmental borrowings 
should be determined in advance and in conjunction wdth other 
borrowing plans. This made for a much greater degree of co-ordina-
tion in public borrowdng than could otherwise be possible".*'' Though 
not legally binding, this arrangement would tend to offset the rise in 
creation of semi-governmental bodies as a means of avoiding Loan 
CouncU control. 
During the period of preparation for the second World War and 
during the war, the Loan Council provided a convenient instmment 
in meeting the needs of the time. As Sir Bertram Stevens recognised, 
"We are faced with . . . problems which no single Government can 
deal with alone. Co-operation and decisive action through a developed 
Loan Council may be a solution."** 
FoUowdng the outbreak of war, a Works Co-ordinator was appointed 
to examine and report upon the works projects embodied in the works 
programmes submitted by each Government.*® By this means, through 
the Council, the necessaty co-operation of the States was achieved— 
first, to mobUise the resources of the countty for full employment in 
the war effort, and later to limit the inflationary effects of loan spend-
ing by restricting the amounts to be borrowed and also to concentrate 
resources on defence works. At its shortest meeting on record, the 
Loan Council in 1943 gave effect in entirety to recommendations by 
the Co-ordinator-General of Public Works.^ ® 
At the Premiers' Conference on 14th July, 1943, a further important 
step was taken. A National Works CouncU (consisting of the State 
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Premiers and the Prime Minister) was formed on the initiative of the 
Commonwealth Government. As part of its plan for post-war recon-
stmction and for continued fuU employment, it suggested that there 
"should be a national 'public works' policy directed to improving the 
welfare of the community and timed to correct deficiences in private 
spending. Whfen private enterprise faUs to employ aU avaUable 
workers, the Government must step in and ensure their employ-
ment".^^ In consultation with the States and based on plans for works 
prepared by them, the Co-ordinator-General of Public Works pre-
pared a programme of urgent and immediately required post-war 
works. From this list the Loan Council each year approves funds for 
immediate works, whUe new plans are added to the reserve and others 
brought up to date each year. 
In this way a new flexibility was attempted as a foil to the rigidities 
of the system in this field. It appeared possible that, as Hancock ex-
pressed it in 1928, the "needs of the Australian people may, perhaps, 
find satisfaction, without any radical amendment of the Constitution, 
merely by a shifting of political gravity and emphasis, by indirect 
pressure of the central authority, by co-operation and inter-penetration 
and the creation of intermediate organisations between the various 
centres of activity".^^ But signs were not wanting that this way was 
fraught with frustration, and the events of the post-war years may be 
interpreted as indicating that this way may not stand up to the forces 
at work in the modern world in times when a war no longer provides 
a focus for all interests into one predominant aim. 
In 1944 the Co-ordinator stated that there had been "some difficulty 
in ensuring a uniform approach in allocation of priorities".^* He noted 
a tendency for Governments to concentrate an imduly large proportion 
of work in the highest priority classification,^* and feared that it was 
hard to maintain a just balance. Having no power to see that his 
scale of values is adhered to by the States, the function of the Co-
ordinator has, since the end of the war, become merely that of collat-
ing the programmes forwarded by the various State Co-ordinators of 
Works for presentation to the Loan Council. The Commonwealth, 
therefore, again has no direct influence on the particular projects on 
which a State's loan funds are spent. The amount of its indirect in-
fluence may be gauged from subsequent events. 
Until 1950 the post-war boom provided plenty of cheap money and 
loan requirements were satisfied by the market, with the Federal 
Government mainly financing its works out of revenue. In the sub-
sequent period of marked inflation, however, people and institutions 
shied clear of low-yielding Commonwealth bonds with the attendant 
risk of capital loss, and at the meeting of the Council in August, 1950, 
the States were warned that their works programmes were tending 
to outrun the loan market. A special meeting was caUed in June, 1951, 
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and the position put to the States that their works would have to be 
cut, as loan money was not avaUable in previous quantities.®® In 
August, 1951, the States put forward loan programmes totaUing £293 
mUhon plus semi-governmental works of £82 mUlion.®* As they were 
aware, tihe most that could be expected from the market in that year 
was about £125 miUion.®' 
The Commonwealth Govemment was in a dUemma. It was anxious 
tn its 1951-52 budget to counter inflationary forces and to reduce 
public works spending,®* but if the States were left to carty out work 
programmes wdth the small amount that would be raised on the 
market, it was apparent that there would be serious dislocations, 
especiaUy as rising costs reduced the effective use of such loans. The 
Commonwealth, which alone controls other flexible sources of money, 
bowed to the pressure of circumstances and the Premiers, and agreed, 
for the first time, to under-write State Government loan programmes 
to a total of £225 mUlion. "We did so after the Premiers had earnesdy 
assured us that to reduce loan programmes below £225 million would 
create great difficulties for their States and prevent them from meet-
ing important actual commitments falling due."®® Although the 
figure of £225 mUlion was agreed to by the Loan CouncU, the States 
publicly complained that the refusal of the Commonwealth to provide 
sufficient money would slow down works and mean dismissals of 
workers. As the Federal Treasurer said: "PoliticaUy we made the 
worst of both worlds; for our increased taxes, levied, as it turned out, 
exclusively on behalf of the States, earned us much criticism. But some 
of the larger States, so far from acknowledging the value of our im-
mense and timely aid, have done littie but complain that we did not 
do more."*® 
The same situation arose at the May, 1952, meeting. The States' pro-
grammes for 1953 (not including semi-governmental borrowdng) 
totaUed £351 million, whereas the market at reasonable rates and 
conditions was expected to yield £55 miUion. The Commonwealth 
proposed a total of £180 mUlion and agreed to underwrrite that figure. 
The States refused to budge below £ 2 4 7 | mUlion and finally outvoted 
the Commonwealth to pass this figure as the borrowdng programme 
for 1953.61 
From this survey it is apparent that, as in other fields, there has 
been a shift in power in the direction of the Commonwealth. Its finan-
cial resources and control of currency enable it to exert a large amount 
of control on the total volume of public investment. Over a cycle 
covering depression, war and inflation, the institution of the Loan 
CouncU has undergone a profound change. It has recently been 
claimed that "the CoimcU exercises an influence far beyond its original 
scope and functions and now virtuaUy embraces not merely the co-
ordination of public investment in Austraha, but also the general 
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fiscal pohcy of the Commonwealth and the States". There is evidence 
for this view, but it does not reflect a complete picture.*^ 
The assumption by the Commonwealth of responsibUity for 
economic security, and the changed climate of economic thought, 
have forced it to take a lively mterest in the volume of public invest-
ment, and the Loan CouncU is one of the avenues for its pressure. Yet, 
paradoxically, its political power to carty out its policies is weakened 
because of the checks of the federal structure, again operating largely 
through the Loan CouncU. The latter has emerged as "a new States 
House"** where each Premier independently of party,** battles for 
works for his OWTI State, and where together the States have, in 1953, 
refused to accept the Commonwealth's decision on the total volume of 
loan spending. Too much should not, perhaps, be made of this point, 
as the Commonwealth possesses the fiscal power to ensure that hi the 
short run its decision is foUowed. However, the blame for unemploy-
ment and lagging State works appears to have been successfully laid 
by the States at the door of the Commonwealth and in the long run 
their non-co-operation may prove vital to a govemment. 
It is further argued by many that it is not possible to secure fuU 
employment wdthout a high degree of economic planning extending 
over to individual works. Certainly the Federal Govemment has of 
recent years been trying to direct investment to more basic industries, 
because of its internal policies and external commitments. The Loan 
CouncU does not provide the Commonwealth with legal power for 
this task, and the serious conflicts of recent years have shown the 
inabUity of indirect influence to fill the breach. 
It is tempting to conclude that although the Loan Council has aided 
a shift in power which helps the Commonwealth Govemment or the 
various Governments to meet the needs of depression or war, it is not 
sufficient to preserve full employment without inflation. This problem, 
however, is common to aU democratic communities and is not peculiar 
to federal states. On balance, the Loan CoimcU appears as an institu-
tion which modifies the tendency of federal government to be conser-
vative and weak, and is a significant aid to governments in meeting 
"the felt needs of the time". 
In the proposals for the creation of a statutoty councU in 1927, Mr. 
CoUier made a prophecy*® which to-day seems more likely to be ful-
fiUed. He claimed that the greater flexibUity of Commonwealth 
resources, combined with a lack of sufficient moneys from the loan 
market, would force the States to hand over many of their functions to 
the Commonwealth. It seems that the Commonwealth may eventually 
supply loan money for works from central bank credit or its other 
sources of funds subject to conditions which the States wiU gradually 
be forced to accept. In this way a gradual control over the direction 
of spending of public works money could be achieved by the central 
government. 
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APPENDIX 
Net loan expenditure 1935 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Westem Australia 
Tasmania 
Commonwealth 
Original Request 
£ 
9,000,000 
5,500,000 
3,900,000 
2,400,000 
2,920,000 
1,715,000 
7,500,000 
£32,935,000 
By F.A. Formula 
£ 
9,160,000 
3,030,000 
2,040,000 
2,020,000 
2,480,000 
350,000 
6,000,000 
£25,080,000 
Now Allotted 
£ 
8,000,000 
4,000,000 
3,000,000 
2,100,000 
2,600,000 
600,000 
5,750,000 
£26,050,000 
Source: D. B. Copland & C. V. Janes—Cross Currents of Australian Finance. Angus & 
Robertson, Sydney, 1936, p. 8. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
20 THE COMMONWEALTH GRANTS 
COMMISSION AND POLICY 
FORMULATION IN THE 
CLAIMANT STATES 
R. J. May 
I 
At the last Annual Conference of the Australian Regional Groups 
Dr. G. S. Reid, in reviewing Commonwealth-State relations,^ suggested 
that the trend in govemmental relationships within the Australian 
Federation has been governed by the premise "that Australians, 
wherever they may live in the Federation, ought to enjoy govern-
mental services at equal standards".^ A conscious movement of un-
equal units towards equality involves two central problems: deter-
mination of the standards at which equality is to be achieved, and 
determination of the means by which unequal units are to be brought 
towards these standards. In the Australian Federation the conscious 
progression towards equality, at least as reflected in the financial 
sphere, has been essentially a process of bringing the "weaker" States 
—i.e., those States which, by virtue of geographical and economic 
characteristics, have for some time been in a financially inferior posi-
tion to the other States—up to the standard of the other States. The 
most important single means of achieving this has been the payment 
of unconditional block revenue grants ("special grants") to States 
claiming assistance from the Commonwealth under Section 96 of the 
Constitution. The States concemed have been Western Australia 
(which has received special grants since 1910-11), Tasmania (since 
1912-13) and South Austraha (since 1929-30). UntU 1933 special 
grants were made on a more or less ad hoc basis and were the sub-
ject of perennial wrangling between the claimant States and the 
Commonwealth. In that year the Commonwealth Grants Commission 
was created to consider States' applications for special grants in a 
consistent basis. Before the Commission's first appointment ter-
minated in 1936 its three members had evolved a conceptual frame-
work and a set of principles and methods upon which to estabhsh a 
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permanent and consistent system of special grants. With some modi-
fications these principles have been adopted by all subsequent Com-
missioners and the Commission's recommendations have always been 
accepted wdthout change by the Commonwealth Parhament. 
The much-quoted basic principle upon which the Commission's 
work has been founded was stated finally in the Commission's Third 
Report (1936): 
Special grants are justified when a State through financial stiess from 
any cause is imable efficiently to discharge its functions as a member of the 
federation and should be determined by die amount of help foimd necessary 
to make it possible for that State by reasonable effort to function at a 
standard not appreciably below that of other States.* 
The Commission recognised that "differences of opinion (would) 
arise in its interpretation of the terms" and went on to elaborate its 
statement of principle: 
The cause of financial difficulties, though immaterial to the general thesis, 
may have important effects on its apphcation. For a State whose difficulties 
are due largely to its ovra mistakes or extravagance m the past, it would be 
reasonable to expect a higher degree of effort than for a State whose posi-
tion was due largely to the effects of federal pohcy. If the difficulty were 
due to relative poverty of natural resources, an intermediate standard might 
be expected.* 
But the Commission stressed that the determination of these standards 
was a matter of broad judgment, "based on the political and economic 
realities of the situation", and clahned no logical authority for its pro-
posed standards, urging the Commonwealth Parhament to take ulti-
mate responsibility in this direction.® 
The procedure evolved by the Commission in determining special 
grants in this early period comprised four basic steps. After examining 
the latest final budgetaty results of all the States and making adjust-
ments where necessaty to achieve comparabUity, the Commission 
calculated for each claimant State the amount necessaty to bring its 
per capita budgetaty deficit to the level of the three non-claimant 
States.* The use of final figures introduced a type of lag in the system 
—the grants recommended for payment in year n related to the budge-
taty result of year n-2. This amount was then adjusted to take account 
of differences in standards of expenditure and revenue raising between 
each claimant State and the average of the standard States, in respect 
of maintenance of capital equipment, costs of administiation, scale of 
social services, severity of taxation, charges for State services and 
local government activities. To the amount emerging from the first 
two stages of the calciUation a deduction was made, representing a 
"sacrifice" or "effort" required of the claimant States as a "penalty" 
for errors of policy and an incentive to overcome their financial in-
feriority. This requirement comprised two elements: a unfform 
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penalty on aU claimant States and a differential deduction vatying 
according to the extent to which a State's disabilities were deemed to 
be due to its own mistakes in past or current policy. These were 
measured in terms of two of the factors in respect of which the com-
parable budgetaty deficits had been adjusted—the former m terms of 
a lower standard of social services (by up to 10 per cent), the latter 
in terms of a higher severity of taxation (by up to 10 per cent)—but 
the Commission stated that this procedure did not imply any judg-
ment by the Commission as to how the States should attempt to over-
come their disabilities. But, finaUy, the Commission stressed that these 
calculations merely provided a guide to the final recommendation, 
and from time to time made marginal adjustments to the calciUated 
grants in accordance with its "broad judgment". 
Subsequent developments in the Commission's work brought modi-
fications to its methods in four directions. Firstly, in some later years 
the net budgetaty experience of the non-claimant States was a surplus; 
in each case where this has happened the Commission has adopted as 
its standard a balanced budget, though it has not dismissed the possi-
bUity of a surplus budget standard.^ Secondly, as economic conditions 
changed, the effect of the two year lag in the system became more 
acute. At fitrst this was overcome by making advances and deferments 
to the grants as current conditions dictated, these being taken into 
account in the grants two years later. In 1943 this procedure was ex-
tended by the making of a supplementaty grant during the year. 
FinaUy in 1949 the Commission revised its procedure, adopting a 
system in which the grant recommended for a particular year com-
prised two parts, the first part being calculated according to the 
established procedure and the second being designed to cover each 
States' "indispensable need", after aUowing for a "margin of safety" 
in the current year and being taken into account, of course, in the 
first""part of the grant two years subsequent. Thirdly, imder the in-
fluence of wartime conditions and with the Commission suffering from 
a shortage of staff, from 1944 all budgetaty adjustments in respect of 
standards in the selected expenditure and revenue raising items, with 
the exception of standards in the scale of social services and severity 
of taxation,* were suspended. In 1949 an adjustment for the level of 
charges for States services was reintroduced and five years later its 
scope was substantiaUy expanded under the new tide "differential 
impacts of financial results of State undertakings on the budget". 
Although the Commission did not resume the other adjustments m 
their earlier form, generally the range and depth of its activities m 
making budgetaty adjustments has increased markedly over the past 
ten years under sustained pressure from both the Commonwealth and 
the State Treasuries for more detaUed examination. Fourthly, the 
penalty for past mistakes was suspended in 1944 and the requirement 
for effort the foUowing year. These have never been remtroduced, the 
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Commission taking the view, in apparent opposition to the Common-
wealth Treasury, that tihe claimant States cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to make greater effort than that already imphcit m the 
standards used in the Commission's methods.® 
It can be appreciated from this review that the Commission's 
methods—and would be appreciated much better after an analysis of 
the interaction between the States, the Commonwealth Treasuty and 
the Commission during the Commission's hearings each year—that the 
Grants Commission can exert a substantial influence over the policies 
of the claimant States. The Commission has always stressed, and the 
States generally acknowledged, that it does not wish to dictate State 
policies, but as the Commission itself has said: 
The Commission has no authority to recommend pohcy: for it to do so 
would be inconsistent with its function of reviewing financial needs. Never-
theless, though it has no authority to make recommendations of a policy 
nature, it is now inevitable that its recommendations based on financial 
needs arising from conditions peculiar to each claimant State, must both 
affect and be affected by, current pohcies of each claimant State.^ ® 
Some of the evidence of this influence is presented in the following 
section. 
n 
In a loose sense the Grants Commission could be said to exert an 
influence over the policy of the governments of claimant States 
through its determination of the size of special grants since 
special grants constitute a major source of revenue in the budgets of 
these States and hence influence substantially the level of the States' 
expenditure and the consequent scale of governmental activity. In 
this sense there is no real question of a redirection of State expendi-
ture,^^ (and hence a "cost" in terms of policies foregone), but merely 
a question of the extent of the addition to State expenditures (or 
reduction of revenue raising) made possible by the Commonwealth 
grant. Nevertheless, State ministers have from time to time made this 
objection to the work of the Commission. In 1946 the Western 
Australian Treasurer put the point: 
. . . it is very striking that, in the case of a State wdth small revenue, a small 
body of men has the power to determine the extent of the financial obhga-
tions the State should undertake.^^ 
His successor continued to press this argument and in 1948 initiated a 
Premiers' Conference attended by Westem Austiaha, South Austraha 
and Victoria, at which the need to maintain States' "sovereignty" was 
stressed. In a more specific context, when in 1942 the Tasmanian 
Covemment was given, informaUy, wrong information regarding the 
size of the special grant recommended by the Commission, and as a 
result subsequently had to revise its draft budget, the Treasurer had 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Federal Institutions I 287 
littie hesitation in holding the Commission responsible for a decision 
of the State Government not to grant a rise in public service salaries. 
More significantly, the Commission's method of determinhig special 
grants, involving detailed consideration of selected items in the States' 
budgets relative to norms of expenditure and revenue raising, tends to 
promote certain fiscal levels thus influencing policy in a qualitative 
sense. Within this categoty, the influence of the Commission's work is 
reflected in ex post adjustments to State expenditure and revenue 
raising to line up with the Commission's norms or to meet specific 
critiques by the Commission, and in State governments' anticipating 
of the Commission's standards in adopting certain fiscal levels or in 
deciding to adopt (or not to adopt) certain administrative policies 
because of the "favourable" (or "unfavourable") effect on State 
finances through the special grant system. It should be noted at the 
outset, however, that it is difficult to assess the actual extent of the 
Commission's influence over State policy: State governments are not 
always anxious to acknowledge the Commission's influence when it 
has been relevant while, on the other hand, the Commission offers a 
convenient scapegoat when unpopular decisions have to be made. 
Moreover, closer consideration is given to the implications of the 
Grants Commission's methods at some levels of policy formulation 
than at others and this is not always discernible to the outside 
observer. 
In its most general application the Commission's "qualitative" in-
fluence is reflected annuaUy in the process of budget formulation. 
When faced with the task of pruning departmental estimates of expen-
diture and deciding on levels of taxes and charges the Treasuries of 
the claimant States inevitably pay more attention to those items in 
respect of which the Commission makes adjustments than to items 
outside the range of the Commission's detaUed examination. 
The first clear evidence of the Commission's influence over specific 
State policies came after the presentation of the Commission's Fifth 
Report in 1938. In a special chapter of the Report, entitled "Financial 
Policy in Times of Prosperity", the Commission drew attention to 
several fields in which, it considered, claimant States may not have 
been minimising their needs "by reasonable pohcy within the limits of 
fair Australian standards".^* South Australia was criticised for its 
faUure to coUect outstanding public debts, ^ * Western Australia for 
continuing unproductive loan expenditure and Tasmania for the un-
satisfactoty way in which its raUway system had been administered. 
These matters were "taken into consideration" in the final assessment 
and the amount of each State's grant reduced somewhat from the 
amount of the initial calculation.^® In the same Report the Commission 
noted that a reorganisation of Tasmania's local government system 
seemed to be urgent.^* In the Report of the following year the charges 
against South Australia and Western Australia were repeated. But the 
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Commission noted that a Transport Commission had been appointed 
by the Tasmanian Govemment (the Commission had been estab-
hshed in the face of strong opposition in the State Parliament) to co-
ordinate and control the various transport services of the State, and 
by 1940 the Grants Commission was able to report: 
The Commission is much impressed by the manner in which the Transport 
Commission has approached a difficult task. Aheady there are signs of 
improvement in the raUway finances . . .^ '^  
Also in 1939 the Tasmanian Government appointed a Royal Commis-
sion to examine the State's local govemment system. This Commission 
reported late in 1939. In 1940 a special parhamentaty session was held 
to implement some of its recommendations and after much controversy 
legislation was passed with upper house amendments. In its Seventh 
Report (1940) the Commission acknowledged that some action had 
been taken by South Australia and reduced the penalty adjustment, 
but observed that action had still not been taken by Westem Australia. 
In making an adjustment to the Western Australian grant the Com-
mission summarised its position: — 
While it is not our province to interfere wdth State pohcy, we deem it our 
duty to point out that a claimant State cannot reasonably expect to invest 
in unreproductive works or enterprises and to get aU the resulting losses 
made up in the form of special grants.^ * 
The same Report refers to two further instances of the Commission's 
influence on State policies, both in South Australia. One concerned the 
appointment of a committee to investigate uneconomic farming settle-
ment in marginal areas; this foUowed some critical comments by the 
Grants Commission (though other factors were relevant to the State's 
move). The other related to the work of a select parhamentaty com-
mittee which, in considering the State's policy on unemployment 
relief, sought "to ensure that its policy shaU not react upon the Com-
monwealth grant".^ ® 
As the Commission's work became more routinised and with 
changes in the range of its budgetaty adjustments, there has been 
less evidence of its influence over administrative policies and more 
evidence of its influence in specffic fiscal items. As early as 1939 there 
is evidence of the Commission's having figured in a decision of the 
Western Australian Govemment to raise the level of probate duty in 
that State.^ ® Ten years later the Westem Australian Treasurer, in 
announcing increases in charges for State raU and tramway services, 
acknowledged the Commission's considerations regarding charges for 
State services.^^ Again m presenthig his 1953-54 budget the Westem 
Australian Treasurer stated that the decision to re-introduce entertain-
ments tax in that State was made to avoid a reduction in the State's 
special grant;^^ in the same year probate duty and raUway freight 
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charges were both raised after the Commission's calculations had 
shown them to be low relative to the other States. The Commission's 
standards of probate duty were again taken into account when in 
1956 amendments were made to the Westem Australian Death Duties 
Taxing Act. In Tasmania, for some years the Govemment has fixed 
the level of its probate duties to yield an amount equal to the average 
yield from probate duty in the non-claimant States,^* (i.e., the 
standard adopted by the Commission). 
This deliberate gearmg of fiscal levels to the average levels m the 
"standard" States appears to have been quite general among the 
claimant States. In Tasmania the principle seems to have been applied 
to most taxes, notably probate duty and land tax,^* and has also 
governed the level of salaries paid to the State's teachers and police 
and, to some extent, the level of social service expenditure.^® Simi-
larly in South Australia, in announcing a number of tax increases 
(including increases in certain succession duties and in stamp duty 
and re-entty into land tax) in 1952, the Treasurer said: 
The adoption of these proposals wiU result in the State raising its levels of 
direct taxation in the aggregate to the levels used as a standard by the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission in assessing the relative severity of 
State taxation.26 
The Treasurer went on to give an iUuminating account of the way in 
which the Commission's methods influenced the levels of State taxes, 
charges and expenditures.^' In its submission to the Commission for 
1954-55 South Australia put the point again in relation to charges for 
State services: 
. . . it has been the objective of the State to keep at least abreast of other 
States in making reasonable charges in its State undertakings .^ ^ 
In the same year the State raised its motor taxation to a level "at least 
on a par wdth the eastern States" in order to avoid further unfavour-
able adjustments by the Commission.^® A similar position appears to 
exist in Westem Australia. In presenting the budget for 1953-54 the 
Treasurer referred to the implications of the Commission's methods on 
standards of revenue and expenditure in claimant States, claiming that 
under the Grants Commission's methods the State had to keep taxation 
and expenditure to limits set by the standard States.*® The point was 
raised again the foUowing year and the Treasurer said: 
. . . the Treasurer of this State, or of any claimant State, is certainly cir-
cumscribed in his efforts to carry out Govemment pohcy within the limits 
of the finance available.*^ 
A simUar comment was made by the Westem Australian Treasurer in 
1960-61 when announcing increases in Metropolitan Transport Trust 
fares, Metropolitan Water Supply charges and raU fares and freight 
charges.*^ 
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There have also been, in recent years, several examples of the Com-
mission's work having entered (or been dragged in) as an important 
consideration in State Govemments' decisions on "administrative" (as 
opposed to "financial") pohcies. Perhaps the most publicised of these 
related to a proposal by the Tasmanian Government to introduce foot-
baU pools in that State. The matter was raised in the Tasmanian 
Parliament m September 1957, shortly before the Government, m pre-
senting its budget, made clear its intention of introducing the scheme. 
As would be expected, the move met wdth strong opposition inside and 
outside the State Parliament.** Most of the criticism was on moral 
grounds, but a question was raised as to the effect of the measure on 
the State's finances, considering the Grants Commission's methods. 
This question was taken up by the Mercury, which claimed: 
The State actually will not benefit at all. Whatever amount is raised from 
football pools, the Grants Commission wdll automaticaUy reduce the grant 
by an equivalent sum.** 
Then in mid October, under the headlines "Under-Treasurer Opposed 
State's Football Pools Legislation" the Mercury reported that in a 
Treasury file tabled in the House of Assembly on 16th October it was 
revealed that the Under-Treasurer had informed the Government that 
the introduction of football pools "would not increase the revenue of 
the State by one penny."*® The Bill, having been defeated in the 
House of Assembly was subsequently rejected by the Legislative 
CouncU and dropped. While the Mercury and its "Political Observer" 
undoubtedly exploited the evidence of the State Treasuty's lack of 
enthusiasm regarding the financial aspects of the scheme, it would 
seem that in a meaningful sense the Commission's work could be said 
to have influenced the defeat of the proposal, and at least provided a 
useful weapon for the opponents of the measure.** 
In a simUar case, at one stage during the discussion, in the 1950's, 
regarding the payment of grants to non-State schools in Tasmania 
State Treasury officials were consulted on the question of the effect 
such a move would have on the State's finances via the Grants Commis-
sion's assessments. A further instance occurred in Westem Austialia 
in 1953-54. After fading in three attempts to pass legislation restoring 
quarterly basic wage adjustments the State considered, but decided 
against, applying, by executive action, adjustments to the salaries of 
government employees. The main reason given was that such a move 
would "incur the wrath of the Grants Commission, which would un-
doubtedly refuse to meet any portion of the State's deficit" (arising 
from such a policy) .*' The Commission featured in an almost identical 
decision of the Tasmanian Government in November I960.** 
In a more subtle form, the Commission's influence also permeates 
the financial accoimts of the claimant States—wdth implications for 
policy. The most notable example here has concemed the Tasmanian 
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Government's treatment of the accounts of the State Hydro-Electric 
Commission. In its Fourth Report (1937) the Commission noted that 
the Hydro-Electric Commission was devoting a substantial part of its 
profits to depreciation, contingency and loan redemption reserves and 
to capital expenditure; this had the effect of cutting down the amount 
of the credit balance payable to Consolidated Revenue and hence 
fading to contribute further to reducing the State's budgetaty deficit. 
However the Commission did not judge the transfers to reserves to be 
excessive and made no adjustment. The subject came up again in 1949, 
when the Commission noted that while the H.E.C. was dividing its 
profits between reserves and Consolidated Revenue, losses on unprofit-
able rural extensions were being financed from Consolidated Revenue 
and Loan Account. In addition the Commission observed that repay-
ments of H.E.C. loans were not being used to offset sinking fund pay-
ments from Consolidated Revenue. The following year the Commission 
made appropriate adjustments. By 1951 the Tasmanian Treasuty had 
altered its policy in the second respect, to meet the Commission's 
objection, but defended its policy on the question of rural extensions, 
which was debated over successive years. In its 1952 submission the 
State Treasury, referrmg to the Commission's proposal, said: 
This in effect means that the Hydro-Electric Commission should become a 
taxing authority whereby consumers of its product are taxed in order that 
a subsidy may be paid in the interests of general development. The con-
tention of this State is that all sections of tiie commtmity should bear the 
burden of the subsidy, because in the long run all sections of the community 
wffi benefit.*® 
On the other hand, the Commission, whUe acknowledging that the 
issue involved questions of State policy which must be decided by the 
State Government on its own responsibility, continued the unfavour-
able adjustment. In 1953 the Tasmanian Govemment announced to 
the Conunission its intention of reviewing the relevant legislation,*® 
but the matter appears stUl not to have been finalised.*^ A further 
example from Tasmanian experience concerns that State's discontinu-
ance of annual payments from revenue to liquidate losses under the 
Soldier Settlement, Closer Settiement and State Advances to Settlers 
agreements. The discontinuance was in response to comments by the 
Commission.*^ In announcing the Government's intention the 
Treasurer said 
. . . the Govemment, while not conceding that the Commission's view is 
correct or that the provision of these items was anything else than normal, 
sound, financial practice, has been obhged to discontinue these payments.** 
In an earlier period, the Westem Australian Government in 1939 intro-
duced legislation designed to divert part of the proceeds from motor 
taxation from the Roads Fund to Consolidated Revenue. This 
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foUowed suggestions by the Grants Commission. The measure was 
rejected by the State Legislative Council. The subject was raised again 
in 1940 and in 1941. In the latter year, after the Parliament was in-
formed of the Government's intention to re-introduce the bUl the 
foUowing exchange took place: 
Hon. C. G. Latham: It is a way of trying to get some of the Federal money. 
Hon. J. C. WUlcock (Prem.-Treas.): Yes. I say candidly that that is so . . . 
WhUe we may not agree with the reasoning of the States Grants Commis-
sion in making this reduction, we have to face the fact that it has been 
made ** 
More recently a similar diversion of motor taxation revenue was made 
from the Tasmanian State Highways Trust Fund. 
Though the Commission's influence, as one would expect, has been 
largely confined to the claimant States, it has not completely avoided 
the non-claimant States and the Commonwealth. Since its establish-
ment the Commission has done much to achieve imiformity in States' 
accounts and financial procedures, comparability of States' finances 
being demanded by the Commission's methods. As early as 1934 the 
Commission made representations to the Prime Minister seeking 
immediate steps to bring about greater uniformity in the presentation 
of States' public accounts and statistics. WhUe noting some improve-
ments the Commission continued to press the subject in subsequent 
years. In 1943, following a further appeal to the Prime Minister by 
the Commission, a conference of Commonwealth and State Treasuty 
officers drew up certain proposals for greater uniformity of financial 
statistics, along lines suggested by the Commission; these were 
accepted at the Loan CouncU meeting of that year. In 1947 the subject 
of uniformity in accounting and financial practice was discussed at a 
preliminaty conference of officers from the Commonwealth and State 
Treasuries, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Common-
wealth Bank, Department of Post-War Reconstruction and Grants 
Commission, and later at an informal meeting of State Under-
Treasurers; this foUowed a representation to the Prime Minister in 
1946. In 1948 a conference of raUway accounting officers from all 
States met to discuss uniformity in raUway accounting. In all these 
discussions the Commission has played a major role, both in initiating 
discussion and in influencing its results. More significantiy, before 
Queensland applied for a special grant in 1958*® steps were taken by 
the State Treasuty to bring into line several items of its budget in 
respect of which the Commission, while using Queensland as a 
standard State, had been making corrections. There are even isolated 
instances of claimant States pressing the standard States to increase 
their expenditure in certain fields, the ulterior motive being to achieve 
an increase in their special grants. When in 1944 the Victorian Premier 
referred to Tasmania as a "mendicant State" the fiety Tasmanian 
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Treasurer, E. Dwyer Gray, responded by labeUing Victoria a "sub-
standard State in social services" and, claiming the support of the 
Leader of the Victorian Opposition, had his views brought before 
pubhc attention through Victorian and New South Wales newspapers. 
For some time before this, the Treasurer had been complaming 
strongly against the Grants Commission's "restrictions" on the State's 
social service expenditure. In recent years representatives of the 
claimant States at conferences of State ministers of education have 
drawTi the attention of Queensland representatives to their State's 
relatively low expenditure on education. The Commission has had 
little influence on Commonwealth Government policies (outside of 
special grants). In its Third Report (1936) the Commission recom-
mended that the Commonwealth investigate the possibilities of 
developing the north-west portion of Westem Australia and of pro-
viding technical and financial assistance, to supplement special grants, 
to Tasmania. The recommendations were ignored by the Common-
wealth, except that an officer of the Commonwealth Treasury rebuked 
the Commission for exceeding the scope of its powers. In the early 
years of its work the Commission also expressed concem over the 
growth of special purpose grants, pointing out that such grants could 
cause "overlapping and other anomalies" vis-a-vis the special grants 
system;** again the Commission was ignored. In one instance how-
ever, repeated corrections by the Commission, in respect of losses on 
the Morgan-WhyaUa Waterworks (a joint South Australia-Common-
wealth undertaking) charged against the South Australian budget, 
resulted in the negotiation of a new agreement between the two 
governments, which omitted the controversial provision. 
m 
As against this record of the Commonwealth Grants Commission 
influencing States' financial and administrative policies, there are 
abundant examples of States continuing to adopt positions which they 
know wUl incur unfavourable adjustments to the Commission's basic 
grants and of State Governments taking action which wUl have a 
favourable effect on grants with apparently no regard to this effect. 
But the whole process of discussion each year between the claimant 
States and the Grants Commission could be regarded as one of highly 
technical and "refined" bargaining between experts, with the object 
of the States' representatives being to modify, extend or reinterpret the 
Commission's methods in such a way as wUl benefit their State's 
special grant. 
The notable feature of the situation, given the Commission's influ-
ence over State policy, is that so little has been made of the matter at 
the "political" level. Apart from its early years, when the Commis-
sion's membership and its work came under spasmodic fire (strongest 
after the Commission had recommended grants smaUer than the pre-
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vious year's), there has been little serious chaUenge to its work by the 
claimant States. 
The major exception to this centres around the colourful Tasmanian 
Labor Treasurer, Dwyer Gray, in the 1940's. Dissatisfied with the 
Commission's determinations and believing that special grants were 
"merely a paUiative" and not a permanent solution to the claimant 
States' financial problems, Dwyer Gray, supported by the Mercury, 
launched a continued attack on the Commission, objecting to its 
methods, accusing it of inconsistency, suggesting that (in the instance 
of the 1942 error in advising Tasmania of its grant) the Commission 
had been induced by the Commonwealth Treasuty to change its 
recommendations,*'' and making personal attacks on members of the 
Commission.** Dwtyer Gray's shrewd pohtical manoeuvring included 
the organisation of the State's teachers to complain against the Com-
mission's methods—after they had been convinced that the Commis-
sion was to blame for a decision not to grant their demands for an 
increase in salaty*®—the publicising of a proposal, grandiosely entitled 
"The Tasmanian Parhamentaty Formula", which sought a reformation 
of Commonwealth-State financial relations,®® and exploiting party 
politics by the claim that "fining" a State for its expenditure on social 
services was "a vety nice principle" for a Federal Labor Government 
to condone. The campaign succeeded in obtaining an enquity into the 
Commission's work by a committee of the Federal Parhamentaty 
Labor Party (the report of the Committee was never presented) but 
died out after Dwyer Gray's death in 1945 wdthout having brought any 
significant change in the Commission's work. Yet even Dwyer Gray 
was prepared to defend the Commission against other critics.®^ Apart 
from this, State representatives have made occasional complaints of 
the type that "it is not right" that a smaU body of men, not respon-
sible to the States' electors, should have such influence over States' 
financial and administrative policies®^ and that the system represents 
an invasion by the Commonwealth of States' sovereignty.®* The 
charge has also been made that the system promotes financial irrespon-
sibUity in some directions.®* Or as one State Premier coUoquiaUy 
summarised his attitude: 
. . . ff the complexion of the Grants Commission changed and men who 
have no sympathy towards the claimant States are appointed, we wiU be in 
queer street overnight.®® 
But generally speaking the claimant States have appeared favour-
able to the Commission's work and have accepted what incidental in-
fluence it has exerted wdthout strong objection. At times the States 
have even acknowledged the value to the claimant States of the Com-
mission's detaUed examination of their finances®* and when in 1958 a 
Queensland Liberal Party Convention was discussing a move to press 
for the estabhshment of a joint committee of pubhc accounts in that 
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State, the State Treasurer advised against such a move on the grounds 
that the Queensland Government was to make a claim to the Grants 
Commission and that this would render such a committee redundant. 
The claimant States have also supported moves for extensions of the 
Commission's powers into other fields of federal finance.®'^ In 1940 a 
motion was put to the Western Austrahan Parhament calling for an 
enlargement of the Commission's powers to include the making of re-
commendations to the Loan Council.®* 
When in 1959 Commonwealth-State financial relations were re-
formed, reducing the relative importance of special grants and remov-
ing South Australia from the claimant State status, the South Australian 
Government appeared to be satisfied with the change and accepted its 
new status (having first secured an increase in the amount of the new 
basic grant), with little complaint.®® A member of the Government ex-
pressed the view: 
There are imphcations in our freedom from the Grants Commission . . . It 
gives us far more control over our own affairs . . .*® 
But pohtical opinion generally was mixed and many criticised the 
Government's move. On the other hand both Tasmania and Western 
Australia expressed their strong preference for the existing system.*^ 
IV 
This paper has attempted to do no more than to outline the methods 
used by the Commonwealth Grants Commission in determining special 
grants, consider the evidence of the Commission's work on State poli-
cies and briefly glance at the States' attitudes to the question. The 
emergent conclusion—that the work of the Grants Commission does 
have an important bearing on State policy both in that special grants 
constitute a major source of claimant States' revenue and in that the 
Commission's methods inherently tend to induce the States to adopt 
certain standards of expenditure and revenue raising for particular 
items, and to give consideration to the Commission's past critiques 
and potential reactions when formulating policies—clearly has deeper 
implications. In the first place, the exercise and, generally speaking, 
the acceptance of this influence is particularly relevant to the basic 
question of States' "sovereignty" and of the very nature of federalism 
as a system of government.*^ Secondly, while special grants constitute 
part of the complex of forces tending to bring about equality between 
States in the provision of govemmental services, the system on which 
special grants operate tends to increase differentiation between State 
blocs.** This has been reflected, for example, at Premiers' Conferences 
and to a lesser extent at Loan CouncU meetings, lending support to the 
general thesis that undue emphasis has been placed on the issue of 
"the States" versus the Commonwealth and insufficient on the issue of 
inter-State differences.** Thirdly, from the viewpoint of the admini-
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strator this analysis would suggest that the Treasuty in a claimant 
State may be imusuaUy influential (e.g. vis-d-vis the Parliament) in 
State policy formulation*® and this, it could be argued, may render it 
more difficult for opposition parties to displace the govemment. 
FinaUy the phenomenom of a central govemment exerting such in-
fluence over the budgets of States suggests an interesting extension for 
that field of study currentiy referred to as "budgetaty theoty". 
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21 THE AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL 
COUNCIL: A SUCCESSFUL 
EXPERIMENT IN COMMONWEALTH-
STATE RELATIONS 
F. O. Grogan 
Under the constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia certain 
powers are reserved to the Commonwealth and residual ones remain 
wdth the States. These powers are not in all cases mutually exclusive 
and the Commonwealth and one or more of the States may deal with 
the same subject (e.g., taxation). In such cases if there is any conflict 
or contradiction between Commonwealth and State legislation, the 
former prevaUs. 
One of the powers not conferred on the Commonwealth is that of 
legislating with respect to agricultural production. Overseas market-
ing, however, does come wdthin the Commonwealth's province. The 
close relationship between production and marketing of agricultural 
and pastoral products is obvious; particularly so, perhaps, to the pro-
ducers and to their representatives in the Commonwealth and State 
parliaments. Over one half of the total production of these products is 
marketed overseas and provides approximately 80 per cent, of 
Australia's export income. For producers the problems of growing their 
crops and of marketing them are two aspects of the same problem 
of making their activities pay. 
The position in Australia where, under federalism, the States have 
successfuUy maintained their control over agricultural production pre-
sents an interesting contrast with the situation m Canada and in the 
United States of America, where, under a federal form of government 
in each case, a vety different position has arisen. 
Comparatively little has been written regarding the constitutional 
aspects of Commonwealth-State relations with respect to agriculture. 
It is interesting that in the proceedings of a conference conducted by 
the Australian Institute of Political Science in March, 1953, at which 
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experts discussed a wdde range of constitutional problems which had 
emerged since Federation, agriculture received no discussion. This 
omission is the more striking because at the time rural problems were 
pressing and giving concern to both Commonwealth and State 
Govemments. 
With the divided constitutional responsibUity the need for consulta-
tion between the Commonwealth and States on agricultural and 
marketing matters had early become clear; the need for co-ordination 
of agricidtural research had also become evident following the 
establishment of the (Commonwealth) Council of Scientific and 
Industrial Research.^ To meet this latter need a Commonwealth State 
Standing Committee on Agriculture had been formed but agricultural 
matters of common concern were handled by correspondence between 
the State or by ad hoc conferences of Ministers from the States con-
cemed, and at times, with Commonwealth Ministers. 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN 
AGRICULTURAL COUNCIL 
Sir Earle Page, the leader of the federal Countty Party, had for a num-
ber of years advocated the formation of a body where Agricultural 
Ministers of the States and Commonwealth could meet as experts, free 
from the publicity and party political considerations inevitably asso-
ciated with Premiers' conferences. He considered that such a body 
might agree on national policies for agriculture and might find solu-
tions to the numerous problems, especially in the marketing field, 
where the difficulties in the way of the Commonwealth and State 
Governments reaching a unified view prevented speedy and effective 
action. 
On 3rd December, 1934, a conference was convened by the Prime 
Minister of Commonwealth and State Ministers on agricultural and 
marketing matters. Sir Earle Page, who was the Commonwealth 
Minister for Commerce, acted as Chairman and in his opening address 
stated that the conference had been summoned to discuss four things: 
(1) Means to make it possible for Australia to speak with one voice 
on agricultural and marketing matters; 
(2) Determination of a definite policy in regard to international and 
especially intra-Empire marketing relations; 
(3) Formulation of a definite policy on wheat, both immediate and 
ultimate; 
(4) The finalising of a basis of a rural rehabUitation scheme through 
relief of farmers' debts. 
The conference resolved unanimously to form the Australian Agri-
cultural Council, a Ministerial organization to provide the basis for 
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continuous consultation amongst Australian governments on economic 
aspects of primaty production. The CouncU was to consist of the 
Federal Minister for Commerce and the State Ministers concerned 
with Agriculture, with the power to co-opt other State and Common-
wealth Ministers as the necessity might arise. Primaty production was 
assumed to mean agriculture in the widest sense but not to include 
mining, fisheries or forestry. 
The primary objective of the CouncU was to promote the welfare of 
the agricultural industries and to foster the adoption of national poli-
cies towards that end. In addition it was recognized that the CouncU 
would from time to time be called on to consider special problems 
which might necessitate the inclusion of Ministers other than those 
controlling agricultural departments. 
The functions of the CouncU were agreed to be: 
(fl) GeneraUy to promote the welfare and development of agricultural 
industries; 
(b) To arrange the mutual exchange of information regarding agri-
cidtural production and marketing; 
(c) To co-operate for the purpose of ensuring the improvement of 
the quality of agricultural products, and the maintenance of high-
grade standards; 
{d) To ensure, as far as possible, balance between production and 
available markets; 
(e) To consider the requirements of agricultural industries, in regard 
to organised marketing; 
(/) To promote the adoption of a uniform policy on external market-
ing problems, particularly those pertaining to the negotiation of 
intra-Empire and International Agreements; 
(g) To consult in regard to proposals for the grant of financial assist-
ance to agricultural industries; 
(h) To consider matters submitted to the CouncU by the Standing 
Committee on Agriculture. 
The Council has no statutoty authorisation and its constitution rests 
on the formal acceptance by the Commonwealth and the six State 
Governments of the membership and functions recommended by the 
Conference of December, 1934. 
A permanenf technical committee was also set up at the same con-
ference to enable the CouncU to perform its functions adequately. This 
Committee was to be known as the Standing Committee on Agri-
culture and initiaUy comprised the Permanent Heads of the State 
Departments of Agriculture, members of the Executive Committee of 
C.S.I.R., the Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Com-
merce and the Commonwealth Director-General of Health. The last-
mentioned was included because plant and animal quarantine is a 
responsibUity of the Department of Health. 
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The duties of the Standing Committee m addition to advismg the 
CouncU on the matters hsted under (a) to {h) above, included: 
(i) to secure co-opefation and co-ordination in agricultural research 
throughout the Commonwealth; 
(u) to advise the Commonwealth and State Govemments, either 
direct or through the Council, on matters pertaining to the initia-
tion and development of research on agricultural problems; 
(hi) to secure co-operation between the Commonwealth and the 
States, and between the States themselves, with respect to quaran-
tine measures relating to pests and diseases of plants and animals, 
and to advise the Commonwealth and State Govemments with 
respect thereto. 
The previously existing Standing Committee on Agriculture of 
C.S.I.R., which had dealt with research, was absorbed into the new 
body. It was determined that the Commonwealth Department of Com-
merce would provide secretarial assistance for the Agricultural 
CouncU while the secretarial work for the Standing Committee on 
Agriculture would be done jointly by the Department of Commerce 
and die C.S.I.R. 
LATER CHANGES IN THE COUNCIL AND STANDING 
COMMITTEE 
Although the basic charter of the Council as described above has not 
been changed, the scope of its activities widened enormously during 
the war years and temporarily a number of additional Commonwealth 
members were added to the Standing Committee on Agriculture, e.g., 
representatives of the Department of Supply, the Director-General of 
Manpower, the Commonwealth Statistician, the Department of War 
Organization of Industry, the Commonwealth Director-General of 
Agriculture. With a retum to peacetime govemmental relationships in 
agriculture, the Standing Committee reverted to its original member-
ship, except that the Commonwealth Department of the Treasuty was 
given representation and more recently the Permanent Head of the 
Commonwealth Department of Territories has become a member. 
FoUowing the creation of the Departments of Primaty Industty and 
of Trade in 1956, the Minister for Primaty Industty became Chairman 
of the CouncU and the Minister for Trade was co-opted to represent 
the Commonwealth on matters relating to trade. The Permanent 
Heads of the Departments of Primaty Industty and Trade became 
members of Standing Committee, which now comprises the Perma-
nent Heads of the six State Departments of Agriculture and repre-
sentatives of the Commonwealth Departments of Primary Industty, 
Trade, Health, Territories, Treasuty and the Commonwealth Scientific 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Federal Institutions I 301 
and Industrial Research Organization (formerly knovra as the CouncU 
for Scientffic and Industrial Research). 
C.S.I.R.O. no longer takes an active part in the secretarial work for 
the Standing Committee, which is performed by the CouncU Secre-
tariat within the Department of Primaty Industry. The Secretariat had 
been transferred to this Department following the abolition of the 
Department of Commerce and Agriculture, which had replaced the 
Department of Commerce. 
THE COUNCIL AT WORK 
The CouncU meets on average about twice a year and there have been 
forty-five meetings since its establishment. The practice is for it to 
meet in Canberra and in the State capitals in rotation, that is, every 
second meeting is in Canberra. An agenda is prepared before each 
meeting and includes matters brought forward from the previous 
meeting and any additional items requested by any of the Common-
wealth or State Ministers comprising the Council. 
There are no formally established or written rules of procedure. The 
proceedings are held in camera and the only publicity consists of 
announcements to the press by the Chairman of the decisions reached 
on individual items. The Commonwealth Minister of Primaty Industty 
is the Chairman and his opening address, which in recent years has 
taken the form of a comprehensive review of the agricultural situation 
since the previous meeting, is also usuaUy made avaUable to the press. 
The CouncU's proceedings are governed only by the generally 
accepted rules of debate and are of a very informal nature with the 
result that these rules are rarely, if ever, invoked. The order of speak-
ing is anti-clockwise around the table with the Ministers opening the 
agenda items in rotation. An exception is in the case of items placed 
on the agenda at the request of a particular Minister who as a ride will 
open that item. A verbatim record of proceedings is taken by Hansard 
reporters and reports of the proceedings are printed but issued only on 
a confidential basis for restricted circulation to the Ministers and 
Departments directly represented on the Council and the Standing 
Committee. 
The decisions of the Council are not, generaUy speaking, binding on 
the Governments which constitute the CouncU, but the Council's con-
sistent aim is to reach agreement on a line of policy with respect to 
each item before it. Where such agreement is reached it is incor-
porated in recommendations of the Council which wUl be submitted 
to the Commonwealth and State Governments concemed and will 
usually receive favourable consideration and, where appropriate, be 
implemented. Where majority agreement only is reached in the 
CouncU there is never any assumption that a resolution will have 
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binding effect unless it is accepted by all the Governments concerned. 
The difficulty encountered in reaching unanimous agreement and 
subsequent implementation varies with the nature of the matter 
under discussion. Some items may concern only some of the States; 
some may be matters of administrative convenience or of such a non-
contentious nature that general agreement is readily reached; some 
may concern all States and the Commonwealth but the intrinsic diffi-
culty of the problems involved may make general agreement difficult. 
Industry stabilization schemes which involve far-reaching con-
sequences for producers and consumers and concerning which State 
viewpoints stemming from economic and political differences in the 
respective States may differ are an example of the latter kind. Again, 
in certain situations, the States might share a viewpoint but be unable 
to reach agreement with the Commonwealth; for example, on matters 
pertaining to export marketing there may be financial implications, or 
obhgations under international agreements, which pose major pro-
blems for the Commonwealth Government but are not of direct con-
cern to the States. 
The Standing Committee usually meets for two or three days imme-
diately preceding the Council meeting. Information papers on each 
agenda item are prepared by the Secretariat or submitted by the 
Departments concerned and are circulated in advance through the 
Secretariat. The aim of the Standing Committee is to reach agreement 
if possible between the Departments concerned on each item and to 
submit a concise summary report, with recommendations where appro-
priate, to the Council. It has been a common practice for the Standing 
Committee to meet on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday with the 
Council deliberating on the following Monday and Tuesday. This 
allows the week-end for preparation, processing and distribution of 
Standing Committee's Report to Council, a task involving, with an 
agenda of up to fifty items, a considerable amount of work. 
This procedure greatly facilitates the Council's discussions as the 
Standing Committee is an expert body eminently suited for reviewing 
technical questions and, within limits, of advising upon most policy 
matters affecting agriculture. The Standing Committee meets inde-
pendently of the Council from time to time to deal with matters 
requiring special attention at the direction of the Council; or to deal 
with matters of an administrative nature or pertaining to research 
wliich require a co-ordinated approach but not necessarily involving 
Ministerial approval. 
The Standing Committee has no permanent staff of its own. The 
Agricultural Council's Secretariat in the Department of Primary 
Industry carries out all secretarial work of the Committee as well as 
of the Council but the Permanent Heads of Departments comprising 
the Committee usually have senior officials in attendance to advise 
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them and to assist in drafting reports and recommendations to 
Council. 
The Haison between the Council and Standing Committee is very 
close. Members of Standing Committee are, almost without excep-
tion, always present at meetings of the Council to advise their 
Ministers. The reports of the Standing Committee are presented to the 
Council by the Chairman of Standing Committee who introduces each 
item by reading the Standing Committee's report. The State represen-
tatives act as Chairman of the Committee in rotation on an annual 
basis. 
The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organiza-
tion, hke the other departments represented on the Standing Com-
mittee, submits reports directly for consideration, and through its repre-
sentative, participates actively in the discussions. Its interests lie more 
in the scope and co-ordination of research and the dissemination of 
research findings than in the administrative and policy issues with 
which the Committee also deals. 
Many of the matters coming before the Council relate to joint Com-
monwealth-State marketing policy. If there are Commonwealth or 
State Marketing Boards dealing with a particular industry the views 
of the Boards would usually be presented to the Council by the 
Minister concerned and it is not usual for Boards to be granted 
direct access to the Council. Council's decisions on matters affecting 
a Board would be conveyed to the Board by the Minister under whom 
the Board operated. 
Standing Committee's reports and recommendations may be 
accepted, amended or rejected by Council and normally require 
Council's endorsement before they have effect. The Council's decisions 
are conveyed by the Secretariat to the members of Standing Com-
mittee (including the Department of Primary Industry within which 
the secretariat is situated) for implementation. Where joint action is 
required the Department of Primary Industry would take the initia-
tive iu collaboration with the State members of Standing Committee 
concerned, although in matters of high Government policy the deci-
sions may be subject to formal reference from the Minister of Primary 
Industry, as Chairman of the Council, to the State Ministers. Between 
meetings most matters arising out of the Council's and/or Standing 
Committee's deliberations are handled at the Departmental level be-
tween the Secretariat and the members of Standtag Committee or be-
tween the Commonwealth and State Departments concerned. 
The Standing Committee has held fifty-five meetings, an average of 
between two and three per year. The fact that the Standing Com-
mittee has met more often than the Council is explained by the fact 
that on certain difficult and contentious matters Standing Committees 
may have to meet more than once before achieving agreement on 
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the technical issues involved and arriving at recommendations to 
CouncU for policy decisions. Such a situation is obviously likely to 
arise where interim discussions or negotiations with industty repre-
sentatives have to be arranged. The Standing Committee does not 
publish any reports or issue any prepared statements. All its reports 
are submitted on a confidential basis to the Agricultural CouncU or 
to the Commonwealth and State Departments concemed. The Secre-
tariat at present consists of the Secretary and two assistants. Papers 
for Standing Committee and for CouncU are prepared in mimeo-
graphed form but CouncU proceedings are printed for confidential 
and restricted circulation. 
THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL 
The confidential nature of the proceedings makes it impossible to 
discuss in detaU the work of the CouncU. However, certain general 
observations may be made with reference to— 
{a) changes over the years in the matters with which the CouncU has 
been concemed; 
(b) the degree to which the CouncU has succeeded in its ahn of 
reaching agreement and common policy on agricultural issues; 
(c) the extent to which it has been found practicable to implement 
the CouncU's decisions. 
(a) Changes over the Years 
Matters discussed by the CouncU have always covered a wide 
range of topics relating to production policy, research, administration, 
extension, disease and pest control and prevention, marketing and 
economics, as they affect the fuU range of Australian agricultural and 
pastoral industries. 
Factors which have had a bearing on the subjects covered by the 
CouncU's deliberations have included— 
(i) the changed financial relationships of the Commonwealth and 
States foUowing the introduction of uniform taxation in 1942; 
(ii) changing emphasis in marketing problems leading to various 
forms of price support or stabUization schemes. These foUowed 
in many cases the wartime control schemes and/or the long-term 
purchase schemes of Australian products by the United Kingdom; 
(iu) the increasing importance placed by Governments and by pro-
ducers on research and advisoty services, 
(i) Commonwealth-State Financial Relations. The Agricultural 
CouncU was not mtended to operate as an agency for aUocation of 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Federal Institutions I 305 
Commonwealth funds for State activities. Although function (g) as 
set out earlier was "to consult in regard to proposals for the grant of 
financial assistance to agricultural industries" moneys to States are 
made avaUable through other and quite different organizations such 
as the Loan CouncU and Grants Commission. However, one resiUt of 
the present arrangements for tax coUection and disbursement m 
Australia is that State Governments which wish to obtain special funds 
for expanding existing services or for new services to agriculture may 
have to convmce the Commonwealth Government of the desirabUity 
of such expenditures. The CouncU forms an admirable forum for the 
discussion of such proposals on an informed and generally sympathetic 
basis. General agreement between Commonwealth and State Ministers 
in the CouncU on the desirability of a particular course of action is 
often the prelude to an approach by the Commonwealth Minister to 
Cabinet for the necessary funds. 
Conversely, the Commonwealth can and does persuade the States to 
provide financial contributions towards projects which both consider 
worthwhUe but which would probably be left undone without some 
financial support from the Commonwealth. Expert and amicable dis-
cussion of the methods of implementing special projects and of shar-
ing the work and cost is facilitated by the CouncU and its advisoty 
Committee—the Standing Committee on Agriculture. 
(ii) Marketing Arrangements. Ever since the thirties (and it is no 
coincidence that the establishment of the CouncU dates from that 
period), marketing problems have been not least amongst those fac-
ing primaty producers. Overseas marketing lies within province of the 
Commonwealth Government but can hardly be usefully considered 
in isolation from the production and home market aspects. Where 
legislation has been necessaty to implement marketing or stabUization 
schemes joint or complementaty Commonwealth and State action has 
usuaUy been found necessaty and co-ordination of aims, and of 
methods of achieving them, including the drafting of legislation, has 
been successfuUy obtained through the CouncU. 
There is no space to review here, however briefly, the numerous 
marketing arrangements and stabilization plans which have been 
implemented under the aegis of the CouncU before, during and since 
the war. Most of these plans have involved protracted and complicated 
negotiations between producers and Governments at their initiation 
and on periodic renewal. Sometimes special meetings of Ministers are 
found necessaty in addition to formal consideration at meetings of 
the CouncU, but generally the latter provides a very satisfactoty clear-
ing house for discussion and for reconciling divergent viewpoints 
where these exist. 
The Wheat Industry StabUisation Plan, a scheme for orderly market-
ing and for price guarantee to producers, may be cited as an example 
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of the activities of the CouncU m this field. The basis of the scheme is 
that the Commonwealth Government guarantees to wheatgrowers that 
they wiU receive at least an officially assessed cost of production on up 
to 100 miUion bushels of wheat exported from Australia. The State 
Govemments, which control production and marketmg witihin their 
own borders, in turn undertake to see that f.a.q. (fair average quality) 
wheat sold for local consumption wUl be sold at a determined price, 
not less than the cost of production. The producers agree to pay into a 
Stabilisation Fund certain sums derived from export sales when these 
are made at a figure above the cost of production. This fund is used 
to make up the deficiency when export realizations are below cost of 
production and are supplemented if necessaty from Commonwealth 
Govemment funds. To facUitate the working of the scheme all wheat 
for marketing is vested in a central marketing authority, the Australian 
Wheat Board. 
The plan in its initial development was vety contentious and diffi-
cult. The views of growers, of individual State Governments and of 
the Commonwealth Government had to be reconciled on a wide 
number of issues; for example, the principle of guarantee on exports 
and the level of guarantee, the principle of a stabilisation fund and 
the respective contributions to be made by the producers and by the 
Govemment, the level of the home price at which wheat would be 
sold in the States, the question of whether the same price should 
apply to wheat sold for human consumption and for stock feed, the 
duration of the plan, the method of assessing cost of production and 
yearly variations therein. 
When agreement on these and other difficult issues involved in the 
scheme was reached, it had to be confirmed by an Australia-wide 
referendum of wheat producers and then implemented by Common-
wealth and State legislation designed to overcome the legal difficul-
ties arising out of the constitutional division of functions and in par-
ticular Section 92 of the Commonwealth Constitution relating to 
freedom of trade between the States. 
The negotiations for the present plan began in 1950 and ended in 
1954. The Agricultural Council considered the proposals several tunes, 
as did tihe Ministers in special conference. Final agreement was 
reached at a Premiers' Conference and the matter was referred back to 
the Ministers to complete the arrangements. 
It is certain that without the machinety for continuing and expert 
consultation provided by the Agricultural CouncU, the agreement 
necessaty for the scheme would, if indeed it were possible, have been 
much more difficult of attainment. 
(iii) Research and Extension. The CouncU was from the beginning 
concemed with agricultural research and with co-ordination of the 
Commonwealth and State activities in this field. Marketing problems, 
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particularly those of disposing of Australia's export surpluses over the 
years, have highlighted the need for maximum efficiency and low 
costs in production. The Commonwealth Government has become 
increasingly interested in encouraging the most effective prosecution 
of research over a wide range of agricultural problems and in the 
speediest dissemination of the findings of such research to the pro-
ducers. The States have, cautiously at first, more enthusiastically in 
recent years, welcomed such increased interest by the Commonwealth 
whUe maintaining their owm historical role in this field, particularly in 
extension and advisoty work which they claim is integraUy related to 
production and hence a State function. 
Large sums of money have been provided by the Commonwealth to 
augment existing services and the basis of expenditure and administra-
tion and these funds has been agreed in the CouncU. A recent and 
extremely interesting and important development has been the 
formation of agreements between the Governments and individual 
primaty industries for joint contributions to research and extension. In 
the tobacco industty, for example, the Commonwealth Government 
contributes £21,000 per year, the manufacturers £28,000 per year and 
the growers £14,000 per year in addition to a capital cost of £168,000 
for which the Commonwealth Government and the manufacturers 
assumed fuU liability. The money is spent under the general super-
vision of the Tobacco Industty Advisoty Committee, a body set up by 
the Minister for Primaty Industty under the oversight of the Agricul-
tural Council. Recently, after protracted negotiations between the 
Minister for Primary Industry and representatives of the Wheat 
Industty, a plan has been adopted and implemented by legislation 
whereunder the growers contribute Md. per bushel on all wheat 
delivered for sale and the Commonwealth Govemment augments this 
contribution. The expenditure of the funds is supervised by State 
Advisoty Committees nominated by the State Ministers for Agriculture 
and by a Central Committee nominated by the Minister for Primary 
Industty. 
If wool industry research and extension (but not promotion) is in-
cluded, the annual contributions by producers for research and exten-
sion are now at a rate probably in excess of £650,000 per annum and 
the total, wdth Government contributions, is over £ 2 million per 
annum. This amount is additional to that spent on agricultural services 
by the Commonwealth and States from their normal Budget and loan 
funds. 
A further mdication of the range and importance of the CouncU's 
association with research and advisoty work and with industty 
economics is given by the numerous technical and policy committees 
and specialist conferences which operate in close or loose association 
with tihe CouncU. They cover most major fields of research in agri-
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cultural science being carried on in Australia and include such com-
mittees as the SoU Conservation Committee, the Irrigation Production 
Advisoty Committee and the Wheat Costs Committee. The activities 
of many of these bodies involve periodic conferences on an Australia-
wdde basis and the general oversight of such conferences to ensure the 
efficient and economical use of manpower and resources involved is 
one of the administrative functions exercised by Standing Committee. 
(fo) Degree of Agreement Achieved by the Council 
Agreement is reached by the CouncU on the majority of items con-
sidered. On matters relating to research and administration, recom-
mendations from Standing Committees are rarely amended or 
rejected. In Standing Committee the discussion of such matters is on 
a technical level. Recommendations are normally made on the basis 
of the greatest common ground after taking into account special 
problems of individual States. On matters where high Govemment 
policy is involved, discussion in the Council may be lengthy but the 
issues on which some progress has not been found possible have not 
been numerous. 
One interesting example of a quasi-policy, quasi-technical issue on 
which contentious and difficult problems have delayed any final solu-
tion is the Australian system of marketing wheat on an f.a.q. basis. 
This matter was raised for discussion at the first meeting of the 
CoimcU in 1935 and is currently under review again. 
(c) Action Arising Out of Council Recommendations 
It is not possible, wdthout an analysis of the Proceedings of the 
CoimcU, to list in detail the cases where action recommended by the 
CouncU has been taken by the Govemments concerned. On the vety 
wide range of matters relating to research, quarantine and administra-
tion of various Acts affecting Agriculture, it is true to say that in the 
great majority of cases where agreement has been reached by the 
CouncU it has been foUowed by appropriate action by the Government 
concerned. 
With respect also to matters of the highest importance directly relat-
ing to both production and marketing policy, a remarkable measure of 
agreement has been achieved. As regards production policy this can 
be Ulustrated by the wartime production goals and targets, by the 
1952 Statement of production policy and by the Statement regarding 
wheat production in Australia issued by the Chairman after the most 
recent CouncU meeting. 
On the economic and marketing side a large number of extremely 
important and comprehensive industty measures such as rural rehabUi-
tation (before the war), the home consumption price scheme for 
wheat which foUowed the Royal Commission on the Wheat, Flour and 
Bread Industries 1934-35, the numerous and complex arrangements 
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for the marketing of rural products during the war and the plans for 
assisting or stabUising primary industries in the post-war period and 
for marketing their products provide evidence of Govemment action 
foUowing CouncU agreement. 
EVALUATION 
Problems on both the production and marketing sides of Australian 
agriculture have, within the constitutional and financial framework of 
Commonwealth-State relations, necessitated co-operation between the 
Governments. The Australian Agricultural CouncU with its permanent 
advisory Committee, the Standing Committee on Agriculture, has 
over the twenty-three years of its existence developed into an effective 
instrument for achieving this co-operation. It is perhaps not an exag-
geration to suggest it is the most successful example of such co-opera-
tion in Australian Commonwealth-State relationships. 
From the Standing Committee the CouncU receives highly com-
petent technical advice which takes full account of the wide diver-
gences in natural and economic factors affecting agriculture over a 
continental environment. Similarly, in the Council, State and Com-
monwealth Ministers have first-hand knowledge of the political, as 
well as the producers' problems, attaching to any particular issue. 
Although at times differences of viewpoint have been strong, respect 
by the Commonwealth and States for each other's rights and problems 
has been evident throughout the proceedings over the years.^ This 
fact, combined with the friendly personal relationships developed by 
continuing association at both Ministerial and official levels and the 
atmosphere of easy informality in which the meetings are usually con-
ducted, has led to an understanding in the CouncU by each State for 
the others' problems and a very genuine desire to reach acceptable 
compromises where unanimous agreement is not possible. It is not 
suggested that such agreement or compromise is always reached. For 
example, the different views of the States on the relationships between 
margarine manufacture and the daitying industty have so far rendered 
difficult the formulation of a completely satisfactory and workable 
formula. However, even in such cases the frank, amicable and full dis-
cussion that is possible in the CouncU undoubtedly does much to 
prevent exacerbation of feelings between the States and to obviate 
precipitate or one-sided action. 
The CouncU provides the Commonwealth Government with a 
unique opportunity for balanced assessment of problems and for the 
formulation of national objectives and plans as was evidenced by the 
role of the CouncU in the war years, by the publication of the pam-
phlet "Agricultural Production Aims and Policy" in 1952 and by the 
successful planning and implementation of a number of far-reaching 
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industty StabUisation plans. That the vety great value of the CouncU's 
role is realised at the official level is clearly showm by the importance 
attached to it by the Commonwealth Permanent Heads who have been 
successively responsible for oversight of the Secretariat. Documenta-
tion of meetings of Council and Standing Committee is comprehensive 
and vety carefully prepared and during the meetings of the Secretariat 
has the assistance of some of the most senior of the officers in the 
Department concerned. 
From the States' viewpoint the Council is equaUy valuable. The 
relations in the CouncU are not those of donor and donee although the 
CouncU provides an opportunity to discuss financial aspects, including 
costs and contributions thereto, of various proposals, aimed at the 
general welfare of Australian agriculture which come up for considera-
tion. Problems of individual States are seen in perspective when dis-
cussed with other States and with the Commonwealth and any State 
can press its viewpoint when considered necessaty. 
The Commonwealth Minister who acts as Chairman of the CouncU 
is merely primus inter pares; the Ministers present normally reflect 
different party political viewpoints as well as different State interests. 
This diversity of viewpoints, discussed on a basis of equality with the 
absence of publicity making political posturing pointless, and with 
the benefit of careful documentation and Standing Committee's expert 
advice makes for a thorough and dispassionate examination, with the 
minimum of rhetoric and irrelevance, of issues which are often diffi-
cult and contentious. 
The degree of accord and constructive action which has been 
attained is a major achievement by the Council. Partly, perhaps, this 
reflects the personalities involved and good forttme in the Common-
wealth Ministers and Permanent Heads upon whom the responsibUity 
largely rests to make the machine work, or at least to provide the oU 
to make its working smooth; partly, perhaps, it reflects the underlying 
community of interest of the Commonwealth and State Governments 
in agricultural matters. Ignoring difference of political viewpoint, what 
is technically sound agricultural policy for a State is probably sound 
policy for the Commonwealth, at least with respect to that State. 
Where the need for statesmanship, and for effective consultation as an 
aid towards it, arises is, first, in disentanglmg the long term or national 
viewTpoint from short term or sectional interests and, second, in recon-
ciling State interests where these happen to diverge. 
The Rural Reconstruction Commission in its Sixth Report, dated 
April, 1945, stressed the importance of a sound working basis for co-
operation between the States and for the development of a national 
agricultural policy. It expressed the views that though the Australian 
Agricultural CouncU should have been weU suited to its tasks experi-
ence had shown that success had only been partial particularly in 
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(then) recent years (i.e., the war years). It listed reasons for the 
(aUeged) partial faUure, the main ones being: 
{a) Meetings at fairly long and irregular intervals with over-loaded 
agenda and insufficient time for adequate deliberations. 
{b) A predominance of Commonwealth initiative in the preparation of 
plans with the States relegated to the role of critics. 
(c) A tendency to rush proposals through—sometimes due to wartime 
emergencies. 
{d) Distribution of information to members too late to aUow for ade-
quate consideration by members before the meeting. 
(e) The State representatives should come armed with sufficient 
authority from their Governments to reach agreement at least, on 
principles of necessary plans. 
(/) Insufficient agricultural knowledge and expertise on the part of 
staff of the Commonwealth Department of Commerce. 
(g) Necessity for a clear realization of effects of proposed schemes. 
{h) DesirabUity of direct contact with industry representatives to 
make up for staff inadequacies in the Department of Commerce 
in its task of advising the Commonwealth Minister on all aspects 
of the production side. 
(i) Necessity for machinety to deal adequately with problems (e.g., 
rural finance, irrigation and land settlement) affecting other State 
and Commonwealth Departments than those directly represented 
on the CouncU and Standing Committee. 
The Commission believed that the CouncU and Standing Committee 
would have a better chance of effective work if— 
(a) The composition of these bodies were reduced to their pre-war 
form; 
(b) the bodies referred to were to meet at least quarterly and at fixed 
dates; 
(c) the Commonwealth were to extend its information service by pass-
ing to the States at intervals of not greater duration than one 
month all documents which are relevant to subjects likely to come 
up for discussion and which provided— 
(1) statistical data; 
(2) information conceming trade agreements made and in pro-
spect; and 
(3) surveys of trends in external markets; 
while, on their part, the States were to appoint special officers to 
collect such information and consider it from their point of view 
and to keep the Commonwealth and other States informed as to 
crop prospects, special local problems, etc.; 
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(d) heads of State agricultural departments were relieved of some 
of their administrative work by a process of decentralization and 
by the selection, appointment and training of more men with 
positions of senior responsibility who would be able to assist State 
directors in their routine work; and 
(e) care was taken in preparing the basic material for each subject 
on which decisions are required emphasizing first the reasons for 
the problem, secondly the way in which it specifically affects each 
State, and thirdly the relationship of various solutions to general 
agricultural policy apart from their relationship to the particular 
problem concerned. 
With respect to the Commission's criticism^ and recommendations 
some comments may now (some twelve years later) be offered: 
(i) The Council and Standing Committee have reverted substanti-
ally to their pre-war form as recommended by the Commission. 
(ii) The Council meets at (approximately) half-yearly intervals with 
the Standing Committee meeting oftener as found necessary. Steps 
have recently been taken by the Council to prevent over-loading of 
the agenda and to ensure priority in discussion for the more important 
items. 
(iii) With regard to important industry stabilisation schemes 
arrangements have been made, by appointment of sub-committees of 
Standing Committee or by delegation to Department of Primary 
Industry, to ensure adequate consultation with representatives of the 
industries concerned and for progress reports to Council. 
(iv) In the post-war years the Department of Commerce and Agri-
culture and later the Department of Primary Industry was re-organ-
ized to include a Division of Agricultural Production and a Division of 
Agricultural Economics, both of which included graduates in Agri-
cultural Science with experience of Australian primary industries. 
(v) With the passing of wartime emergencies, information papers or 
discussion papers rather than cut-and-dried Commonwealth proposals 
or schemes have been circulated by the Secretariat. The Division 
(Bureau) of Agricultural Economics in particular has established co-
operative working arrangements and interchange of information with 
State Departments in the -wide range of economic surveys of primary 
industries which it has carried out in Australia and in Papua-New 
Guinea. 
(vi) The State Departments of Agriculture supply to the Depart-
ment of Primary Industry for collation at quarterly intervals a report 
on agricultural conditions in their respective States, while the Com-
monwealth provides a quarterly report on overall production and 
marketing trends. This is amplified in regular reports submitted to the 
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meetings of Standing Committee and CouncU. The current agricul-
tural situation is usually reviewed in detaU by the Chairman of the 
CouncU in his opening speech. In addition, the Department of Trade 
keeps Standing Committee and Council regularly and fuUy informed 
on such matters as trade agreements and developments in trade policy 
relevant to agriculture. 
(vu) The Commission spoke of frictions between various authorities 
and concluded: "the success of any human organization must be 
largely dependent upon the attitude of mind and goodwUl of those 
who operate it. It suggests that there is a real need for State authori-
ties to recognize that as their States together form the nation and, as 
agricultural policies wUl be matters of even greater urgency in the 
future than they have been in the past, it follows that the States have 
definite obligations to regard the proceedings of the Australian Agri-
cultural CouncU of the highest importance and to ensure its satisfactoty 
working. This wiU not be achieved unless they regard it as their com-
mittee rather than as a Commonwealth body to which they are caUed." 
The Commission took a pessimistic view of overseas market pro-
posals and envisaged that ultimately the Commonwealth might be in 
a position in which it would have to consider control in the volume of 
products exported overseas and the manner in which those products 
are marketed. Marketing schemes for some of the major export indus-
tries have in fact been designed and put into operation. 
Fortunately, however, so far the problems with which the CouncU 
has had to grapple since the war have been those of expanding agri-
cultural production rather than the more contentious and difficult ones 
of acreage restriction and quota allocations. WhUe this may have been 
a contributing factor to smooth working, no one who has attended 
recent meetings of the CouncU and Standing Committee could faU to 
be impressed by the cordial relations between Commonwealth and 
State Ministers and the obvious goodwUl and desire on the part of aU 
members of both bodies to make a constructive contribution to the 
welfare of Australian agriculture. The impression emerges of an effec-
tive piece of administrative and consultative machinety providing 
solutions to difficult problems that wUl not only be workable but which 
wiU satisfy the tests of democracy and of federalism in government. 
The Council, whUe reiterating its conviction that the individual pro-
ducer rather than any central planning body must make his own deci-
sions wdth regard to the nature and scale of his production, has given 
a lead as to the patterns of production along which it considers, in the 
light of the best avaUable information, the national interest lies. 
Any criticism that might be levelled at the CouncU today would not 
be that it is slow in arriving at decisions or unsuccessful in smoothing 
out State frictions as suggested by the Rural Reconstruction Commis-
sion. Perhaps any criticism now would be to the effect that the 
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Council has not sufficiently taken the initiative with respect to major 
policies affecting agricultural development. On the marketing side 
schemes for orderly marketing or for assistance to industries to meet 
rising costs and stiffening overseas competition have been devised. On 
the side of production techniques expansion of existing research and 
extension services has been a continuous aim of the Council and large 
sums of money have been made available. However, on problems of 
production policy, such as rural finance, irrigation, land settlement and 
land utilization with which the Rural Reconstruction Commission 
suggested the Council might need to concern itself, its public pro-
nouncements, critics might suggest, have not been frequent or suffi-
ciently positive. On such possible criticism the following observations 
may be made: 
(a) Most of such matters come within the province of the State 
Governments and it would be mainly with specific proposals submitted 
by an individual State that the Commonwealth would be concerned, 
and then, most probably, as a problem in Commonwealth-State finan-
cial relations, which would not rest finally with the Agricultural 
Council. 
(b) Even in the case of the Snowy River Mountains Scheme where 
three States and the Commonwealth are concerned the decision 
regarding the use which will be made of the irrigation waters has been 
left to the individual States. Whether this problem will be capable of 
satisfactory solution by them without taking into account the market-
ing problems likely to arise from increased production remains to be 
seen. Such marketing problems will almost certainly require joint con-
sideration by the States and Commonwealth through the Agricultural 
Council. The Council in one of its Committees, namely, the Irrigation 
Production Advisory Committee, has a technical body especially 
created to watch and advise on such problems. 
(c) It is interesting to note that in one of the press statements 
released by the latest (45th) meeting of the Council a carefully 
worded pronouncement drew attention to the marketing problems, 
especially with dairy products, and the problems of most profitable 
land use which could arise in connection with the use of newly avail-
able irrigation water. 
(d) The Council has taken up the attitude that full responsibility 
for producers' production decisions must rest with themselves, but it 
has given a lead as to the lines along which the national interest lies; 
for example, in the announcement of production aims or goals for 
various primary industries in 1952 and more recently by specifically 
repudiating a policy of wheat acreage restriction advocated by certain 
marketing authorities and by some sections of producers' organiza-
tions. 
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(e) In the pre-war years the Council was concerned with an Aus-
tralia-wide scheme of rural rehabilitation and it is conceivable that 
joint Commonwealth-State action to reconstruct sections of particular 
industries in chronic financial difficulties may eventuate in the future. 
(/) Publicity by the Council is mainly confined to statements by the 
Chairman regarding specific recommendations. It has not regarded 
as its role to provide detailed and authoritative analyses of the posi-
tion of agriculture in the general economy. However, its concern at the 
situation of agriculture in the later war and post-war years stemmed 
from detailed examination and appraisal of the facts. The adoption of 
the Production Aims in 1952 by the Council followed a detailed 
analysis of production levels and trends and of the situation which 
could arise if the trends in population, production and consumption 
were allowed to continue unaltered. 
The great expansion in mineral production and in secondary indus-
tries in recent years connotes profound structural changes in the 
national economy which must be relevant to any balanced assessment 
of the future role of agriculture. This serves to illustrate and emphasise 
the importance of the role of the Council in the future. 
(g) It is probable too that on broad issues with important repercus-
sions beyond the agricultural sector, the Ministers comprising the 
Council are conscious of their individual Government's responsibili-
ties beyond the agricultural sphere and of their own responsibilities 
to their State Cabinets and exercise caution correspondingly in making 
recommendations on such issues. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it may be stated that marketing and production are 
opposite sides of the same coin so far as agriculture is concerned. 
While the constitutional position with respect to them remains as it is, 
the Australian Agricultural Council must remain of first-class import-
ance for the promotion of sound national policies and for their smooth 
and efficient administration. The Council has signal successes to its 
credit during both war and peace, with respect to all the functions 
originally allotted to it and to Standing Committee.* 
It has arranged for continuous review on a quarterly basis of pro-
duction in all states and of marketing conditions and trends and for 
this and other relevant information to be exchanged between Com-
monwealth and State departments concerned. At meetings of the 
Council production and marketing trends are regularly and carefully 
reviewed. 
Improvement in the quality of agricultural products and the main-
tenance of high-grade standards have been encouraged in two ways. 
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First by co-operation between the Commonwealth and States in 
carrying out inspection services in their respective spheres and by 
seeking uniformity of standards where practicable; secondly by advo-
cating, and in some instances, financing, research aimed at rais-
ing quality in commodities produced. The Tobacco Grant is an 
example of the latter and considerable emphasis in the extension drive 
for increased efficiency in the dairy industry was placed on practices 
leading to higher-quality products. 
With respect to international agreements, the initiative necessarily 
rests with the Commonwealth Government due to its constitutional 
functions and to the practical requirements of such negotiation. How-
ever, the Commonwealth has kept State Ministers informed of the 
agricultural implications of pending negotiations and, as far as practic-
able, of the progress of negotiations. In the case of F.A.O. it is not 
unusual for a State member of Standing Committee to be included in 
the Australian delegation to the biennial general Conference. 
The Council, in peacetime, has not regarded it to be its proper func-
tion to make decisions regarding production which in a free economy 
rest with individual producers, but it has not hesitated to give clear 
indications, in the light of the best information available to it, as to the 
lines along which it considers the national interest lies. Such assess-
ments take into account the desirability of balance between produc-
tion and available markets. In making such judgments the close co-
operation and mutual assistance of the States and Commonwealth is 
essential. The former supply first-hand and accurate knowledge of pro-
duction trends and possibilities, while the Commonwealth is in close 
and continuous contact with the various marketing agencies and with 
marketing opportunities overseas. 
For research and extension matters and for such purposes as quaran-
tine and pest and disease control. Standing Committee has served as 
an invaluable co-ordinating committee for achieving co-operation. It 
has helped to forge close links between the States and C.S.I.R.O. with 
mutual gain and it has contributed in a very great degree to better 
practical administration of agricultural matters of joint concern to the 
Commonwealth and one or more of the States. 
It is probably in the field of marketing, however, that the Council 
has made its most distinctive and important contribution to Common-
wealth-State relations. A very brief description has already been 
given of the complexities and problems which the Council machinery 
helped to overcome In the Wheat Stabilisation Plan. With other indus-
tries, notably dairying, problems different but equally difficult, have 
been handled successfully as also in the case of tobacco. Even where 
solutions have still to be found, the Council and Standing Committee 
provide an excellent form to discuss proposals. 
The Council now functions as a tested and proven piece of admini-
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strative machinety. The expert competence of its technical advisoty 
committees and the continuing research with which it is in close touch 
should ensure that its planning wdU be on a sound technical and 
economic basis. The knowledge, by the CouncU itself and by the 
govemments it serves, of the importance and value of its work is a 
guarantee that that work wdU be continued wdth a corresponding sense 
of high responsibUity. The friendly associations and mutual under-
standing which continuing association has produced at both Mini-
sterial and official levels and the easy dignity wdth which the Council's 
proceedings are conducted make for (hspassionate and constructive 
consultation and for workable compromise where unanimity is not 
possible. 
If it is suggested that these facts in themselves do not guarantee 
vision and constructive statesmanship in the CouncU's approach to the 
future problems of Australian agriculture, it should be added that 
there is no reason to suppose such vision and statesmanship are less 
likely to be vouchsafed to agriculture's policy makers than to those 
of any other sector of the national economy. There is, in fact, good 
reason to believe, from the CoimcU's record of achievement, that these 
quahties wdU mark its future deliberations. 
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part six PARTIES AND 
PRESSURE GROUPS 
Australian political parties have been well served by two political 
scientists. Professor Louise Overacker^ and Mr. James Jupp,^ but Aus-
tralian pressure groups have been sadly neglected although it is gener-
aUy agreed that the parties can be understood only in relation to their 
attendant pressure groups, their "syndicates" in Professor Miller's 
term. On three occasions the Australian Institute of Political Science 
summer schools have produced reports on the state of Australian 
parties: Trends in Australian Politics in 1935, The Australian Political 
Party System in 1954, and Forces in Australian Politics in 1963. In 1935 
and 1963 papers by J. A. McCallum and P. B. Westerway gave parti-
cular attention to pressure groups, but apart from a few histories of 
primary producers' groups and some studies of trade unions in politics, 
they remain out of sight in the parties' back-rooms. 
The papers by Professor L. C. Webb and Professor J. D. B. MUler 
on "The Australian Party System" and "Party Discipline in Australia" 
are concerned wdth broad questions, the relationship between the 
party and electoral system and the recurrent problem of the mainten-
ance of discipline within parties. Dr. B. D. Graham and Professor R. S. 
Parker tell what is knowm about the role of financial interests behind 
the anti-Labor parties between 1910 and 1944, and whilst the Liberal 
Party denies that such a state of affairs exists today to understand 
the present structure of the Liberal Party it is necessaty to know 
what it guards against. Professor R. M. Martin performs a simUar 
service for the Australian Labor Party and its syndicates, the trade 
unions, although here the link is stUl vital. Finally Professor Keith O. 
Campbell and Mr. R. D. Freeman examine two major pressure groups 
areas, primary producers' and trade associations, and assess their im-
portance to the interaction of polity and economy. 
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22 THE AUSTRALIAN PARTY 
SYSTEM 
L. C. Webb 
The tide of a recent report by a committee of the American Pohtical 
Science Association—"Towards a More Responsible Two-Party Sys-
tem"—is one sign of a change of attitude in democratic countries to-
wards pohtical parties. In the past, parties have been studied in 
somewhat the same spirit as the pure scientist shows in the study of 
natural phenomena. That is, it has not been assumed that the purpose 
of study is to enable us to have better political parties any more than 
it has been assumed that the purpose of meteorology is to enable us to 
have bettfer weather. Political scientists have regarded it as part of 
their proper function to propose schemes for the reform of the civU 
service, the Cabinet, Parliament, and local government but they have 
seldom looked upon parties as institutions which the political com-
munity is entitied to shape in accordance with its political ideals. The 
courts, it seems, have a simUar view. In Australia, as we know from 
Cameron v. Hogan,^ a political party is legaUy a private association 
on a par with a cricket club or an art society; the courts wUl not inter-
fere with its management or mismanagement of its affairs on any plea 
of public interest but only on the meagre ground that the property 
interest of a member has been injuriously affected. 
There may be a justification in expediency for leaving political 
parties free to develop without interference from courts and legisla-
tures, and it can be admitted that attempts by political communities 
to control the development and functioning of political parties have 
not always been happy. But there can be no good reason for fading 
to take political parties for what they are—institutions with public 
responsibUities accountable to the community for the manner in which 
they discharge these responsibUities. In fact, the beginnings of 
such an attitude are perceptible in Australia. Three recent works on 
Australian politics—Sir Frederick Eggleston's Reflections of an Aus-
tralian Liberal, Professor Overacker's Australian Party System, and 
Professor Crisp's Parliamentary Government of Australia—ha.ve in 
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common a disposition to measure political parties and the party 
system against certain norms of good government. But while it is 
healthy that parties should be judged critically and should be regarded 
as subject to control in the public interest, it is important for the 
critics to avoid the kind of empiricism which assumes that the task 
of bringing parties under social control is relatively simple. It is legi-
timate to say that a political party and, say, a civil service both exer-
cise public functions and are therefore accountable for the manner 
in which they discharge these functions; but this one point of simi-
larity, important as it is, should not obscure the fact that they are very 
different social entities. Public services are institutions created from 
outside to serve defined purposes; though in some measure they 
develop their own powers of growth and adaptation, their develop-
ment is dictated largely by an externally imposed social policy. 
Political parties are spontaneous responses to needs seldom capable of 
precise definition; their development, up to the present, has been 
shaped by forces as yet imperfectly understood; and although a grow-
ing recognition of their importance in the processes of government is 
bringing them under critical judgment, it is still necessary, in the pre-
sent state of our knowledge of their nature and fimctioning, to move 
warily in regulating their activities. In so far as we have political 
democracy, it has been made possible by party govemment, and it is 
therefore prudent to assume in the party system some degree of immi-
nent wisdom. This, perhaps, is a long way of saying that those who 
want a better party system should begin by enquiring why the system 
is what it is. 
Before the last war, substantial books on the origins and functioning 
of the party system could be numbered on the fingers of one hand. 
The last decade or so, however, has seen notable advances in this 
branch of political science. In France, Duverger has made the first 
satisfying investigation of the effect of electoral systems on the 
development and functioning of parties and Goguel and others have 
demonstrated the possibUities of electoral geography. In England the 
election surveys sponsored by the Nuffield Foundation have showm the 
party system in action. In the United States sociologists and social 
psychologists have investigated the influence of social class and status 
on party membership and stmcture. 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest the possible bearing of some 
of this recent research on the Australian situation. I hope to show that 
Australian parties do constitute a system, to show also how this 
system arose, and to indicate some of the influences which govern its 
working. Finality, as Disraeli remarked, is not the language of politics, 
and in any case so littie work has been done in Australia on the histoty, 
stmcture, and interaction of political parties that an essay written now 
can be no more than a set of hypotheses for subsequent workers to 
demolish. 
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Even my first proposition, which is that Australia has a two-party 
system, is open to argument. Professor Lipson, whUe recognizing that 
minor parties can exist in a two-party system, holds that once a minor 
party succeeds in holding the balance between the principal con-
tenders the two-party system ceases to exist.^  This, he contends, has 
been the situation in Australia since the emergence of the Countty 
Party. For reasons which I wdU develop later, I believe that this both 
misconceives the nature and functioning of the Country Party and 
defines the two-party system too narrowly. 
It is clear that a two-party system had emerged in federal politics at 
the end of the first decade of federation, and it wUl be useful to begin 
by enquiring why it emerged and why it took the form it did. 
ORIGINS OF THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 
In the first three Commonwealth Parliaments members were divided 
into three fairly even groups—Protectionist, Free Trade, and Labour.* 
The first two groups were not political parties in the present sense of 
the term; they had no permanent electoral organization, their disci-
pline was loose, and they did not have programmes relevant to the 
whole range of political issues. To some extent, moreover, their basis 
was regional as weU as ideological. The Free Traders represented 
mainly the commercial interests of New South Wales. The Protec-
tionists had their main strength in Victoria, where the Liberal Party 
and the trade unions had formed a political alliance some twenty years 
previously. A substantial section of the Protectionist group was there-
fore Liberal and even radical on issues of social reform. 
The Labour Party, drawing its strength principally from New South 
Wales and Queensland, was in strong contrast to the Protectionist and 
Free Trade groups; it had a permanent organization based on the 
trade union movement and a tight discipline. Its principal difference 
from the Labour Party of today was that, although it had a general 
programme, it was still an interest party. "The members of the Labour 
Party," said one of its members, "receive the support of the wage-
eaming class chiefly, because their interests in the past have been 
neglected. We are here to definitely voice their requirements, and 
chiefly because the needs of other sections are vety carefuUy studied 
by other honourable members."* 
In this period the normal basis for a government was the similarity 
of outlook between Labour members and the more radical wing of the 
Protectionists. When the tariff issue was dominant the Protectionist 
could usually form a govemment with the support of those Labour 
members who favoured protection. When there was peace on the 
tariff front and issues of social reform or labour legislation were 
dominant the common radicalism of the left-wing Protectionists and 
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the Labour Party gave the Ministty a majority in the House. In the 
politics of this period it was men and policies that counted. A sense of 
the importance of the federal experiment drew to the Commonwealth 
Parliament men of powerful and independent minds. It was, moreover, 
a period in which great issues were decided. The tariff battle was 
resolved in favour of the Protectionists, the system of compulsoty 
arbitration of industrial disputes was completed by its extension to the 
Commonwealth sphere, a national defence policy related to a wider 
Imperial defence policy was initiated, and the machinety of federal 
govemment was brought into being and principles of Commonwealth-
State relations worked out. Historians have perhaps been too ready 
to regard the period as one of instabUity and confusion and the move-
ment towards the two-party system as a desirable development in the 
direction of a more responsible government. Yet govemment based on 
loose and shifting aUiances was in some respects weU suited to the 
formative years of the Commonwealth. It may have been a disad-
vantage that no government was ever sure of its term of office, but it 
was wholly advantageous that, as each national issue arose, the pre-
dominant parhamentaty opinion on that issue was effectively ex-
pressed. 
During this first decade of the Commonwealth Parliament, elections 
to the House of Representatives (with the partial exception of that of 
1901) were by simple majority and single member constituencies. 
According to a widely accepted theory, this electoral method tends, by 
a combination of mechanical and psychological factors, to the estab-
lishment of a two-party system. That is, the progressive under-repre-
sentation of weaker parties ultimately brings electors to the view that 
a vote is ineffectual unless cast for one of the two main parties. At 
first sight, electoral results in the first three Commonwealth elections 
TABLE 1* 
1903:* 
Free Trade 
Protectionist 
Labour 
Liberal 
1906: 
Free Trade 
Protectionist 
Labour 
Independent 
Tariff Reform 
Percentage of 
votes 
31.8 
28.4 
30.4 
'§M 
28.5 
23.7 
36.4 
.1 
11.3 
Percentage of 
seats 
34.7 
33.3 
30.7 
1.3 
26.7 
28.0 
32.0 
— 
13.3 
Average of votes 
per seats von 
8,817 
8,196 
9,521 
44,562 
13,573 
10,737 
14,438 
— 
10,736 
*The 1901 election was not conducted on a uniform franchise; no comparison, 
therefore, can be made of voting strengths and percentage of seats won. 
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do not support this theoty, since the main groups remained fairly even 
in both electoral support and parliamentary representation. 
The explanation of the relative stability of the main groups appears 
to be that the under-representation theoty of the origins of the two-
party system apphes only to a situation in which three or more nation-
aUy-organized parties are contestmg most of the electorates. This was 
not the situation in the Commonwealth elections of 1901, 1903, and 
1906. Only tihe Labour Party had a permanent central organization and 
it was as yet contesting only those electorates wdth substantial work-
ing-class populations. The Protectionist and Free Trade groups were 
not political parties in the present-day sense of the term and their 
strength was to some extent regionally concentrated. The movement 
towards the two-party system in Commonwealth politics paraUeled, 
and was in part caused by, the development of the modem type of 
party organization. In most of the States the two-party system had 
already emerged and Australian electors were therefore already aware 
of the consequences of three-cornered contests under the system of 
single-member constituencies with majority voting. Moreover, by the 
middle of the decade, the Free Traders found themselves in the posi-
tion of a minority attached to a lost cause. Reid's "Socialist tiger", 
paraded in the election of 1906, was the outcome of his search for a 
raison d'etre.® FinaUy, the decision of the Brisbane Labour Conference 
of 1908 to forbid Labour parliamentarians to enter political alliances 
speUed the end of government on the basis of group combinations.* 
Men like Groom might protest against the assumption that govern-
ment by aUiances was "absolutely fatal to the administration of respon-
sible government under our Constitution",'^ but Deakin's metaphor of 
the three cricket elevens seems to have expressed the majority 
opinion.* 
The more interesting question is not why the system of govemment 
by aUiances gave way to the two-party system, but why the two-party 
division did not foUow what appeared to be the natural line of cleav-
age. As we have seen, the common radicalism of the Labour Party 
members and a group of Protectionists was the real basis for majority 
govemment in the first decade of the Commonwealth parliament. 
Moreover, in both Victoria and New Zealand an alliance between 
Liberals and trade unionists had formed the basis for a mass party of 
the Left. Why, then, did not the Commonwealth parhamentaty situa-
tion resolve itself on simUar lines? Deakin, for one, had assumed as 
early as 1908 that this would be the course of events and had offered 
to withdraw from the leadership of his group in favour of Sir WUliam 
Lyne in order that the latter might negotiate an aUiance wdth Labour.® 
By this time, it should be noted, the tariff issue has ceased to be a real 
point of difficulty between the Protectionists and the Labour Party, 
since Deakin's "new protection" policy, in spite of the obstacles im-
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posed by the High Court, had converted most Labour members to 
protectionism. The real reason for the unnatural aUiance between the 
Protectionists and the Free Traders lay in the fact that the emergence 
of a separate Labour Party had destroyed the possibility of a Liberal-
Trade Unionist Party on the Victorian and New Zealand pattern. 
For, although the social Liberalism of men like Deakin and Groom 
would have enabled them to accept most of the Labour Party's pro-
gramme, they had also inherited enough of an older tradition of 
Liberalism to make the Labour Party's tight discipline and intolerance 
of dissent entirely unacceptable to them. The fusion of 1910 marked 
the end of the politics of men and principles and brought in the 
politics of party machines and interest groups. 
One other aspect of the fusion deserves notice. The political faith of 
Deakin and his followers was Liberalism adapted to the Australian 
environment; from nineteenth-century English Liberalism they had 
inherited a belief in the freedom and dignity of the individual as the 
touchstone of aU political action, but the realities of the colonial 
environment had saved them from the dogmatic attachment to laissez 
f aire, which, by the end of the nineteenth century, was causing English 
Liberalism to lose the initiative in social reform. The weakness of this 
creed, it may be suspected, was that it came too close to expressing the 
political faith of the middle block in Australian politics and therefore 
afforded no basis for a two-party system. There is some confirmation 
for this point of view in the events preceding the 1910 election. Early 
in 1909, knowing that some sort of political consolidation was immi-
nent, Deakin set out on a tour of the eastern States with the intention 
of stimulating political organization among his supporters.-^" The result 
of his tour is thus described in a letter to his sister: 
All the information gained confirmed my pessimistic outlook from an elec-
toral point of view, though I was gratified to find our pohcy popular every-
where and, broadly speaking, witii all classes. But this very encouraging 
state of mind promised nothing to us as a party. In each State a decisive 
raUy is being made against the Labour caucus, and the old Opposition, 
being everywhere at the head of it, has those who sympathize with our 
views working with them for each local fray. We could not dissociate them 
for federal constituencies without a new organization of their own, which 
they dreaded, lest it should divide the vote against Labour. Hence there 
was no place for us or our organizations except in the very few electorates 
we aheady held. . . .^ ^ 
The fusion of 1910 was the beginning of a split in Australian Libera-
lism. In so far as it was individualist, it became absorbed in the party 
of the right; in so far as it was radical and empirical it became 
absorbed in the Labour Party. But the great non-existent centre party 
of Australian politics, determining the general trend of political action, 
has remained in the Deakin tradition of Liberalism. Duverger, who 
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has done more than any other political scientist to clarify the relation-
ship between electoral systems and political parties, has noted the 
paradox that, although the single-member constituency system pre-
vents the emergence of an organized centre party, nevertheless "the 
centre influences the whole parliamentary life of the country".^^ 
THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN ACTION 
For four elections after the fusion, Australia had an orthodox two-
party system. Table 2 shows the percentage of total valid votes cast 
for each party and for independent candidates and also the percent-
age of seats won by each group. 
TABLE 2 
1910 
1913 
1914 
1917 
Non-L 
Percentage 
of votes 
45.1 
48.9 
47.2 
54.2 
abour 
Percentage 
of seats 
41.3 
50.7 
44.0 
70.7 
Lab 
Percentage 
of votes 
49.6 
48.5 
50.9 
44.5 
our 
Percentage 
of seats 
56.0 
49.3 
54.7 
29.3 
Independents 
Percentage 
of votes 
5.3 
2.6 
2.0 
1.3 
Percentage 
of seats 
2.7 
1.3 
We have here a good example of the tendency of the system of single-
member constituencies with the simple majority vote to over-represent 
the party with the highest percentage of total votes and so to under-
represent third parties and independents that the elector's effective 
choice must lie between the two major parties. Thus, with 54.2 per 
cent of votes in 1917, the non-Labour party won 70.7 per cent of seats, 
whereas 48.9 per cent of votes in 1913 won it only 50.7 per cent of 
seats. The decline in the percentage of votes cast for independents 
during the period is also significant, as also is their virtual elimination 
from political life. The main objective of the fusion—the establishment 
of a stable two-party system—had, it seemed, been fully achieved. 
In 1919, however, the electoral law was changed in a manner which 
has profoundly affected the development of the party system. During 
the First World War the farming interest in Australia, as in several 
other countries, had become convinced of the need for independent 
political action. What would have happened if the Australian Country 
Party had been allowed to struggle for existence within the framework 
of the then existing electoral law is a matter for speculation. Possibly, 
like the New Zealand Country Party, it would have been strangled in 
infancy by the simple majority system; alternatively, it might have won 
a secure but restricted existence as a regional party simUar to the Irish 
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Nationalists. But it so happened that in a by-election in 1918 for the 
Victorian electorate of Flinders the Australian Country Party put up a 
candidate and thereby threatened to wreck the chances of S. M. Bmce, 
at that time the rising hope of the non-Labour forces. The Nationalists 
bought a stiaight fight for Bruce with a promise to introduce preferen-
tial voting.^^ Admittedly, the change commended itself to many on the 
non-Labour side who were repeUed by the rigidity of party discipline 
and who hoped that preferential voting would do away with the pre-
selection of candidates. It may be, indeed, that the introduction of pre-
ferential voting was less a matter of chance than the surface facts seem 
to indicate and that Australian political opinion was too varied and 
vigorous to be contained wdthin the orthodox two-party system. The 
merit of preferential voting seemed to be that it enabled parties to 
relax their discipline without seriously compromising their electoral 
prospects. 
PREFERENTIAL VOTING AND THE PARTY SYSTEM: 
1919-1929 
Two main difficulties are encountered in any attempt to assess the 
effect of preferential voting on the party system, the first is that there 
is a continual danger of confusing cause and effect. Obviously electoral 
laws do influence the functioning of parties and their interaction; but 
over the long period it may reasonably be assumed that the party 
system tends to get the electoral system best suited to its needs. The 
second difficulty is that, at different periods, preferential voting 
appears to produce different effects. 
It is clear, for mstance, that the elections of 1919, 1922, 1925, 1928 
and 1929 constitute a fairly homogenous group, in which the pre-
ferential voting system had the effects intended by its authors. Though 
parties did not abandon pre-selection, the number of candidates in-
creased signfficantiy. In the four elections between 1910 and 1917, the 
highest number of candidates was 162 in 1910 and the lowest 140 m 
1914. In the five elections between 1919 and 1929, the lowest number 
of candidates was 150 m 1928 and the highest 199 m 1922. This m-
crease is only partly accounted for by the emergence of the Countty 
Party, and a closer examination of election returns suggests that pre-
ferential voting gave some encouragement to independents and to un-
endorsed party candidates. The two mam parties did not, however, 
substantially modify their pre-selection systems, though the Countty 
Party adopted multiple endorsement. It is also noticeable that, whereas 
between 1910 and 1917 the total vote for mdependent candidates 
dwindled rapidly, it increased substantiaUy m 1919 and, wdth the excep-
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tion of the 1925 election, remamed at above 3 per cent. It may be 
assumed that preferential votmg, by lessening the dangers of vote 
splittmg, somewhat lessened the reluctance of electors to vote for 
independents. 
But the most noticeable feature of this period is the apparent ease 
with which the two-party system, assisted by preferential voting, 
accommodated itself to the existence of the Country Party. In the 
1919 election, for mstance, the Countty Party contested seventeen 
seats and won eleven; of the seventeen seats contested, eight were also 
contested by Nationalist candidates. In the three-cornered contests, 
exchange of preferences between Nationalist and Countty Party con-
didates was highly effective. In five cases where the result was decided 
on preferences the highest leakage was twelve per cent and the lowest 
three and a half per cent. This is the pattem for the period; it was only 
rarely that non-Labour lost seats through vote splitting, and on the 
whole the two main party machines seem to have had the situation 
fuUy under control. 
But even in this period it is clear that preferential voting was not 
whoUy effective in eliminating vote splitting. Since there is always 
some leakage of preferences—the average in three-cornered contests 
decided on preferences may be about five per cent—it was stiU neces-
saty for the two non-Labour parties to seek the elimination of one of 
their candidates in electorates where non-Labour and Labour are 
evenly balanced. Moreover, it is noticeable that the leakage of pre-
ferences usuaUy increases substantially when the number of candi-
dates rises above three. Thus, in 1922 Riverina was contested by a 
Labour candidate, a Nationalist candidate, and two Country Party 
candidates. The seat was won by a Countty Party candidate but the 
preferences of the Nationalist candidate and of the other Countty 
Party candidate revealed a leakage of 16.5 per cent to Labour. 
The first-preference voting figures for the period are analysed in 
Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
(Country Party figures in brackets) 
1919 
1922 
1925 
1928 
1929 
Non-Labour 
Percentage 
of first 
preference 
votes 
53.8 (8.4) 
50.9 (12.9) 
53.7(11.6) 
51.9 (12.0) 
44.6(11.3) 
Percentage 
of seats 
62.7 (14.7) 
60.0(18.7) 
69.3 (20.0) 
57.3 (18.6) 
33.2 (14.6) 
Labour 
Percentage 
of first 
preference 
votes 
41.5 
43.8 
44.7 
44.8 
48.8 
Percentage 
of seats 
34.7 
38.7 
29.3 
41.3 
61.3 
Independents 
Percentage 
of first 
preference 
votes 
4.7 
3.4 
1.7 
3.3 
6.1 
Percentage 
of seats 
2.7 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
5.3 
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If for the moment we regard the Nationalist and Countty Parties as 
constituting one political group, it is clear that, in this period, pre-
ferential voting gives a pattern not essentiaUy different from simple 
majority voting. That is, the group which is stronger in terms of votes 
is relatively over-represented, and its over-representation is the more 
pronounced the higher its share of the votes. For instance, the non-
Labour group in 1925 received less than 54 per cent of total votes but 
won nearly 70 per cent of seats. In 1929, however, its share of total 
votes feU to just under 45 per cent, but its share of seats feU to only 
a third of the total. On the evidence of the elections from 1919 to 
1929, then, preferential voting, although it encourages independents 
and unendorsed candidates, does not modify the law of under-repre-
sentation of weaker parties. 
PREFERENTIAL VOTING AND THE PARTY SYSTEM: 
1931-1946 
The pattern of Australian politics in the elections of 1931, 1934, 1937, 
1940,1943 and 1946 is dramaticaUy different from that in the five pre-
ceding elections. In 1931 the Labour Party split under the strains 
imposed by the economic depression. In New South Wales there was 
open conflict between the State Labour machine and the Federal 
Labour Party, and in addition the Labour cause was further divided 
by the emergence of other minor parties, including the Communist 
Party and the Social Credit Party. About 1938 the process of disinte-
gration spread to non-Labour and was characterized by frequent 
independent candidates and by the emergence of a litter of minor 
parties, including the One Parliament for Australia Party, the Services 
and Citizens Party, and the Liberal and Democrats. As might be 
expected, the total of candidates rises steeply in this period—229 in 
1931, 237 m 1934, 190 in 1937, 268 m 1940, and 327 in 1943. In the 
1943 election there were eleven parties in the field, in addition to an 
exceptionally large number of independents and United Australia 
Party candidates secured little more than 16 per cent of the total first-
preference votes. 
The record of the preferential voting system in this period is an 
interesting one. In New South Wales Labour had won 20 out of 28 
seats in the 1929 election; in the 1931 election, the conflict between 
State and Federal Labour machines lost it 13 of these seats. Preferen-
tial voting was largely ineffective in preventing vote splitting, for 
although 90 per cent and over of State Labour preferences went to 
Federal Labour, there was little reciprocity. Barton, which was con-
tested by U.A.P., State Labour, and Federal Labour, was won by 
U.A.P. because over one-third of the Federal Labour preferences went 
to U.A.P. In East Sydney, State Labour could have won the seat with 
only 57 per cent of Federal Labour preferences, but in fact over 50 
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per cent of Federal Labour preferences went to U.A.P. In Macquarie, 
on the other hand, State Labour preferences were distributed 94 per 
cent to Federal Labour and 6 per cent to U.A.P.; however, 97 per cent 
of State Labour preferences would have been required to elect the 
Federal Labour candidate. In Newcastie over 90 per cent of State 
Labour preferences went to the Federal Labour candidate, thereby 
securing his election. 
The pattern of preference voting on the Labour side m subsequent 
elections of this period is simUar to that for 1931, and the conclusion 
which emerges is that the Labour side is relatively unsuccessful in 
using the preferential votmg system as a means of preserving its 
electoral strength in a period of stmctural disunity. The contrast m 
the aUocation of State and Federal Labour preferences in 1931 is at 
first sight somewhat puzzling. Two causes seem likely. The first is 
that State Labour, being further to the left than Federal Labour, 
would be less likely to countenance the giving of preferences to the 
right; the second is that the Federal Labour Party conceived itself to 
be fighting for the unity of the movement as a whole and would there-
fore be likely to regard a victoty for a rebel as a greater evU than the 
loss of a seat. In this connection it is relevant to note that whereas 
about 80 per cent of the preferences of Communist candidates norm-
ally go to Labour, only a very small percentage of Labour preferences 
go to Communist candidates. Indeed, the preferential voting system 
reveals clearly the extent to which the Labour Party's exclusiveness 
and its insistence on formal unity impede the mobUization of the 
varied political interests which lie to the left of the centre. 
Non-Labour's use of the preferential voting system in this period is 
considerably more effective. The contrast with Labour is exemplified 
in the New South Wales electorate of Lang, which in 1931 was con-
tested by State Labour, Federal Labour, and two U.A.P. candidates. 
Lang had been won by Labour in 1928 and 1929; it was lost to non-
Labour in 1931 because, whereas 93 per cent of the weaker U.A.P. 
candidate's preferences went to the other U.A.P. candidate, only about 
two-thirds of Federal Labour preferences went to State Labour. But 
even on the non-Labour side the leakage of preferences increases wdth 
the number of candidates, and in elections such as those of 1943 and 
1946, when parties proliferated on the right, the preferential voting 
system did not save the right from a substantial loss of voting strength. 
These two elections mark the peak of factionalism in Australian 
politics, and there are occasional cases of dissident Labour candi-
dates being elected on Liberal preferences. In Reid, in 1946, J. T. 
Lang received 80 per cent of Liberal preferences, and in Bourke in the 
same year Mrs Blackburn received over 80 per cent of Liberal pre-
ferences. 
Table 4 analyses the election returns for the period. 
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TABLE 4 
(Country Party figures in brackets) 
1931 
1934 
1937 
1940 
1943 
1946 
Non-L 
Percentage 
of first 
preference 
votes 
53.2 (10.6) 
49.8 (13.5) 
49.7 (16.2) 
44.9 (13.8) 
35.8 (8.4) 
45.4(11.4) 
abour 
Percentage 
of seats 
74.6(21.3) 
63.5 (20.3) 
60.8 (23.0) 
51.3 (18.9) 
32.4(13.5) 
39.2 (14.9) 
Labour 
Percentage 
of first 
preference 
votes 
38.2 
48.2 
45.9 
48.0 
53.0 
52.8 
Percentage 
of seats 
24.0 
36.5 
39.2 
48.6 
66.2 
59.5 
Independents 
Percentage 
of first 
preference 
votes 
7.8 
2.0 
4.4 
7.0 
11.1 
1.8 
Percentage 
of seats 
1.3 
1.4 
1.3 
These figures bring out a tendency which is also perceptible in the 
preceding period—the tendency of non-Labour to be relatively over-
represented by comparison with Labour. Thus, with 53.2 per cent of 
votes in 1931 non-Labour won 74.6 per cent of seats; wdth about the 
same percentage of votes in 1943 Labour won only 66.2 per cent of 
seats. The reason for this discrepancy wdU be discussed later. 
THE ROLE OF THE COUNTRY PARTY 
Before discussing in general terms the effects of preferential voting on 
the party system, it seems appropriate to consider what light is thrown 
on the r61e of the Country Party by the facts we have been consider-
ing. The Countty Party has lately become the whipping-boy of Aus-
tralian pohtics. Sir Frederick Eggleston,^* Professor Overacker,^ ® and 
Professor Crisp^ ® have aU admonished it for opportunism and the 
Sydney Morning Herald^'' has recentiy recommended it to eliminate 
itself in the interests of good govemment. I wiU not venture to justffy 
pohtical opportunism, beyond remarking that if we are to make it a 
ground for eliminating politicians and parties it wUl be hard to know 
where to stop. But I wdU venture to suggest, on the strength of the 
voting figures for the periods we have been considering, that the 
role of the Countty Party has not been adequately understood. 
If we consider the Countty Party figures in Tables 3 and 4 one 
striking fact emerges: the Countty Party's percentage of seats won is 
higher in evety election it has contested, and sometimes substantiaUy 
higher, than its percentage of the total of first-preference votes. This 
picture is even more striking if (as has been done in the next table) 
we calculate the number of votes which (on average) a party requires 
to wdn a seat. 
These figures considerably iUuminate our previous generalization 
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TABLE 5 
= 
1919: 
Labour 
Nationalist 
Country Party 
Independent 
1922: 
Labour 
Nationalist 
Country Party 
Liberal 
Independent 
1925: 
Labour 
Nationalist 
Country Party 
Independent 
1928: 
Laboiur 
Nationalist 
Country Party 
C.P. Progressive 
Independent 
1929: 
Labour 
Nationalist 
Country Party 
Independent 
Percentage of 
first preference 
votes 
41.5 
45.4 
8.4 
4.7 
43.8 
36.1 
12.9 
3.9 
3.4 
44.7 
42.1 
11.6 
1.7 
44.8 
39.9 
10.4 
1.6 
3.3 
48.8 
33.3 
10.3 
6.1 
Percentage of 
seats 
34.7 
48.0 
14.7 
2.7 
38.7 
36.0 
18.7 
5.3 
1.3 
29.3 
49.3 
20.0 
1.3 
41.3 
38.7 
17.3 
1.3 
1.3 
61.3 
18.6 
13.3 
1.3 
Average of first 
preference votes 
per seat won 
30,455 
24,065 
14,542 
45,525 
23,765 
20,965 
14,452 
15,445 
53,137 
59,214 
33,201 
22,470 
48,413 
37,340 
38,290 
20,597 
41,713 
84,273 
30,570 
74,648.5 
29.782 
176,730 
that non-Labour tends to win its seats less expensively in terms of 
votes than Labour and therefore to be over-represented in relation to 
Labour. The usual explanation of this tendency is that Labour voting 
strength is heavUy concentrated in certain working-class metropolitan 
seats and in the mining-pastoral seats. But if the Countty Party figures 
are considered separately, it becomes apparent that the over-represen-
tation of non-Labour is due largely (though not wholly) to the very 
heavy over-representation of the Country Party. The position seems to 
be that the Countty Party contests a limited number of seats, most of 
them in the wheat belt and the smaU farming areas, and most of them 
only marginaUy attached to non-Labour. If the Countty Party did not 
contest these seats, some of them would probably be lost to non-
Labour. That is, by virtue of its ability to mobUize the countty interest, 
the Countty Party enables non-Labour to win more seats than would 
be possible if there were only one non-Labour Party. 
If this view is correct, it foUows that the Countty Party is not an 
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orthodox third party in the sense understood by Professor Lipson, but 
is more in the nature of a regional and autonomous extension of the 
main non-Labour Party. It does not, as Professor Lipson suggests, 
"hold the balance between the main contenders", for although it has 
a certain bargaining power its freedom of action is limited by two 
considerations.^^ The first is that (except in Victorian State politics, 
where it is in some respects a different party) the Countty Party 
cannot be regarded as free to switch its allegiance at will between 
Labour and non-Labour. Its whole policy line has always been anti-
Labour, its leaders have always been careful to emphasize its loyalty 
to composite non-Labour govemments, and in any case the Labour 
Party's rules prevent it from entering alliances. In the second place, 
the introduction of list voting in Senate elections means that the 
Countty Party, if it hopes to get Senate representation, has little 
option but to enter into an alliance with a party organized in all 
electorates. In its 34 years of representation in the Commonwealth 
Parliament, the Countty Party has not once overthrowm a government 
of the right, and it may be suspected that its disintegration would 
begin on the day that it attempted to do so. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENTIAL VOTING 
Preferential voting, as we have seen, was introduced mainly in order 
to prevent the main party of the right from being weakened by the 
emergence of the Country Party and also with some thought that it 
might do away with or modify the system of pre-selection of candi-
dates. The first purpose appears to have been achieved, though it is at 
least questionable whether preferential voting is a necessaty condi-
tion of the Country Party's existence as a minor party within what is 
essentiaUy a two-party system. If the analysis of the Countty Party's 
role in the preceding section is valid, it may reasonably be argued that 
the Countty Party could continue as a regional party by virtue of its 
abUity to wdn certain countty seats which the main party of the right 
would not be able to win. 
The effect of preferential voting on pre-selection practices has been 
slight. Though the Country Party aUows multiple endorsement, the 
two main parties have maintained rigid pre-selection systems. The 
U.A.P. aUowed multiple endorsements in 1940, but only because it was 
so disunited that it was compeUed to do so. However, although pre-
ferential voting has had little effect on pre-selection systems, it has 
obviously weakened the capacity of the main parties to enforce party 
discipline and to prevent splinter parties and unendorsed and inde-
pendent candidates from entering the election field. 
To what extent, then, can the notorious factionalism of Australian 
politics be attributed to preferential voting? The strUdng difference 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Parties and Pressure Groups I 335 
between the 1919-29 and 1931-46 periods is a warning agamst hasty 
generalization. In the first period, though independent candidacies 
increased, there was no noticeable tendency for parties to splinter o r -
apart from the Country Party-for new parties to emerge. On the other 
hand, it would be difficult to attribute the splintering and factionalism 
of the period between 1931 and 1946 solely to the inability of the 
Labour Party to meet the chaUenge of the economic depression. In 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand, and indeed in most countries 
wdth two-party systems, the party m power at the onset of the depres-
sion tended to disintegrate. But the disintegration lasted for a com-
paratively short time. In Australia, the splintermg process went on for 
fifteen years, with a brief interlude of stability in the period of the 
1937 election. It is thus difficult to avoid the conclusion that preferen-
tial voting, because it lessens the fear of vote splitting, greatly 
reduces the two-party system's capacity to resist factionahsm and 
greatly extends the time the system takes to recuperate after a major 
fission. 
The histOty of the State Labour revolt in New South Wales seems 
to support this conclusion. Splits of this sort are common enough in 
Labour movements, but with the system of single-member constituen-
cies and simple majority voting the consequences of vote splitting are 
such that the left has a choice between unity and overwhelming elec-
toral defeat. But preferential voting, even though the rival Labour 
factions were not able to work out an effective arrangement for the 
exchange of preferences, still enabled Labour to avoid overwhelming 
defeat. This at least partly explains why State Labour won four New 
South Wales seats in 1931 and nine in 1934 and why in a somewhat 
dffierent form, this faction reasserted itself later. 
The two-party system, then, is weakened by preferential voting. 
But it remains a two-party system. Like proportional representation, 
preferential voting encourages the multiplication of parties; but since 
it mitigates without eliminating the dangers of vote splitting it does 
not (as proportional representation does) enable a multiplicity of 
parties to exist. (The special case of the Countty Party has already 
been considered.) The analyses of electoral returns given in this paper 
show that, with single-member constituencies, the substitution of pre-
ferential voting for simple majority voting does not appreciably 
diminish the tendency of the system to under-represent the weaker of 
two major parties and so greatly to under-represent third, fourth and 
fifth parties that their position is virtually hopeless. The figures for the 
1931 election are a good Ulustration of this point (Table 6) . 
The other important effect of preferential voting, already noticed, 
is to give an appreciable advantage to the non-Labour parties because 
they combine a tolerance of dissent wdth an underlying sense of com-
munity of interest. Because the Labour Party dislikes deviationists 
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TABLE 6 
1931: 
A.L.P. 
State Labour 
U.A.P. 
Country Party 
Communist 
Independent 
Percentage of 
first preference 
votes 
27.1 
10.6 
42.6 
10.6 
M 
Percentage of 
seats 
18.7 
5.3 
53.3 
21.3 
__ 
I J 
Average of first 
preference votes 
per seat won 
61,390 
83,830 
33,751 
23,040 
— 
250,060 
more than it dislikes its opponents of the right, it cannot get much 
advantage from preferential voting. 
The record of preferential voting in Australia is not, I suggest, an 
impressive one. It has stimulated faction and intrigue but it has not 
removed or mitigated any of the bad features of the two-party system 
—its tendency to avoid issues rather than to face them, its insensitive-
ness to new currents of opinion, and its under-representation of 
minority interests. The minor parties which emerged in the period 
between 1931 and 1946 were short-lived and sterUe; they added 
nothing to Australian political Iffe except confusion and corruption. 
THE SOCIAL RASIS OF THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 
My argument could, at this stage, be summarized somewhat as 
foUows: Australia has a two-party system which is the result in part 
of a popular belief that no other system is compatible with responsible 
govemment and in part of the tendency of single-member constituen-
cies to eliminate minor parties; the distinctive features of the Aus-
tralian two-party system are in part due to the adoption of preferential 
voting. 
The importance of electoral laws in explaining party systems lies 
in the fact that the purpose of political parties is to wdn elections. 
Electoral laws are, as it were, the rules of the party battle and they 
must therefore be a principal determinant of party behaviour. But it is 
obvious that they are only a partial determinant; in some measure, 
party behaviour must be a result of other forces, including the struc-
ture of society itself. Most people are, in this matter, unconscious 
Marxists; even if they do not adopt in its wholeness the theoty of 
parties put forward in the opening passages of the "Communist Mani-
festo",^ ® they assume some relationship between party and social class. 
A recent French writer on party systems, for instance, makes the 
statement that the Liberal and Labour parties m Australia correspond 
roughly to the division between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.^" 
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"AU parties are class parties;" says Mr. A. L. Rowse, "they represent 
an agglomeration of class-interests, and if you seek the motive force of 
their pohcy you must look to their centre of gravity, which is m 
class."" 
The difficulty about these generahzations concernmg the relation-
ship between class and party is that the moment we try to extract a 
precise meanmg from them we find that it is hnpossible to attach a 
clear and agreed meaning to the term "class". We can, however, get 
some clarification of the problem by laying hold of a proposition which 
is common to almost all theories of class—that a person's occupation 
imposes on him certain attitudes in regard to social and political 
issues,^ ^ or, more simply, that if we know something about a person's 
occupation we know something about his political opmions. The 
surveys carried out by Australian Public Opinion Polls make possible 
a rough test of this hypothesis. Tables 7 and 8 indicate the relation-
ship between party voting and occupational status in the elections of 
1951 and 1953. 
TABLE 7 
Survey 79—30 March 1951: 
Occupational Groups 
Professional, and business 
owners and managers 
Owners of small busi-
nesses 
White collar workers 
SldUed workers 
Semi-skilled 
Unskilled 
Farmers 
Farm Labourers 
How they said they 
voted at the 1949 
Federal Election 
Labour 
% 
11 
43 
39 
61 
68 
79 
15 
47 
Non-
Labour 
% 
89 
57 
61 
38 
32 
21 
85 
52 
Ind. 
% 
— 
1 
— 
— 
1 
How they said they 
would vote at the 
1951 Federal 
Election 
Labour 
% 
15 
46 
34 
64 
68 
81 
18 
53 
Non-
Labour 
/o 
85 
53 
64 
36 
31 
19 
82 
47 
Ind. 
/o 
1 
2 
, 
1 
— 
, 
It is important to note that these tables indicate, not actual voting, 
but expressions of intention to vote in a particular way and assertions 
of having voted in a particular way. It is consequently probable that 
the preponderance of non-Labour voting at the top of the occupa-
tional scale and of Labour voting at the bottom of the scale are 
somewhat exaggerated. It is likely that more unskiUed workers wUl 
vote non-Labour than wiU admit they voted non-Labour. The pattern 
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TABLE 8 
Survey 94—10 Aiml 1953: 
Occupational Groups 
Professional, and business 
owners and managers 
Owners of small busi-
nesses 
White collar workers 
Skilled workers 
Semi-skilled 
Unskilled 
Farmers 
Farm Labourers 
How they said they 
voted at the 1951 
Federal Election 
Labour 
% 
20 
58 
48 
70 
75 
85 
28 
64 
Non-
Labour 
% 
80 
41 
51 
30 
25 
14 
72 
36 
Ind. 
% 
1 
1 
1 
How they said they 
would vote at the 
1953 Senate 
Election 
Labour 
% 
22 
60 
53 
77 
78 
89 
31 
67 
Non-
Labour 
% 
78 
38 
46 
23 
22 
10 
68 
33 
Ind. 
% 
1 
1 
1 
1 
showm in these tables is, it should be added, simUar in its main out-
line to the patterns revealed by similar investigations in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. 
Most people will say that they do not need public opinion poUs to 
teU them that most unskilled workers vote Labour; but although the 
facts may be obvious, their bearing on the functioning of political 
parties and the party system may be less obvious. For the fact that 
most unskiUed workers vote Labour is less significant than the fact 
that one in five does not vote Labour. Putting it more generally, Aus-
tralian political parties do not get overwhelming support from any one 
occupational group. The same phenomenon has been noted in 
England; a recent survey of the relationship between voting and 
occupation in the Greenwich area shows that what is conventionally 
described as a "solid working-class area" is one in which there is a 
70-30 preponderance of Labour votes.^^ An American political scientist 
has drawm the foUowing conclusion from similar correlations between 
voting and occupation in the United States: 
UsuaUy even under favourable circumstances 60 per cent or 70 per cent of 
any group is the maximum response that can be elicited in pohtical agita-
tion. All pohtical organization is subject to a law of imperfect mobffization 
of social interests, the consequence of the fact that each individual person 
has many interests and belongs to many groups.^* 
The fact that political parties get some support from aU occupational 
groups but cannot fully mobUize the support of any one group is one of 
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the main influences determming policies and electoral appeals. If, for 
instance, the Labour Party were to base its election programme exclu-
sively on the interests of trade unionists, it would not greatiy increase 
its trade-union vote and would almost certainly lose heavUy in 
support from other groups. More and more, in the two-party system, 
parties are commg to realize that safety lies in general appeals; for 
not only do gains secured by appeals to group interests tend to be self-
cancelling, but identification with group interests diminishes the 
party's freedom of manoeuvre. 
These considerations go some way towards explaining why, in Aus-
tralia, the Labour Party has been relatively less successful than the 
main parties of the right in mobUizing electoral support. We have 
seen that, m the first decade of the Commonwealth Parliament, the 
Labour Party was in fact and professedly an interest party. It was 
able to function as an interest party only because, in the absence of 
the two-party system, it could wield effective political power by 
holding the balance between the Free Trade and Protectionist groups. 
When the Brisbane Labour Conference of 1908 vetoed political 
aUiances and thereby hastened the emergence of a two-party system, 
it created for the political wing of the Labour movement a dUemma 
which it has not yet resolved. Henceforth, the Labour Party could only 
achieve power by becoming the mass party of the left and it could only 
do so by ceasing to be an interest party. From one point of view, the 
whole histoty of the Labour Party since the election of 1910 has Ibeen 
the histoty of a conflict between the efforts of the trade unions to 
preserve the original character of the Labour Party as the political 
expression of the industrial labour movement and the efforts of 
Labour politicians to win that freedom of manoeuvre which alone wUl 
enable them to gain political power. Sir Frederick Eggleston, in his 
Reflections of an Australian Liberal, makes the claim that the Liberal 
Party has always been better able to express the mind of the Aus-
tralian people than the Labour Party has. This is a statement which 
could be variously enterpreted, but if it ...eans that the Liberal Party, 
being less securely anchored than the Labour Party to a single interest 
group, is better able to adopt its policy to changing circumstances and 
currents of opinion, I would agree with it. In the forty-three years 
since the two-party system established itself, the Liberal Party has 
held office for over twenty-eight years. This is partly due, as we have 
seen, to the tendency of the electoral system to under-represent 
Labour, but it is due also to non-Labour's greater freedom of 
manoeuvre. 
The tension between the political and industrial wings of the 
Labour movement brought about by the demands of the two-party 
system is, I believe, a pointer to the significance of that vety remark-
able feature of the Australian labour movement—the A.L.P. industrial 
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groups. The industrial groups are commonly regarded as a counter to 
Communist influence in the unions—which no doubt they are. But 
recent statements by Labour leaders put the groups in a somewhat 
different hght. Dr. Evatt has said that group control of the unions is 
necessaty to ensure that future Labour govemments wdU not be 
embarrassed, as Mr. Chifley's government was tn 1949, by the indisci-
pline of trade unions; and an official Labour publication, commenting 
on the success of the groups in gaining control of certain unions, 
clahned that this meant the re-affiliation of 80,000 unionists with the 
Labour Party.^^ We are, it seems, witnessing the reverse of the process 
whereby, towards the end of last centuty, the trade imions created a 
political party and then sought to keep it under control. Today the 
political party is reaching back and seeking to control the unions, 
hoping thereby to win the independence without which it cannot be 
fully effective as the party of the left in a two-party system. 
The outcome of this curious process may be somewhat different from 
what the political wdng of the Labour movement intends. Mr. Star-
gardt, tn his edition of Mr. Chifley's speeches, has remarked that a 
struggle is tn progress for the soul of the trade-union movement.^® 
It is at least possible that the trade-union movement, foUowdng a 
clearly defined trend in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, may 
prefer to have a soul of its owm. Now that the battie for trade-union 
rights has been won, and full employment accepted as a part of 
national policy, the case for trade imions identffying themselves with 
one poUtical party is at least open to argument. Most trade-union 
leaders would agree that their task is never more difficult than when a 
Labour govemment is in power. 
CONVERGENCE ON THE CENTRE 
It might seem inappropriate to end a discussion of the Australian 
party system without some reference to party policies, but with the 
progressive watering dowm of the Labour Party's socialism, it has 
become difficult for the student of politics to point to anything more 
than differences of emphasis m the party programmes. To some extent, 
as we have seen, there is a tendency m all two-party systems for the 
maul parties to converge to the centie. This is due partiy to the fact 
that, m the two-party system, it is only the voters of the centre who 
have an effective choice, and it is therefore to the centre that the 
parties must direct theh appeal. It is due also to the fact tiaat a party 
is not likely to achieve more than a 70 per cent mobUization of any 
social group; it cannot therefore afford to make its election pohcy a 
direct appeal to group interests. 
In Australia, this process of convergence towards the centre has 
been powerfuUy stimulated by federahsm. The two mahi parties, and 
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to a less extent the Country Party, reflect in their structure the original 
federal compact. The State party organizations, like the State Parlia-
ments in the first two decades of federalism, are more influential than 
the Commonwealth party organizations. Both in Commonweakh elec-
tions and referenda, the parties function, not as national organizations, 
but as loosely-knit federations of State organizations. In the half 
century since federation, there has been a steady accretion of power 
to the Commonwealth Parliament—so much so that in the smaller 
States parliamentary institutions have begun to atrophy. Federal issues 
now dominate the political life of Australia, whereas in the earlier 
period of federation (as R. S. Parker has showm in his study of 
referendums) State political issues tended to dominate federal politics. 
Party organization has followed this trend—but with a long time lag. 
Thus, it was not until fifteen years after federation that the A.L.P. set 
up its Federal Executive, even though the Labour movement had 
been a powerful influence on the side of federalism. Moreover, 
although the Labour Party remains formally pledged to increase Com-
monwealth powers, and although Commonwealth powers have in fact 
increased substantially in the last two decades, the Labour Party 
structure has remained strongly resistant to centralization. Without 
much distortion of truth it could be said that the Federal Executive, 
far from being a centralizing influence, has been an instrument for 
keeping Commonwealth Labour parliamentarians under the control 
of the State Labour parties. The Liberal Party, which is in any case 
loosely articulated by comparison with the Labour Party, is a loose 
confederation of State parties with little delegation of power to the 
centre. It should be noted, however, that although there is less formal 
centralization in the Liberal Party, the existence of an efficient central 
secretariat and research organization, which the Labour Party notice-
ably lacks, tends to redress the balance. The Country Party is the least 
articulated of the three at the federal level. 
The reason why the two main parties have continued to be 
organized mainly on a State basis and have not developed as national 
organizations is to be found, paradoxically enough, in the process by 
which the Commonwealth Parliament, since the late 1920s, has 
increased in power and influence at the expense of the State Parlia-
ments. With the increase in federal power and influence, the important 
issues of political life are debated and decided in the federal rather 
than the State sphere. In the State sphere, therefore, the convergence 
of parties towards the centre has been pronounced and politics has 
become a contest for office and the fruits of office. The proposition 
that in State politics convergence to the centre is more marked than 
in federal politics is, I believe, part of the reason why, in recent years, 
Queensland and Tasmania have regularly showm Labour majorities in 
State elections and Liberal-Countty Party majorities in Common-
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wealth elections. EquaUy, it may explain why South Austialia, with 
a heavy Labour majority in Commonwealth elections, has for years 
retumed a non-Labour Govemment. 
In Labour politics the State parties, themselves converging towards 
the centre, are constantiy striving to puU the Commonwealth parlia-
mentarians in the same direction. State election campaigns (as the 
1947 election in Victoria dramaticaUy proved) are fought more on 
Commonwealth than on State issues; therefore the Federal Executive, 
in which representatives of State parties heavily predominate, is 
normaUy an influence on the side of caution and negative policies. 
For the Labour Party, federalism has in the past been a much more 
serious handicap than it has been to the non-Labour parties. In the 
Senate election campaign Dr. Evatt made the significant statement 
that the socialist issue was dead because the constitution made 
socialism impossible.^'^ One might perhaps broaden this statement 
somewhat and say that, as early as the end of the First World War, 
Labour's dynamic in matters of social reform had seriously slowed 
down by constitutional difficulties and that constitutional reform is a 
pre-requisite for the recovery of this dynamic. But it seems apparent 
that the domination of the Commonwealth Parhamentaty Labour 
Party by the Federal Executive, in which the influence of the State 
parties prevaUs, is a guarantee that no major constitutional reform wiU 
be attempted. 
Non-Labour's difficulties hi pohcy-making stem hi part from the 
fusion of 1909. Within the non-Labour party, says Fitzhardinge, "there 
has been a contmuous struggle, sometimes visible, sometimes beneath 
the surface, between two sections; one derivmg from the Conserva-
t ive-Free Trade party of the Reid-Cook Opposition and one from 
Deakin's Liberal-Protectionist poUcy.''^^ This inner disunity perhaps 
explams why Reid's "sociahst tiger", now in its forty-seventh year is 
StUl the principal election equipment of the non-Labour parties. It 
should be noted that, on the two occasions when the non-Labour party 
has played a positive part m Australian pohtics, it has done so m a 
period of national emergency and under the leadership of a recruit 
from the left. The Nationalist Party, led by W. M. Hughes, came mto 
existence for the specific purpose of organizing the national war effort 
in 1916; the United Austraha Party led by Lyons met the need for a 
strong government to cope with the economic depression. Both the 
Nationahst Party and the United Austraha Party were, in their initial 
stages and by the circumstances of theh origm, centre parties. They 
could remain so only for the duration of the emergency that created 
them; when the emergency had passed, the logic of the two-party 
system pulled them to the right. The present Liberal Party is to this 
extent justified in the claim that it does not derive from the United 
Australia Party; historicaUy, it is in a line of descent from the fusion 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Parties and Pressure Groups I 343 
of 1909. "The main hope for the future," wrote Littleton Groom after 
the fusion, "lies in the signs of evolution on the part of the old reac-
tionary forces . . . now allied with more progressive forces. If they 
can be depended upon to continue being liberalized all wdU be weU."^^ 
Mr. Menzies might have had the same thought thirty-five years later; 
Disraeli had it sixty-five years earlier. "A sound Conservative govern-
ment," said Mr. Taper musingly; "I understand: Toty men and Liberal 
measures."^" 
A large part of Australian political writing tn these days consists of 
laments for the intellectual bankmptcy of the political parties and the 
dominance of party machines. I have tried to show, however, that the 
parties are in the main what the two-party system makes them—and 
the system is essentially the same at most times and in most places. Its 
advantage is political stability. Its disadvantage is that it leaves the 
centre unorganized and inarticulate; and usuaUy the best elements of 
a countty's political life are to be found at the centre. This disadvant-
age is lessened by the fact that the centre is influential because both 
parties must appeal to it during elections. But only lessened. The 
question which must be asked in whether, in the long run, stabUity is 
not too high a price to pay for a system which leaves party debate 
almost devoid of content and at times results in a two-party con-
spiracy to avoid the real issues of national policy. 
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J. D. B. Miller 
Any discussion of party discipline in Australia must be concerned 
largely with the Labour party, but if attention is directed towards the 
Labour Party alone, a distorted view is obtained of the development 
of party discipline—a view which assumes that Labour alone is respon-
sible for Australia's departures from "England's classic philosophy of 
parliamentary government".^ It is true that Labour has provided the 
most obvious examples of parliamentary discipline and that other 
parties have been prepared to copy its institutions; but if we are to 
understand the nature of Austrahan parliamentary discipline today, 
we need to see what degree of party discipline was present before 
Labour came into parliament, and what special circumstances have 
conditioned the actions of the other parties. I propose here, therefore, 
first to examine briefly the nature of the "colonial parliaments" (i.e., 
the parliaments of the various States, then knowm as colonies, before 
Federation in 1901), then to show how, and why Labour developed its 
characteristic disciplinary forms, and finally, after describing the 
special sorts of discipline imposed by the non-Labour parties, to 
suggest the part that party discipline plays in Australian politics today 
in comparison with its part in British politics. 
n 
Unlike the New Zealand parliament, the Australian colonial parliaments 
had manhood suffrage from the 1860's onwards. The gold rushes of the 
'fifties and 'sixties had upset the hardening class-structure which the 
early pastoralists had striven to establish, and had filled the countty 
with impatient men from all parts of the world, who looked to the 
local parliaments to provide them with the services and opportunities 
which the "golden lands of Australia" had promised them. Democracy 
was a reality in Austraha at a time when it was stUl being regarded 
wdth suspicion by Bagehot and Gladstone m England. In 1874 W. H. L. 
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Ranken was disgusted by what he regarded as the undesirable 
effects of the extended franchise: "as the better or more inteUigent 
class were outvoted in Pariiament", he wrote, "they withdrew from 
these parhaments; and as they despised their victorious opponents, 
they did not join wdth these even for their joint benefit. From one 
step to another the breach has widened, untU parliaments have only 
rarely an educated representative of property". He noticed also a 
fundamental difference between politics in Australia and politics in 
England: "Politics in the colonies are a mere matter of business, not of 
ambition or distinction . . . Politics were at no time looked upon with 
the veneration and mterest they claim m other countries."^ WhUe we 
need not accept Ranken's pessimistic view of what was happening, he 
was right in pointing out that Australia had developed a different 
political climate from Britain's, and that institutions had changed 
with the change in climate. Visitors of discernment from Britain 
noticed the same thing. Fronde, DUke and TroUope^ remarked upon 
the contrast in class-structure, the constant concern for the wishes of 
the smaU settler, the greater degree of rowdiness of the parhamentaty 
assemblies (although DUke and TroUope found the South Australian 
House "remarkably decorous"), the predominance of a few men who 
had become professional politicians, the concentration of the parlia-
ments upon local issues and the allocation of public works—enlivened 
by arguments about the tariff, the disposition of lands, and squabbles 
between Catholics and Protestants.* 
Charles Gavan Duffy, on arrival in Melbourne in 1855, had "speedily 
visited the Legislative Assembly and made acquaintance with the lead-
ing members. They were generally men of capacity and experience, 
but I was assured that not one of these Legislators had ever seen a 
Parliament, and business was necessarily conducted at random."® 
Duffy, with his House of Commons experience, had tried to drUl the 
Victorian Parliament in obedience to parhamentaty conventions; but he 
had found it an unrewarding task. Forty years later an acute observer 
found the Australian parliaments devoid of even the principles which 
animated the Mother of Parliaments: 
It is doubtful whether Responsible Govemment, in the sense of govemment 
by a Ministry which carries out a definite policy approved by the country, 
and, in retum, receives allegiance from its supporters in Parhament, has 
ever been acclimatised in Australasia except in New South Wales, under the 
influence of the late Sir Henry Parkes. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, 
when it was sought to transplant a dehcate system, hallowed by conven-
tions and dependent for its success upon the election of a special class of 
representatives among a community necessarily ruled by men who had httle 
experience of public hfe?^ 
Sir Henry Parkes of New South Wales certainly did try to carty on 
the attitudes and practices of the House of Commons, but he had littie 
success.'' In the period in which he was at the height of his powers 
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(from the 1850's untU 1880) politics in aU the colonies was a welter of 
local issues and of "parties" which hardly deserved the name, forming 
and re-forming about a few men of prominence, reflecting in their 
formlessness a society in which economic interests were still vety fluid. 
Only in Victoria, under the influence of David Syme's inflexible per-
sonality and the consistent policy of his newspaper. The Age, did some 
sort of order show itself.^ 
By the 1880's, however, a change became apparent. It is from this 
period that we can date the development of party discipline in some-
thing like its modem form, although it was rudimentaty and not so 
thorough as it is now. Nevertheless, in comparison with parhamentaty 
institutions in England at the same time, Australia was showing her 
own special characteristics. The upheavals of the gold-rushes and of 
the economic adjustments which followed them had died dowm; class 
lines were beginning to show themselves; trade unionism was spread-
ing rapidly; and the growth of secondary industries meant a sharpen-
ing of the Free Trade versus Protection controversy. The anarchic 
nature of parhaments in the 'sixties and 'seventies, when each man 
was intent upon securing what he could for his own electorate, was 
stUl apparent. But party lines began to show more clearly. The institu-
tions through which they expressed themselves are worthy of examina-
tion. 
First, the caucus had already established itself, as in New Zealand.® 
It had been farthest developed in Victoria by the Liberal Party. By 
1881, the youthful Alfred Deakin was being attacked for voting against 
the decision of the party caucus and caucus decisions were openly dis-
cussed in the Assembly.^" In New South Wales the practice of holding 
caucuses grew in spite of the objections of Sir Henry Parkes, who 
could see no warrant for it in British parhamentaty practice; in 1885 
Sir John Robertson held a caucus of his pledged supporters before 
embarking upon a picnic, attendance at which would indicate that 
members of the Legislative Assembly were prepared to foUow him.^^ 
This example, with its combination of caucus and picnic, shows the 
intermediate stage which party discipline had reached. Sir John 
Robertson had certain pledged supporters hi the House, but there was 
a large section of unpledged members who knew no aUegiance. For 
these the picnic was necessaty, as a half-way stage between member-
ship of a caucus and independent declaration of one's loyalties on the 
floor of the House. 
Next, parties had begun to form branches in local districts and to 
provide themselves with a central organisation to fight elections. 
Before the elections of 1877 in Victoria, Graham Berry had organised 
"leagues" throughout the countty for the Liberal Party. ^ ^ In New 
South Wales the two mam parties. Free Trade and Protectionist, 
established leagues wherever they could, although these did not cany 
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on much activity between elections. At the 1889 elections (those 
immediately before Labour entered the political field as a party), the 
parties were well organised: 
. . . At the last general election, it will be remembered, the selection of 
candidates in the Free Trade Interest was left entirely in the hands of the 
Free Trade Association. On this occasion the Parliamentary party will 
assume the chief direction of affairs; but steps have been taken to secure 
concerted action between the two bodies, and to effectually prevent friction 
. . . The central committee of the Protectionist party were busily engaged 
. . . The managers say that the abundance and exceUence of the material at 
their command in this respect is hkely to be a cause of weakness when the 
fight comes on, but they declare their intention of picking out the best men 
for each constituency, utterly regardless of personal claims, and they caU 
upon the protectionists to ignore all others who offer themselves in their 
interests.^^ 
These party organisations used the pledge to discipline their candi-
dates, who would lose endorsement if they voted against Free Trade 
or Protection, whichever they had pledged themselves to. The pledge 
was freely employed by other bodies also. At these 1889 elections in 
New South Wales, lists of pledged candidates were published by each 
of the two parties, by the City RaUway Extension League, by the 
Independent Order of Good Templars, by the N.S.W. Local Option 
League, and by the Association for the Promotion of Morality and 
Social Purity.^* Each body had submitted specific questions to the 
candidates and obtained satisfactory replies from those whose names 
they published. 
So it is evident that caucus, central organisation and the pledge-
all of them institutions usually associated wdth Labour—were in exist-
ence before Labour came on the political scene. But none of them was 
as efficient as Labour was to make it—and therein lies the difference 
between party discipline before and after the entty of Labour. Labour 
took the existing institutions and made them effective. The older 
parties and organisations had used the pledge, but had been able to 
apply it successfully only to a single policy, such as Protection or 
Local Option. On other matters it was of no avaU. Labour made it 
apply to a platform, a set of policies. The older parties tried to make 
central endorsement a weapon which could be used against members 
who broke their pledges, but they did not possess sufficient prestige to 
make lack of endorsement a serious obstacle to election. Labour, with 
its enforcement of trade union "solidarity", was able to do so. The 
caucus, in the hands of the older parties, was an occasional con-
venience; Labour made it a permanent mstitution. Thus, Labour did 
not invent the devices which it was to use to ensure party discipline, 
but it was the first party to make them effectively rigid.^ 15 
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To understand the growth of Labour Party discipline, one must note, 
first, that it took its tone from the trade unions, to whom "solidarity" 
was a vital slogan; and, second, that it operated for its first fifteen 
years as a party granting "support in return for concessions". 
The question of "solidarity" is important as being the dominant ele-
ment in what ChUde calls "the Labour view of democracy".^^ Some-
times "solidarity" has been dignified as "mateship", but in its enduring 
form the "Labour view of democracy" is a determined conviction that 
a "cause" exists which must be served by all, and that, once a decision 
has been taken, those who refuse to obey it are "scabs" or "rats". It 
has encouraged the view that "solidarity" is in itself a desirable objec-
tive as weU as a means to attain other objectives.^'' This view of 
democracy had been hammered out in the trade union struggles of the 
19th century, especially in the pastoral industry. It was transferred as 
it stood to parhamentaty politics. It has remained an important factor 
in Labour discipline. The trade unions were responsible for the 
organisation of Labour electoral activity in the 1890's, and they natur-
ally gave their tone to it, as they do still. Their attitude towards the 
party which they had created was expressed in 1892 by Wilson, the 
President of the Sydney Trades and Labour Council, at a meeting 
held to consider the behaviour of Labour M.P.'s who had split apart 
on the fiscal issue: 
The members . . . had been selected, not by reason of their superiority in 
intelhgence over their fellows, but simply because they took up the cry of 
Labour . . . He would remind them that the people whose votes put them 
in at the last election could put them out at the next, and they were only 
cutting their owm throats, for the workers would put others in their places. 
It was expected that they would leam to carry on parliamentary business 
properly . . . Where the members had spoUed their work was by having too 
unruly tongues and by being unable to prevent themselves from making 
rash promises, which went against them when they were caUed upon to 
decide any questions . . . The league had a right to demand that all indi-
viduahsm should be simk by those members it had selected to carry out its 
platform.is 
In other words, the Labour M.P.'s had been behaving like ordinary 
M.P.'s, and taking just as little notice of their pledges; "solidarity" 
must be brought into effect. What was the purpose of that solidarity? 
In the 1891 Parliament tn New South Wales, Labour found itself in 
what was to be its typical position in that and other State Parhaments, 
and in the Federal Parliament, for approximately another fifteen 
years—the position of a third party. The other two parties were loosely-
defined groups of free traders and protectionists, or liberals and con-
servatives. Obviously Labour would be best served by holding the 
balance between them. Immediately after the 1891 elections, the 
secretary of the Labour Electoral League (the body which had con-
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ducted the Labour campaign) announced that "as a party we shaU 
elect our own leader before Parliament meets. We shall sit on the 
cross-benches. On all questions embodied in the Labour platform we 
shall vote as one man. On all other questions affecting Labour, yet 
not embodied in the labour platform, we shall vote in accordance with 
the decision of the majority of our party. On the fiscal question we 
shall vote according to conscience, untrammelled by the League."^® 
This determination to act as a disciplined force on questions affecting 
the interests of Labour was given further point by George Black, a 
Labour journalist who was one of the new M.P.'s, when Parliament 
met. He stated that "the motto of the Labour Party is: Support in 
return for Concessions. If you give us our concessions, then our votes 
will circulate on the Treasury benches; if you do not, then we shall 
withdraw our support."^" The whole strategy was taken directly from 
Parnell's Irish Party in the House of Commons. 
In fact, however, it proved difficult to enforce in the different con-
ditions of Australia. Obviously it was desirable that the party should 
vote as one man wherever vital interests were at stake, and desirable 
too that it should swing its united weight from side to side of the 
House, making and un-making governments so that it might make 
and unmake social conditions. But members soon split on the fiscal 
issue, which they had hoped to avoid. It looked as if the new party 
could not carry out the strategy it had planned.^^ 
Looking back from this distance in time, one can easily see why 
Parnellite strategy could not be automatically applied by an Australian 
Labour Party in the 1890's. For one thing, the party had no such 
dominant leader; it had, in fact, no leader at aU to start with, and 
functioned under the guidance of a committee. The Irish Party had 
been able to carty out its strategy successfully only because of 
ParneU's masterful hold over his foUowers. As weU as lacking a 
dominant leader, however, the party lacked a dominant objective. 
ParneU's aims were simple and few, and his over-riding objective was 
the independence of Ireland. Labour in New South Wales, in con-
trast, began with a platform consisting mainly of reforms which would 
make conditions easier for miners, seamen and other trade unionists, 
but also including general "democratic" reforms such as the abolition 
of plural voting, free education, a National Bank, election of magis-
trates, wider local government, land reform, volimtary defence, and 
"any measure which wiU secure for the wage-earner a fair and equit-
able return for his or her labour".^^ It was designed to commend 
itself to trade unionists, small farmers and "idealists" of various kinds, 
a coalition of interests which Labour has tried to preserve ever since. 
The appeal which Labour made was diffuse and broad, as distinct 
from the deep, narrow, passionate appeal of the Irish Party m Ireland. 
It is no wonder that the Labour Party faded automatically to develop 
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the solidarity which the trade unions wanted it to show. It needed new 
disciplinaty institutions, rigorously applied. Only by means of disci-
pline exerted first from within the party itself and later from dominant 
trade union leaders outside could the Party hope to grant "support in 
return for concessions". As we shall see, the institutions which it 
developed for this purpose were later adapted to the different purpose 
of maintaining discipline in a Labour Party which was able to form a 
government of its own. These institutions were the pledge, the caucus, 
the nexus between the M.P. and the Labour organisation outside 
Parliament, and later the election of a ministry by caucus and the 
restrictions which this placed upon a Labour Premier or Prime 
Minister.^^ 
IV 
The complicated stoty of the evolution of the Labour Party pledge has 
been told by a number of writers, and need not be repeated here in 
f uU detaU.^* It is enough to state that the first pledge, drawm up by the 
members themselves in 1891, committed them only to vote as a 
majority of the caucus should determine "on all occasions considered 
of such importance as to necessitate a Party deliberation". This vague 
commitment was changed in 1893 to one which demanded that mem-
bers pledge themselves "not only to the fighting platform and the 
Labour platform", but also to a solid vote "upon all questions—affect-
ing the Labour Party, the fate of a ministty, or calculated to establish 
a monopoly or confer further privileges on the already privileged 
classes—as they arise." This established the principle that the party in 
Parliament could be held to account if it did not vote together on vital 
issues. In 1895 the pledge became even more binding. The candidate 
pledged himself "not to oppose the selected candidate of this or any 
other Branch of the Political Labour League", and "to do my utmost 
to ensure the cartying out of the principles embodied in the Labour 
platform, and on all questions, and especiaUy on questions affecting 
the fate of a government, to vote as a majority of the Labour Party 
may decide at a duly constituted caucus meeting." In making the 
candidate promise not to go against the final decision of the Party's 
Executive, this pledge made that Executive the final authority over the 
candidate. He was now pledged to a movement as well as to a policy. 
As weU, he promised to vote on all questions as a majority of caucus 
decided. Only in this way could Labour exert its fuU influence in the 
N.S.W. Pariiament. 
In the Federal Parliament, on the other hand, a more delicate situa-
tion arose. The Labour members who assembled at Melbourne for the 
first Commonwealth Parliament in 1901 came from different States, 
with no Federal organisation to guide them. Some had made pledges 
on the fiscal issue (which was now transferred from the State to the 
Federal sphere) and others had not. Accordingly, they adopted a plat-
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form of five planks (White Austraha, Adult suffrage. Old Age pensions, 
A citizen army and Compulsory arbitration) and decided that only on 
matters relating to this platform should they be bound to vote 
together.^® 
We can draw certain conclusions from these various pledges. As we 
have seen, the notion of a member being pledged to his constituents on 
certain matters was well established when Labour came into politics, 
and it is thus something of an over-statement to suggest, as Louise 
Overacker does, that "the pledge was a novel, pragmatic solution to a 
problem which had worried members of the new party from the 
beginning".^® Pledges to constituents and to organizations were not 
new. But they had been mainly applied to single policies (e.g., free trade, 
protection), and not to sets of policies. The Labour pledge was from 
the beginning a pledge to a platform, and it soon became, in New 
South Wales, a pledge to a movement, as represented by the central 
executive of the Party. When the Federal Party came into being it 
recognised that unity of action was desirable, but that there was not 
yet full unity of opinion amongst the various states. By pledging its 
members to a limited programme it was able to go ahead with a suc-
cessful policy of "support in return for concessions" untU its time 
came to take the reins of government. 
The contrast between this situation and that which prevaUed in the 
colonial parliaments is well brought out in criticisms of the Labour 
pledge by George Reid, an anti-Labour leader who had been trained 
in the rough-and-tumble of N.S.W. politics and had succeeded Parkes 
as Free Trade leader before entering the Federal House. He said: 
I do not beheve that such a platform ever existed before in connection with 
a constitutional party in the Empire. We are told in reply, "Oh well, aU 
parties work together and all parties have their caucus meetings, all parties 
feel the pressure of government influence, and all parties make concessions 
in order to attain greater objects, and to support the Govemment in whom 
they generally believe." But the Govemment [i.e., the Watson Labour 
Govemment of 1904, the first Federal Labour Govemment] represents the 
one party that ever existed in the Parhaments of Austraha or the Empire, 
which is in the position that one cannot be a member of it without endors-
ing every plank in the platform. You can swear to eight honestly and say to 
the Labour Party, "I am heart and soul wdth you about these eight, but here 
is a ninth which is not of much importance, will you allow me to waive 
that? WiU you allow me to exercise my judgment in regard to it?" Their 
answer is, "Sir, you cannot belong to our party unless you solemnly pledge 
yourself in writing to support every one of our planks." I appeal to all of 
political experience in Austraha, if there has ever yet been a Govemment in 
power on this continent which has drawn up a platform of seven planks, 
and compelled its supporters to subscribe to every one of them.^ T 
The existence of the platform was thus the distinguishing mark 
between Labour and the parties opposed to it, which stUl retained the 
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lack of a defined set of commitments which had characterised the
colonial parties. In due course, however, the platform ceased to be so
important. As its original planks became law, and a variety of new
ones were added, Labour began to place more emphasis upon its
"objective" (defined in 1921 as "the Socialisation of Industry, Produc-
tion, Distribution and Exchange").
The pledge today is one which binds the candidate to support and
advocate the socialist objective, not to oppose the Party's selected and
endorsed candidate and not to retire from the contest without the
Executive's consent, and on all questions relating to the Labour plat-
form, especially questions affecting the fate of a government, to vote
as a caucus majority decides. 28 The pledge is now somewhat more
liberal than in 1895, since it allows the member some scope for voting
against his party on matters not connected with the platform or the
fate of a government, but it confirms the change which took place
then by giving the central Executive full control over the member. He
can be refused support and endorsement if he disobeys its instruc-
tions.29 The pledge is now much more a matter of organisation than
of conscience. It does pledge the candidate to a certain set of policies,
but, even more, it pledges him to take his place in the strategy of a
well-drilled party in Parliament. It is a means of achieving "soli-
darity". In the last resort, it is a pledge given to the expressed official
majority opinion of the Labour movement at any particular time, and
cannot be circumscribed within the bounds of a platform. It becomes
important only when there is some quarrel between the politicians
(or some group amongst them) and the Labour executives (or some
group amongst them). Thus its full effect can be gauged only after we
have discussed caucus and the outside organisation of Labour.
V
During the period of "support in return for concessions", the Labour
caucus operated in much the same way as the caucuses of other
parties, though with more regularity and discipline. Its aim was to
work out a parliamentary strategy which would enable it to get the
most value for its votes. In this it was remarkably successful. New
South Wales politics between 1895 and 1905 was largely a matter of
"a minority actually controlling the domestic policy of the State,
without sharing in the responsibility of office",30 and Labour gained
many things which it wanted in legislation and in administration-
notably in the Public Works Department. The same is true of the
Federal Parliament for its first decade. Many of Alfred Deakin's
achievements were made possible only by Labour support and some
of them were the result of Labour pressure.3! At one stage the Labour
Party, after attempting to form a coalition with Deakin, entered into a
working alliance with the Liberal Protectionists, but its supporters
grew restive at the electoral immunity which this gave the Protec-
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tionists in the aUiance.^^ j ^ Queensland and in South Australia the 
Party entered coalitions in the early years of the century. In 1908 the 
Party tried again to form a coalition m the Federal Pariiament with 
Deakin, but the attempt was a failure.^^ 
It wUl be noticed that in certain instances Labour supported other 
parties without actually forming a coalition with them, and in others 
Labour took seats in a coalition ministry. By about 1910 a third stage 
was reached: the party became so strong in nearly aU the Austrahan 
parliaments as to contemplate forming governments on its own 
account, and the "support in return for concessions" period was 
over.^* In aU these situations, however, the need for a strong, united 
caucus was apparent. As we have seen, the Parnell example of parlia-
mentary strategy was being foUowed, but without Parnell's over-riding 
objective. The party was not attempting to achieve a socialist society 
by parhamentaty tactics. It was successfully attempting to gain 
certain concessions—in industrial law, social services, and other fields 
—which its followers had been led to expect from it. Unless it had a 
strong united caucus it could not swing its weight to the best effect. 
This was the advantage of the caucus when Labour was supporting 
another party in office. But the caucus became even more important 
when Labour entered a coalition. If caucus did not keep a tight hold 
over Labour ministers, they might drift over to the other side, regard-
ing their hold on office as more important than obedience to the 
demands of the Labour movement: Kidston, the Labour leader in 
Queensland, did this in 1907.^ ® In the Federal Parliament, the Labour 
caucus early established a rule that no member should enter a ministty 
without caucus approval.^® As experience of aUiances and coalitions 
grew. Labour opinion hardened against them; the 1905 and 1908 
Federal conferences of the Party were both suspicious of them, show-
ing clearly that Labour people regarded the maintenance of solidarity 
as more important than temporaty gains which might result from 
relaxing it. When Labour gained the strength to become a government 
in its own right, however, new problems of solidarity and caucus 
control arose. 
This is a useful point at which to summarise the growth of party 
discipline up to approximately 1910. Nearly twenty years of a Labour 
party tn the various parliaments of Australia had curbed the anarchy 
which had characterised them during the colonial period. The other 
parties stUl lacked definite objectives and strong discipline, although 
they each possessed, in rudimentary form, the sort of machinery which 
Labour used—the caucus, and the outside organisation which would 
refuse to re-endorse a member of parliament if he persistently broke 
his pledges. Labour had not invented this machinety, but had made it 
effective. The Labour pledge was a pledge to a platform of policies, 
and to a movement which regarded solidarity as a vital watch-
word. Labour's strategy of alliance, and occasionally of coalition. 
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demanded a disciplined party; and that discipline was enhanced by 
the further need to keep control over Labour ministers once they had 
gained office in a coalition in which other influences might operate 
against their Labour allegiance. The whole emphasis was upon 
parhamentaty strategy, as was inevitable in a situation where three 
or more parties were competing for power. 
In the remainder of this article I shall examine the development of 
party discipline in the Labour Party when it took office on its own 
account, and in the other parties under the stress of competition with 
Labour and with one another. This wUl entail a closer examination of 
the relationship between Labour in parliament and Labour outside, 
and of the extent to which non-Labour forces have been able to 
achieve a "solidarity" comparable with Labour's. 
VI 
We may take 1910 as the date when the Australian Labour Party 
began to face the problems of "running the countty", and all that this 
entaUed in party organisation. There had been a Commonwealth 
minority Labour government of four months' duration in 1904, and 
one of seven months' duration in 1908. In 1910 the first majority 
Labour govemments were elected in the Commonwealth, New South 
Wales and South Australian parliaments. In Queensland Labour was 
to achieve a majority in 1915, in Western Australia in 1911, and in 
Tasmania in 1914. Thus, aU over Australia, Labour was called upon to 
adapt its existing party machinery to the new task of keeping a 
govemment in check. 
The problem of relations between a Labour caucus and a Labour 
cabinet had been seen in embtyo in the Federal sphere as early as 
1904. When it became clear that J. C. Watson was to be asked to form 
a minority govemment, there was speculation about the caucus rule 
preventing any of its members from taking office without caucus 
approval. However, the caucus unanimously resolved that "the 
Chakman have a free hand in the formation of his Ministty".^'' Once 
it was selected (containing one non-Labour man, H. B. Higgins) the 
caucus appointed a committee of six, three from each House, to assist 
the Leaders in the two Houses.^® There was some newspaper specula-
tion as to whether Higgins would have to obey caucus rulings, and 
his biographer remarks that he was in fact embarrassed by caucus 
discussions, to which he was not a party, about matters connected 
with his Department.^® 
From this point onwards, the idea of caucus electing a Labour 
ministty began to take shape. At the 1905 Federal Labour Conference, 
a resolution was carried that "in the event of the Labour Party obtain-
ing the Mmisterial benches the Labour Ministty shaU be recom-
mended by the party in caucus".*^ A simUar motion was moved at the 
1906 Annual Conference of the party in New South Wales, but was 
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opposed by party leaders and faded to pass." In 1908 the Federal 
Conference re-affirmed its previous motion, and the mmority govem-
ment formed by Andrew Fisher m that year was elected by caucus-
although the Prime Mmister hunself was reluctant to make the fact 
knowm, and Watson, his predecessor, unsuccessfully attempted to 
have die selection of ministers placed in Fisher's hands alone.*^ 
The 1910 Labour Cabinet was elected by caucus without opposition. 
In 1914 Federal caucus carried a motion "that the word 'recommend' 
tn the rules governing the appomtment of Ministers be omitted and 
the word 'elected' inserted tn lieu thereof".*^ This marked the final 
acknowledgment of caucus supremacy, because it rejected the 
fiction that caucus was only "recommending" Ministers to the Prime 
Minister, who had received the Governor-General's commission to 
form a government. 
The election of the Cabinet by caucus was one more way of bring-
mg the parhamentaty activities of the Labour Party under coUective 
control. It is fairly clear that the leaders of the party did not welcome 
it. It was opposed to parhamentaty precedent,** it took an important 
source of patronage out of the hands of the leader; and it saddled him 
with Ministers whom he might not have selected himself. While his 
freedom to allot portfolios was never in question, he was restricted in 
his field of choice. But rank and file members, aided by the Labour 
organisation outside, considered that a party leader might gain too 
much power if he were given the right to choose his Cabinet. On the 
assumptions of the Labour movement, this was reasonable enough. 
The leader himself, up to this time, had been known only as "chair-
man" of the caucus and was subject to regular election,*^ and the 
trade union movement had always made a point of electing its officials 
rather than have them appointed from above. 
Nevertheless, the early Labour cabinets showed a tendency to 
"grow away" from caucus. The Fisher Ministry of 1914 saw a number 
of differences between Cabinet and caucus, culminating in a special 
meeting in June 1915 which passed a motion that all Government 
measures be submitted for the consideration of caucus before being 
presented to Parliament, and that the nature of those measures be as 
a caucus meeting decided. The Cabinet had taken certain steps in 
regard to sugar supplies and the tariff, without consulting caucus.*^ 
Wartime experiences were to intensify these differences between 
caucus and Cabinet. In New South Wales the McGowan and Holman 
governments (1910-1917) had a number of differences with caucus, 
the most notable being those over appointments to the Upper House 
in 1912 and 1915.*'' The Labour Cabinet said such appointments were 
an executive matter and should remain so; when made, they were 
found to contain a majority of non-Labour men. One member of 
caucus wrote later that "this was the most serious mistake ever per-
petrated by the Labour govemment. . . . As a result the whole Labour 
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organisation became a seething mass of discontent".*^ This and other 
actions built up a barrier between caucus and Cabinet which was to 
be intensified when the quarrel came over conscription in 1916 and 
1917. 
Broadly speaking, members of Labour cabinets were more inclined 
towards conscription than rank and file M.P.'s and the Labour move-
ment outside Parliament. Labour ministers, especially in the Com-
monwealth and N.S.W., were seized with the over-riding nature of 
mUitary demands. It is not surprising then, that when the split came, 
ministers tended to support conscription and rank and ffiers to oppose 
it. There were exceptions on both sides, and in Queensland the 
whole Party was "solid" against conscription; but the end of the war 
found Labour out of office except in Queensland, and with "its brains 
blown out", its former leaders, such as Hughes, Holman, Spence, 
McGowan and Watson having mostly become "Nationalists" in asso-
ciation with their former Liberal opponents.*® This evoked much 
bitterness against "leaders". 
It is not surprising, then, that the 1919 Federal Conference of the 
party should have stressed the importance of caucus control, one 
delegate moving "that in the event of a Labour majority being 
obtained, the system of Cabinet government be modified so as to 
associate in the administration of each Department a committee of 5 
members elected by caucus".®" He said: 
They wanted to get away from the present system so that the work of 
administration could be carried out by practicaUy the whole party, and not 
merely by the 8 or 10 men chosen for the positions, as obtained now. . . . 
It should mean more effective administration than what the people got at 
the present time. Ministers drawdng high salaries had in a sense become a 
class apart, and they came to caucus in a solid body—even when they had 
differences of opinion on subjects—and presented their proposals in such a 
way that it did not always make for the best in legislation, nor afterwards 
in administration. It would be better to divide the work up among the mem-
bers of the party. 
The motion was defeated by 17 votes to 11. It is noteworthy now 
mainly for its emphasis upon administration. There was littie com-
plaint about Cabinet's legislative decisions; what the supporters of 
the motion objected to was the fact that Labour M.P.'s were often 
unable to get what they wanted from the administrative departments, 
and that Labour Ministers would not help them to do so. Labour 
members had inherited the traditional duties of an M.P. in colonial 
days—to "see" Ministers and departments, to be employment broker, 
social service adjuster, "fixer" of public works; and they were often 
less interested in law-making than in pleasing their constituents by 
their assiduity at these duties. 
One may bring the relationship between caucus and cabinet up to 
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date by contrasting two statements about it. The first is by Sir WUliam 
Harrison Moore, writing in 1914: 
In England, the feature of the day is the domination of the House of Com-
mons by the Cabinet. But in Australia, the prevalence of the caucus would 
threaten the cabinet as much as the House. Where the caucus elects the 
Ministry, the regular sessions of the caucus must, it would seem, tend to 
supersede the deliberations of the Cabinet, at any rate while Parliament is 
sitting; to bring Ministerial differences to the arbitrament of the party 
meeting instead of to the Cabinet or the Premier; and to substitute for the 
collective responsibility of the Cabinet to Parhament the individual respon-
sibUity of Ministers to the caucus.^^ 
In contrast, the verdict of the Canadian Brady, after caucus election 
of cabinet had been going on for another 30 years, was that: 
. . . in fact this control is more apparent than real, since the ministers are 
ordinarily the most skilful and forcible debaters, able when united to con-
vince the majority of the caucus, and, ff they fail in persuasion, they may 
obtain their owm way by using the formidable threat of a dissolution.^^ 
Moore's vision of how caucus control might develop was frustrated 
by the sort of influences that Brady mentions, and by the impossibility 
of caucus becoming an administrative body capable of superintending 
the operations of government. But the cabinet ascendancy which 
Brady mentions can be maintained only if three conditions are pre-
sent: reasonable unity of opinion within the party as to the policy 
to be followed; reasonable unity amongst ministers; and the support 
of the Labour organisation outside if the threat of dissolution is to 
be successful. These conditions were not present in the case of the 
first Federal Labour government to take office after the conscription 
split, the Scullin government of 1929; and it proved unable to govern 
in a period of economic stress.^^ On the other hand, they were present 
during the currency of the next Labour govemments, the Curtin and 
Chifley administrations of 1941-49; in consequence, the Chifley 
government was able to surmount successfully a major threat to party 
unity when it came in the shape of the Bretton Woods controversy of 
1946-7.S* 
The relationship between caucus and cabinet is the crux of Labour 
discipline within Parliament. A Labour cabinet is, in the last analysis, 
the servant of caucus; but it is in a strategic position to guide and 
influence its master. As well, it can bring home with force to caucus 
those "national" issues of which only a cabinet can have adequate 
knowledge, and in this way direct attention to issues which caucus, 
in its concentration upon specifically "Labour" policy, may overlook. 
But this point should not be pushed too far, since caucus members 
are practical politicians as well as (often more than) Labour zealots, 
and may often be acutely conscious of "national" (i.e. electoral) 
opinion of which Cabinet's concentration upon departmental affairs 
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has prevented it from becoming aware. When Cabinet and caucus are 
m harmony, this system works weU; when they are at loggerheads, as 
in the case of ScuUin's government, it creates further strife. 
vn 
The position of the Labour leader deserves attention. There has 
always been an undercurrent of resentment against "leaders" in the 
Labour Party, exemplified by the Sydney Worker's statement when 
Holman was having his fights with caucus over the Legislative 
CouncU appointments in 1914: 
The Labour movement needs no leadership and possesses no leader. It 
represents a phase of evolution infinitely in advance of the days when the 
workers were "led". They have no use for leaders. In conference assembled, 
they formulate their pohcies and decide their tactics. In mutual associations, 
they select their candidates and conduct their campaigns.^^ 
The experiences of the conscription period intensified this point of 
view in various quarters. Yet the 1920's saw Labour in Queensland 
wdth a strong leader, Theodore; the 1930's saw the same process 
repeated, wdth far more emphasis, tn the case of J. T. Lang in New 
South Wales, and in the 1940's Curtin and Chifley in the Federal 
sphere provided leadership which was widely recognised as being 
something more than the cartying out of decisions made by other 
sections of the party. What, then, is the position of the Labour leader? 
First, so far as his position hi Parliament is concerned, he is some-
what weakened by not being allowed to select his owm ministers, but 
he can exert influence by his disposition of portfolios. As well, if he 
is a strong and popular leader, he can usually be sure of having his 
owm particular friends and supporters elected to Cabinet. He is usuaUy 
a man of long parliamentary experience and one who, in his owm 
right, occupies a prominent position in the public eye. AU these 
factors give him some degree of independence in exercising his 
leadership. But he can rise to power, and retain it, only if he has the 
support of the dominant trade unions, those which provide the funds 
and functionaries for the Labour Party's outside organisation. This 
point can be Ulustrated from the case of Lang in New South Wales.^ ® 
Lang achieved supreme power because the leaders of the trade 
union movement in New South Wales (with the exception of the 
A.W.U.),^'' were convinced that his policy was more likely to soften 
the effects of the depression than the policy being pursued by the 
Federal Labour govemment under Scullin. In a period of unrest and 
unemployment, he was able to marshal behind himself and his "Lang 
Plan" aU the "solidarity" which was the haU-mark of the trade unions 
and the Labour Party. "Solidarity" had operated to puU down leaders 
like Holman and Hughes. Now it operated in the reverse direction: 
it elevated Lang to a pinnacle of power such as no Labour leader had 
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reached before. Once the unions decided to support Lang, anyone 
who opposed him was ruthlessly cast out. 
The significant thing, however, is that when Lang lost this trade 
union support, he was unable to continue as an mdependent force of 
any strength within the Labour movement. After nearly ten years of 
steady support, the New South Wales unions began to withdraw their 
aUegiance. For once, the A.W.U. and the other unions found them-
selves hi agreement; after a series of scuffies within the party organisa-
tion, and the settmg up of an "industrial" Labour Party to wm trade 
union support from Lang, he lost the leadership and a few years later 
was expelled from the party. The lesson is plain. No Labour leader 
can retain his position without the support of the trade union move-
ment. If he loses it, his parliamentary supporters drift away from him. 
If he retains it, however, as Curtin and Chifley did, he can marshal 
"solidarity" behind him in Parliament and out of it. 
vm 
We saw in the previous article that the trade unions were mainly 
responsible for forming the Labour Party, and that their tradition of 
"solidarity" was transferred as it stood to Labour in Parliament. The 
relationship between Labour Party and trade unions has remained 
much the same ever since. The trade unions are the main source of 
Labour finance. In each State, the supreme Labour authority is the 
annual conference of branches and affiliated unions of the party, at 
which unions are represented roughly in accordance with their mem-
bership. These conferences select "executives" to manage the affairs 
of the party for the next twelve months. These State executives are 
the centres of power tn the Labour Party. They conduct electoral 
campaigns, endorse candidates for elections, and recommend policy to 
Labour governments. UsuaUy they contain a majority of trade union 
representatives, and in this sense the trade unions can be said to 
"control" the Labour Party—wdth the important proviso that while 
the trade unions always uphold "solidarity" as a principle to be 
enforced, they are rarely "solid" amongst themselves on more than a 
few matters of industrial policy. There is a long histoty of confhct 
between the A.W.U. and other major unions, for example; some 
unions have Communist officials, whUe others are under direct Labour 
Party control; unions do not always co-operate with one another in 
industrial disputes. 
It is usual for "tickets" to be run at each conference of the A.L.P., 
and for one "ticket" to sweep the board in the election of the execu-
tive.®^ The ticket wUl comprise representatives of the dominant trade 
unions, plus other members of the party who are of the same line of 
thought, and other prominent members, who, whUe not closely identi-
fied with the dominant union group, help to give the ticket a univer-
sality which wiU attract stray votes to it at the conference.^® In this 
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fashion the State executive gives a rough proportional representation 
to a variety of elements within the party—although it may squeeze 
out altogether certain factions opposed to the dominant group. This 
often occurs at times of crisis in the trade union movement. When 
any group is losing power in the Labour movement generally, it wUl 
attempt to retain its position of strength in the Party "machine" by 
manipulating the rules and by the liberal use of patronage of various 
kinds. This tactic was adopted in N.S.W. in the 1920's by the dominant 
A.W.U. group, and again in the 1930's by the dominant Lang group. 
An opposition movement within the trade unions and Labour 
branches has to surmount this sort of obstruction—a long, violent and 
fatiguing operation. 
The relationship of the trade unions to the A.L.P. has often been 
discussed. Marxists and semi-Marxists, like ChUde and Fitzpatrick®® 
believe the Party should always be under the unions' thumb. Crisp^^ 
sees the need for Labour's organisation to take account of the various 
elements within the party and also of those outside the party who vote 
for it at elections. In fact, the organisation has always been tn a state 
of change, now with one group dominant, now with another. Some-
times these groups have been strongly "ideological" in their demands; 
sometimes they have simply been after power. On the whole, however, 
the party has tended to represent accurately the main changes in 
trade union thought, and to follow trade union opinion on industrial 
questions. On other questions (even questions of doctrine about 
"socialism") the trade unions have rarely been "solid", and it is only 
a half-truth to identify the trade union leaders as "idealists" and the 
Labour politicians as "practical men", as Hancock does.®^ The trade 
union leaders are "practical men" too, with a narrower group of 
constituents than the Labour M.P.'s—constituents whose demands 
are industrial and who vote as unionists when industrial matters are 
to the fore, but who may vote in quite some other way—e.g., as smaU 
property-owners or members of a religious faith—when other questions 
are prominent. Trade union leaders are usually satisfied to leave other 
than industrial questions to the politicians, so long as those politicians 
are "sound" on industrial matters such as working conditions and 
wages. 
We may sum up the disciplinaty power of Labour's outside organi-
sation in this fashion: when there is reasonabe unity between politi-
cians and the dominant section of the union movement, pressure wUl 
be felt from the outside organisation only on special occasions.®^ 
When felt, it wUl be obeyed, unless the leader's prestige is so strong 
as to allow him to treat with the Executive and make his owm terms. 
But when there are deep rifts wdthin the outside organisation, and a 
fight for supremacy there between different factions, more than one 
being powerful enough to seize control, the result wUl be chaos, and 
the parhamentaty party wiU lose its powers of initiative and its capa-
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city to act as an independent force. This means that the individual 
M.P. may find his opinions subordinated to the whims, grievances and 
bitternesses of a temporarily predominant faction in the "movement" 
outside pariiament. The destruction of his "responsibility" in such a 
case is far greater than any destruction which caucus is likely to 
wreak. In caucus he has a voice and vote; as a victim of a factional 
struggle he may have no voice at all, but be simply discarded because 
of personal resentment against him or a change in power-relation-
ships. When such things happen—and they were common in the 1920's 
-Labour reaches its lowest ebb. "Solidarity" is invoked in the name 
of evety contending faction at once. The loyalty which party members 
feel to their "movement" is used by factions to gain temporary control. 
But is must be emphasised that when factional strife is not the 
order of the day, the outside organisation can be of considerable 
assistance to the parhamentaty party. It can sample public opinion 
and institute discussion. And in providing opportunities for party 
service to rank and file members, it keeps in being the election-win-
ning organisation which a parliamentary party must have if it is to 
survive. It is hard to imagine a modern political party without such 
an organisation; and we may conclude that when that organisation is 
divided, it usually reproduces a division of opinions and attitudes 
within the general bulk of Labour supporters. Its excesses are the 
price paid for Labour's being a mass party. 
IX 
The development of the non-Labour Parties falls into two periods 
from 1910 onwards. In the first, a single Liberal Party, the product 
of a "fusion" amongst a number of non-Labour groups, faces Labour 
across the floor of all the Australian Parliaments. In the second, 
foUowdng the conscription split in 1917 and the growth of Country 
Parties around 1919, there are two main non-Labour parties. One is 
a "city" party, labelled successively Nationalist, United Australia and 
Liberal, not vety different in structure, aims and attitudes from the 
Liberal Party of 1910-1917; the other is a "countty" party, represent-
ing primarUy farmers but other country interests as well, necessarUy 
a minority party and adapting its strategy to suit the circumstances of 
a permanent minority.®* Usually, the "city" party cannot form a 
government on its owm. It must enter a coalition with the Country 
Party.«5 
The "fusion" party of 1910-1917 was formed speciflcally to combat 
Labour, and consisted of a variety of disparate elements united only 
by their common antipathy to Labour legislation.®® Its successors have 
preserved this heterogeneous character. The Liberal Party of to-day 
represents a variety of social forces and interest-groups, and it has 
had neither the same need nor the same inclination as Labour to 
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cultivate "solidarity". It has never had the same degree of coherence 
in its political programme (it is a true descendant of those colonial 
parties to which Reid belonged, and which asked no-one to subscribe 
to a platform). It has concentrated more upon opposition to Labour 
than upon budding up its own distinctive policy. If one may make a 
distinction which is somewhat difficult to maintain, it has concentrated 
more upon organisation than upon discipline. It has usuaUy had two 
separate controUing factors—"first, the public association consisting of 
local branches, conferences of delegates appointed by the branches, 
and executive; second, the confidential group which collected and 
disbursed party funds".®'' Whereas Labour has brought its individual 
members (enroUed in branches) and its collective members (the trade 
unions) together in the one external organisation (of conference and 
executive), the Liberal Party has, in the past, separated the two: 
collective membership has been secret, unacknowledged, vital and 
powerful. To-day the Party attempts, for the first time, to do without 
a formal "confidential group" which raises money and wields ultimate 
power. In the past the "confidential group" has determined party 
policy at crucial periods, and controlled the money needed for 
campaigning.®^ 
So far as discipline is concerned, the main non-Labour Party has 
tended to move away from formal pledges and commitments, and to 
rely upon the ultimate threat of withdrawn support, to maintain order. 
The Nationalist and United Australia Parties had formal pledges and 
much the same sort of selection and endorsement provision as Labour; 
the Liberal Party of to-day exacts no pledge, but does exert pressure 
upon its members when they fail to follow the party line on vital 
matters.®® The Liberal Party does not provide for caucus election of 
Ministers, this task remaining in the hands of the party's leader; but 
it does conduct regular caucus meetings at which rank and ffie 
members are able to say what they think of the party's strategy. It 
would be fair to say that the Liberal Party leader has more initiative 
and manoeuvrabUity than his Labour counterpart; but the loss of 
office of Mr. R. G. Menzies tn the Commonwealth, and Mr. B. S. B. 
Stevens in New South Wales (both in 1941), showed that a 
Liberal caucus''® can and does get rid of leaders whom it finds unsatis-
factory. To what extent changes in leadership are the result of caucus 
indignation alone, or of pressure from outside, we do not know; but 
there is good reason to believe that in both the cases quoted the 
pressure from outside was considerable. 
One may say that the Liberal Party of to-day is about halfway 
between the Australian Labour Party, with its long-established disci-
plinaty institutions, and the British Conservative Party, which does 
not even hold regular party meetings in Parliament. It is quite other-
wise wdth the Country Party. 
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X 
It is important to note that the Country Party, whUe a minority party, 
does not pursue the early Labour strategy of "support in return for 
concessions". Labour's view was: here are two or more rival parties, 
each of which wiU bid for my support. I shaU attach myself perma-
nently to none of them, but wiU swing my support from one to the 
otiier, depending upon what they give me. The Country Party view 
is: I represent the country interest, and I am confronted with two 
city parties, neither of which cares much about the country. But one 
is an employers' party and the other an employee's party; my members 
are nearly all employers, so I cannot support an employees' party. 
Instead, I shaU attach myself to the employers' party, without losing 
my own identity; and I shall threaten temporaty loss of support unless 
I get what I want. But I shall never support Labour. 
Even at the beginning of the "fusion" period there were grumblings 
from the two big farmers' organisations, the Graziers' Association and 
the Farmers' and Settiers' Association, that countty interests were 
neglected by the new Liberal Party. At the 1910 conference of the 
Farmers and Settlers, a motion for the formation of a separate 
Country Party resulted in a tie. One speaker said that unless such a 
party were formed, the Association would be "only a joint in the 
Liberal Party's tail".''^ Another voiced the opinion of many when he 
said: "They should form a party, just as the Labour people did, and 
if their members were not loyal to the Association, they should kick 
them out". Although no party was formed at this stage, a motion was 
carried declaring that branches should submit any political resolutions 
to the Association's Executive Council before sending them to local 
M.P.'s: "If they were an army engaged in battie", said the mover, 
"would the officers of divisions, regiments and companies have the 
right to say which way they should go? (No!) . . . Now they must 
have discipline." Similar sentiments were expressed in Victoria, 
Queensland and Western Australia. 
When the Country Party did arise in 1919 as a result of exertions 
by the two major farmers' organisations, it found a political climate 
favourable to it.''^ There was widespread disapproval in countty areas 
of the marketing schemes which the Hughes Nationalist government 
had carried through in the federal sphere; there was also a conviction 
that the ex-Labour leaders in the Nationalist Party had given it too 
pink a tinge. The Countty Party (known at first in New South Wales 
as the Progressive Party) began as a breakaway movement from the 
Nationahsts. By 1923 it was a partner in a Federal Government, on 
terms which gave it a complete veto and a ministerial strength beyond 
its members;''^ it was participating, though not on quite such favour-
able terms, in governments in New South Wales, Victoria and 
Westem Australia. Issues have changed somewhat since 1923, but the 
position of the Country Party remains much the same. In order to 
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occupy such a position, it must have powerful disciplmaty machinety. 
The Federal Constitution of the Australian Country Party mam-
tains that "the Federal Council shaU not form with any other political 
organisation an alliance that does not preserve intact the identity of 
the party", and that "acceptance of portfolios in any other than a 
purely Countty Party government must be with the approval of a 
majority of members of the Federal CouncU".''* In addition, the 
Federal CouncU determines the Federal policy of the Party, which is 
laid down at a joint meeting of Federal M.P.'s and the Council, at 
which only Council members vote. In the State sphere the conditions 
are much the same, except that they are stricter in Victoria, where 
M.P.'s cannot accept office in a coalition without the approval of two-
thirds of the central councU; at meetings of the party, ministerial 
members "shall deliberate as and vote as members of the Countty 
Party and not as ministers of the Crown"; decisions of the Cabinet 
"shall not be binding on such Ministers at such Party meetings"; and 
members must vote with a majority of the party, even on questions 
outside the platform and policy.''® 
When the Country Party forms a coalition with the Liberals, it 
adopts the Labour practice of electing its own Ministers. The Liberal 
leader is thus forced to accept whatever Ministers the Country Party 
insists on, although he may find them personally unsuitable. In addi-
tion, the Country Party attempts to nominate the portfolios which its 
Ministers wUl hold. In this way it hopes to gain strategic offices in 
the government, especially those which deal with rural questions. 
The reader wUl readily imagine the difficulties which such a forced 
marriage creates; differences of opinion are frequent within a Liberal-
Countty coalition, and resentment between the parties often becomes 
an important factor in political change. For our purpose here, how-
ever, what is important is the fact that the Countty Party is a non-
Labour party which learnt the lesson of Labour "solidarity" and 
discipline, and has applied that lesson to its great advantage. 
XI 
It will now be seen how far party discipline has developed since the 
anarchy of the early colonial parliaments. The discipline which Free 
Traders and Protectionists were struggling unsuccessfully to exert in 
the 1880's is now the order of the day. Australian parliaments present 
the spectacle of three well-drilled political parties, each with regular 
caucus meetings, and each with a powerful outside organisation which 
decides strategy. The parties are all hnked with major interest-groups 
outside parliament, but in different ways. Labour's link with the 
trade unions, through conferences and executives, is direct and 
unambiguous. The Country Party's link with the major farmers' 
organisations, which was strong and open at the time the party was 
formed, is now concealed by making those organisations' leaders 
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'*tmstees" for the party; but the amicable connection remains. The 
Liberal Party's previous incarnations had "consultative committees" 
consisting of major interests in industry and commerce. To-day there 
are no such committees, but informal relations stiU exist. In recent 
years the task of anti-Labour propaganda in election and referenda 
campaigns has been largely taken over by special fund-raising 
bodies.^ ® The disciphnaty influence of outside organisations is felt 
frequently by Labour, less frequently by the Liberals (except in some 
time of crisis, when the pressure is heavy), and rarely by the Country 
Party, except in Victoria. 
This gradation of pressure is typical of the parties' support in the 
community. As we have seen, faction-fights within the trade union 
movement lead to turmoil in Labour's supporting organisation, and 
this is communicated to the parliamentary party: "solidarity" is a 
force which is exerted in the interests of whichever group happens to 
be on top at the moment. The Liberals, on the other hand, have no 
simUar tradition of "solidarity" and are united by nothing more than 
a general desire to limit the influence of Labour ideas and legislation. 
The various interests which the Liberals represent—industrial, com-
mercial, professional, white-collar—are not bound closely together, 
and they sometimes clash. It is to be expected, then, that they will 
not approve discipline for the sake of disciphne, but wUl apply it only 
when it seems strategically necessary. The Countty Party, however, 
represents the most "solid" interest of all—the country demand for 
marketing schemes, public works, decentralisation of government and 
the curbing of unionism. It is not surprising, then, that the Country 
Party provides, on the one hand, complete disciplinary machinery, 
and, on the other, a natural solidarity which makes the machinery, in 
most cases, unnecessary. But it is there if it is wanted. 
xn 
The contrast with Britain is instmctive. There, outside organisation 
has gone even further than in Australia, but the M.P. has been left 
much freer from control and instruction. Cabinets are not elected, and 
they do not meet their back-benchers regularly to discuss and decide 
policy, as is done in Australia. The Prime Minister stUl remains a 
figure with great power, more than he possesses in Australia, no 
matter which party he belongs to.^^ 
Obviously we shall look for reasons for this difference, not so much 
in a greater British aptitude for politics (though that may be a factor), 
as in a difference of circumstances. Australian society, as we saw 
earlier, has never given its politicians much status. They have always 
been servants of their constituents, men who were sacked if they did 
not provide raUways, roads, water supply, better working conditions, 
tarffis, marketing schemes, and the other aspects of the "ample 
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government"''^ which Australia has always demanded. These bread-
and-butter questions have always dominated Australian politics. In 
Britain, on the other hand, the M.P. stiU has around him the thread-
bare mantie of the 18th and 19th centuries, the remains of that 
"deference" which Bagehot regarded as at once the most charac-
teristic and most valuable aspect of British political Iffe. While the 
enlargement of the franchise in the late 19th century demanded 
special organisational means of swinging mass opinion behind one or 
other of tiie major parties, the individual M.P. was left without the 
same heavy surveiUance from a central party executive as has charac-
terised Australian politics. To-day the British Labour Party finds that 
the "crypto-Communist" has sometimes to be destroyed by disci-
plinary action; but neither Labour nor Conservative parties use the 
same devices, with the same day-to-day effectiveness, as their Aus-
tralian counterparts. 
If, however, British politics continues to develop along its present 
lines, wdth more and more state control and a more "economic" set of 
issues at each general election, then we may expect a tightening of 
British party discipline along something like Australian lines. It is 
bread-and-butter issues, on a national scale, that bring discipline to 
the parhamentaty institutions of a democracy. 
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24 THE PLACE OF FINANCE 
COMMITTEES IN NON-LABOR 
POLITICS, I9IO-I930 
B, D. Graham 
[The] enumeration of the different "extemal organizations" which may 
bring about the creation of a pohtical party would not be complete without 
mention of the action of industrial and commercial groups: banks, big 
companies, industrial combines, employers' federations, and so on. Unfor-
tunately here it is extremely difficult to pass beyond the bounds of general-
izations and hypotheses, for such action is always cloaked in great dis-
cretion. In the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, E. H. UnderhUl demon-
strates the part played in the birth of the Canadian Conservative party in 
1854 by the Bank of Montreal, the Grand Tnmk Railway, and by Montreal 
"big business" generally. SimUar influences could no doubt be discovered at 
work in the formation of almost aU right-wing parties; but on this point we 
have for the most part at our disposal only presumptions (well-fotmded, it 
is true) but not evidence: very tactful investigations would be required to 
make clear the forms and degrees of influence exerted by capitalist groups 
on the genesis of pohtical parties.^ 
It was between 1906 and 1910 that the continued expansion of the 
Australian Labor Party forced the diverse non-Labor groups to form 
united Liberal Parties, a significant federal "fusion" of the former 
Free Trade and Protectionist Parties taking place in 1909. FoUowdng 
the war-time split of the Labor movement over the conscription 
issue, most of these Liberal Parties joined with the conscriptionist 
wings of the divided Labor Parties to form imited National Parties, 
which remained the dominant non-Labor force untU 1931, when they 
were reorganized as the United Australia Parties. 
Although the parhamentaty histories of these successive groups are 
well knowm, little has been wT:itten about the nature and working of 
their extra-parliamentaty organizations. Their members maintamed 
that they were beyond the influence of outside interests, and self-
righteously condemned the roles of the trade unions wdthhi the 
Labor Party and of the farmers' and graziers' organizations withm 
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the Countty Party. That this claim was, to say the least, exaggerated, 
has been suggested by L. F. Crisp in his Parliamentary Govemment 
of the Commonwealth of Australia (1949)^ and by Aaron Wildavsky 
and Dagmar Carboch in their recent studies of the 1926 referendum 
and 1929 election campaigns.^ Not only have these writers revealed 
the pattern of interest connections which underlay the parties, but they 
have thrown light on the role of various semi-secret finance com-
mittees in supplying funds for their electioneering and organizing 
purposes. 
The political function of the finance committees needs to be clearly 
established. Were they, as Labor members suggested during the 
'twenties, the means by which sinister capitalists manipulated the 
non-Labor parties,* or were they much milder organizations with 
limited powers? Did they influence the policies of the Liberal and 
National Parties to any significant extent; from what sources did they 
draw their funds; how much money did they handle; how were they 
organized; what relationships did they establish with the parliamen-
tary parties and with their leaders? These questions, for all their 
importance, may never be answered satisfactorily, but it is necessary 
that any information bearing on the finance committees should be 
evaluated as it comes to light. As an approach to this task, this paper 
will endeavour to establish the role of the finance committees in the 
affairs of the Liberal and National Parties between 1910 and 1930. 
I 
1. THE FINANCE COMMITTEES OF MELBOURNE 
Founded immediately after Labor's victoty in the 1910 federal 
election, the Constitutional Union of Melbourne supplied money to 
the Victorian Liberal Party's electoral organizations, the People's 
Party, the People's Liberal Party and the Austrahan Women's 
National League (A.W.N.L.), from 1910 to 1917. At a luncheon 
attended by representatives of these organizations, the Constitutional 
Union's President, WUliam Riggall, expressed his pleasure 
that cordial relations had been estabhshed between the Constitutional 
Union and the Liberal pohtical leagues. The function of the former body 
was to collect funds, to enable these pohtical bodies to properly organise 
their forces for effective service in Federal and State elections. All friends 
of the party should subscribe freely to the central fund of the Constitutional 
Union, just as was done in the case of the big pohtical parties in England, 
and as the Labour Sociahsts themselves did in Austraha, so that the effec-
tive organisation of the Liberal party could be fully achieved.^ 
Some indication of the Union's political importance is showm by the 
fact that, in October 1915, two of its representatives, H. Bremner 
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Lewis and John West, were allowed direct access to the state premier, 
Sir Alexander Peacock, whom they urged to work for the state 
Liberal Party's unity in view of the expected campaign against the 
federal Labor Government's 1915 referendum proposals.® 
After the Victorian National Party was formed in 1917, the Consti-
tutional Union became known as the National Union, and immediately 
set about reducing the number of conflicting non-Labor electoral 
organizations then in existence, for, at this stage, the three pre-war 
Liberal organizations were co-operating with a National Labor 
Party, wdth branches of the newly formed National Federation and 
with a scattering of campaign committees left over from the 1916 
referendum and the 1917 federal election campaigns. By 1918, the 
National Union had succeeded in welding all of these (except the 
A.W.N.L.) into a unified Victorian National Federation. Despite all 
its efforts, however, it was unable to persuade the Victorian Farmers' 
Union, which had just founded a small Country Party in the state 
parliament, to ally itself with the Nationalists. Harold Glowrey, the 
Farmers' Union acting secretaty in 1917, spoke on a later occasion 
of his organization's dealings with John West, the secretary of the 
National Union. 
He attended at the office of the Victorian Farmers' Union. . . . He told us 
that it was proposed by his rmion that the National Federation, the People's 
party, the People's Liberal party, and the Australian Women's National 
League should confer and form one party to fight against the Labour party, 
and he invited the Victorian Farmers' Union to join them. We put a pertinent 
question to Mr. West by asking him how it was to be accomplished. He said 
"It is simple. We find the money that enables these parties to function, and ff 
they do not do it volxmtarily we will cut off their sources of supply, and they 
will go out of existence." We refused to attend that meeting. It was held, how-
ever, and from that day to this neither you, Mr. Speaker, nor any other mem-
ber has heard of the People's party, or the People's Liberal party. The Aus-
tralian Women's National League did put up a fight. They said they were re-
presenting the women, and they succeeded in retaining their identity. Mr. 
West came to us again. He said, "My executive has considered the matter. We 
think that there is something in what you say. There should be a Farmers' 
Union to go round the country and organise the farmers for a nominal sum. 
If your executive will do that, we wdU give you as much money as you 
want, but there is to be one condition. It is that every politician elected 
under your auspices will accept the dictation of our body in regard to 
matters brought before Parhament."'' 
The Farmers' Union was able to retain its financial independence by 
levying a high annual membership fee of £ 1 per member. 
Although in 1917 the National Union rallied business mterests to 
the support of the Hughes federal government, it was later to reflect 
the discontent felt by many of these with the ministry's post-war 
policies. Graziers and mixed farmers never forgave the Hughes 
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administration for the meat-price fixing regulations of 1918; graziers, 
importers and mining companies were disappointed by the increased 
protection afforded by the Massy Greene tariff of 1921; the Employers' 
Federation and the Chamber of Manufactures, whUe they benefited 
from the increased tariff duties, disliked Hughes' defence of the arbi-
tration system; and conservatives generaUy accused his govemment 
of extravagance, of an undue interest in preserving such state enter-
prises as the Geelong Woollen Mills and the Commonwealth Shipping 
Line, and of a belief in a greater measure of economic control (as 
indicated by the 1919 referendum proposals). The unrest amongst the 
government's business supporters was expressed at two conferences of 
the National Union's subscribers, the first held in November 1921 and 
the second in October 1922.^ There is reason to suppose that it was 
partiy because of the insistence of the former meeting that Hughes 
included S. M. Bruce, an advocate of retrenchment, as treasurer in 
his cabinet. 
In 1922, some of the interests offended by Hughes' policies finally 
broke away from the National Union and formed their owm Liberal 
Union as a means of financing a reformation of the pre-war Liberal 
Party.® This Party, it was hoped, would work with the Federal 
Countty Party to replace the Hughes regime with a more conservative 
administration. The 1922 federal election, however, resulted in the 
return of only two Liberals, J. G. Latham and W. Duncan Hughes, to 
the new parliament, whUe the National Party, although reduced in 
numbers, stUl remained the most powerfvU group in the House. In 
February 1923, on the insistence of the Country Party, but also, one 
suspects, because of the influence of the National Union, Hughes was 
forced to resign the Prime Ministership to enable Bruce to form a 
Nationalist-Country Party coalition. 
In 1925, conservatives affected deep concem at the influence of 
bolsheviks wdthin the trade unions. In October of that year the 
National Union conducted an extensive canvass of Melbourne firms 
for contributions to its funds as "insurance against Bolshevism". 
According to information given to Smith's Weekly in 1926 by a former 
official of the Union, the amounts subscribed by individual firms 
varied from £1,000 to £10,000, with the result that the Union was able 
to spend fuUy £59,000 during the federal election campaign of 
October-November 1925. Its funds were distributed between the 
English, Scottish and Australian Bank and the Commonwealth 
Banking Company of Australia, cheques being signed in one case by 
a firm of solicitors and in the other case by a solicitor and G. S. 
MacLean, the secretary of the National Federation. 
During the campaign, Bruce, as prime minister and leader of the 
National Party, claimed that if the non-Labor parties were retumed 
to power they woxUd take steps to ensure that communists did not 
gaua control of Australian affahs through their influence within the 
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Labor Party. A current waterfront strike was represented as the fore-
runner of a general revolution and Thomas Walsh and Jacob Johnson, 
president and secretary of the Seamen's Union, were arrested by com-
monwealth police and threatened wdth deportation under certain 
clauses of an Immigration Act passed earlier in the year. Sir WUliam 
McBeath, as president of the National Union, had taken a great 
personal interest in the campaign and fully suppori:ed the proposal 
to deport Walsh and Johnson. He was extremely disappointed when 
the High Court disaUowed the deportation of the two unionists, and, 
in February 1926, he cut short his holiday trip to Hawaii to return to 
Melbourne and press for a careful drafting of the Crimes BiU about 
to come before the first session of the new parliament. Bruce stood 
his ground and refused Sir WUliam an advance copy of the measure. 
Even after the offended merchant finally obtained a copy and had 
gained an audience with the prime minister, he met with no success 
in his demand for a more stringent measure. At the end of a heated 
interview Bruce was reported to have exclaimed, "I am committed 
to the party and the countty", to which Sir William was said to have 
replied ominously, "Very weU. You know what that attitude means." 
In fact. Sir WUliam was forced to accept the situation: the Crimes 
Bill was enacted without drastic amendment, Walsh and Johnson 
were not deported, and the Bruce-Page ministty was not turned out 
of office imtU 1929, and then by the electors and not as a result of a 
cloak-and-dagger intrigue inspired by the National Union.^® 
There were several other occasions during the 'twenties when the 
National Union tried to interfere with the National Federation's 
arrangements for both state and federal election campaigns. In mid-
1920, for example, the two organizations differed over the choice of 
a Nationalist candidate for the Ballarat federal by-election,^^ while 
further differences led to the Union's reducing of the Federation's 
funds on the occasion of the 1924 state election.^^ 
2. THE CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF SYDNEY 
Indirect evidence suggests that Sydney business interests were supply-
ing funds to non-Labor parties before the war,^^ but it was not untU 
1919, under circumstances described by Dr. Evatt in his biography 
of W. A. Holman, that the Consultative Council, the Sydney counter-
part of Melbourne's National Union, was formed. Holman, the leader 
of the state National Party, worked through his business associates 
Hugh Mcintosh and P. T. Taylor, to interest "a number of powerful 
industrial and financial concerns" in a scheme to augment his party's 
electioneering and organizing funds. Sir Owen Cox, a wealthy shipper, 
became the leading business figure in the enterprise and was chiefly 
responsible for organizing the Consultative Council, of which he 
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became the chairman. Meanwhile, Holman wrote to businessmen 
proposing that the Nationalists should raise a sum of £80,000 every 
three years, of which £25,000 was to be set aside for each election 
campaign, state or federal, and of which £10,000 per annum was to 
be spent on organizational purposes.-^* 
Close relations existed between the Consultative Council and the 
National Association, the New South Wales National Party's electoral 
organization. According to a letter published in the Brisbane Courier 
in March 1925, the Council "is composed of some of Sydney's best 
citizens, and works within the organisation [the National Association] 
as a finance committee. The secretary of the organisation is also the 
secretary of this finance body, and the two bodies are housed under 
the one roof".-^ ^ That the Consultative Council made its funds freely 
available to the National Association is suggested by the latter's 
balance sheet for the year ending April 1929: not only does this show 
a credit balance of £7,459—a surprising figure in view of the heavy 
expenses which would have been occasioned by the 1928 federal 
election held only six months previously—but also places the Associa-
tion's assets at a total value of £-37,336.^^ 
The radical policies of the Lang Labor government (1925-7) 
prompted the Consultative Council to lend its weight to the proposal, 
publicly supported by the Graziers' Association and the National 
Association, that a close electoral alliance be formed between the 
Country and National Parties. Sir William Vicars, a wealthy woollen 
manufacturer and a prominent member of the Council, was 
appointed to a small committee formed in December 1926 to arrange 
the details of the proposed alliance.^'' J. T. Lang, the Labor premier, 
took the arrangement to signify "an understanding that the National 
Consultative Council will finance all approved candidates running 
in the interests of the Coalition".^^ There is no evidence available as 
yet to back up Lang's claim, but it may not be very far from the 
truth. In the following year, the combined National and Country 
Parties won a close-fought election campaign and subsequently 
formed the Bavin-Buttenshaw coalition ministry. 
3. THE FINANCE COMMITTEES OF PERTH 
In July 1916, a meeting of subscribers to the Western Australian 
Liberal Trust Fund was held in Perth and appointed a permanent 
committee of six members to "control all expenditure". The six mem-
bers were Sir John Forrest and his son, David, S. Burt, a Perth 
solicitor, W. T. Loton, a director of the West Australian Bank, W. M. 
Burges, a director of the Western AustraUan Trustee, Executor and 
Agency Company, Ltd., and A. C. Gillam.^^ Burges, Burt, Loton and 
Gillam all held positions on the executive of the Western AustraUan 
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Pastoralists' Association. Little is knowm of the Committee's activities 
but it appears to have been disbanded by 1925, in which year Perth's 
business interests established a Consultative CouncU to collect funds 
for the Nationalist campaign during the 1925 federal election. 
In 1926 this Council, reflecting the business community's concern 
over the Collier Labor government's radical policy, discussed with the 
leaders of the United and Country Parties the possibUity of arranging 
a firm non-Labor electoral alliance for the 1927 election campaign. 
M. T. Padbury, the president of the Countty Party's supporting 
organization, the Primary Producers' Association, told the delegates 
to his association's 1926 conference that the Consultative CouncU 
consisted of 
businessmen and financial men who are sick and tired of the way things 
have been going on lately, and who are prepared to find a good deal of 
money provided a working arrangement can be brought about. Many 
thousands of pounds have been collected to help us in our work, and but 
for the arrangement that money would not have been subscribed. . . . We 
used to look upon those men as our enemies. They were keeping a good 
many producers going, and thereby grew fat while the other men got pretty 
white. We can deal with those people only.through the co-operative move-
ment. However, they have big interests in the State and are prepared to 
assist those who are against the Bolshevist movement.20 
S. J. McGibbon, chairman of the Consultative Council, announced at a 
meeting of non-Labor candidates in February 1927 that his organiza-
tion was engaged in collecting £7,000 to finance the joint election 
campaign. He claimed that the Council's members represented "a 
cross-section of the community, inasmuch as aU classes of businesses 
and professions were represented, and any advice they might give 
would represent, therefore, some sort of collective wisdom. The only 
hope for the country lay in an anti-socialistic Government".^^ The 
electoral alhance was arranged but, although the two parties fought 
the election in close collaboration, they failed to achieve their 
object, for the CoUier government was returned for a second term. 
4. THE FINANCE COMMITTEES OF BRISBANE 
As the electoral organization of the pre-war Queensland Liberal Party, 
the Queensland People's Progressive League was financed by a 
Queensland Liberal Fund Trust Committee, which in December 1913 
appealed for £5,000 for the following year's organizing activities.^^ 
During 1916 and 1917, the non-Labor forces in Queensland were 
reorganized at the parliamentary level into a unified National Party 
and at the electoral level into a National Political Council (N.P.C.), 
to which were affiliated the Queensland Farmers' Union and the 
National Party's regional electoral organizations. At the same time, a 
m 
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National Union was established to coUect political funds from 
Brisbane's business community. 
Soon, the National Union began to play an important part in the 
National Party's affairs. In January 1918, its representatives attended 
a conference held to settle differences between the N.P.C. and the 
parhamentaty Nationalists.^^ It again came into prominence in 1919, 
when the non-Labor forces were in a state of disorganization. This 
was the time when the Farmers' Union broke with the Nationalists 
and joined wdth the United Graziers' Association and the United Cane 
Growers' Association to form a Primary Producers' Union (P.P.U.) 
through which it worked to rejuvenate the parliamentary Countty 
Party. In January 1919, the National Union informed the N.P.C. that 
its financial assistance was at an end, and the latter was forced to 
amalgamate with an organization supported by the National Union, 
the Australian Democratic Union, to form the National Democratic 
Council (N.D.C.). The new Council became the National Party's 
main electoral organization. After representatives of the National 
Union and the N.D.C. had conferred in March and AprU, the Union, 
reluctant to provide the revenue requested by the CouncU, agreed 
to recognize the new body's right to collect funds from the business 
community. In July, however, it changed its policy and informed the 
N.D.C. that it wished to remain the sole Nationalist collecting body. 
The N.D.C. refused to surrender its new right, but the National 
Union countered by providing funds for a unified non-Labor electoral 
committee (on which the rural organizations' P.P.U. was also 
represented) during the federal election campaign of October-
December 1919. The N.D.C., without the connections or the resources 
to remain outside the committee, was forced to co-operate wdth it and 
to recognize the National Union's prior rights in the collecting field. 
On 22 Januaty 1920, a meeting of Brisbane businessmen decided 
to form a Consultative CouncU "to assist in organising the finances 
of the National Democratic Council". The Consultative CouncU was 
to consist of three representatives of the N.D.C. and "one representa-
tive of each trade, profession, or business desirous of being repre-
sented thereon". Besides the CouncU proper, the meeting also 
appointed a special sub-committee consisting of representatives of 
each of the trading, professional and business groups composing the 
CouncU. The sub-committee was authorized to appoint three repre-
sentatives to attend the N.D.C.'s executive meetings as ex officio 
members.^* This new effort to break the National Union's monopoly 
of the collecting field faded, for the latter, in a struggle whose outlines 
are obscure, was eventually recognized as the body responsible for 
collecting funds for the Nationalist campaign committee during the 
1920 state election campaign.^^ George Browm, the N.D.C.'s chair-
man, said m May 1920 that he and his coUeagues on the CouncU 
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are quite prepared to agree . . . that we are a powerful pohtical body, but 
to suggest that we are powerful enough to mould as we like the men repre-
senting the whole financial interests of the State is a comphment we cannot 
accept. The 106 gentiemen who constitute the National Union are not only 
quite capable of managing their own affairs, but do so.^ s 
In 1925, when he disclosed much of the National Union's secret 
history m a series of detailed articles, C. R. J. Dahl suggested that, m 
1920, the Union's subscribers insisted on the annual election of its 
executive members and replaced several of the former office-holders 
with new men. In later years, however, the old ehte gradually 
reasserted itself: according to Dahl's account: 
no election has been held since the first, when a number of the former mem-
bers were passed out by the subscribers, and other business men chosen in 
their stead. Some of the new-comers, however, found that the "inner circle" 
had been re-established, that steps were being taken of which they had no 
knowledge and did not approve, and that some of the men who had been 
defeated re-appeared in the imion ranks without election! Consequentiy they 
resigned.^'' 
In the last months of 1922 the National Union began a campaign 
to force the United (formerly National) and Country Parties to 
amalgamate, and, since the latter had just lost the financial backing 
of the United Graziers' Association,^^ it was in no position to offer 
continued resistance. The United Party, even after the Rockhampton 
"unity" conference of Januaty 1923,^ ® resisted the National Union's 
pressure and sought to compete with it in the collecting field for 
political funds. The Union thwarted this move and finally demon-
strated the extent of its power during the Brisbane municipal elec-
tions held early in 1925. At this stage the Brisbane Courier and a small 
group of the United Party's members launched a public attack on 
the Union, but a special meeting of the latter's subscribers, held at 
the Union Bank Chambers, Queen Street, on 12 March 1925 expressed 
complete confidence in the executive and recorded "its favourable 
appreciation of the methods adopted in dealing with funds''.^® The 
remainder of the year was marked by tortuous faction fighting within 
the parliamentary non-Labor parties, and by occasional attacks 
against the National Union. FinaUy, in November 1925, the fusion of 
the Countty and United Parties was completed and the new Countty 
and Progressive National Party was organized in time for the 1926 
state election campaign.^^ 
5. THE FEDERAL ROLE OF THE SYDNEY AND 
MELBOURNE COMMITTEES 
Although there is proof that they existed, little is knowm of the activi-
ties of the National Unions of Adelaide^^ and Launceston.^^ It is 
clear, however, that both the National Union of Melbourne and the 
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Consultative Council of Sydney provided financial assistance not only 
to their own state parties but also to the non-Labor parties in the 
smaUer states. The Sydney body made Queensland its special respon-
sibility while the Melbourne Union catered for South and Western 
Australia and for Tasmania. J. Denham, the Liberal premier of 
Queensland in 1913, admitted to a meeting of his supporters that, in 
the 1912 Queensland state election, the Liberal Party had obtained 
£4000 from the South, but it did not come from trusts and combines . . . it 
came from people with interests in the State. It was tmderstood that those 
in New South Wales should come to the aid of Queensland and those in 
Victoria to the aid of other smaller and less affluent States.^* 
On the occasion of the 1925 federal election the National Union of 
Melbourne made available substantial funds to each of the South 
Australian, Western Australian and Tasmanian National Parties,^" and 
tUere is every reason to suppose that it supplied these parties with 
state election finance as well. 
n 
Such general conclusions as may be drawn from the above informa-
tion must necessarily be tentative. It is obvious that the finance 
committees differed in their character and function from state to 
state and that the political situations within which they operated also 
varied a great deal. But some attempt to evaluate their significance 
must be made. 
From the evidence available, it would appear that they were 
usually small bodies representative of the different sections of the 
business community, some of which were appointed by meetings of 
subscribers while others functioned as permanent non-elective groups. 
They frequently had special rooms at their disposal, and employed 
one or two salaried officials such as a secretary and a treasurer: their 
chairmen were often prominent members of the commercial elite (for 
example. Sir William McBeath in Melbourne, Sir Owen Cox in 
Sydney, R. J. Archibald in Brisbane and S. J. McGibbon in Per th) . 
The committees had always to be prepared to justify their activities 
to their subscribing interests: the meetings of subscribers held in 
Perth in 1916, in Brisbane in 1920 and 1925, and in Melbourne in 
1921 and 1922 appear to have discussed administrative problems, 
financial matters and, in the case of the latter, government policy. 
Seen in the context of the business world, the finance committees, as 
institutions, presented two facets: on the one hand they were con-
venient bodies for the discreet collection and distribution of political 
funds, while on the other they could act as general pressure groups 
in relation to non-Labor governments. 
According to scattered references in newpapers, the committees 
drew subscriptions from a wide range of interests—private trading 
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banks, insurance companies, graziers' organizations, professional asso-
ciations, land and station firms and various trading, mining and 
industrial companies. From confidential information given the author, 
it appears that the secretary of a particular finance committee would 
send requests for funds to each affiliated interest, specifying tn a 
circular letter the total amount needed and the purpose for which it 
was required. The flow of contributions from a particular firm tended 
to vary from year to year according to its directors' judgment of the 
political situation and the extent to which the firm's interests were 
being affected by governmental policies. The finance committee's 
secretary, ii the practice of the Melbourne Union's secretary was 
typical, would then deposit the funds tn special bank accounts. How 
much money did the finance committees handle? We know that tn 
1913 the Queensland committee was asking for £5,000 for organizing 
purposes, that in 1927 the Perth committee was coUecting £7,000 for 
a state election campaign, that in 1919 Holman wanted Sydney's Con-
sultative CouncU to collect £80,000 every three years and that in 1925 
Melbourne's National Union spent £,59,000 on the federal election 
campaign. Although comparative material is scarce, these figures 
would indicate resources in excess of those commanded by the Labor 
and Country Parties at this time, and they certainly emphasize the 
importance of these committees in relation to the functioning of the 
non-Labor parties. 
Indeed, the Liberal and National Parties of this period may be 
viewed at three distinct levels: at one level we see the parliamentary 
party posing as an independent body representing aU interests in the 
community without fear or favour; at the second level, a respectable 
electoral organization, such as the Liberal Union of South Australia, 
the National Federation of Victoria and the National Association of 
New South Wales, would arrange the parhamentaty party's election 
campaigns, select its candidates, and hold relatively ineffectual 
annual conferences of its local supporters; whUe at the third level, we 
find the finance committees discreetiy coUecting funds from business 
interests and making them avaUable for the public electoral organiza-
tions, with their ridiculously low membership fees ( 1 / - per annum 
in the case of the Victorian National Federation). 
It is obvious that the distinction made in Australian politics between 
"parliamentary" and "interest" parties is an unreal one and that our 
political history wiU never be understood if the Liberal and National 
Parties are treated as different in kind from the Labor and Country 
Parties. The trading, manufacturing and professional interests served 
by the financial committees represent the "interest" equivalent of 
the trade unions in the Labor Party and of the farmers' and graziers' 
organizations in the Country Party; in other words, aU four parties 
were financiaUy dependent on extra-parliamentary pressure groups. 
If the party politics of the 'twenties, or of any other decade, are to 
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he seen in their total context, the relationships between each party 
and its supporting interests must be evaluated and compared. 
Since so many of the finance committees' activities were carried 
on in secret, it is difiicult to estimate the extent of their co-operation 
with the non-Labor electoral organizations. Brisbane's National Union 
was represented on the Nationalist electoral committees for the 
federal election of 1919 and for the state elections of 1920 and 1923;3« 
the Consultative Council of Perth was actively concerned with 
organizing the non-Labor election campaign in 1927, and the National 
Union of Melboume, according to one source,^'' was represented on 
the National Federation's executive in 1917. There are also references 
to joint meetings attended by representatives of the parliamentary 
parties, the electoral organizations and the finance committees, such 
as those held in Perth in 1927 and in Brisbane in 1918. On occasions, 
too, officials of the finance committees have gained direct access to 
heads of state, as in the case of McBeath's interview with Bruce in 
1926, and in the case of H. Bremner Lewis' and John West's visit to 
Sir Alexander Peacock, the Victorian premier, in 1915. 
However, the finance committees' political role was not as sinister 
as these examples would indicate. For the most part, the interests 
which contributed to their funds preferred to influence specific legis-
lation through the agency of more accessible pressure groups, such as 
the Employers' Federation, the Chambers of Commerce, the Cham-
bers of Manufactures and the United Graziers' Federal Council: there 
is no evidence to suggest that a particular finance committee ever 
interested itself in a special bill, or exerted pressure for particular 
concessions on behalf of a special interest. On the other hand, the 
finance committees did represent the business community's traditional 
concern for a private enterprise economy, and for a conservative 
approach to general policy matters; conversely, they reflected in a 
very direct manner its opposition to the Labor Party. There is a 
pattern in the attempts of the finance committees of Brisbane, Perth 
and Sydney to promote maximum non-Labor unity against the 
Theodore, Collier and Lang Labor governments respectively; signi-
ficant also were the attempts of the National Union of Melboume 
(and of the short-lived Liberal Union) either to depose Hughes from 
the prime ministership or to force him to moderate his government's 
economic and social policies. 
Faced with the twin problems of attracting a middle-class vote and 
of appeasing the conservatism represented by the finance committees, 
non-Labor leaders must have encountered immense difficulties. If 
they attempted to institute economic controls, to encourage state 
enterprises or to defend the industrial arbitration system too zealously 
they ran the risk of alienating those interests which financed their 
parties' organizing activities and their election campaigns. If, on the 
other hand, they strove to placate their conservative supporters by 
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openly supporting laissez-faire economic policies, by criticizing the 
arbitration court and by discouraging state controls, they faced the 
prospect of alienating the middle-class vote and thus of inviting 
electoral defeat. If, in desperation, they tried to make themselves 
independent of the finance committees they were likely to split their 
parties and lose the fight in the long run. Seen from this standpoint, 
the rapid succession of non-Labor leaders and parties which charac-
terized Australian politics between 1909 and 1944 becomes more 
comprehensible. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
25 GROUP INTERESTS AND THE NON-
LABOR PARTIES SINCE I930 
R. S. Parker 
NOTES ON NON-LABOR PARTIES IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
SINCE 1930 
In 1931 the spectacular course of the Lang regime provoked various 
groups who despaired of effective resistance by the moribund 
Nationahst organization into forming political quasi-parties of their 
owm. Prominent among these were the Northern, Riverina, Monaro 
and Western "new State" movements representing rural interests, and 
the "New Guard" and "AU-for-Australia League" promoted by 
alarmed businessmen and suburbanites in Sydney. However, before the 
1932 elections the regional movements had sunk their political 
identity in a revivified United Country Party (August 1931) and the 
A.F.A. threw in its lot wdth the nascent United Australia Party, while 
the New Guard, under its "leader". Colonel Eric CampbeU, and the 
swashbuckling fumiture dealer, de Groot, contented itself wdth some 
pseudo-mUitary demonstrations and some questionable campaigning 
for the U.A.P. at the elections.^ 
After its defeats in the Federal election of 1940 and the New South 
Wales election of 1941, the U.A.P. lost impetus and enthusiasm as 
weU as popular support. It was largely discontented elements from 
wdthin the New South Wales U.A.P. that formed the Liberal-Demo-
cratic Party, and former U.A.P. supporters among white-coUar ex-
servicemen that formed the Commonwealth Party, both during the 
early part of 1943. Towards the end of that year, wdth a State election 
approaching in 1944, the leadership of the U.A.P. was induced by 
the Institute of Public Affairs, its main financial backer, to hold a 
unity conference with the two smaller groups. The conference broke 
dowm on the refusal of the Liberal Democratic Party representatives 
to accept the old U.A.P. paid officers and headquarters in Ash Street 
as the basis for a new organization, and the Liberal Democrats fought 
the 1944 election as a mmority party, winnmg no seats, whUe the 
Commonwealth Party merged with the U.A.P. Opposition as the 
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Democratic Party.^ At the end of 1944 both of these purely New 
South Wales parties joined with representatives of the U.A.P. and 
simUar groups from other States in settmg up the Liberal Party of 
Australia which continues as the main non-Labor party in New 
South Wales. 
THE NATURE OF NON-LABOR INTERESTS AND PARTIES 
IN AUSTRALIA 
The problems of political organization among non-Labor groups were 
summarized in the foUowing way by Sir F. Eggleston: 
The residents of cities and towns, professional classes, business men, traders 
and financial organizations . . . had no common interest which could be 
served by political action. . . . Parties of the traditional type interested in 
the established order have been greatly handicapped. . . . Political pohcies 
have always tended against wealth and capital. The pohtical power of 
financial interests and wealthy men is negative. Their economic power in-
deed is no less great. Pohtical action, tmfavourable to capital, has been 
justified as an attempt to compensate for the economic power of wealth, but 
such attempts have been quite unsuccessful. The result is that the capitahst 
is disgruntled, deficient in pubhc spirit, and tmwdffing to give up his 
economic and financial power, but conscious that the assaults of the poh-
ticians are really ineffective.^ 
Shorn though it is of its more inconsistent sentences, this passage stUl 
typifies Eggleston's half-conscious predUection for provocative para-
dox: financial interests and wealthy men are politically defenceless. 
But their economic power is unassailable. They know this. But they 
are disgruntled and dislike all political action. Eggleston is here 
offering a modified version of the thesis adumbrated by Bryce and 
popularized by Sir Keith Hancock, that Australian conservative parties 
are parties of "resistance or caution", representing "residual" interests 
that are attacked by the aggressively positive policies sponsored by 
Labor and Country parties on behalf of homogeneous, strongly 
Organized producer groups.* 
But if the conservative party seems to play a passive role, this is 
precisely because the major interests it stands for are protected by 
a far stronger bulwark than parliamentary legislation—the structure 
of the economic system itself. Government prescribes conditions of 
work, standards of health and cleanliness, fair trading practices, and 
supplies railways and roads, harbour facilities, a stable currency, and 
law and order to help the economic system to work. But in the basic 
determination of what shall be produced and how much, and what 
shares owmers and others shaU have in the proceeds of industty, 
government remains on the periphety. The crucial decisions which 
develop and shape the economy are stUl made largely by private 
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capitalists—financiers, manufacturers, traders, pastoral companies, 
farmers. Other groups, and particularly wage-eamers, organized or 
not, have neither achieved the power nor sought the responsibility of 
helping to direct the productive and distributive process. Very little 
has happened under the "welfare state" in Australia to alter these 
fundamental facts. The main contributions of the govemment are to 
alleviate fluctuations and to redistribute a certain amount of income 
through taxation and social services, levies and subsidies. Even the 
elaborate machinery of arbitration and wage-fixing barely enables 
wage-earners to keep pace with the incomes of owners of property— 
and this often at the expense of more defenceless groups. As an 
Australian economist has recently remarked: 
It is important . . . to realise that today successful wage demands are only 
to a minor extent achieved at the expense of profits, because business firms 
in general fix their OWTI prices and can protect their own profits. The impor-
tant exceptions to this are: firms, mostly farmers, producing for export . . .; 
secondly some firms who produce in keen competition with imported goods 
. . .s 
In the light of these facts, it would be reasonable to depict the 
Labor and Country parties, but not the urban conservative parties, 
as being on the defensive, fighting with clumsy political weapons to 
preserve and enhance the interests of their constituents against the 
natural tendencies of the established economic order. 
If principle had proved as important in our politics as the infant 
party system seemed to promise, the Liberal Party and its predecessors 
would have been more consistently on the offensive against what Sir 
Keith Hancock himself called our "settled policies": pensions and social 
services, arbitration. White Australia and protection, the basic wage, 
bounties, subsidies, and marketing schemes. Their relatively passive 
role may be partly explained in terms of the very broad hypotheses 
that have been discussed above. But this role can be further illumined 
by a more detailed examination of their relations with interest groups 
and the electorate, and especially of the question of finance. 
"THE PARTIES OF TOWN CAPITAL"? 
In the first place, serious dilemmas arise from the complex nature of 
the interests that have looked to the conservative parties as their 
political instrument. This complexity emerges as soon as we look 
closely at a conventional Marxist generalization like that of Professor 
Crisp, that: 
In Australia the anti-Labor parties are, first and foremost, the political 
organisations of the active controllers and often passive owners of private 
capital.^ 
Of course there is plenty of evidence for this kind of statement, and 
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some of it wdU be cited here in a moment. But it is only a part of the 
truth, unless we read imaginatively between the lines of the qualifica-
tion, "first and foremost". We must obviously ask: "Who are the con-
troUers and owners of private capital? How many of them, and which 
ones, take an active interest in the fortunes of the non-Labor parties? 
And what is the nature and extent of this interest?" What foUows 
offers merely tentative answers to some of these questions. 
At least in highly developed States like New South Wales and 
Victoria, there are great concentrations of urban and rural wealth, 
partly interlocked in the uncalloused hands of "the Pitt Street and 
CoUins Street graziers" (both phrases have been current). But it is not 
very original to observe that even among the large owmers of capital, 
and certainly between them and many lesser entrepreneurs, the varied 
scope of the State's economic activity provides ample ground for con-
flicts of interest, sometimes on quite important issues. So if we look for 
signs of identification of particular groups with the political parties, 
we have immediate doubts about the place of the manufacturing 
industries, whose representatives on occasion have openly aligned 
themselves with organized labour,'' and which in fact have a long-
term common interest with labour, as against commerce and primary 
industries, on issues like the tariff and internal development. Then 
again, there are the errant and elusive brewers, and perhaps other 
groups like them, who have certainly given tangible encouragement 
to Labor parties in the past, though no doubt they also are not above 
distributing their favours more impartiaUy at times. 
The rural and urban groups have often chafed at the bit when 
forced into political double harness, as in the coalition govemments 
of New South Wales. Some of the inconsistencies tn non-Labor 
government policies clearly have arisen from this cause. The Stevens 
government of 1932-39, for example, not only promoted State 
abattoirs and helped to keep private enterprise out of the electric light 
and power supply business, but actively continued the preceding 
Lang government's policy of moving towards a State monopoly of 
metropolitan passenger transport. This last policy was enthusiastically 
—some have said ruthlessly—enforced by the leader of the Countty 
Party as Minister of Transport. It is exceedingly difficult for politicians 
professing laissez faire to work in harmony with a group of which Sir 
W. Harrison Moore once said that: 
The real Socialists in Australia were the Coimtry Party, for their pohcy 
pointed in the direction of the supersession of private property by pubhc 
property. Farmers were being guaranteed against the risks of fluctuating 
markets, of droughts, storms and floods. Property was thus being freed 
from the liabilities usuaUy associated wdth its owmership, and people . . . 
would then begin to assert that the property in question should be held in 
name, and in fact, by the community, instead of by the individuals who 
were endeavouring to exploit it.^ 
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The Stevens govemment was on happier grounds when, like the 
FuUer (non-Labor) government m the 1920's, it sold to private 
bidders at bargain prices some of the only State industrial enterprises 
that had been a thoroughgoing success by capitalist standards (the 
crime, of course, being that their success had undercut private enter-
prise). This is the Idnd of non-Labor party policy (among many 
different policies) that most clearly reflects the influence of those 
large capitahst groups which, it seems, it would be reasonable to 
associate more particularly with the urban parties of the right. The 
most important of these may, on the little evidence so far analysed, 
be the importers, the wholesale traders, the retaU magnates, and the 
private banks and insurance companies. 
Here arises one of the central points I wish to discuss in this 
paper. What has been the nature of this association, and what have 
been its effects on the policy, finance, and organization of the urban 
non-Labor parties? 
It may be that the groups just mentioned are the ones that 
Eggleston and Crisp reaUy had in mind, because they are the ones 
that want least from the State and most resent interference or imposts 
by the State. J. A. McCaUum, in the essay cited above, declared that 
"the main purpose of the United Australia Party is to keep the Labor 
Party out of office".® Eggleston, though he also was speaking gener-
aUy, and therefore loosely, about "the interests behind the Liberal 
Party", made the point that applies more particularly to these smaUer 
groups: 
On the whole these interests do not want any particular privileges; what 
they mostly want is to be left alone. 
They want to be protected from, rather than to promote legislation, and 
only show an interest in pohtics when the question of taxation becomes 
important, i** 
This is a banal point, but it can be associated with another generaliza-
tion of Eggleston's that is of central interest for this paper. He writes: 
The conservative wing which is not a bit interested in pohtics, opposes on 
principle aU advanced pohcy, but reahses it cannot be successful in this 
resistance, and therefore interferes capriciously if the pockets of its members 
are affected, or ff any attempt is made to subject it to controls, and, be-
cause this wing is the main contributor to the funds of the party, its in-
fluence cannot be denied. . . . The same could be said in simUar degree of 
the attitude of the farmer. . . . The reason why the wealthy classes have so 
httle influence on Austrahan pohtics is that they never show any pohtical 
competence. Few wealthy classes are so unenhghtened in culture and so 
lacking in ideas. Neither the business community nor the pastoralists have 
ever sent any considerable leader into Australian pohtics.^^ 
Of course this statement is too sweeping, particularly ff applied to 
the nineteenth centuty or to the countty parties. But it points to one 
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of the real issues that has bedeviUed the urban non-Labor parties in 
the present centuty, at least in State politics. It has been a tremendous 
embarrassment to their active political leaders that their most 
powerful supporters have sought to inUuence party policies and 
personnel through finance whUe at the same time remaining aloof 
from active and overt engagement tn the pohtical arena. Speaking 
now of New South Wales, it can be said that among those who figure 
in the Sydney newspapers' "society" columns there has been nothing 
corresponding to the noblesse oblige of the English ruling class whose 
leading members counted it an honour to take public office, if only to 
preserve the ascendancy of their own kind. There is nothing corres-
ponding to the Labor Party's flow of experienced leaders from the 
top ranks of the industrial labour movement. The outstanding political 
leaders who brought success to the forerunners of the Liberal Party 
were W. A. Holman (1916-20), an ex-Labor Premier, and B. S. B. 
(now Sir Bertram) Stevens (1932-39), previously a senior official of 
the New South Wales Treasuty. Since what they mainly want from 
govemment is to be left unmolested and imtaxed, the real leaders of 
business, finance, and the professions have been content to puU per-
functory financial strings from behind the scenes, leaving politics to 
"lesser men"—modest businessmen and professional people—who 
are public-spirited enough to undertake the thankless chores of party 
hack-work. 
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND 
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND THE PARTIES 
Mr. B. D. Graham has given some account of the relationship which 
emerged as a result. It was described in 1943 by Mr. Warwick Fairfax, 
principal proprietor of the Sydney Morning Herald, in the foUowing 
terms: 
Broadly speaking, the financing of both the U.C.P. and the U.A.P. have 
been outside their own control. The large companies that have been pro-
viding the bulk of the U.A.P. war chest have been giving it not to the 
U.A.P. but to trustees outside the party organization. These trustees com-
prised the Consultative Council, a seff-elected body, chosen by none but 
itseff, constitutionaUy and legally representing none but itseff. In actual fact 
it was composed of persons who, between them, controlled and influenced a 
great part of the industrial, commercial and financial companies in the 
State—that is to say, the largest of them. They appealed for money aroimd 
the city. They got it. They gave it to the party. They were, naturaUy, in 
close touch wdth the party leaders, with whom they discussed party policy. 
Not unnaturaUy, party leaders paid a good deal of heed to their views.^^ 
When the United Australia Party was in decline the Consultative 
CouncU gave way to a new body styling itself the "Institute of Public 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
386 I Readings in Australian Govemment 
Affairs", and declaring that its object was "to create an informed 
public opinion 'along sound lines' with regard to economic problems 
and the political and social welfare of Australia."^^ The Institute 
acknowledged "no allegiance to any existing political party", but its 
membership and activities were similar to those of the defunct Con-
sultative Council. 
The influence of these otherwise unobtrusive institutions has often 
been evident at the successive times of crisis in the affairs of the 
urban non-Labor parties. There is evidence on one of these interven-
tions, at the time of the dissolution of the United Australia Party late 
in 1943, which affords an intriguing glimpse of a relationship between 
the financial backers and the politicians which might be described 
as patriarchal, if not patronizing. As already shown, dissatisfaction 
with the leadership and achievements of the U.A.P. had led during 
the year to the organization among its former supporters of several 
rival groups, notably the Liberal-Democratic Party, the One Parlia-
ment for Australia Party, and the Commonwealth Party. Early in 
November 1943 these groups (excepting the O.P.F.A. Party) together 
with the U.A.P. itself and the Country Party, received invitations 
from the Institute of Public Affairs to send representatives to a con-
ference, "as a preliminary to the calling of a public meeting to form 
a new political party", and to "discuss the recommendations adopted 
by the council of the N.S.W. branch of the U.A.P., and any proposals 
brought forward by any other political party or group"." The object 
was clearly to try to unify the non-Labor political forces in the con-
text of a disastrous defeat in the recent Federal elections and of a 
State general election looming in the following year. The conference 
was duly attended on 4 November by representatives of all the groups 
invited. The Institute of Public Affairs was represented by its Presi-
dent, Mr. (later Sir) Charles Lloyd Jones, its Director, Mr. A. E. 
Heath, Sir Sydney Snow, and Sir Norman Kater. These were all 
eminent figures in the world of company directors, chambers of 
commerce, graziers' associations, and clubmen. None of them was 
active in party politics, unless Sir N. Kater's unassimiing membership 
of the Legislative Council since 1923 could be so described. According 
to press reports, this conference, from which press representatives 
were strictly excluded, was formally opened by Mr. Lloyd Jones, who 
then departed, leaving the political delegates to sort out their affairs 
as best they might.'^ ^ 
The point of this story, as I see it, can be stated as follows. The 
particular elements of town and country capital represented in the 
Institute of Public Affairs wanted to see in being a strong and united 
political party which would serve their interests. While such a party 
existed they were content to remain in the background, supplying 
finance and keeping party leaders apprised of their "views". When 
the party ceased to be an effective political force and split into frag-
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ments, they felt it necessary to step in, point out to the politicians the 
error of their ways, and invite them to set their house tn order. But 
they would not participate in the detaUs of this process, nor take any 
public responsibUity for their influence on the political process. The 
politicians were expected to do that—and given a free hand, so long 
as they were prepared to create an effective political organization 
amenable to continued clandestine influence. 
Before examining the sequel it wiU be helpful to consider for a 
moment the significance of this situation from the point of view of the 
politicians. Their role was to a degree ignominious. It was their job 
to organize a political party, to hold its members together under 
banners of their owm design, to get themselves elected, to fight the 
parhamentaty battie, to form a govemment if possible, and to accept 
public responsibUity for its policy. But in so far as this required 
money, the bulk of it would be channelled through an irresponsible 
junta who would expect services rendered for value received, wdthout 
taking any of the risks or the stigma incidental to political activity. 
Furthermore, because of their Olympian detachment from the realities 
of political Iffe, this junta would provide little tn the way of positive 
guidance. They would simply want to disapprove of "objectionable" 
policies or leadership. Eggleston experienced this situation as a State 
politician in Victoria and is inclined to discount the junta's influence 
on policy in that State. But he corroborates the other points made 
here: 
The only instance I have ever heard of its interference was on one occasion 
when the leaders of the backgroimd organisation told the head of a party 
facing an election, who was supposed to have had no popular appeal, that, 
unless he handed over the leadership to someone else, the funds would not 
be forthcoming. I do not know whether the story was true or not, but the 
person selected by the organisation actuaUy did lead, rather to the misfor-
tune of Austraha. 
My experience of the persoimel of this background organisation is that they 
know so httie about pohtics that they could not effectively interfere. They 
have no ideas, and no guts. Several times, when my party was in difficulty, 
we appealed to the paurty Secretary to have some statement made by the 
pubhc men who were prominent in this organisation, but they took panic 
at the suggestion and refused.^ ® 
For a political party operating in a parhamentary democracy, such 
a situation would seem bound to create intolerable strains. For the 
party as a whole there would be the strain of reconcUing the need 
for popular support from below with the loyalty owed to the deus ex 
machina above. For the leader there would be the simUar strain of 
maintaining party unity whUe striving to please the oligarchy which 
at any time might threaten his position. Surely these strains might 
account, at least in part, for some of the recurrent crises of organiza-
tion and changes of leadership within the non-Labor urban parties. 
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Without a clear-cut interest to serve and a goal, however hazy, to 
aim for, party discipline was loose. The rank and file exerted little or 
no influence on decision-making. There was no pledge to bind the 
leadership, no pohcy to guide it, and no power inside the party to 
pohce it. Hence the leaders, whether in or out of office, were left to 
themselves to work out a pragmatic policy as they went along, or to 
drfft wdthout a policy. Even this looseness of organization could not 
prevent tensions from arising from time to time. There were many 
repetitions of the situation in New South Wales under the Stevens 
govemment in the 1930's when caucus became practically a dead 
letter and complaints about "the Government's aloofness towards the 
rank and file of the party" led to demands for the annual election of 
a leader and elective Ministries. 
THE NON-LABOR PARTY STRUGGLES FOR 
EMANCIPATION FROM "THE INTERESTS" 
To summarize what has been said so far, four sets of reasons have 
been suggested for weaknesses tn the urban non-Labor parties before 
1945. Firstiy, they did not have the complete or wholehearted backing 
of aU forms of town capital. Secondly, they had (as they stiU have) 
to contend wdth divergent demands among the groups which did 
accord them general support. Except on broad issues involving the 
rights of property and of employers, there is not the same homo-
geneity of interest among bankers, importers, merchants, and farmers 
—large and smaU—as there is among wage earners as such. Thirdly, 
they could not secure leadership from the reaUy influential "captains 
of industty", who, relying mainly on the inherent forces of capitahst 
economics to preserve the interests of their class, were content to 
leave pohtical activity to its junior representatives, whUe allowing 
them pocket money and taking a perfunctoty interest in their efforts. 
Fourthly, the politicians themselves were embarrassed by their 
dependence on financial support from irresponsible sources which 
they could not openly acknowledge or justify. 
At this point we come to the further dUemma which in some ways 
was the most serious of aU. While these parties may have been "first 
and foremost, the pohtical organisations" of—mainly—financial and 
commercial interests, on the other hand to vindicate their existence as 
parties, that is, to form a govemment, they must look far beyond these 
interests for majority electoral support. For this support they could 
rely upon the bulk of the magnates and self-employed professional 
people and their famUies, and perhaps three-quarters of people in the 
"managerial" class. They have not won much more than half of the 
smaU business and salaty-eaming groups. To make a majority they 
StiU needed an appreciable proportion—maybe a quarter to a thkd—of 
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the wage-eaming class and, in countty electorates, as many votes as 
they could get from dairymen and other farmers. Leaving aside the 
question of how far a party dependent on a voting support of this 
composition can be an "organ of town capital", let us consider the 
practical issue which the non-Labor politicians first faced squarely tn 
1944. In brief, they admitted to themselves that the occult cash nexus 
with "the interests" not only could not get a party's organizational 
work done nor win elections, but in view of the adverse publicity it 
was receiving at the time, it was a positive liabUity. 
As a result, methods of raising finance formed a major issue in the 
conferences at Canberra in October 1944, and at Albury on 17 
December 1944, when the warring conservative factions re-united in 
the Liberal Party of Australia. Representatives of the N.S.W. Institute 
of Public Affairs, and of simUar bodies in other States, made it their 
business to be present as "observers" at these conferences and must 
have listened with interest to a debate on "whether a large number 
of business and commercial people wanted to keep their party con-
tributions secret", and whether "organisations outside the party" 
should be aUowed to provide the main financial support. In the course 
of this debate a Victorian delegate produced evidence that a canvass 
in his State had resulted tn substantial contributions being made to 
the party's funds without passing through any intermediate organiza-
tions. It was later reported that in Western Australia the Liberal Party 
collected its owm funds and put its National Union out of existence. 
The low minimum membership fee adopted at the Albury Con-
ference—2s. 6d. a year for adults and Is. for juniors—was interpreted 
at the time as implying that the new party would not look to outside 
organizations for its main financial support. However, it remained 
constitutionaUy possible for the party to receive outside donations, 
whether from individuals or organizations. 
The first task of the New South Wales Party was to fight a bitter 
by-election tn Ryde (3 February 1945). There was an immediate need 
for funds, and the party accepted assistance from the I.P.A. on the 
understanding that no strings should be attached and that the party 
intended to set up its own financial organization and be entirely inde-
pendent of the I.P.A. as soon as possible. 
However, when the New South Wales Provisional Executive 
(appointed January 1945) made its first public appeal for general 
funds in March, the I.P.A. immediately countered with a circular to 
a large number of business and commercial men, obviously intended 
to divert their political offerings through its own hands. This led 
directiy to the resignation of seven of the twenty-one members of 
the provisional executive, when they faded to pass a motion that the 
State Branch should "not accept any further funds from the Institute 
of Public Affairs in any circumstances". The dissident minority, led 
by the former head of the Liberal Democratic Party, described the 
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majority attitude as "a betrayal of the spirit of Canberra and Albuty", 
and declared that the I.P.A. was ahnhig at "that financial control over 
the Liberal Party which it held over the United Australia and Demo-
cratic Parties".^^ 
It was not until the Provisional Executive was replaced by the first 
elected State CoimcU in June 1945 that the party hierarchy began to 
accept the idea of financial independence from bodies like the I.P.A. 
They celebrated the CouncU's formation with a mild resolution, 
intended mainly to soften some of the current criticism, that party 
branches must not accept funds from corporations or individuals 
unless they were offered unconditionaUy. This was a rather ^mpty 
gesture, as there was no evidence that the I.P.A. attempted to control 
the funds it provided. Its real danger was that it deflected part of the 
potential flow of direct contributions to the party, and it could 
decide how much to provide, and when. If the party did not do what 
was expected, the contributions could cease. FuU realization of this 
soon led to the rule which stUl prevaUs tn New South Wales and is 
said never to have been infringed. Donations may come from indi-
viduals or from firms, but not from any outside organization such 
as the I.P.A., nor even from trade groups or associations. 
The Liberal Party in New South Wales was the direct heir of the 
U.A.P.-Democratic Party to the extent of inheriting its members of 
Parhament, its paid officers and premises, its parhamentaty and 
concUiar leaders, its general policies, and most of its rank-and-file 
members. Its most important innovation was this new approach to 
party finance. 
The Institute of Public Affairs has not gone out of existence, and 
with other bodies like the Constitutional Association, the Sane Demo-
cracy League, and the Chambers of Commerce and Manufactures, 
it continues to provide a good deal of indirect assistance to the Party 
wdthout having any institutional or financial connection with it. These 
bodies, aU nominaUy neutral in party politics, spend a great deal of 
money on anti-Labour and anti-union advertising, overt or disguised. 
It is clear that the lUtimate sources of most of the Liberal Party's 
funds must be much the same as for those of its predecessors. The 
basis of the new Party's claim that it has won emancipation from 
"outside control" is that, having now buUt a fund-raising organization 
of its owm, the Party cannot be held to ransom by a self-appointed 
coterie threatening to cut off a large part of its supply. As a Party 
official has put it: "If they give large sums and they withdraw a large 
sum then you would be in trouble. You can afford to offend a lot more 
httie people than you can a few large bodies." 
The changed basis of Liberal party finance may be characterized 
as a bid for self-respect by the professional pohticians. By the 
accounts of its owm officers, it has achieved remarkable success, 
largely because it has been accompanied by the necessaty coroUaty— 
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a widely-based party o.-ganization modelled closely on that of the 
Labor party. There are important differences, of course, that lie 
beyond the scope of this paper, but there is little question that the 
Liberal Party is a more autonomous, a more democratic, and a more 
smoothly functioning political organization than its predecessors. Its 
leaders wish it to become a national party, with electoral support 
spread across all classes and based on a positive policy. Can these 
laudable aims surmount the persistent facts that the Labor Parties 
wdU continue to have a peculiar claim on the votes of trade unionists, 
and that the dominant elements of town capital can stUl look to no 
other political agent than the Liberal Party? 
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GOVERNMENTS IN AUSTRALIA: 
A STUDY OF THE RELATION 
BETWEEN SUPPORTING INTERESTS 
AND PARTY POLICY 
R. M. Martin 
A glance at the structure of the Australian Labour Party is enough 
to show the party's organizational dependence on trade unions of 
manual workers. It is in this sense, but only in this sense, that J. D. B. 
Miller finds it possible to describe the Labour party as "emphatically 
a trade union party",^ for he and other observers {pace the publicists) 
now generally accept that a simUar identification is not possible in 
the broad field of party policy and, more particularly, of Labour 
government policy. It is argued, on the one hand, that electoral 
realities have compelled Australian Labour governments to make 
room for the claims of interests other than the unions, and, on the 
other hand, that the unions are in any case so divided among them-
selves that it is difficult to find "a trade union policy".^ The general 
conclusion drawm from this argument is that, as S. R. Davis puts it, 
no major interest is "wholly indulged or wholly ignored" under 
Labour, any more than non-Labour, governments, with the reservation 
that certain groups may to a minor extent tend to benefit more than 
others from the policies of particular govemments. 
There is, of course, room for preference. Is there, however, evidence of 
great preference? There are in each [Austialian] State a few pieces of legis-
lation which are characteristically moulded to suit the favourite clients of 
each party. But aside from these few platform show-pieces, a scmtiny of the 
legislation passed in the six States over the ten years, 1946-55, does not 
reveal any dominating preferential relationship between the party in office 
and its "supporting interests".^ 
The argument I wish to advance here is that in certain circum-
stances there is a consistent "trade union pohcy", and one, moreover. 
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which Australian Labour governments have been prepared to apply 
m spite of what appear to be "electoral realities". As a result, whUe it 
is admittedly futUe to look for a "dominating preferential relation-
ship" between Australian trade unions and Labour governments, m 
terms of policy, it is wrong to conclude that this means there can be 
no significant preferential relationship at aU between them. The pre-
sent article is thus intended to go some way towards meeting Henty 
Mayer's complaint, "that the analysis of Australian parties in terms of 
the interests behind them breaks off when it comes to the crucial 
question of the context of party pohcy"*—without at the same time 
predicating that the parties are nothing more than the interests 
behind them. 
The initial question is: in what circumstances can a government's 
policy decision be regarded as reflecting a preferential relationship 
between that government and an interest group? 
In the first place, the term "preferential" necessarUy implies that a 
choice has been made between at least two would-be recipients, and 
that what has been granted to one is in some sense incompatible with 
what would have been granted to the other had it been preferred. 
In other words, a strictly preferential relationship presupposes con-
flicting demands, and it can exist only when the satisfaction of one 
demand has involved the frustration of another. In the present context 
this can be translated into the proposition that opposition is an 
essential prerequisite of a preferential relationship between a govern-
ment and an interest group. Thus there is no preferential treatment 
involved when a government concedes a claim which no one opposes. 
In the second place, given the presence of opposition, a preferen-
tial relationship may be quite simply specified by postulating that 
such a relationship exists when a government adopts a policy which 
an interest group regards as satisfying the interest it stands for.^ 
Defined in this way, however, the concept is of doubtful value as an 
analytical aid if we wish to discover differential relationships between 
a government and particular interest groups, in terms of applied 
policy. It is of little help in this connection primarily because it not 
uncommonly happens that two or more interest groups consider their 
interests satisfied by the same policy (for example, trade unions and 
manufacturers in the case of a protective tariff), and they thus appear 
to share a preferential relationship with the government. They may, 
of course, be thought of as sharing equally or unequally, but while 
one may conceive of different degrees of preference, it is quite another 
matter to discriminate between the sharing groups by weighting such 
differences in a meaningful way. 
To avoid this difficiUty, therefore, a sharper and more restricted 
conception of preference is needed, a conception that wiU make it 
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possible to isolate policy decisions in which not oiUy preference but 
also the recipient of that preference is unequivocaUy indicated. In 
the foUowdng attempt to provide such a conception, the frame of 
reference is limited to the organized interest groups of farmers, 
graziers, manufacturers, traders and manual workers, which are 
customarUy regarded as constituting the main "supporting interests" 
of the three major Australian parties.® In view of the multiplicity of 
supporting interests and the frequency of coalition governments on 
the non-Labour side, the conception outlined below is more easUy 
applied to the Labour side, and is framed with particular reference 
to trade imions and Labour governments. 
For present purposes, a given government policy may be regarded 
as providing evidence of preference for the governing party's sup-
porting interests ff two principal conditions are simultaneously satis-
fied. (1) Unanimity: the government party's supporting interests are 
united, or substantially so, in their support for the policy. (2) Exclu-
siveness: the other parties' supporting interests are substantially united 
in their opposition to the same policy. It is to be emphasized that 
both these conditions must be satisfied at the one time in relation to 
a given policy decision. 
The first condition does not necessarUy involve literal unanimity, 
but it does require something fairly close to it (vagueness here is, 
regrettably, unavoidable). The condition is not satisfied, for example, 
by the bare majority vote of a Labour party or trade union con-
ference; the vote, especiaUy in the latter case, must be at least "over-
whelmingly" one-sided. Where support for a particular proposal is 
something less than overwhelming, its translation into policy by a 
Labour govemment entaUs, in effect, an expression of preference for 
the views of one group of unions against those of another substantial, 
ff minority, group. Preference, in these circumstances, can hardly be 
said to have been given to Labour's supporting interests as a group. 
Joined to the first condition of unanimity is the second condition 
of exclusiveness. Preference is clearly exclusive i£ it is given, in a 
specific case, against the objections of all but the beneficiaty. Thus if 
the trade unions promote a particular policy and aU the other major 
interests oppose it, a government's adoption of that policy is as clear-
cut a case of preference as one could hope to find. 
Of course, the notion of such a preferential relationship hinges on 
the assumption that ff the conditions of unanimity and exclusiveness 
are satisfied in relation to a policy proposal, and ff a govemment f orm-
aUy adopts it, then the government has deliberately given preference 
to the interests promoting the proposal. The weakness in this assump-
tion is obvious enough, and is common to aU causal propositions pur-
porting to explain social behaviour in so far as they involve ultimately 
untestable statements about human motives—in the present case the 
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motives of govemment leaders in making a particular policy 
decision. By the same token, such propositions are tenable only to the 
extent that one accepts the possibUity of inferring motives from a 
sequence of observable events or actions. The conception of prefer-
ence formulated above is designed to delimit, as closely as practicable, 
the observable circumstances which appear to give strongest support 
to a causal proposition of this kind. It is, therefore, an extreme con-
ception which, in application, wiU inevitably exclude many policy 
decisions likely to have a preferential element. It does not, for 
example, extend to cases of "shared" preference where the preference 
given to a single interest cannot be disassociated from that given to 
another interest. Nor does it cover situations tn which the non-
recipient interests are divided between neutrality and opposition, 
since not merely opposition but opposition from aU except the pre-
ferred interest is an essential requirement. The important point, how-
ever, is that this conception of preference directs attention to situa-
tions in which there is likely to be greatest justification for speaking 
of a preferential relationship between a particular govemment and 
a particular interest. In other words, it specifies a type of situation 
which gives reasonable grounds for assuming (wdth some confidence, 
if nothing like complete certainty) the operation of the motive that 
is implicit in this notion of a preferential relationship—an intention on 
the part of government leaders to give preference to a particular 
interest. 
n 
In the statement quoted earlier, S. R. Davis draws a distinction between 
preference in a minor key, and "great preference" or a "dominating 
preferential relationship". The only hint he gives about the meaning 
of the latter terms (and that on the side of Labour only) is when he 
quotes as relevant A. A. Morrison's comment on the long Labour rule 
of Queensland: "it would be difficult to say that this State has 
advanced much further along the path to socialism than [non-Labour] 
South Australia. . . ."^ Davis, who recognises the trade unions as the 
Labour party's main supporting interests, thus implies that there 
would be evidence of a dominating preferential relationship, between 
Labour governments and the trade unions, if such govemments had 
been more active in writing frankly socialistic policies into the statute 
books. 
This argument, however, necessarily presumes that the great bulk 
of Australian union leaders are mUitantly socialist in temper, and, 
more than this, that they know fairly precisely what they mean by 
socialism—that the word is something more to them than an evocative 
catch-cry to be clothed only in vast generalities. Such an assumption 
is doubtful, to say the least. It is also an assumption that Davis himself 
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implicitly disowns elsewhere when he contrasts the "famUiar . . . day-
to-day industrial interests" of most trade unionists with the "rarefied 
ideological demands of a smaU doctrinaire wing".^ He is thus in the 
position of identifying a possible dommating preferential relationship 
on the Labour side with socialistic legislation, despite the fact that he 
regards Labour's supporting interests as being httie concerned with 
doctrinaire socialism. 
It seems that Davis has been drawm into this paradox by an 
apparent inclination to look on the notion of a dominating preferen-
tial relationship as bemg worth speaking about only in terms of the 
whole range of a government's policies. For, clearly, evidence of 
such a relationship, defined tn these terms, is hkely to be found only 
ff the supporting interests concemed possess some Weltanschauung 
which is radicaUy different from that of the other supporting interests, 
and which may as a result give a distinctive flavour and direction to 
the broad sweep of a government's policies. A socialist ideology, 
assuming it were faced wdth an opposing ideology or ideologies, 
would provide this ingredient. 
However, in the absence of such a clear-cut ideological cleavage 
between the supporting interests of Australian political parties, we 
are forced to conclude not only, as Davis does, that there is no domi-
nating preferential relationship (in his sense) between parties and 
supporting interests, but also that there can be no such relationship 
discernible in the statute books. This does not, of course, rule out the 
possibility of a government's policies revealing any preferential rela-
tionship. What it does mean is that such a relationship, ff discover-
able, wdU reflect empirical rather than ideological considerations, and 
wUl be "dominating" within a limited policy area only. It wiU be 
determined, in other words, by the nature of the issue at stake. 
Thus, before examining the policies of Labour governments for 
traces of a preferential relationship with the trade unions, the essential 
first step is to ascertain whether there is any class of issues on which (1) 
the unions are consistently most nearly imited in their support, and 
(2) the non-Labour parties' supporting interests are consistently most 
nearly united in opposition. It is in a Labour government's perform-
ance on such issues, ff on any, that a distinct preferential relationship 
wiU be evident. 
m 
Austrahan trade unions through their leaders express firm opinions on 
topics as diverse as hydrogen bombs and opera houses, but by their 
nature they are primarUy concerned wdth economic topics. And even 
here, whUe they are deeply interested in many of the broader policy 
issues arising within the economic sector, their most intense and 
consistent attention is reserved for matters that directiy and vitaUy 
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affect the working-lives of their members. This concentration of 
attention is reflected in continual agitation for higher wages, shorter 
hours and greater fringe benefits, particularly those involving more 
money or less work. It is in relation to these issues that the conditions 
of unanimity and exclusiveness are most consistentiy satisfied. 
On the side of unanimity, claims for immediate industrial benefits 
of general application continually override factional and ideological 
divisions, and clashes of industrial interest, among the unions.® For 
example, late in 1955 on the Queensland Central Executive of the 
Australian Labour Party, which was already split into warring fac-
tions, only one union broke an otherwise solid union front on a resolu-
tion directing the state Labour government to introduce three weeks 
annual leave legislation.^® Fifteen months later and eight weeks before 
the expulsion of the Premier, V. C. Gair, the issue was again before 
the Q.C.E. This time it was in the form of a motion which clearly 
indicated the critical nature of the decision, by threatening with 
disciplinary action members of the parhamentaty group, supported 
by the right-wing union faction, who had opposed the three weeks 
leave proposal in Caucus. Even in these circumstances, the Q.C.E. 
recorded a vote of 51 to 11 in favour of the motion, the minority 
including the votes of only three of the right-wing unions.^^ 
It is to be emphasised that the claims relevant here are distinguished 
not only by the fact that they concern direct industrial benefits of the 
wages-hours-holidays type, but also by the fact that they are general 
in the sense that their application is seen as promoting the interests 
of unionists at large in more or less equal measure. The importance 
of this generality factor has been underlined by a union official, with 
ample experience of industrial action for sectional wage claims, who 
remarked during the campaign in 1962 for increased annual leave 
that this claim had "none of the features that cause disunity among 
the unions when the question of wages is being tackled".^^ 
Union solidarity slackens markedly as soon as one moves from the 
circle of issues that clearly involve these direct and general industrial 
benefits. This is apparent even in the case of, say, penalties for striking 
and the legal regulation of union elections, which as general issues 
affecting the unions' freedom of action may be regarded as being 
only just beyond the chcle. The "right" of unions to strike and to 
manage their internal affairs must stUl be referred to with public 
reverence by union officials, and can still produce formidable displays 
of solidarity. At the same time, the changing character of trade union 
politics in Australia since the war has helped to diversify attitudes 
towards restrictions on the use of the strike weapon, and, more openly, 
has led to a continuing division on the question of court-controlled 
ballots, along with a switch in official union policy. ^ ^ 
It often happens, of course, that the trade unions are officiaUy 
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united in their attitude on general industrial issues of this kind, 
which do not involve direct industrial benefits; and they are also 
frequentiy found giving unanimous support to sectional claims for 
such direct benefits. But what distinguishes the unanimity in these 
cases from the unanimity evoked by claims for industrial benefits that 
are both general and direct is that, in the latter case, something more 
is involved than mere formal agreement, something which has to 
do with what might be caUed the intensity of support for a particular 
claim. Claims for industrial benefits that are both general and direct 
are almost invariably supported and promoted by the unions in 
general with much greater intensity than is usually evident in the 
case of general claims which faU outside the circle of direct industrial 
benefits. These variations in the unions' intensity of support have 
obvious and important consequences for the vigour and persistence 
wdth which different types of claims are pressed on government by 
the unions at large. 
The further one moves away from the circle of direct industrial 
benefits, into the broader issues of economic policy and beyond to the 
hydrogen bombs and opera houses, the more glaring the cracks tn the 
unions' solidarity tend to become. Thus in 1957, by contrast with its 
near unanimity on the three weeks leave issue (referred to above), 
the Queensland Central Executive of the Australian Labour Party 
split along strictiy factional lines when it accepted, by 32 votes to 27,^* 
a watered-down motion criticizing the Petrol BUl, which raised 
contentious but non-industrial issues. This is not to say that sub-
stantial agreement among the unions is never found or is not, in some 
cases, customary on issues of this kind. Unanimity is, in fact, the 
norm when it comes to such principles as price control, rent control 
and higher social welfare benefits, though on others it cannot be 
predicted with as much assurance. Again, however, the question of 
intensity of support is important; and, generally speaking, claims of 
this kind are not promoted with the vigour and persistence that 
characterise union campaigns for industrial benefits. The narrower 
claims exclusive to trade unionists as producers tend to arouse greater 
enthusiasm among them and their officials than do the wider claims 
they share as consumers. 
In any event, so far as the question of preference is concemed and 
whatever the position regarding the condition of unanimity, the 
second condition of exclusiveness is less certain to be satisfied when 
it comes to the broader issues. The non-Labour parties' supporting 
interests invariably oppose the major bread-and-butter industrial 
claims of the union. But on wider issues, such as credit restrictions, 
import licensing and monopolies control, one or more of these groups 
are often found sharing the unions' position, if not their reasons for 
taking it up. 
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It has been argued above that the conditions of unanimity and ex-
clusiveness are most consistently satisfied in relation to the unions' 
general claims for direct industrial benefits. Because of this, signs of 
a distinct preferential relationship between Australian Labour govern-
ments and trade unions (if there is one) are likely to be most readUy 
discernible in the industrial policies of such governments. 
Government policy may be examined at two levels: the level at 
which policies are formally adopted, and the level at which they are 
applied or administered. It is often necessaty to take account of a 
government's performance at both these levels. In the following 
discussion, however, attention is confined to the first.^^ Exclusion of 
the second level from consideration is justified for two reasons. 
In the first place, the kind of policies relevant to this argument are, 
by definition, highly controversial, at least at the time of their formal 
adoption by government. Thus the mere fact of their adoption is 
politicaUy significant. It means that, however government leaders may 
intend to administer such a policy, they have publicly committed 
themselves to it tn spite of strong opposition to their doing so. For 
example, a Queensland Labour government enacted legislation in 
1932 to enable the state Industrial Court to make awards of preference 
in employment to unionists. The provision was hotly disputed at the 
time and for many years afterwards, even though successive Labour 
govemments soft-pedaUed its administration by refusing to allow 
government industrial inspectors to institute court enforcement pro-
ceedings. The point is that this policy was publicly identified with 
Labour governments, as a result of the initial decision to adopt it; 
and the fact that their administration of it was less than whole-
hearted did not enable them to avoid such identification in the eyes of 
the electorate. It is reasonably assumed that government leaders are 
not altogether unaware of this consequence of formal commitment, 
and that, therefore, their decision to adopt (or not to adopt) policies 
of this character by itself indicates the weight they have given to the 
various pressures brought to bear on them. 
Secondly, the question of government administration is in fact 
comparatively unimportant when it comes to the policing and en-
forcement of the industrial policies with which the present argument 
is primarily concerned. Once these policies have been formally 
adopted, the unions themselves are for the most part capable of 
handling the administrative function. This is one of the reasons why, 
despite the faUure of Queensland Labour governments to enforce 
preference to unionists awards, the level of unionization in Queens-
land is far higher than in any other state. The governments' admini-
strative diffidence has been very much less important than the 1932 
policy decision, so far as the practical application of the preference 
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to unionists principle is concerned. SimUarly, in the case of long-
service leave, three weeks annual leave and quarterly cost-of-living 
adjustments (referred to below), the unions are totally dependent on 
government action in one form or another for the formal adoption of 
these pohcies. Once this point has been passed, however, the unions 
are nowhere near as dependent on govemment action. They custo-
marUy police the application of the relevant statutory or award pro-
visions and take steps to enforce them against defaulting employers, 
either through legal proceedings or by way of direct negotiation and 
industrial action. 
For these reasons, then, it is sufficient for the purposes of this article 
to restrict consideration of government industrial policies, as defined 
above, to the point at which such policies are formaUy adopted. It is 
assumed that the nature of the relationship between Australian 
Labour governments and the trade unions in this pohcy area is deter-
mined primarily at this point. 
Queensland Labour governments, as Morrison asserts, may not have 
gone any further towards socialism than have their non-Labour 
counterparts in South Australia.^® They have, however, gone much 
further towards satisfying the unions' central industrial aims. This 
is showm briefly by comparing the terms of the major industiial 
statute tn each case, as it stood in 1956 before Queensland Labour's 
coUapse. Thus the Queensland Industrial Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion Acts of 1932-55 prescribed a 40-hour working week, two weeks 
annual leave, one week sick leave a year, overtime rates of not less 
than time-and-a-half, and three months long-service leave; the South 
Austrahan Industrial Code of 1920-55 contained no corresponding 
provisions.^'' The point of the comparison is heightened by the 
simUar contiast between the way in which the legislation dealt with 
other less central issues such as strikes, preference hi employment to 
unionists and union officials' right of entty into workplaces. More 
important, however, this contrast is not peculiar to the industrial 
policies of Queensland Labour governments and South Australian 
non-Labour govemments. For despite variations in the performance 
of Labour in different Austrahan states, it is stiU possible, over a 
period of time, to draw a clear line between the policies initiated by 
Labour governments on major industrial issues and the corresponding 
pohcies of their non-Labour counterparts. This is indicated by the 
accompanying Table in which are outlined comparative performances 
on the key issues of long-service leave, three weeks annual leave and 
quarterly cost-of-living adjustments to the basic wage. 
Labour govemments have often showm themselves reluctant to 
faU in with major industrial claims advanced by the unions. They 
have staffed and sought compromises, and have sometimes publicly 
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Vic. (1956) repealed Labour's 
1953 measure. 
Qld. (1961), Court to make adjust-
ments only after formal hearmg. 
''S.A., no move to alter state Court's 
decision to follow federal Court 
(1953). 
Qld. (1957-), S.A. 
(1959-), no move. 
(1953-) & W.A. 
Comparative Performance of Australian Labour and Non-Labour Govemments on 
Three Policy Issues up to 1962. 
Labour Govemments Non-Labour Govemments 
1. QUARTERLY COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS TO THE BASIC WAGE: 
State authorities' pohcies after the federal Arbitration Court 
abandoned the system in September 1953. 
i. State award workers: 
Vic. (1953) & N.S.W. (1955) 
restored system by legislative 
direction. 
''Qld., Industrial Court continued 
system. 
'*W.A. (1953-55), restoration re-
jected by Legislative Council and 
state Arbitration Court; but (1955) 
Court restored system. 
"Tas. (1955), Chairman of wages 
boards restored system, then (1956) 
abandoned again, 
ii. State government employees under 
federal awards: 
Vic. (1953) & N.S.W. (1955) Vic. (1956) rescinded 1953 decision. 
restored system by executive 
decision. 
«"(?W. (1953-7) &W.A. (1953-9), 
no move to restore. 
Tas. (1958) restored, then (1960) 
abandoned. 
2. LONG-SERVICE LEAVE: 
N.S.W. (1951) and Qld. (1952) 
apphed to workers under state 
awards. 
Vic. (1953), N.S.W. (1955), Qld. 
(1955), Tas. (1956) & W.A. 
(1958) applied generally to 
federal as well as state award 
workers. 
Tas. (1960) also apphed to 
casual waterside workers. 
3. THREE WEEKS ANNUAL LEAVE: 
N.S.W. (1958) apphed by 
legislative direction to all workers 
under state awards. 
Tas. (1961) amended Act to No action, 
empower Chairman of wages 
boards to award, which he sub-
sequendy (1962) did. 
* The references to the actions of industrial tribunals are not to be taken as 
necessarily implying a causal hnk between the political colour of govern-
ments and the tribunals' decisions—though such a link is quite evident in 
the Tasmanian case at least. 
** In Qld. and W.A. the number of government, as of private, employees 
covered by federal awards is very small. 
S.A. (1957) applied in very limited 
form to state and federal award 
workers. 
C'wealth. (1961) applied to water-
side workers, tied to anti-strike 
provisos. 
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rejected such claims. At the same time they have given, in this 
respect, a measure of satisfaction beyond that which most union 
leaders feel they can expect from non-Labour governments. This is 
so not only in tiie case of the general and direct industrial benefits 
cited above. It is also true of rather less central matters such as 
workers' compensation, apprenticeship and general factory and shop 
regulation, which usually generate less political heat but stiU occupy 
a high place tn the scale of union claims. However, the record on the 
more sensitive issues is particularly significant because it is when 
these issues are at stake that the conditions indicating a preferential 
relationship are most consistently and clearly satisfied. In other words, 
they are not only the issues on which union feeling tends to run 
highest; they are also the industrial issues on which a Labour govern-
ment is subject to the strongest countervaUhig pressures. Accord-
ingly, the unions' influence on government policy is the more rigo-
rously tested in such cases since they must secure concessions in the 
face of these opposing pressures.^^ 
VI 
The contrast between the industrial legislation of Queensland and 
South Australia alone is hardly surprising, given that the governing 
party's supporting interests were different in each case. In each of 
these states up to 1956, the dominant party had held office con-
tinuously for weU over twenty years; and owing to the existence of 
electoral boundaries and voting systems favourable to it, each party 
could regard itself as firmly entrenched—saving a split in its ranks, 
as eventuaUy occurred in Queensland. The Queensland Labour 
government and the South Australian non-Labour government were 
thus in a distinctive position in 1956, for even in New South Wales 
and Tasmania, where Labour had retained office for fifteen years or 
more, the electoral mechanism was not so blatantly favourable to it. 
This element of electoral security almost certainly had some bearing 
on the contrast between the Queensland and South Australian indus-
trial legislation, assuming that it diminished the force of pressures 
working against the satisfaction of the unions' industrial claims in 
Queensland (so far as these pressures came from outside the Labour 
movement), and, by the same token, increased the force of the 
same pressures tn South Australia. 
Electoral considerations, however, have not set absolute limits to 
the responsiveness of Labour governments confronted wdth union 
industrial claims. For example, the "characterless and dispiriting 
respectability"^® developed by the Victorian parhamentaty Labour 
party, over a half-century out of power, produced a 1955 election 
policy that was not greatly different from that of its opponents. 
Nevertheless, only the Labour platform included specifically industrial 
planks, in the form of proposals relatmg to long-service leave, equal 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Parties and Pressure Groups I 403 
pay for women, workers' compensation and factory regulation.^® 
Much more significant, however, was the same party's record during 
the term of its first majority government in the history of Victoria. 
In the parliament preceding the 1955 elections, the Cain Labour 
govemment passed the first long-service leave measure to cover workers 
under federal as well as state awards. It was also the first Labour 
govemment that compelled state industrial tribunals to continue 
quarterly cost-of-living adjustments to the basic wage, after the 
federal Arbitration Court (as it then was) had decided to abandon 
this system. 
The Victorian example is iUumhiating. The Cain government was 
dependent on the votes of a splinter group, the Victorian Liberal 
party, in the upper house, and its majority in the lower house was not 
unduly large. Nor could it regard itself as electoraUy entrenched in 
office as could the Queensland and South Australian govemments 
at the time. In the circumstances, the government might well be 
expected to have avoided, or at least to have proceeded more 
cautiously with legislation which, while pleasing the faithful, was 
equally likely to antagonize others whose votes the government 
needed. The principle involved in terms of electoral support has 
been enunciated in this way by E. E. Schattschneider: 
To make extreme concessions to one interest at the expense of the others is 
hkely to prove fatal to the ahgnment of interests that make up the constitu-
ency of a major party. The process moderates the course of party action . . ,21 
The extent to which the leaders of state Labour govemments have 
defied this principle in the field of industrial policy may owe some-
thing to a fraternal sympathy born of shared ideals and long associa-
tion with trade unionists. However, this is a matter of speculation 
only. More readUy observable, and also in some degree controllable 
by the unions themselves, are externally-imposed compulsions which 
(like Schattschneider's principle) ultimately derive their force from 
the politician's instinct for survival rather than his sense of mate-
ship. These arise from the structure of the Australian Labour Party. 
In Australia, as in the United States to which Schattschneider's 
remarks were primarily directed, manual workers' unions constitute 
only some of many interests in the electorate at large, and, despite 
their mass membership and the fabled solidarity of their members, 
by no means exercise a dominating influence in that context. But 
the power of Australian trade unions tn party-politics is less a matter 
of their numerical strength, or of their ability to marshal the vote 
of their members at election-time, than of their position within the 
framework of one of the major parties. Whatever may be the signific-
ance of the unions within the wider electorate, the structure of the 
Australian Labour Party means that the leaders of the unions can 
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constitute the dominant group within the party outside parliament. 
They are thus at least potentially capable of determining the fate of 
Labour's political leaders in a way that has nothing to do with the 
electoral support the A.L.P. has among unionists, or, for that matter, 
with the A.L.P.'s support among electors in general. 
But, of course, it also follows that this potential situation is in fact 
realizable only when, and to the extent that, the unions are agreed 
on the way in which and the purposes for which the power inherent 
in their formal position within the party should be used. It is for this 
reason that one must look beyond formal party structure to specific 
issues for the occasions when it can be said that the trade unions, 
rather than some trade unions, dominate A.L.P. decisions. And the 
specffic issues on which the unions tend to act most consistently as a 
group involve matters which go to the heart of the interests of all 
trade unionists, the bread-and-butter matters on which unions are 
built and around which their activities revolve. More than this, it is 
on such matters, when the immediate industrial interests of unionists 
in general are at stake, that the unions' intensity of support is con-
sistently high and they are therefore prepared to assert most firmly 
the intra-party power which their unanimity confers on them as a 
group. In short, issues of this kind most consistently evoke not only 
the greatest measure of agreement and the most intense support 
among the unions, but also, in consequence, the strongest and most 
persistent union pressure on Labour governments. 
At the same time, it is no part of the present argument that 
Australian Labour governments (or non-Labour governments for that 
matter) are, or have been, merely passive instruments of their party's 
supporting interests in policy matters. Even on the crucial industrial 
issues, the union-government link through the A.L.P. machine does 
not involve the union "control" of Labour governments which many 
union leaders claim should exist, and which their political opponents 
claim does exist. For one thing, as the history of the A.L.P. shows, 
the party machine does not possess the sort of sanctions which can 
be used to control rather than kill Labour governments. Rarely has a 
significant proportion of union leaders been prepared seriously to 
contemplate jeopardizing such gains (whether of a personal or policy 
nature) as they have made or can hope to make, through a Labour 
government, by using the party's formal sanctions in order to assert 
the claim that on a particular issue they should control rather than 
merely influence the government's actions. In other words, there is 
no ground for presuming a simple command-response relationship 
between the two, even in situations involving policy issues which 
evoke complete unanimity and the most intense support and persistent 
pressure on the part of the imions. It is true that, in these circum-
stances. Labour governments rarely reject a union claim out of hand. 
But it is equally rare for them to give immediate effect to such a 
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claim, and they usuaUy stave off action by variations on the theme 
of "accepted in principle pending more favourable circumstances and 
/or further study". 
On the other hand, the fact that union leaders lack controlling 
authority, owing to their known unreadiness to use the party's formal 
sanctions against Labour governments, does not mean that the 
parhamentaty leaders can afford persistently to ignore union claims, 
particiUarly on general industrial issues, without eventual danger to 
their position. Dissident factions, inside as weU as outside parlia-
ment, thrive on frustration wdthin the party, and in the long-term 
more subtle sanctions than expulsion or withdrawal of endorsement 
may be available.^^ Moreover, outside the party structure, strike 
action may sometimes seem a greater electoral liabUity to a Labour 
government than a pohcy concession. The leaders of Labour govem-
ments, tn other words, may feel they can afford to delay granting the 
unions' major industrial claims and to press for compromise solutions, 
but it is apparent that they do not feel able to brush such claims 
aside with the equanimity of their non-Labour counterparts. 
Thus the New South Wales Labour government might for a long 
time have resisted heavy (ff, in some union quarters, tongue-in-the-
cheek) pressure from the unions for repeal of the state anti-strike 
penalties, and it might eventuaUy have brought down only a com-
promise amendment which fell very far short of the unions' claims. 
But in the same amending measure the government also gave 
unionists absolute preference in employment and provided for 
compulsoty daylight training of apprentices. Moreover, during the 
preceding five years, despite delaying action on these issues as well, 
it had, among other things, restored cost-of-living adjustments within 
its jurisdiction, extended long-service leave benefits to workers under 
federal awards, and introduced three weeks annual leave and a 
scheme leading to equal pay for many women. Similarly, if the 
Tasmanian Labour govemment's policy on cost-of-living adjustments 
has been notably erratic, the govemment did at least do something 
to satisfy union claims on this score; and union leaders, while strongly 
critical, stUl find this kind of uncertainty preferable to the consistency 
displayed in the same matter by the non-Labour governments of 
Victoria and South Australia. From the unions' viewpoint, the 
deficiencies in a Labour govemment's performance cannot be 
divorced from its merits, and even apparent deficiencies can have 
meritorious aspects when the alternative is viewed. 
The N.S.W. [Labour] Govemment has failed to introduce a 35-hour week, 
but nevertheless supports same in principle; the Liberal Party leader Mr. 
Askin came out in direct opposition to it. The N.S.W. Govemment has 
faded to eliimnate the [anti-strike] penal clauses from the Arbitration Act, 
but did modffy them; the Liberal Party leader is in favour of making them 
even more repressive.^^ 
o 
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And underlying, and in part flowing from, the judgments made on 
the basis of particular policies, there is the broad and clinching 
assumption: 
. . . basicaUy, Labour Govemments wdU protect the industrial and social 
rights of workers whereas Liberal Govemments wiU not hesitate to ignore 
[tiiem] . . . On bread and butter issues. Labour's pohcy is far superior to 
the pohcies of the Liberal-Coimtry Party forces.2* 
This, of course, stiU leaves imexplained the variations in the per-
formance of different Labour governments—for example, the assump-
tion by New South Wales Labour, rather than electorally-entrenched 
Queensland Labour, of the pace-setting role in post-war industrial 
legislation; and the caution of Tasmanian Labour governments as 
against the comparative brashness of their relatively insecure Victorian 
counterpart of 1953-55. The electoral factor is clearly insufficient as 
an explanation, and other local factors must be taken into account. 
It is unnecessary to deal with the question in detaU, since the central 
concem here is with policy differences between Labour and non-
Labour governments rather than among Labour govemments, but two 
relevant considerations may be mentioned. 
In the first place, there is the obvious fact that Labour govem-
ments in Victoria, Westem Australia and Tasmania, as earlier in South 
Australia, chronicaUy suffer (or enjoy, on another interpretation) 
upper houses in which they lack a party majority. This has proved a 
serious obstacle in Westem Australia, where the upper house per-
sistentiy blocked biUs on major industrial issues introduced by the 
Hawke Labour government of 1953-59, passing the long-service 
leave measure of 1958 only because its main terms had earlier been 
embodied in an agreement between employers and unions. The 
upper houses of Victoria and Tasmania, however, have been less 
intransigent. Thus, a spht in one of the non-Labour parties gave the 
Victorian Labour govemment of 1953-55 a foothold in the upper 
house that it would otherwise have lacked; and the Tasmanian Labour 
government confronts an upper house which, despite the continued 
absence of a Labour majority, has proved much more tractable than 
the Western Austrahan. 
In the second place, there is the character of trade unionism and 
of Labour's internal politics in the various states. The remarkable 
stabihty of the ruling group in the Queensland A.L.P. machine, up 
to 1955, is in marked contrast to the more fluid character of the New 
South Wales machine's internal politics, and appears to have given 
Queensland Labour governments a measure of insulation not enjoyed 
by their New South Wales counterparts. This (and also the fact that 
the insulation was by no means complete) is probably reflected in 
the way Queensland foUowed, instead of leading. New South Wales 
on the 40-hour week and long-service leave issues. Again, whUe the 
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comparatively weak response to the unions' industrial claims in 
Tasmania may be partly ascribable to parliamentary conditions, these 
conditions have clearly been less decisive there than in Western 
Australia. It is, perhaps, of at least equal importance that Tasmanian 
trade unionism, with the exception of one or two pockets, is relatively 
quiescent industriaUy, and that the trade unions, as a group, appear 
to occupy a much less significant position in the structure of the 
Tasmanian Labour party than is the case in the other states.^^ 
vn 
The kind of govemment policies discussed above are among those 
which Davis seems to have in mind when he talks of "platform show-
pieces"—the "few pieces of legislation which are characteristicaUy 
moulded to suit the favourite clients of each party".^® But those 
pieces that reflect the A.L.P.-trade union relationship are of more 
significance than this disparaging term, "show-piece", allows. 
Granted that there is no evidence of dominating preferential relation-
ships (in Davis's sense) between Australian governments and their 
supporting interests, the "show-pieces" of state Labour governments 
at least point to consistent differences between Labour and non-
Labour state govemments which are more than matters of party 
label and personnel, or even of emphasis. They point to distinct 
policy differences between all state governments on each side. 
It is to be emphasised that these differences are conceived in terms 
of the formal initiation of policies, and not their subsequent continua-
tion tn force. In these terms, for example, the Queensland Countty-
Liberal party government in 1962 was not to be identified with the 
legislative provision for a 40-hour working week which the govemment 
had inherited from a Labour predecessor. It may be argued against this 
approach that formal initiation of policy is too narrow a criterion, 
and that the Queensland government, simply because of its failure to 
repeal the provision, is properly regarded as having tacitly adopted 
the 40-hour policy. In this sense, of course, govemments of aU colours 
are continuaUy "adopting" policies initiated by alien predecessors. 
But before it can be concluded that such "adoption" denies the 
policy differences (asserted above) between Labour and non-
Labour state goviernments, it is necessary to make a questionable 
assumption. The assumption is that a positive act of adoption, 
involving the legislative initiation of a proposal, is politically no 
different in character from a subsequent passive "adoption" of the 
same policy, which takes the form of a faUure to change or rescind 
the policy. More specifically in the present context, this involves 
assuming that there is no significant change in the political environ-
ment between the time an industrial policy is initiated by a Labour 
govemment and the time during which a succeeding non-Labour 
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govemment "adopts" the same pohcy by default. This assumption 
is rarely justified in the case of major industrial policies. 
Non-Labour parties, along wdth their supporting interests, have 
almost invariably opposed strongly a Labour government's initiation 
of major industrial pohcies at the time of such initiation. However, 
when they subsequentiy achieve government office, time has usually 
drained much of the heat and controversy from the issue. Not only 
does it happen that over a period non-Labour supporting interests 
become adjusted to living wdth policies which they found exceedingly 
uncomfortable at first, but the policies become entrenched tn the 
community's pattern of expectations to the extent that their with-
drawal is likely to have industrial and electoral repercussions desired 
by neither a non-Labour govemment nor its supporting interests. 
Such entrenchment is fostered by the introduction of simUar policies 
in other state jurisdictions (as in the case of long-service leave), and 
a highly influential role in this respect is played also by the federal 
Arbitration Commission when it applies particular policies in relation 
to employees covered by federal awards (as in the case of the 40-
hour week and two weeks annual leave). Moreover, the effective 
reversal of major industrial policies initiated by Labour governments 
often requires not merely legislative repeal but also legislative direc-
tion to an arbitration tribunal, say, to provide in its awards for a 44-
hour instead of a 40-hour week; and non-Labour state governments 
since the war have been characteristically loth to interfere with the 
discretionaty powers of their industrial tribunals tn this way.^'' 
Thus the circumstances in which non-Labour governments tacitiy 
"adopt" a major industrial policy are usually quite different from 
those obtaining at the time of tiie policy's initiation by a Labour 
government, and they are different largely as a result of that initiation. 
By the same token, the circumstances are such that tacit "adoption" 
cannot be regarded as reflecting a preferential relationship between 
the trade unions and the non-Labour government concerned, since 
the conditions signifying such a relationship (as defined previously) 
are no longer satisfied. It follows that there is no justification for 
treating simple faUure to repeal a major industiial policy as a policy 
act identical in character with the prior initiation of that policy. The 
distinction drawm here between the policies of Labour and of non-
Labour state governments is chaUengeable only in terms of the 
initiation of major industrial policies. 
Even in these terms, there is in fact one apparent exception to the 
rule-the South Australian non-Labour govemment's enactment of 
long-service leave legislation in 1957. There are, however, certain 
peculiarities about this exception. In the first place, it is quite clear 
that the Playford govemment's hand on the issue was forced by 
electoral considerations which had littie or nothing to do wdth 
pressure from the unions as such.^s In the second place, the terms 
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of the resultant measure are much more grudging to employees than 
those of its counterparts introduced earlier by Labour governments 
in aU the other eastern states.^® There is thus little ground for inter-
preting this legislation as providing evidence of a preferential rela-
tionship between the unions and the Playford government. The South 
Australian case in one sense constitutes a genuine exception to the 
general policy distinction drawn above, but the features referred to 
place it in a quite different category from the comparable actions of 
Labour governments.^® 
vm 
The poUcy differences postulated here between Labour and non-
Labour govemments occur in a field which may appear narrow to 
the observer. This does not mean, however, that they are justifiably 
dismissed as politically unimportant. Australian parties, A. F. Davies 
has written, 
display their characteristic differences mainly in a readiness to indulge at 
the margin certain pressures in preference to others—namely, those that are 
in their owm train. We should note, however, that the main pressures are 
permanent and apply irrespective of party, so that it is only marginaUy that, 
say, unions gain from Labour govemments. . . .^ ^ 
The question is, marginal to whom? Their major industrial claims are 
clearly not marginal to the trade unions, if the unions are properly 
regarded as being economic interest groups before they are ideological 
vehicles. Moreover, it is because such claims evoke united opposition 
from employer groups, as well as solidarity of support from the unions, 
that (as is argued above) they constitute the subject-matter of policies 
tn which a distinct preferential relationship is discernible between 
unions and Labour governments. If both unions and employers in fact 
looked on such things as cost-of-living adjustments and long-service 
leave as being of marginal importance. Labour and non-Labour 
governments might also be expected to regard them as marginal and 
to diverge less markedly in their performance on these issues. 
The industrial policies of state Labour governments have directly 
affected matters which go to the heart of the trade unions' concerns. 
One consequence of this is that the interests of Australian unions 
are more intimately involved in govemment policy than are those 
of theh British and American counterparts. The latter are equally 
concerned with the broad lines of govemment policy which help 
to shape the environment in which they operate; but when it comes 
to their bread-and-butter claims, they look, generally speaking, else-
where than to government.^^ Australian unions are thus more closely 
and continually concerned with government action,^^ and it is 
government action relating to their immediate industrial aims that 
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forms the focus of the unions' concem with politics—fo the extent, at 
least, that this concem is a concem with policy.^* 
Once this has been said, however, it is to be emphasised that the 
government action which most closely touches the unions' central 
interests is action taken by state governments, since it is the state 
governments alone that possess the constitutional power directiy to 
determine general conditions of employment. Even had Labour 
retained federal office throughout the last decade, the unions could 
have gained littie more than in fact they did on such issues as long-
service leave, cost-of-living adjustments and three weeks annual leave. 
For whUe P. H. Partridge in 1951 might justifiably include "the 
regulation of industrial conditions" among the main fields in which 
"the Commonwealth Government has achieved the major control",^"* 
the notion of "control" here must be heavUy qualified. In pohtical 
terms, it is in fact a most attenuated form of contiol because it must, 
for the most part, be exercised through a virtuaUy independent 
agency, the federal Arbitration Commission. Under the terms of the 
Austrahan Constitution, federal governments determine the nature 
and scope of the Arbitration Commission's powers, but in general 
they cannot determine the use it makes of those powers.^® Such direct 
control as they have in this respect is therefore of a negative kind, in 
that they can only prevent the Commission from dealing with certain 
matters by withholding or withdrawing the power to do so. 
It is thus at the federal level, so far as Labour govemments and 
the unions' immediate industrial aims are concerned, that there is 
some truth in Davies' argument about the marginal nature of the 
gains that can be made by a party's supporting interests—though 
the primary reasons for this are not political, as his argument postu-
lates, but constitutional. The fact that federal governments are rela-
tively powerless in such a vital policy area enhances the pohtical 
significance of the distinction between the industrial policies of 
Labour and non-Labour state governments since 1945.*^ 
IX 
Recognition of the inadequacies of the wholesale "initiative-resist-
ance" interpretation of Australian party-politics^^ has in recent years 
led to an equally extreme reaction. It has become the fashion to 
emphasise party simUaritities as the over-riding feature in the field of 
policy. Such policy differences as are admitted are regarded as insig-
nfficant in the long-term, and the influence of supporting interests on 
applied party policy is dismissed as marginal. This interpretation, 
and the extent of the reaction it supports, owe a great deal to two 
shortcomings tn the way in which the topic is usuaUy approached. 
First, there is the persistent tendency to look at parties' electioneer-
mg policies, instead of at the policies they adopt when m office. It is, 
admittedly, a much simpler task to examine the policy points displayed 
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tn the parties' shop windows at election time; but simphcity is 
achieved only at the cost of limiting discussion to party promises, as 
distinct from party performance. Even ff it were certain that the 
record of kept promises is "remarkably good"^® in the state as weU 
as in the federal sphere, election platforms usually give lamentably 
incomplete accounts of the policies actually initiated during a party's 
subsequent term of office.*® Unless one is daring enough to assume, 
a priori, that party leaders include all their significant policy points tn 
election speeches, it is plainly inadequate to discuss party policies 
(except as election policies simpliciter) solely, or even mainly, in 
terms of such speeches. 
Secondly, there is the equaUy persistent tendency to discuss party 
policy in terms of the "great" issues that bulk largest in the eyes of 
the observer, instead of those that are major issues to the participants. 
For the main supporting interests of Australian parties are organized 
primarily "on individual items and not on great and glowing general 
principles",*^ and it is individual items that are the constant subject-
matter of govemment policy-making.*^ Not that these individual items, 
and their importance to the parties' supporting interests, are invari-
ably or altogether overlooked in arguments concluding with sweeping 
assertions about the uniformity of party policy. But they are usuaUy 
regarded as substantiating the uniformity claim by indicating how 
paltty are such policy differences as do exist. Detailed consideration 
is reserved for the "great" issues. The point is that these are the 
issues on which the major Australian parties can agree in principle 
because the focus of their attention is elsewhere. 
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27 AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNIONS 
AND POLITICAL ACTION 
R. M. Martin 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in their Industrial Democracy, analysed 
the way in which 19th century British trade unions enforced their 
"Regulations", or industrial policy aims, in terms of three "Methods". 
One of these they caUed the "Method of Legal Enactment", which 
meant the conversion of union policy aims into legaUy-enforceable 
rules. For the Webbs, legal enactment took a single form, parhamen-
taty legislation; and it involved a single type of action on tiie part of 
the unions, representations to parliamentarians and govemments 
irrespective of party affiliation.^ This characterisation was adequate 
in Britain at the time Industrial Democracy was first published, but 
is no longer so. StiU less is it appropriate tn Australia.^ 
In the first place, the form now taken by legal enactment in 
Australia includes not only parhamentaty legislation proper, but 
also legaUy-enforceable awards made independently by statutoty 
industrial arbitration tribunals. Largely because of the extensive 
coverage of arbitration awards, which directly affect the vast majority 
of employees, legal enactment is of far greater concem to Australian 
than to British trade unions. There is, however, a simUar difference of 
emphasis even in the case of parhamentaty legislation alone, partly 
because direct parhamentaty determination of industrial issues is 
more frequent in Australia, and partly because the powers of arbitra-
tion tribunals are governed by statute. 
In the second place, legal enactment now involves more than a 
single type of union action. On the one hand, there is what may be 
caUed litigious action, meaning the use of procedures leading to the 
making of an award by an arbitration tribunal. Litigious action is 
"non-political" in the sense that it entaUs the aim of influencing the 
permanent members of arbitration tribunals whose proceedings are 
judicial in character. It is, however, the political heads of government 
who must ultimately be influenced when legal enactment takes other 
forms.^ The term "political action" is commonly used in this connec-
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tion, but has the shortcoming that it faUs to discriminate between two 
distinct types of action, both of which are political in character. 
One type of political action includes the kind of procedures that 
the Webbs thought exclusively appropriate to legal enactment; it may 
be caUed direct political action, and in modem conditions charac-
teristicaUy takes the form of trade union leaders dealing with govem-
ment officials and ministers without the use of intermediaries. The 
other type of political action is parfy-political action, which involves 
trade unions channeUuig policy claims through the extra-parha-
mentaty organization of a political party in which those unions are 
formally incorporated.* 
Since most Australian trade unions are affiliated to the Australian 
Labour Party, they have access to both these types of political action, 
but the relative usefulness of each as a means of securing legislative 
endorsement of union pohcies is chiefly a function of the relevant 
govemment's political colour. Party-political action is of greatest 
value to the unions when a Labour government is in office. On the 
other hand, when Labour is in opposition, union claims presented 
through the party machine tend to become parliamentary debating 
points rather than serious contenders for recognition by a non-
Labour government. Direct political action often gives greater 
promise of success in these circumstances, a non-Labour government 
being likely to consider claims advanced in private discussions or 
correspondence rather more seriously than those hurled across the 
floor of parliament. At the same time, the value to the unions of 
direct pohtical action also usually varies as between Labour and 
non-Labour governments, because in their direct dealings with a 
Labour government (as distinct from approaches to it through the 
party machine) their close association wdth the Labour party adds a 
weight to their claims that tends to give them an initial advantage 
over the claims presented in the same way by other interest groups. 
The two types of political action may be distinguished, therefore, 
not only in terms of the procedures each involve, but also by reference 
to their relative importance in the relationship between the unions 
and different govemments. In the case of Australian Labour govern-
ments, party-political action plays the dominant role; it imparts a 
special quality to the unions' total relations with such govemments, 
even though those relations are conducted partiy by way of the pro-
cedures of direct political action. In the case of the unions' dealings 
with non-Labour governments, on the other hand, the emphasis falls 
on direct political action, since in general party-political action is 
virtually inoperative as a means of securing government acceptance 
of union policy aims. It is thus possible, and also convenient for the 
purpose of this paper, to identffy each type of political action with a 
particular type of government—party-political action with Labour 
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govemments, and direct pohtical action with non-Labour govem-
ments. 
Austrahan tiade unions now use both types of pohtical action as a 
matter of course. This, however, is a comparatively recent develop-
ment, the distinctive feature of which has been the unions' readiness 
and abUity, since the second world war, to take direct political action 
in relation to non-Labour govemments. Their readiness to act in this 
way represents a quite marked change from the pre-war attitudes of 
the general run of trade union leaders; and their abUity to do so 
results primarUy from a corresponding change tn attitudes on the 
part of non-Labour govemments, together with certain organizational 
developments on both sides. 
TRADE UNION ATTITUDES 
In Australia, as in Britain, direct political action on the part of trade 
unions is almost as old as trade unionism itself,^ and Australian union 
leaders generaUy regarded their early efforts to secure parhamentaty 
representation primarUy as a means of reinforcing their pressure-
group activities.® But the shortcomings of direct political action, as 
weU as those of strike action, were laid bare in the events of the last 
decade of the 19th centuty which played a major part in producing 
a distinct Labour party in Australia.'' The result was that, particularly 
in the Labour party's formative years around the turn of the centuty, 
union leaders were inclined to rely almost exclusively on party-
political action for the advancement of their aim.^ It seemed that 
there was little or no point in their seeking from non-Labour govern-
ments any co-operation beyond what they could obtain through the 
balance-of-power tactics of Labour parhamentarians. 
This exclusive emphasis on party-political action was modified 
once improving economic conditions enabled unionists to believe 
again in the effectiveness of the strike weapon, for which, tn some 
union quarters, the imported doctrines of the Industrial Workers of 
the World provided an ideological justification. But inflated hopes of 
success by this means were punctured in 1917 when the New South 
Wales raUways strike and its supporting stoppages were broken. 
About the same time, moreover, the repercussions of the dispute 
wdthin the Labour party over the federal govemment's conscription 
referendum of 1916 confirmed early union doubts about party-political 
action, doubts which had been fostered by the enlarged influence of 
the politicians and the declining voice of the unions in Labour's 
political machine, and above all by the faUure of majority Labour 
govemments to live up to their supporters' high expectations on 
pohcy matters. This did not mean, however, that after 1916 the 
unions abandoned party-political action (or the strike, for that 
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matter). Action through the Labour machine in fact gave them 
significant policy gains during the 'twenties, particularly in New 
South Wales and Queensland. Nevertheless, in the following decade 
the pohtical and economic environment changed in a way that virtu-
ally nuUffied the usefulness of party-political action, as well as direct 
industrial action. 
The 1934 Congress of the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
might have been emboldened to adopt (though only by an ineffectual 
53-51 majority) a proposal for "mobUising the whole forces of 
Labour for a General Strike", and might urge "the whole wage and 
salaty-earning class" to vote Labour's political candidates into 
power.® There was, however, little immediate comfort to be had in 
either of these directions. The economic depression had broken the 
reed of strike action for all but a minority of unionists wedded to it 
on doctrinaire grounds, and the policies of arbitration tribunals held out 
little hope of relief. Non-Labour governments were in power evety-
where except in three of the smaller states, and the value of even 
Labour govemments seemed questionable in the light of the origins 
and consequences of the "Premiers' Plan" of 1931.^ ® In the circum-
stances it does not now seem surprising that once the 1934 Congress 
had looked doubtfully to the strike and done its duty by the Labour 
party, the A.C.T.U. secretaty should then have commented: "It [is] 
necessaty to take some action and influence [can] be brought to bear 
on Members of Parliament, both Labour and anti-Labour".^^ But 
the very fact that the secretaty found it necessary to raise the matter 
at all in this form is revealing, as also is his emphasis on individual 
parliamentarians. Nowadays, the principle of attempting to influence 
non-Labour governments is discussed by neither A.C.T.U. Congresses 
nor their counterparts at the state level; and trade union leaders 
expect to deal with cabinet ministers, not with backbenchers. The 
A.C.T.U. secretary's diffidence on these two points was a result of the 
fact that in trade union circles in 1934 direct political action was 
not an established method of dealing with non-Labour governments. 
In both the state and federal spheres during the 1920's and earlier, 
it appears that such direct dealings as the unions had with non-
Labour govemments were for the most part comparatively infrequent, 
and were usually highly formal in character, being conducted more 
by way of letter than by face-to-face consultation. This meant that 
trade union and govemment leaders seldom discussed issues, the only 
reaUy notable exceptions being serious industrial disputes. Even 
limited attempts at consultation were regarded with suspicion in 
many union quarters, as Ulustrated by a characteristic reaction to a 
proposal that the A.C.T.U. should take up a matter directly with the 
Bruce-Page government: "there is no reason why such matters cannot 
be dealt with by our Parliamentary Federal members".^^ This kind of 
attitude not only seems to have been much more influential among 
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Austrahan than among British union leaders, from the tune the respec-
tive Labour parties were founded, but its mfluence also persisted 
much longer in Australia.^' 
However, durmg the depression years of the 'thirties it became 
increasingly difficult for the unions simply to ignore non-Labour 
governments, and it was plain they could gain httie by demanding 
concessions wdthout discussion. Moreover, union leaders displayed 
a growing awareness that even if there was httie prospect of their 
influencing the major policy decisions of a non-Labour govemment, 
they might have more hope of at least securing a voice in the way 
its pohcies were administered. The onset of war and the extension of 
federal control over economic and industrial affairs gave added 
weight to the view that the attempt to gain such a voice should be 
made, and the British initiative in union-govemment consultation 
provided an example. In 1941 the A.C.T.U. secretaty impressed on 
the Menzies govemment the unions' claim for a share in the war 
administration.^* 
Opposition to the idea that the unions should seek consultative 
relations wdth a non-Labour government had been weakened by the 
breakdown during the 'thirties in the methods of action on which 
the unions had formerly relied; and while wartime conditions restored 
the strike to the unions, it also raised political (and tn same cases, 
perhaps, emotional) considerations which mUitated against their 
using this weapon to the hUt, particularly after the German attack 
on the Soviet Union. At the same time, an outright refusal to deal 
wdth the non-Labour federal governments of the early war period 
would not only have been probably damaging to Labour's political 
hopes, but, in view of government's far-reaching intervention in 
industty, it would also have entailed renunciation of the unions' 
traditional claim to a voice in decisions directly affecting the working-
lives of their members. In the event, however, the experiences of 
depression and war helped produce a more lasting change in union 
attitudes towards consultation than the nature of these considerations 
might suggest. 
In the words of the president of the A.C.T.U., the trade union 
movement today "reserves the right to negotiate with all govem-
ments". It has in the main held to this policy throughout the period 
since the war when economic conditions have maintained its industrial 
strength at a generaUy higher level than ever before in peacetime. 
Most union leaders now accept that the problems confronting them 
require that they should be free to deal equally, if on different terms, 
with Labour and non-Labour governments alike. 
On the other hand, this does not mean that aU union leaders are 
agreed on the procedures for deahng with non-Labour govemments, 
or even that during the years since the war they have always been 
unanimous on the need for such dealings. There have been strong 
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differences of opinion on both counts. The desirabUity of consultation 
with the Menzies Liberal-Countty Party government, after its election 
in 1949, was by no means taken for granted, despite the prominence 
of those officials who showed immediate realism in facing the impli-
cations of Labour's defeat. In 1950 the A.C.T.U.'s Interstate Execu-
tive overruled the recommendation of its leading officials that it 
should be represented at an industrial conference suggested by the 
Menzies government. As one opponent of participation said at the 
time, "it is our duty to work for the defeat of the Menzies-Fadden 
Government, and the Trade Union Movement should not in any way 
co-operate with such a Government".^^ A few months later a strongly 
left-wdng trades and labour councU carried a resolution recalling the 
attitude prevalent in the 'twenties: "We declare that the A.C.T.U. 
should not confer with the Menzies Government, but on the contraty, 
should demand that the Menzies Government take immediate steps to 
reduce and peg prices."^® 
This view seems at first to have obtained fairly wdde support tn 
union circles. Its hottest advocates were mainly mUitant left-wing 
and Communist officials, together with others who (whUe perhaps 
less mUitant industriaUy) were intimately involved in political affairs 
and felt that the unions should not by-pass the Labour party. Other 
officials, not strongly committed in either of these ways, initially found 
the anti-consultation posture comfortable enough because the union 
movement was stiff strong industrially; and their self-confidence was 
probably reinforced by an over-optimistic belief in the early retum 
of a federal Labour government. But clear indications that industrial 
strength was not enough, and the faUure of the Labour govemment 
to materiahse, caused uncommitted officials to waver on the point. 
At the same time, the ranks of those opposing consultation on principle 
were depleted by the union election successes of the right-wing 
Industrial Groups, which on the one hand reduced Communist 
strength in the unions, and on the other hand threw up new union 
leaders who, despite their close ties with the Labour party, had few 
qualms about dealing with non-Labour governments.^'' 
The A.C.T.U.'s decision to take part in the permanent Ministry of 
Labour Advisory CouncU, set up in 1954 by the Menzies govemment, 
was in marked contrast to its rejection of the same govemment's 
invitation merely to attend an industrial conference in 1950. Even 
since 1954, and the decline of Industrial Group influence in the 
unions, there has been no noticeable swing against the policy of 
negotiating directly with non-Labour governments. Such disagree-
ment as there has been among union leaders has been about the 
forms rather than the principle of consultation. It centred mainly on 
the question of the propriety of A.C.T.U. representation on the 
Ministry of Labour Advisoty CouncU, and has died dowm since that 
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issue was settied in 1958 by the withdrawal of the A.C.T.U.'s nomi-
nees. The Ministry of Labour Advisoty CouncU, however, was a 
special case;^ ® and with this one exception, the pattern of formal 
consultative bodies established under the Menzies govemment has 
not come under serious attack from within the trade union movement. 
There has as weU been little controversy over the principle of union 
representation on administrative bodies, as distinct from purely 
advisoty ones, and none over the principle of ad hoc consultation. 
GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES 
In Australia, as in Britain, wartime conditions have produced the 
most dramatic changes in the attitude of non-Labour govemments 
towards the trade unions. In its period of office during the first world 
war, the Australian National government on a number of occasions 
went out of its way to consult union representatives, but the practice 
was not continued as a matter of general peace-time policy by sub-
sequent non-Labour federal governments. This was partly a reflection 
of the unions' industrial weakness during much of the inter-war 
period, and of thek own reluctance to have much to do with non-
Labour governments; but it is also evident that the members of such 
govemments preferred to keep their distance from organizations that 
were as intimately connected with the Labour party as were the 
unions. It was a time, as union officials recall, of which a senior 
member of a non-Labour state government coiUd boast that, in more 
than eight years of office, the number of his official meetings with 
union leaders could be counted on the fingers of one hand. The great 
change in government attitudes came with the second world war. 
The federal administration up to October, 1941, was in the hands 
of non-Labour parties. Their leaders were quick to seek cooperation 
from the unions once the threat of war became serious enough to 
presage a situation in which the unions would again be a force to be 
reckoned wdth. During 1938 and the pre-war months of 1939, the 
federal govemment tried to set up an official trade union committee 
to advise on manpower problems, but faded to overcome union 
suspicion of its motives. After the outbreak of war, however, it 
eventuaUy managed to form a trade union advisoty panel with wdder 
fimctions in 1940. The panel included representatives of a number of 
important union organizations, but excluded others such as the 
A.C.T.U. At the same tune, there was a great deal of contact between 
the government and unions outside, as weU as inside, the panel. The 
govemment initiated ad hoc discussions on a number of issues 
including, notably, its proposed modifications of the federal arbitra-
tion system and the question of "dUution" agreements covering 
skUled labour in the metal trades. It also appointed unionists in an 
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advisoty capacity to government bodies concemed with such things 
as manpower, munitions production, shipbuUdiing and price control. 
The non-Labour federal governments of the immediate pre-war and 
early war period thus sought, and finally secured, consultation wdth 
the unions on a scale greater than ever before. The later developments 
in consultation that occurred under the Curtin Labour government 
were less a new departure than extensions of a policy already 
established by its non-Labour predecessors. Moreover, in contrast 
wdth what happened after the first world war, both federal and state 
non-Labour governments have continued to foUow this policy since 
1945, ff to a varying extent and on a scale more in keeping with the 
less pressing demands of peace. 
During the 1950's there were trade union representatives on a 
wide range of advisoty and administrative bodies functioning under, 
and in a number of cases established by, federal or state non-Labour 
govemments. The trend towards formalizing consultative procedures 
in this way has been most pronounced at the federal level under the 
Menzies government, particularly in the case of advisory bodies, 
though even at this level such formal arrangements have been used 
less extensively than in Britain. The closer union-government rela-
tionship reflected in the developing pattern of standing consultative 
bodies in post-war Australia has been evident also tn the area of ad 
hoc consultation. The greater readiness of non-Labour ministers to 
participate tn informal discussions with trade union leaders, and to 
authorise departmental officials to do the same, has resulted in such 
discussions becoming almost as normal and accepted an occurrence 
as they have long been in the case of Labour governments. Again, 
whUe this development has been marked in state politics it seems to 
have been most significant at the federal level. 
The striking change in the attitude of non-Labour governments 
towards trade unions in general is mainly a consequence of the post-
war industrial strength of Australian trade unionism combined, parti-
cularly at the federal level, with the expanding role of governments 
in economic and social affairs. It may be also, as K. F. Walker 
suggests, that the change has at least something to do with what he 
caUs a "greater recognition of the union movement in its owm right, 
as an integral part of community organization".^® This implies, how-
ever, that governments can afford the luxury of determining their 
attitude towards a major interest group (and one, moreover, which is 
already closely aUied with their political opponents) by reference to 
its social purpose rather than its economic and political power. It is, 
perhaps, more realistic to attach greater weight to another speculation 
that does not depend on an assumption of this nature. There are 
grounds for suspecting that during the 1950's members of the Menzies 
federal govemment thought they glimpsed a chance of attracting away 
from the Labour party at least a section of its traditional electoral 
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support among trade unionists.^® Thus, senior cabinet ministers over 
a long period publicly asserted that Australian trade unions had much 
to gain by adopting what the ministers interpreted as the uncom-
mitted pohtical stance of American unions.^^ Consistent with this was 
the way in which govemment leaders frequentiy seemed to be dis-
playing the Ministty of Labour Advisoty Council as an iUustration of 
the amicabUity of their relations with the trade union movement. 
The possibUity that these tactics might influence unionists' votes, or 
at least their attitude towards formal affiliation with the Labour 
party, was enhanced by a number of post-1945 developments. Notable 
among these was the emergence of an organized and politically 
extreme right-wdng in the unions, the related split in the Labour move-
ment after 1954,^^ ajj(j tjjg unions' greater independence of the 
Labour party, when out of office, because of their comparatively new 
wiUingness and abUity to deal directly with non-Labour governments 
instead of relying on Labour politicians. For union leaders who had 
no intention of deserting the Labour party, and were at the same 
time unprepared to subordinate their official actions to the require-
ments of that or any other party, the presence of these hopes in 
government circles would not have been without its advantages. It is 
to be emphasized, however, that this consideration, given that it was 
in fact operative, can be regarded as having played no more than a 
marginal role in producing a more concUiatory attitude towards the 
unions on the part of the federal government. The crucial factor seems 
rather to have been the post-war industrial strength of Australian 
trade unionism, which itself is in large measure a product of the 
general maintenance of economic buoyancy to which aU Australian 
govemments since the war have been committed. In these circum-
stances, no government can afford totaUy to ignore the trade unions, 
and least of all a federal govemment which, despite constitutional 
limitations, has come to be popularly regarded as bearing primaty 
responsibUity for economic and industrial conditions. 
ORGANISATION 
Effective union-government consultation is not only a matter of 
attitudes. Also important is the organisation of the parties to the con-
sultative process. This question has been particularly significant at 
the federal level m Australia. During the first world war, consultation 
between federal governments and the trade union movement was 
seriously hampered by the absence of an effective national union 
centre corresponding to the metropolitan trades and labour councU 
in each state. The creation of the Australian CouncU of Trade Unions 
in 1927 did not substantiaUy alter this situation, and it was many 
years before the A.C.T.U. carried sufficient weight among trade 
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unions in general to enable it to act authoritatively on their behalf. 
Thus in 1940 the Menzies government tried to negotiate with the 
A.C.T.U. alone on the formation of a trade union advisory panel, but 
eventually found it could secure the cooperation of major unions 
only by dealing directly with them. The wartime Labour Prime 
Minister, John Curtin, who repeatedly refused to grant exclusive 
recognition to the A.C.T.U., was later to indicate both its lack of 
standing and the way this complicated consultation when he 
appealed for "some definite and authoritative machine" to speak for 
the unions as a whole.^^ There was at that time, in other words, no 
union centre in Australia capable of assuming the responsibUities 
which the Trades Union Congress shouldered in Britain. This did not 
mean that the A.C.T.U. was altogether ignored in wartime consulta-
tion; but it was time and again either by-passed or treated as merely 
one union organization among many, by both Labour and non-
Labour administrations. 
It was not untU the 1950's that the A.C.T.U. convincingly establi-
shed its abUity to act as chief union spokesman,^* and its enlarged 
inter-union authority since 1949 is reflected in the way the Menzies 
govemment recognised its claim to a major role in the consultative 
process. Thus, in contrast wdth simUar wartime bodies, the union 
representatives appointed to the Ministry of Labour Advisory CouncU 
in 1954 were aU A.C.T.U. nominees. The changed position of the 
A.C.T.U. was underlined tn 1956 in an exchange of letters between 
A. E. Monk, A.C.T.U. president, and H. E. Holt, then Minister for 
Labour and National Service, on the subject of ad hoc consultation 
procedure. The minister indicated that he had written to aU members 
of the government in the foUowing terms: 
It has been my practice . . . to refer . . . requests for deputations and repre-
sentations of other than a minor character [from individual unions] to the 
A.C.T.U. indicating that I would consider any requests or views put to me 
from that source. . . . The A.C.T.U. is the only official organisation of its 
affihated trade imions and can speak wdth more authority than anyone else 
for the trade union movement. . . . I have discussed Mr. Monk's letter with 
our coUeagues of the Cabinet and it has been decided that as a matter of 
general practice, members of individual trade unions affihated with the 
A.C.T.U. should be asked, whether making requests for deputations or for-
warding vmtten representations, to submit these to the Govemment through 
die A.C.T.U.25 
The application of this policy has played an important part in 
consolidating the A.C.T.U.'s leadership. At the same time, the import-
ance of this factor should not be exaggerated, for the inter-union 
authority of the A.C.T.U. is now not only wider in scope and more 
substantial than that of the British Trades Union Congress, but it is 
also less heavUy dependent on government recognition.^® 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
422 I Readings in Australian Govemment 
Just as the rise of the A.C.T.U. has facUitated consultation from 
the federal govemment's standpoint, a simUar result was achieved 
for the unions by the formation of the federal Department of Labour 
and National Service in 1940. In the correspondence cited above, the 
A.C.T.U. president asserted that, for theh part, the unions recognised 
that representations on economic and social issues were properly 
channelled through the minister and his department. 
THE PRESENT SCOPE OF POLITICAL ACTION 
It was suggested earher that one probable, if comparatively minor, 
consideration behind the Menzies government's consultation policy 
during the 1950's was the possibility of favourably influencing 
unionist voters and even, perhaps, of inducing some unions to drift 
away from the Labour party. Whatever may have been the effect on 
individual unionists, and this is mainly a matter of speculation, it is at 
least clear that the striking changes in the trade unions' relations with 
non-Labour governments have not been responsible for any unions 
renouncing their links wdth the Labour party. Indeed, from the union 
viewpoint, the question today does not normally present itself in 
terms of mutuaUy exclusive alternatives. It is not a matter of the unions 
substituting the methods of the independent pressure-group for 
their traditional role within the Labour party. It is instead the 
problem of how best to combine both forms of political action, with-
out detracting from the usefulness of either. The A.C.T.U. leader-
ship has thus seen no contradiction between maintaining extensive 
consultative relations with the Menzies government and participating 
tn the Commonwealth Labour Advisoty Committee alongside represen-
tatives of the Labour party organization and the federal parhamentaty 
party—not to mention the A.C.T.U.'s open support of the party at 
election time. 
However, whUe the unions have by no means abandoned party-
political action, there has been a signfficant change since the war in 
their relationship with the Labour party, and a change which is not 
a function simply of the party's parhamentaty reverses during this 
period. The principal symptom of this is a marked emphasis on the 
unions' independent role. Unionists' now traditional wariness of 
politicians as a breed has played some part in this, as has the influence 
StUl exerted in Labour party affairs by the massive Australian 
Workers' Union, which has never joined the A.C.T.U. and is continu-
aUy brought into conflict wdth other unions by the breadth of its 
industrial interests. In addition, there was the dispute over the 
Labour party's backing of the right-wing Industrial Groups up to 
1954, and the residue of suspicion left by this episode on the score 
of "pohtical interference" in union affairs—not to mention the per-
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sistmg Ultra-party conflict smce then, about both its policies and its 
leadership. None of these considerations should be minimised. AU the 
same, the wariness they entaU has been a persistent element in the 
union-party relationship for a long time. The new factor emerging in 
the post-war years is the greater variety of methods of action open 
to the unions; and in this, their wUlingness and abUity to use direct 
political action are of central importance. It is only since the war that 
the unions have ceased to be virtually paralysed at the pohtical level 
when the Labour party is out of office, these being the circumstances 
in which they formerly confined their attempts to influence govern-
ment, for the most part, to action through the Labour opposition. 
This, added to the unions more consistent industrial strength and to 
Labour's sorty electoral record during the period, has meant that 
the union movement's dependence on party-political action was prob-
ably smaUer during the 1950's than at any time since the foundation 
of the Labour party. 
The unions' greater sense of independence of the political wdng is 
reflected in and reinforced by the striking expansion in the A.C.T.U.'s 
authority over the decade. It is also evident at the state level: for 
example, tn the campaign against the long-standing organizational 
fusion of the industrial and political wings in Western Australia,^'' 
and in the way most South Australian unions were ready to accept 
concessions from a seemingly entrenched non-Labour state govern-
ment in the teeth of strenuous opposition from state Labour politi-
cians loth to compromise issues from which political capital could be 
made.2® More broadly, it is probably reflected, too, in the post-war 
trend of feeling among the unions (remarked on in conversation by 
both party and union leaders) against the practice of union officials 
standing for political office. 
If, as suggested above, the Menzies government's consultation 
policy was marginaUy motivated by the possibility of drawing the 
unions away from the Labour party, then it is arguable that this end 
has been partially achieved to the extent that the unions, facing non-
Labour governments, no longer find it necessary to depend almost 
entirely on Labour oppositions to fight their political batties. It is 
true that non-Labour Govemments have conceded littie in the way 
of major policy changes of a positive kind, the unions' positive gains be-
ing limited usually to matters of legislative and administrative detail. 
On the other hand, gains of a negative character involving the pre-
vention, rather than the promotion, of government action are some-
times of greater importance.^® In either case, while the pickings 
from direct political action are not normaUy spectacular, union leaders 
by no means consider them worthless. 
At the most, however, the avaUability of this type of action has 
meant no more than a loosening of union-Labour party ties. The 
unions stUl work through the party machine when and where Labour 
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is in office, and most of theh officials stiU take an active interest m 
party affairs. Their continuing aUegiance to the Labour Party is prob-
ably, in large measure, a case of a tradition dying hard: and the 
once standard explanation in terms of a positive ideological identffi-
cation, though more than ever of questionable importance, can stUl 
not be dismissed altogether. However, there are also more pragmatic 
reasons why the trade unions should find it at least convenient to 
maintain their affiliation wdth the party (apart altogether from the 
personal ambitions of trade union officials with an eye on a political 
career). On the one hand, it is not at aU clear what the unions would 
stand to gain from severing the Labour party link: non-Labour 
govemments are now prepared to deal wdth them despite it, and there 
is no assurance that its absence would enhance the unions' abUity to 
influence such govemments. On the other hand, the disadvantages of 
such a course are much clearer. Affiliation with the Labour Party has 
two great virtues from the union viewpoint. In the first place, when 
Labour is in office it gives the unions a means of access to govem-
ment which is vety rarely open to competing interest groups. In the 
second place, the pressure which the unions can bring to bear on a 
Labour govemment is ultimately dependent less on their variable 
industrial strength (which is of more central importance in the case 
of direct political action relating to non-Labour governments) than 
on sanctions avaUable only within the structure of the Labour party. 
For control of these sanctions, by virtue of the party's constitution, is 
effectively vested in the unions to the extent that enough of them 
are prepared to act in unison.^® To break with the Labour party would 
mean giving up, if only in a potential sense, both these advantages.^^ 
In other words, if the unions chose to abandon party-political action 
they would also be choosing to abandon a favoured position in rela-
tion to some govemments, and thus to place themselves on the same 
footing as most other interest groups tn relation to all governments. 
These considerations help explain why the bulk of Australian trade 
unions do not seriously contemplate breaking the connection with the 
Labour party; they f aU to explain, however, why the unions stiU place 
a great deal of emphasis on this connection. D. W. Rawson has ably 
argued that the Australian, as compared wdth the British, trade union 
movement is characterized by a pronounced "radical" streak that is 
reflected in a stronger emphasis on party-political action and a ten-
dency to blur the distinction between industrial and political activi-
ties.^2 There is a good deal to be said for this thesis. But Rawson's 
further assumption that Austrahan tiade unions can "move toward 
the position of their British counterparts, who have maintained a 
clearer division between industrial and political activities", must be 
read subject to a severe limitation. With or wdthout a radically-
inclined union movement, the kind of distinction between industrial 
and pohtical activities that is stiU possible in Britain is now impossible 
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in Australia. It is impossible because the immediate industrial goals 
of Austrahan unions (not to mention their internal affairs and external 
actions) are so much more intimately involved in politics. They 
are, m fact, pohtical issues. For, among other things, party-political 
action, whatever its frustrations, has outstandingly paid-off for the 
unions in the form of legislation improving unionists' working con-
ditions.^* In Britain, on the other hand, not only are such matters 
StiU regarded for the most part as being outside the scope of direct 
govemment determination, but the "union's hopes from [the Labour 
party] are less and less directly and immediately related to their 
industrial needs".** 
To Australian unionists, as to outsiders, many of the policies of 
Labour-in-office appear indistinguishable from those of its opponents. 
Nevertheless, the unions can still look forward to attaining through 
the Labour party machine and Labour governments immediate indus-
trial goals that seem either unattainable or attainable only slowly and 
with difficulty through industrial action, or through litigious action, or 
by way of direct political action in relation to non-Labour govern-
ments. The greater attention paid by Australian trade union leaders 
to direct political action since the war seems to indicate that they 
have shffted some way towards the politically more detached position 
of their British counterparts. There is, however, little likelihood of 
their reaching that position so long as most of them hold their present 
expectations of party-political action. 
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ATIONS AND AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY 
Keith O. Campbell 
THE NATURE OF AUSTRALIAN FARM ORGANIZATIONS 
(a) Commodity Orientation 
Perhaps the predominant characteristic of Australian farm organiza-
tions is the fact that they are, in general, commodity-based rather 
than representative of farmers as a vocational group. In this they 
contrast markedly with the National Farmers' Union in Great Britain, 
the American Farm Bureau Federation hi the United States and 
major farm organizations in other countries. With the exception of 
the Australian Primaty Producers' Union, which is a comparative 
newcomer, and a few special cases like the non-political Agricultural 
Bureaux of New South Wales and South Australia, the interests of 
each of the major farm organizations are restricted to a closely 
related group of commodities. If wheat is under discussion, one thinks 
automaticaUy of the Australian Wheat Growers' Federation in the 
federal sphere or the United Farmers and Woolgrowers' Association 
in New South Wales—and simUarly with other commodities and other 
states. 
Though they are primarily commodity-oriented, it is sometimes 
more pertinent to regard particular organizations as being representa-
tive of regions. The geographical distribution of different types of 
farms means that particular commodity organizations tend to be 
strong in particular areas.^ Thus the Primaty Producers' Union, the 
N.S.W. dairymen's association, has little competition in its claims 
for farmers' loyalty on the North Coast of that state and the United 
Farmers and Woolgrowers' Association may be regarded broadly as 
representing farmers in the N.S.W. wheat belt. To the extent that 
the organizations do represent particular type-of-farming areas, they 
do, on occasions, tend to interest themselves in, and to make represen-
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tations about commodities grown in association with the commodity 
which is the principal focus of their attention. Thus the Primaty 
Producers' Union has mterested itseff in potatoes and the N.S.W. 
Graziers' Association has a committee which formulates policy on 
wheat. The Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' CoimcU on the 
national plane represents pastoral commodities in the broadest sense 
covering wool, sheepmeat and beef. 
In some instances, a single organization does not have an unrivaUed 
place as spokesman for a particular commodity. The wool industty is 
the classic example. Here regional or type-of-farming interests tend 
to loom larger than narrow commodity interests. The Australian Wool 
and Meat Producers' Federation, predominantly representative of the 
interests of sheep and wool producers on the mixed sheep-wheat 
properties characteristic of the Australian wheat belt, has clashed 
openly wdth the Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' CouncU in 
recent years on major matters of policy such as the merits of wool 
promotion and the necessity for reform in wool marketing procedures. 
Some would ascribe these factional splits to differences in the scale 
and economic structure of the farms represented by the two organiza-
tions concerned, but these characteristics reflect primarily differences 
in the type-of-farming areas from which the respective organizations' 
members are drawm. 
It would be interesting to speculate why Australian farm organiza-
tions have developed predominantiy as commodity organizations 
rather than as vocation-oriented institutions. Whatever the reasons, 
Australian agricultural policy has also developed on a commodity-
basis so that rural pressure groups, governmental departmental struc-
tures and the emergent policies now tend mutuaUy to reinforce reten-
tion of the existing set-up. Governments and govemment officials have 
weU-established patterns of consultation with respect to particular 
commodity policies. 
The Australian Primary Producers' Union, as a broadly structured 
vocational-type of farm organization, has experienced great difficulty 
in the two decades of its existence in gaining acceptance by both 
governments and other farm organizations as being worthy of a voice 
when particular commodity policy was being formulated. The delay 
in the establishment of the Victorian Wheat Research Committee 
because of disagreement about A.P.P.U. representation and the more 
recent endeavours of the Union to get representation on the newly-
constituted Australian Meat Board and the Australian Wool Industty 
Conference might be cited as examples. The Union's ultimate success 
in the case of the Conference is perhaps a pointer for the future. At 
the same time, to achieve this goal it was forced to amend its constitu-
tion in such a way as to give its commodity sections greater autonomy 
and thus sacrifice something of its original unitaty character. 
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(h) State Foundations 
Because the division of constitutional power in 1901 left responsibUity 
for agricultural matters wdth the states, it is not surprismg that most of 
the farm organizations should have developed on a state basis, often 
quite independently and with dffierent names. Indeed the origins of 
some of them such as the Graziers' Association of New South Wales 
antedate Federation. 
Many of these state organizations in the earlier years of necessity 
directed their claims for agricultural reform almost exclusively to 
State Govemments and more particularly to the State Departments 
of Agriculture. From the appearance of the first signs of Common-
wealth Govemment interest in rural policy in the 1920's (which were 
prompted in part by the rural organizations themselves), the main 
focus of organizational pressures has moved more to the Federal 
level. The expansion of agricultural administration in Canberra after 
World War II through the medium of the Department of Commerce 
and Agriculture and subsequently the Departments of Trade and 
Primaty Industry, and more particularly the growth of Federal 
Government subventions and assistance to the rural industries has 
naturaUy been reflected in the activities of the organizations. Even 
so, apart from the Australian Primaty Producers' Union, the organiza-
tions have not found it advantageous as yet to shift their administra-
tive offices to the nation's capital. Indeed the strength of most of the 
federal commodity groups stUl lies in the autonomous state organiza-
tions, the federal representations being conducted primarily through 
federations of state organizations. These federations also stUl operate 
from state capitals; the Australian Wheat Growers' Federation from 
Adelaide, the Australian Daffy Farmers' Federation from Brisbane, 
and the Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' CouncU and the 
Australian Wool and Meat Producers' Federation from Sydney. It 
can be said in essence that the structure of the Australian farm 
organizations mhrors the federal structure within which the nation 
operates. 
(c) The Federations 
In the case of some of the federations such as the Australian Daity 
Farmers' Federation, the sources of state support are clearcut. The 
relevant state dairymen's organizations (e.g. the Primaty Producers' 
Union of New South Wales) send representatives to the Federation. 
In another instance, the Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' 
CouncU, several regional organizations in the same state may have 
representatives on the federal body (e.g. the Graziers' Association of 
New South Wales, the Graziers' Association of Riverina and the 
Pastoralists' Association of West Darling). In still other cases, parti-
cular state organizations may be affihates of two federal commodity 
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federations. For example, the United Farmers and Woolgrowers' 
Association in N.S.W. and the comparable organizations in other 
states are constituents of both the Australian Wheat Growers' Federa-
tion and the Australian Wool and Meat Producers' Federation. 
As a form of organizational structure, the federation has strengths 
and weaknesses from a political standpoint, but on balance its liabili-
ties would seem to outweigh its advantages. On the debit side is the 
difficulty of achieving a consensus when constituent bodies have to 
be consulted and the difficulty of getting such bodies to conform with 
federation decisions, if disagreements have been great. In extreme 
cases, the member association may break away from the federation 
and the federation thereby lose its quality of representativeness. The 
recent withdrawal of the Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' 
Council from the N.F.U. is an appropriate example.^ On the positive 
side, constituent state organizations can sometimes bring seemingly 
independent pressure to bear at the state level particularly tn cases 
where, as so often occurs in the Australian context, complementary 
federal and state legislation is necessary to achieve a particular 
commodity policy. The Farmers and Settlers' Association of N.S.W. 
(a forerunner of the United Farmers and Woolgrowers' Association) 
did this wdth considerable success when the wheat stabUization 
scheme was being formulated in the immediate post-war period. 
Apart from the federaUy-oriented federations of commodity organi-
zations two other forms of federation have made their appearance— 
both representing what might be caUed horizontal integration. The 
first is the state federation of diverse commodity groups of which the 
Primaty Producers' CouncU of N.S.W. (recently renamed the N.S.W. 
Chamber of the National Farmers' Union) might be cited as an 
example. Like some of the federations described earlier the strength 
of these state federations has waxed and waned over the years 
depending on the personality of the secretary and nature of the 
common problems currently emerging. Given the predominantly 
commodity-oriented character of much of the governmental approach 
to agricultural policy at the state as well as at the federal level, these 
state federations have not operated in an environment conducive to 
their growth. They have on occasions lent aid to the weaker com-
modity groups and have attempted to come to grips with agriculture-
wide problems such as drought. However it is significant that, at the 
present time, only three of these state federations survive, viz. those 
in New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania.* 
The other form of federation is represented by the National 
Farmers' Union of Australia—an organization which is essentiaUy a 
federation of federal commodity federations. As such, it suffers from 
all the political disadvantages of federations in double measure. As 
compared wdth some of its constituent bodies, its secretariat is small 
and its political influence slight. The member associations have been 
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at pains to ensure that it does not trespass on their traditional terri-
toty. In 1955, the retiring President of the Union was prompted to 
record in his annual report: 
I would hke to correct a misconception held by certain people that the 
N.F.U. is likely to graduaUy usurp from existing commodity organizations 
the right to speak on problems directiy related to their commodities. This 
iUustrates a complete misunderstanding of the role of the N.F.U., which is 
to speak essentiaUy on matters of common interest. Commodity organiza-
tions are fuUy protected by the constitution, which provides that ff any 
motion comes before the N.F.U. which is domestic to the industry of a 
member organization, that organization can insist on the withdrawal of the 
motion from the N.F.U.'s consideration.* 
One of the chief motivations for the existence of the National 
Farmers' Union in the post-war period has been to provide some 
basis for Australian representation in the International Federation of 
Agricultural Producers (IFAP). However, after 1954 support for 
such affiliation waned, few delegates attended IFAP conferences (the 
expenses of most of them were met by other bodies) and eventuaUy 
Australian membership of the organization was severed in 1963. It 
has subsequendy been restored, though it is fair to say Australian 
support for the IFAP is still not enthusiastic. The A.P.P.U. was 
admitted as an independent member of IFAP in December 1964. 
As in so many cases, the nature of organization leadership at a 
particular point in time has been a determining factor in the organiza-
tion's effectiveness. The executive of the N.F.U. meets at roughly 
quarterly intervals. Two conferences a year are held and at these 
significant issues of rural pohcy are discussed. The organization as 
such is a party at the conferences of representative business groups 
which the Prime Minister has called at regular intervals to discuss 
national economic policy, though representatives of the A.P.P.U., the 
Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' CouncU and the Australian 
Wool and Meat Producers' Federation also attend. 
At times the Union has issued statements on rural policy which 
have atiracted public attention such as the one issued at the time of 
initiation of the agricultural expansion programme in 1952. Sir John 
Crawfford, the Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Agri-
culture at the time (i.e. three years after the N.F.U.'s formation) 
spoke approvingly and optimisticaUy of the work that the N.F.U. was 
doing,^ but it would seem that it has grown littie in strength or 
influence since that time. In such areas as national wage and tariff 
policy where the united voice of the rural interests needs to be heard, 
it is primarUy the stronger constituent organizations and more parti-
cularly the Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' CouncU which in 
the past have bome the brunt of the burden, though their spokesmen 
have on occasions claimed to be putting forward N.F.U. pohcy. 
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Discussions have been held tn recent years in an attempt to effect 
some kind of union between the National Farmers' Union and the 
Australian Primaty Producers' Union. Though progress has been 
reported, the proposed Australian Farmers' Federation has not yet 
come to fruition. On the basis of their respective organizational struc-
tures it is difficult to see an effective basis of true union between the 
two associations. However, the Australian Farmers' Federation, which, 
to aU intents and purposes, would represent the existing commodity 
federations making up the present N.F.U. together with the A.P.P.U., 
may provide the basis for a much needed general farm organization 
in the Australian scene, more concerned with problems confronting 
the mral industty as a whole and less preoccupied with commodity 
issues. At the same time, the possibUity of the establishment of the 
Federation was one of the reasons motivating the A.W.G.C. to 
wdthdraw from the N.F.U. 
It is sometimes argued that a general farm organization is some-
thing of a pipe-dream in the context of the Australian rural industries, 
given the diversity of commodity organizations already in existence 
and their jealous resistance to any incursions on what they take to be 
their historical preserves. Though traditions are hard to break, it must 
be recognized that in other countries, with rural industries perhaps 
more diverse than those of Australia, vocationally-based general farm 
organizations have operated successfully and effectively and particular 
commodity groups within such organizations have benefited from the 
collective support of the entire organization. 
An effort to bridge the gulf between the commodity organizations 
and the A.P.P.U. and thus produce a more general farm organization 
is also evident tn some of the states. In 1966 the South Australian 
Wheat and Wool Growers' Association merged with the South 
Austrahan Division of the A.P.P.U. to form an organization knowm as 
the United Farmers and Graziers of South Australia. SimUar moves 
are afoot in Victoria. In N.S.W. there is little enthusiasm for such 
proposals, the Secretaty of the United Farmers and Woolgrowers' 
Association in that state being recently motivated to reiterate the 
theme that general farm organizations should not encroach on the 
territOty of the established commodity organizations.® 
THE ROLE OF FARM ORGANIZATIONS 
(a) Government-Industry Liaison 
It is now generally acknowledged in most modern democratic 
societies that pressure groups have a legitimate role in the shaping 
of public policy and indeed some civil servants would regard them 
as an hidispensable aid to smooth administration. As Westerway 
has put it: 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
432 I Readings in Australian Government 
Governments and pressure groups in societies like ours, societies wdth a high 
level of Govemmental control, are in a relation of interdependence. The 
Governments need the groups for advice and irfformation as well as to win 
consent of the governed. The groups need advance information and the 
chance to take the initiative in moulding the Governments' decisions.'' 
With the increased intervention of Govemments in rural industries 
in recent decades, Austrahan farm organizations have been drawn 
more and more into the administiative process. For one thing, the 
producer representation on the Commonwealth commodity market-
ing boards is usuaUy drawm from nominees of the relevant commodity 
organizations.^ Given the size of operations and the financial power 
of some of these Boards, e.g. the Wheat, Wool and Meat Boards, 
representatives on these boards are sometimes in a position to exert 
more pressure on narrow commodity questions than the industty 
organizations from which they are drawm. 
Representatives of the farm organizations have been involved also 
in international negotiations in respect to the commodities in which 
they are interested. The intimacy of the relationship between the 
Govemment and the producer groups is colourfuUy revealed in the 
foUowdng quotation from a speech by Mr. McEwen: 
. . . . What I did as Minister in charge of the negotiations waS not merely 
to consult this body and every other organized body in Austraha but 
actuaUy to take to Brussels and to London with me representatives of the 
organized growers or producers. If they couldn't sit at the table they were in 
the room outside where I or my officials could nick out and have a word 
with them. This is a pretty good relationship between govemment and 
primary industry . . .® 
Farm organizations have been drawm directiy into other phases 
of agricultural administration. In the field of price support, for 
instance, the Australian Daity Farmers' Federation has been repre-
sented on such bodies as the now defunct Daity Industty Investigation 
Committee and the Secretary of the Australian Wheat Growers' 
Federation sits on the Wheat Index Committee that reviews the 
guaranteed price of wheat before it is announced each December. 
The commodity organizations are also represented on various com-
mittees responsible for the distribution of research levies on farmers, 
the farmer representation being stronger on the state than the 
federal committees where, in the case of wheat, both exist. 
The close nexus between agricultural administrators and the appro-
priate commodity organizations cannot be adequately appreciated 
simply by reference to formal representation on committees, boards, 
and delegations. Much informal consultation takes place between 
ministers, civU servants and representatives of farm organizations 
when particular pohcy proposals are under discussion and it is not 
always the farm organization which initiates such discussions. What 
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is apparentiy disquietening to ministers and civU servants is the fact 
that sometimes there is more than one voice purporting to speak 
for an industty and some reconcUiation of points of view becomes 
necessary. This is a matter to which I shaU return later. 
Though the development of a high degree of rapport between the 
administrator and the administered may be interpreted as a now 
customary concomitant of administration in a welfare state and 
especiaUy in clientele departments like Agriculture or Primary 
Industry, there is reason to believe that the development of such 
close liaison in agricultural administration since the Liberal-Countty 
Party coalition came to power tn 1949 owes something to traditional 
Country Party phUosophy. Except for a short period, the federal 
agricidtural portfolio has been held continuously by a member of the 
Countty Party. Obvious efforts were made in the early 'fifties to 
restore and develop channels of communication between industty 
groups and the Government, which had withered somewhat under 
the Labor Party's administration, and take more heed of the expressed 
wishes of farmers' representatives. There are several manffestations 
of the major tenet of the Country Party platform to which I refer, but 
its general implication is that those who are responsible for producing 
a particular primaty product are the people most knowledgeable 
conceming it and should have the final voice in its disposition.^® A 
recent exposition of Countty Party policy in this matter was given by 
the Leader of the Party, Mr. McEwen, in Parliament in November 
1965, when he said: 
My attitude is that neither the Austialian Country Party or its parhamentary 
members should decide what is the correct policy for a primary industry. It 
has always been the poUcy of my Party that those who produce, own and 
seU a product are the best judges of the way in which their own property 
should be treated. It is the function of my Party to see that the wdll of those 
who produce and own the product is carried into legislative and adminis-
trative effect. . . . 
What the Cabinet stands for is what my Party stands for—the affording 
to primary industry of the opportunity to decide what pohcy it wants in 
respect of the marketing and disposal of its own product. This is the pohcy 
which I have always stood for, which my Party stands for and which the 
Government of which I am a members stands for.^ ^ 
This principle is applied tn particular to the operations of the 
marketing boards. SuperficiaUy there would appear to be vety littie 
wrong with this approach in the case of the boards, subject to some 
oversight where government-guaranteed finance is employed in the 
board's operations. However, even in such cases, it would appear on 
deeper reflection to be intolerable that any Government should abdi-
cate its resonsibUities to particular groups in the community when 
their decisions might add to Treasuty commitments (say in respect 
of price guarantees) or run counter to or jeopardize other aspects 
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of the Govemment's policy, be it uitemal monetaty and fiscal policy 
or external trade and foreign policy. The controversial question of the 
Wheat Board's sales to Mamland China might be cited in the latter 
regard. 
However, this phUosophy implying the right of particular primaty 
industty groups to be especiaUy listened to and heeded in the formu-
lation of pohcy is not confined to marketing board operations. Par-
ticular farm commodity groups have developed positions of privilege 
vis-a-vis the Govemment comparable to the position enjoyed by the 
Retumed Servicemen's League tn respect of repatriation matters.^^ 
To iUustrate my point, let me quote a few examples. There have 
been occasions in the past when farm organizations have been better 
informed about emerging agricultural policy than the State Depart-
ments of Agriculture, even in cases where the latter departments have 
a vital interest in such policy. This has occurred despite a conscious 
attempt by the Department of Primaty Industty to keep State 
Departments fuUy informed about domestic and overseas develop-
ments that are relevant to their administration. 
In the federal sphere by tradition commodity policy proposals are 
thoroughly discussed with representative commodity groups before 
they go to Cabinet whereas the first the general public hears of 
these proposals is when the policy has largely been ctystaUized as a 
result of two-way negotiation and the Minister enunciates it in his 
second reading speech in the House of Representatives. Requests for 
information on the proposed policy before this time by non-members 
of the privUeged group are met with polite refusal. 'The revision of 
the wheat stabUization scheme in 1963 followed such a pattern. Under 
this regime, the public is uninformed and Ul-prepared to register any 
protests and there is no opportunity for informed and considered 
criticism by other affected parties. It is easy to see in these circum-
stances how the public interest may be sacrificed to the advantage of 
sectional interests, particularly in the matter of subsidies. 
The position of privUege extends to other aspects of agricultural 
administration. Several reports of vital interest to ordinary citizens 
are accessible to and indeed have been widely disseminated among 
farmer organizations, but are confidential so far as the public at large 
is concerned. I might cite one instance.^* The appraisal of the pro-
cedures used in assessing the cost of producing wheat which Sir John 
Crawford prepared in 1956 at the Prime Minister's direction was 
distributed freely to wheatgrower organizations, but was not avaU-
able to the public. This was not a matter which was exclusively of 
interest to wheatgrowers. The taxpayer is entitled to have access to 
an expert appraisal of the basis on which the price of wheat and 
subsidy payments are determined. 
I would not deny the right of, and indeed necessity for the Govern-
ment to consult with the ^rectiy-affected parties when admmistrative 
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policies touching on their interests are being formulated. But I also 
feel that the broader public interest should be protected. I would 
submit that this principle is in jeopardy when secrecy and special 
privUege of the kind I have described are tolerated and even 
encouraged. To say in defence that it is a firm tenet of the Countty 
Party platform is irrelevant. 
(b) Other Pressure Group Activities 
Though the advice of Australian farm organizations on commodity 
problems is currently actively sought by administrators, the perform-
ance of the organizations on broader issues of public policy is most 
disappointing. In this regard a comparison of the resolutions of the 
annual conference of an Australian farm organization wdth those of 
one of the bigger overseas organizations like the American Farm 
Bureau Federation is vety revealing. The annual resolutions of some 
Australian organizations stUl contain an assortment of items of a 
parochial nature equivalent to a resolution from Snake Gully branch 
calling for a better telephone service. The bigger, more influential 
organizations such as the Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' 
CouncU rise above their commodity interests to comment on broader 
issues of national economic policy such as wage and tariff policy. But 
they rarely, it seems to me, follow the pattem of their overseas 
counterparts and take the view that the Government should be 
informed what a significant economic group tn the community thinks 
about such matters as monetaty and fiscal policy, national develop-
ment and intemational affairs, except in so far as the Government 
invites some of them in for consultation. 
Reference has already been made to the yeoman service rendered 
to the Australian rural industries by the Australian Woolgrowers' and 
Graziers' CouncU in undertaking to represent the rural viewpoint in 
national wage and tariff negotiations. The A.P.P.U. in its initial years 
did aspire to participate also in such activities, but lost interest when 
its application for registration with the Arbitration Commission was 
refused. The graziers were thus left to carry on the fight with 
occasionaUy nominal support from other organizations.^* The signific-
ance of these activities from the farmers' standpoint may be gauged 
from an observation of one expert tn industrial relations who has 
claimed that the dispute between employers and employees hi the 
metal trades, which is the focus of the annual basic wage cases, is 
largely a sham dispute and that the real dispute is between Australian 
employers and employees on the one hand and the unsheltered 
primary industries on the other. ^ ^ Be that as it may, the Graziers' 
Associations have devoted much time and money to participation in 
national wage cases as weU as to cases concerning awards affecting 
the pastoral industty directiy. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
436 I Readings in Australian Government 
In the case of that other extra-legislative mstitution bearing on 
Austialian economic policy, the Tariff Board, the major representa-
tions on behaff of the primaty industiies over the years have been 
made by the Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' CouncU in cases 
where such representation has been relevant. UntU 1960 the burden 
of this work was carried by the economist of the CouncU, who up to 
that date was also the tariff officer for the N.F.U. Since that date the 
A.W.G.C. and the N.F.U. have worked more independently, but both 
organizations are members of, and have worked in close coUabora-
tion wdth, the Australian Tariff CouncU (formerly the Joint Committee 
for Tariff Revision). Some direct influence may also be brought to 
bear by virtue of the fact that it is government policy to include some 
representatives of primaty industty among the membership of the 
Tariff Board. However, one cannot help feeling that, apart from the 
A.W.G.C, Austrahan farm organizations, untU recentiy at any rate, 
have lacked vigUance in safeguarding their interests in the matter 
of the protection of secondary industry. 
The limited range of interest and activities of the Australian farm 
organizations as compared with their overseas counterparts is prob-
ably to be explained tn part by their commodity-oriented bases, by 
restricted finances, the insularity of outlook of farmer members and, 
imtU the last decade at least, their employment of iU-equipped execu-
tive staff has also contributed to this situation. On the financial side, 
there is evidence of an attitude of parsimony towards any activity 
which does not promise direct benefits in the form of increased returns 
to the industry. The attitude of some organizations towards parti-
cipation in the IFAP might be cited in this regard. Added to this 
is the fact that few Austrahan farm organizations have the benefit of 
sources of finance apart from membership subscriptions. Comparable 
organizations overseas often have big farm supply, insurance, or 
marketing co-operatives associated with them and this adds to their 
financial strength and stabUity. The United Farmers and Wool-
growers' Association is perhaps the best example of an Australian 
farm organization which has been able to draw some finance from 
as associated co-operative, the Farmers and Graziers Co-op. Co. Ltd. 
But, generaUy, the comparative weakness of farm co-operatives in this 
country is a political liabUity. The marketing boards are not an 
effective substitute in this connection. 
The greater strength of the secretariats of the overseas farm 
organizations as compared wdth the Austrahan is plamly evident. 
Compare for instance the secretariat of the National Farmers' Union 
of Austraha wdth that of Us United Kingdom namesake or the 
American Farm Bureau Federation.^® It is true that m the past 
decade some of the Austrahan organizations have seen that to do 
an effective job they must have a weU-staffed and weU-trained 
secretariat and they have showm a wdUmgness to pay the salaries 
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necessaty to achieve this goal. Others are stiU trying to do, on a 
makeshift basis, a job which clearly requires the use of trained 
personnel. 
The recent recruitment of a research officer for the Austrahan 
Wheat Growers' Federation, financed by the research levy rather than 
from membership subscriptions, is representative of an attitude which 
is hindering some Australian farm organizations from doing the task 
they could be doing to their advantage. It seems to me that research 
work necessaty for a pressure group to do its particular job should be 
paid from members' subscriptions, not by tapping research funds 
intended to enhance the productivity of that industty. It is fantastic 
that an industty of the size and importance of the Australian wheat 
industty should attempt to conduct its pressure group activities 
through the employment solely of a part-time secretary, however 
competent that man may be. If an industty such as the wheat 
industty employed more trained staff, it could meet pubhc criticism 
of its privUeged position by reasoned argument instead of by per-
sonal abuse, llie usual form of reply currently employed. 
Farmers need to realize that it is historicaUy inevitable that their 
industty should represent a declining sector in the economy and that 
this has organizational consequences. Despite last-ditch stands in the 
form of claims by the Countty Party for the over-representation of 
rural electorates in the legislature, Australian farmers must accept 
the fact that in future they will have to rely on weight of argument 
rather than weight of numbers in achieving their economic and 
political goals.^'' Strengthening the secretariats of farm organizations 
both financiaUy and in some cases inteUectuaUy is a necessaty first 
step. If farm organizations were better advised it is conceivable that 
we might see a more constructive adaptive attitude to change than 
has characterized the approach of farm organizations to some recent 
policy issues. There are grounds for believing that the conservative 
stance adopted by some organizations to closer settlement policy, to 
the reconstruction of daity farms (as recommended by the Daity 
Industty Committee of Enquity) and to amendment of the wheat 
StabUization scheme, has often run counter to the industty's long-run 
interests. 
(c) Relationships between Farm Organizations and Political 
Parties 
It might be argued that many farmers seek to achieve their more 
general goals through partisan political activity rather than t h r o u ^ 
the mediiun of their farm organizations. It is tme that in Australia 
there is an agrarian party, the Countty Party, and this situation may 
go some way towards promoting a dichotomy in farmers' political 
activities. 
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Geoffrey Sawer has clahned that "the Countty Party has an organic 
relationship with farmer organizations".^® Though the sources of 
pohtical and financial support for Austrahan political parties are 
shrouded in secrecy, I do not beheve the ties between the pohtical 
parties and the farm organizations are as close as Sawer's statement 
implies ff by "organic" he means formal ties. His statement may have 
been truer of earlier days (i.e. before 1945) when for example the 
N.S.W. Farmers and Settiers' Association and the Graziers' Associa-
tion of New South Wales had formal connections wdth the Countty 
Party^® and the Wheatgrowers' Union in the same State had ties with 
the State Labour Party. Indeed, in the case of the Farmers and 
Settlers' Association, the affihation was written into the Association's 
constitution, and this was originaUy an obstacle to amalgamation of 
the Association wdth the Wheatgrowers' Union. After appropriate 
constitutional changes were made, the United Farmers and Wool-
growers' Association was eventuaUy formed. 
But even ff there are no significant formal ties, leaders in some of 
the farm organizations are also prominent in Countty Party activities. 
This is particularly tiue of the Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' 
CouncU and its constituent organizations. There are many who beheve 
that the various Graziers' Associations are substantial contributors 
to Countty Party election campaign funds. It is also reported that in 
certain electorates the Liberal Party receives financial support from 
the same sources and that organizations like the United Farmers and 
Woolgrowers' Association continue to make donations to the Countty 
Party. These statements are not easy to verify, but, given the over-
lapping interests of the personalities involved, they seem quite 
plausible. In short, I believe it is duphcation of members and interests 
that gives rise to the apparentiy close nexus between the Countty 
Party and the farm organizations rather than any "organic relation-
ship". 
THE DRIVE FOR U N I T t 
The Australian farm organizations in the past five years have been 
subjected to considerable pressure from govemments to achieve 
greater unity. In a few instances, this has taken the form of adumbra-
tions about the political liabUities of diverse opinion wdthin individual 
industries. 
The leader of the Countty Party and Minister for Trade, Mr. 
McEwen, for instance has reiterated this theme tn season and out of 
season. For example, addressing the Australian Primaty Producers' 
Union in 1964 he said: 
. . . It's important that we who work in this field should speak with a unffied 
voice. And I want to say the sooner primary industry in this country can 
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speak wdth a more unffied voice the better for the country, and certainly 
for Govemment which has to work with primary industry. 
. . . You've just got to get a greater measure of unity within the ranks of 
primary industry in Australia ff you are to get the best advantage out of 
organization. And, frankly, there is nothing more tormenting for a Minister, 
or a govemment, which wishes to work with primary industry—and bona 
fide I do and my Govemment washes to work bona fide—there's nothing 
more tormenting than to have confficting advice offered to you. That ought 
to be sorted out before the approach is made to the govemment, not put on 
the plate of govemment as confficting advice, then divesting yourseff of all 
your authority by virtuaUy saying to govemment: "WeU, here we've given 
you the confficting advice; now you sort it out". This is weakness; this is not 
strength.2o 
This is the voice of a man frustrated by schism between wool-
growing interests over wool promotion and wool marketing. On 
occasions, Mr. McEwen has become even more blunt. For instance 
in 1961 he threatened: 
The national imphcations of woolgrowers failing to agree on promotion are 
reaching the proportion that growers need not be surprised or offended ff 
they get some aid in reaching agreement.^^ 
His coUeague, Mr. Adermann, the Minister for Primaty Industty, 
regularly pursues the same theme. In 1963, he explained: 
As a Minister, I have to deal with primary production problems aU over 
the Commonwealth and this experience has reinforced my behef that closely 
knit primary producers' organizations, like this CouncU have the best chance 
of making their voices heard when representing the industry's interests. 
It is confusing—and can even be frustrating—for a Minister to be 
approached by a variety of organizations claiming to represent the 
same industty but speakhig with conflicting voices.^^ 
In 1965, Mr. Adermann reported to the Australian Agricultural 
CouncU: 
Another praiseworthy development in our primary industries in the post-
war period has been the increasing wUlingness of aU sections of an industry 
to come together and to speak wdth a unffied voice. This makes possible 
closer relationship and co-operation between industries and government.^* 
There has been some consohdation of organizations within parti-
cular industty groups in recent years, some of which have already 
been referred to. For instance, in 1960 the Australian Woolgrowers' 
CouncU merged with the Graziers' Federal CouncU to form the 
Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' CouncU. In New South Wales, 
the Farmers and Settlers' Association of N.S.W. united with the 
Wheat and Woolgrowers' Association of N.S.W. to form the United 
Farmers and Woolgrowers' Association. These moves were under 
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discussion for many years and it is unlikely that Ministerial pleading 
had anything to do wdth the outcome. The negotiations for the 
mergmg of the A.P.P.U. and the N.F.U. on the other hand may have 
been assisted by Ministerial encouragement. 
The major intra-industty conflicts in recent years have developed 
in the wool industty, but have not been confined to that industty.^* 
As pointed out earlier, a divergence of interest has become evident 
between the organizations representing the smaUer woolgrowers, who 
mix woolgrowdng with other farming activities (particularly wheat-
growdng), and the older graziers' associations which predominantly 
represent larger scale specialized wool-producers operating tn the 
pastoral zone or the tableland areas. The schism may be viewed as 
partiy historical, partiy geographical, partly ideological and partly 
in terms of personalities involved in the leadership of the organiza-
tions. The smaUer producers in general look for some degree of 
governmental paternalism while the larger producers favour retention 
of that freedom from govemment interference that has long charac-
terized the industty. 
In an effort to find a formula for effecting compromise on policy 
differences, the PhUp Committee recommended the establishment of 
a Wool Industty Conference where 25 representatives of each of the 
rival factions could reach decisions on behalf of the industty under 
the guidance of an independent Chairman.^'' The situation has become 
more complicated now that the A.P.P.U. has been permitted to 
appoint five representatives to sit on the Conference. During the 
course of the controversy about the basis of the franchise at the 1965 
referendum on wool marketing, it became evident that there was 
little hope of any agreement on appropriate procedures for gauging 
industty opinion. Some argued for the principle of one vote for each 
producer, others wanted the voting rights distiibuted according to 
volume of production.^® On the institutional level, there have been 
suggestions that the present method of constituting the Wool Industty 
Conference should be replaced by an electoral coUege system or a 
system of election by states, thus reducing the influence of farm 
organizations in the industty. 
Much of what happened can be interpreted as the consequences of 
a misguided and rather futUe compulsion to achieve a unffied voice in 
an industty. Why must there be a consensus in an industty charac-
terized by great political, economic and geographical differences? 
We do not expect such miracles in the broader political scene. We 
should not expect them in a large and diverse industty like the wool 
industty, but should rather encourage the provision of means for those 
wdth common interests to join together to promote those interests. 
WhUe it is clear that certain political advantages would accrue to 
primaty producers ff they heeded ministerial advice and achieved a 
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monolithic organization or even a unffied opinion in a particular 
industty, I would seriously challenge the thesis that such an arrange-
ment is conducive to the promotion of the public interest. One can 
appreciate that a minister's frustrations and worries (as weU as those 
of his advisers) might be reduced ff an acceptable agreed commodity 
policy were submitted by a particular industty, but a reduction in 
the number of sleepless nights of Ministers of the Crown and civil 
servants is not the ultimate criterion of good govemment. 
I would submit that the interests of the community are best pro-
tected under a plurahstic set-up where practising politicians and 
administrators receive advice (perhaps widely divergent advice at 
times) from several farm organizations.^'^ Under such arrangements, 
the germs of promising suggestions for improvements in policy can 
be fostered rather than run the risk of being stifled or sacrificed in the 
interests of unity. The chances that government will retain the upper 
hand and the position of other groups in the community wUl not 
be eroded are infinitely greater where farmer pressure groups are 
divided than where a monolithic farm bloc exists. This is as true of 
industty organizations as it is of general farm organizations. It is 
merely a matter of degree. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Though I have drawm attention to what I believe to be a few un-
healthy developments tn the body politic touching on farm organiza-
tions, I am convinced that these organizations have an increasingly 
important role to play in the Australian scene in the future. Both 
in their owm interests and in the interests of maintaining an efficient 
adaptive agriculture in the coming years, the majority of Australian 
farm organizations need to develop a broader, less parochial and more 
penetrating approach in their attempts to influence the course of 
pubhc policy. In the past they have interpreted their role in the 
community altogether too narrowly. I further believe that it would 
be better for Australian agriculture if general vocationaUy-based 
farm organizations were given room to develop instead of being 
forced, as the A.P.P.U. has been, into the traditional commodity 
mould. The commodity organizations which have dominated the 
Australian scene to date, it seems to me, have tended to promote 
narrowness of outlook. 
Two decades have now passed since the Rural Reconstruction 
Commission presented its final report to the Commonwealth Govern-
ment. The following extract from Professor Wadham's dissenting 
comment on Chapter IX of that report suggests that Australian farm 
organizations change very slowly. 
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The Commission took evidence from a large number of fanners' organiza-
tions. Certain of them were characterized by broad views and a great under-
standing of the problems of their industries, but these were exceptions 
rather than the rule. Many of the witnesses concemed ladced breadth of 
oudook on the real problems, and were often almost solely concemed with 
demanding a high price for the product, without thought as to the efficiency 
of the producers or the fact that they have responsibffities as weU as rights 
and that they are part of the national economic structure.^s 
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29 TRADE ASSOCIATIONS IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY 
R. D. Freeman 
INTRODUCTION 
Interest in the structure, behaviour, and influence of trade associations 
tn Austraha has arisen from the 1962 Commonwealth Government 
proposals for new Restrictive Trade Practices legislation. Earlier 
Commonwealth legislation in the form of the Austialian Industries 
Preservation Act (1906-50), and legislative provisions relating to 
restrictive practices in most States, have seldom been used, and they 
have not drawn attention to the activities of associations excepting 
Western Australia. The 1959 Western Australian Trade Associations 
Registiation Act, however, does not attempt to control restrictive 
trade practices, but relates mainly to registration of associations and 
their constitutions. 
As a result of renewed interest in restrictive practices, academic 
studies of associations have been largely confined to the ways in which 
associations attempt to regulate market and industrial activity. The 
most comprehensive study was by Mr. J. Hutton^ but he is concerned 
wdth Westem Australian associations only. For Australia as a whole, 
some reference to associations may be found in Professor Hunter's, 
March 1961, Economic Record article.^ These sources, however, give 
an incomplete picture of associations as they are principaUy con-
cerned wdth restrictive trade practices. Moreover, official information 
about associations is inadequate. In Western Australia, the govem-
ment coUects detaUs of the organization and activities of associations, 
whUe in New South Wales, membership figures for some associations 
are collected under the Trade Union Act. Information is not avaUable 
from official sources in other states. The picture of associations is 
therefore an incomplete one, with most emphasis placed on the 
relationship between associations and restrictive trade practices. 
This paper is intended to ffil some of the gaps in the literature by 
examining the structure, behaviour, and influence of associations 
wdthin the framework of the Australian economy. 
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STRUCTURE 
Association Strength 
No official machinety exists for the collection of information about 
the work of trade associations except in Western Australia, so that it 
is difficult to estimate the number of associations. Nevertheless, an 
Australian figure may be estimated from information available from 
four states. The 1961 Report of the Western Australian Registrar of 
Trade Associations stated that there were 163 associations registered 
in the State at that time,* whUe in 1961 Mr. P. Cook estimated that 
there were 163 associations in South Australia.* A search by the 
author in 1964 revealed 352 trade associations in Victoria. In Tas-
mania the existence of over 70 associations has been registered by the 
Royal Commission on Prices and Restrictive Practices,^ and, ff 
Victorian experience of the division of associations between manu-
facturing, wholesaling, retaUing and service is any guide, there would 
be about 100 associations hi Tasmania, including local Chambers of 
Commerce. 
These estimates include various smaU local Chambers of Commerce; 
there are 128 in Victoria, 20 in South Australia and 15 in Western 
Australia. If Chambers of Commerce are included as trade associa-
tions, the number of associations for the four States above is 778. 
On the assumption that the number of associations in New South 
Wales is simUar to that of Victoria and that Queensland has about 
the same number as South Australia and Western Australia, the 
Australian total of associations would be about 1,250. 
The structure of Australian associations is dominated by larger 
general associations. At least 112 associations in Victoria are affiliated 
tn some way with five of the six larger associations, the big six being 
the Victorian Employers' Federation, the Victorian Chamber of 
Manufactures, Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, Federation of 
Victorian Chambers of Commerce, the Victorian Federation of 
RetaUers' Associations and the AutomobUe Chamber of Commerce. 
In many cases smaUer associations are members of more than one 
larger association. An important reason for this is that the smaUer 
associations are able to take advantage of a wide range of services 
provided by larger associations. Larger associations in Victoria by 
providing secretarial and other services are concerned wdth the 
administration of at least 62 smaUer associations, of whom some 31 
are aflUiated with two or more larger associations. These figures under-
state the actual position considerably, as of 73 associations contacted 
in Victoria, only three were not affiliated with another association. 
Many smaU associations are financiaUy and physicaUy tied to the 
larger associations; this is especiaUy true of associations which have a 
common secretariat within Chambers of Manufactures. Many asso-
ciations are too smaU to support a high level administiative structure 
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and are naturally drawm to the larger associations, particularly for 
finance and the provision of specialised services. In addition to local 
affiliations, the majority of trade associations have connections with 
federal or national associations. 
The extent of multiple membership between associations clearly 
tends to mcrease the mfluence of the larger associations. The influence 
of the larger associations is greater than it appears as apart from 
their connections with smaller associations, many individuals and 
firms belong to at least one large and one smaU association. Large 
associations may exert mfluence on the smaUer associations in many 
ways: 
First, larger associations often act as the employer deputations to the 
State and Federal Govemments, issue statements to press and radio, 
and edit and distribute pamphlets and journals. 
Second, members of individual associations who sit on committees of 
large associations can themselves be influenced by discussion within 
such groups. 
Third, association policy may be guided by the provision by large asso-
ciations of specialized services including economic and market 
research. 
FinaUy, larger associations, by holding regular functions for business-
men, may promote and guide discussions on common topics. 
Industrial Classification 
An examination of knowm associations in Victoria, South Australia and 
Western Australia show that manufacturing interests have the largest 
association representation. The author's Victorian figures are set out 
m Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
Industrial Classification of Victorian Trade Associations 
Category 
Manufacturing 
Manufacturing and Distribution 
Distribution 
Service 
Total 
No. of Associations 
66 
54 
46 
58 
224 
% of Total 
29.5 
24.1 
20.5 
25.9 
100.0 
Of the 66 associations included in "Manufacturing", 34 are associa-
tions operating within the framework of the Chamber of Manufac-
tures, indicating its influential position. 
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Membership 
Turning to membership of associations. New South Wales is the 
only state where official information is avaUable. In New South Wales 
figures coUected under the Trade Union Act suggest that the most 
associations have memberships of less than 250.® Mr. Cook has 
estimated the average membership of known South Austrahan asso-
ciations to be about 200.'^  The results of the author's survey of 36 
Victorian associations are set out in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Membership Figures of 36 Victorian Trade Associations 
Group Size 
Under 50 
50 and under 250 
250 and under 500 
500 and under 1,000 ... 
1,000 and under 2,500 
2,500 and under 5,000 
5,000 and under 10,000 
Over 10,000 
Total 
Number in Group 
5 
11 
7 
3 
4 
2 
3 
1 
36 
% of Total Survey 
13.9 
30.5 
19.4 
8.3 
11.1 
5.6 
8.4 
2.8 
100.0 
The figures in this table support what is knowm in New South Wales 
and South Australia. As may be seen some two-fifths of associations 
have less than 250 members. Associations with between 2,500 and 
10,000 members are the larger associations mentioned before, whUe 
that having over 10,000 members is an association of primaty pro-
ducers. 
Association membership is normaUy open to aU proprietors or 
employers engaged in a particular industty or trade, though associa-
tions ahnost invariably retain the right of exclusion. This also applies 
tn larger associations, but their members are normaUy drawm from 
a wider range of industry and trade. 
Administration 
AU but the larger associations seem to have a common pattern of 
organization. They are usuaUy administered by an elected executive, 
councU or board of directors, which meets regularly to decide policy 
matters, whUe the secretaty is responsible for day-to-day administra-
tion. The permanent staff of associations generaUy consists of a 
secretaty and a typist, though some associations are mn by voluntaty 
and part-tune staff. Lawyers or accountants often act as secretaty 
to one or more associations as do Ley TUy and Co., a firm of 
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accountants, for the Victorian Hardboard Distributors' Association, 
the Victorian Hardware Association and the Victorian Plywood 
Distributors' Association, plus other associations. Association members 
are often organized into committees which makes recommendations 
to the executive on policy matters and can thus influence and guide 
their executive. There may be several committees wdthin an associa-
tion covering such subjects as pricing and marketing pohcy, publicity, 
tariffs, membership, finance, research and social activities. 
Finance 
The finance of associations comes mainly from members' annual sub-
scriptions which are levied in various ways; these include pro rata 
fees, and sliding charges based on annual turnover or the number of 
employees. An entrance fee is sometimes levied as weU. With many 
of tiie smaUer associations, annual subscriptions average about twenty 
pounds, but subscriptions based on a sliding scale may be compara-
tively high. For instance, the annual subscriptions of the Victorian 
Master BuUders' Association rise to a maximum of £350, as Table 3 
shows. 
TABLE 3 
Subscription Rates of the Victorian Master Builders' Association 
Annual Turnover 
Up to and including £50,000 ... 
Over £50,000 and up to £75,000 
Over £75,000 and up to £150,000 
Over £150,000 and up to £300,000 ... 
Over £300,000 and up to £500,000 
Over £500,000 and up to £1,000,000 
Over £1,000,000 
Annual Subscription 
£20 
£30 
£50 
£100 
£150 
£250 
£350 
(Source: Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Master Builders' Association 
of Victoria, p. 13.) 
Apart from armual subscriptions and entrance fees, members of asso-
ciations may also be liable under their association's constitution to 
contribute to any extraordinary expenses not covered by other 
revenue. Additional finance also comes from business undertakings or 
from investment of association funds. The Victorian Employers' 
Federation and the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures have long 
established subsidiaty insurance companies, while many of the other 
associations examined have provisions in their constitutions about the 
investment of funds. One interesting case is the Victorian Chamber of 
Fruit and Vegetable Industries, which has as one of its Objects the 
establishment "of such company or other organisation as may be 
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considered necessaty or deshable for the purposes of manufacturing, 
bulk or co-operative purchasing, handlmg and distribution of sprays, 
fertUisers, supplies, plants or other commodities required by members 
or by producers engaged m the Fmit and/or Vegetable Industries 
and to mvest the funds of the Chamber therem".* 
One reason for the existence of such a large number of Australian 
associations is that membership is relatively inexpensive. This is true 
of associations whose administrative work is handled by the larger 
associations, enabling the smaU association to keep its overhead costs 
dowm, particularly office accommodation. In other cases two or more 
associations may keep dowm costs and subscriptions by sharing their 
administrative expenses. 
In Victoria some associations have found it useful to incorporate as 
companies, including The GuUd of Fumiture Manufacturers, the 
Master BuUders' Association, the Employers' Federation and the 
Chamber of Manufactures. Associations which have incorporated as 
companies are generaUy the larger associations which owm premises 
and have extensive financial and other commitments. 
Organization 
The organization of larger associations is complex both with regard 
to their management and their activities. With the Victorian Chamber 
of Manufactures responsibUity for policy is vested in a council con-
sisting of all office-bearers and ex-presidents, of representatives from 
each tiade section or division of the Chamber which has more than 
six members, of ten members who represent the ordinaty members 
of the Chamber, of six members representing countty members of the 
Chamber, and of any other members as the CouncU may deem 
necessaty. In addition to the CouncU there is an Executive consisting 
of all office-bearers and ex-presidents and no less than eight other 
members of CouncU. The Executive is responsible for effecting the 
resolutions of CouncU and for the actual administration of the 
Chamber. The organization of the Victorian Employers' Federation is 
simUar to that of the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures. The main 
difference between the two organizations is that the policy of the 
Employers' Federation is determined by a Board of Governors rather 
than by the CouncU. The Executive Committee of the Employers' 
Federation is simUar in all respects to that of the Chamber of Manu-
factures. 
There are minor variations in the organizations of other larger 
associations in Victoria, but in general they follow the pattem adopted 
by the Employers' Federation and the Chamber of Manufactures. 
There are usuaUy various divisions or sections within the larger 
associations under the control of numerous officers responsible to the 
Executive for day to day admmistration. The sections of the Victoria 
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Chamber of Commerce are designated. Arbitration, Civic Affairs, 
Public Relations, Prices and Taxation, Legislative, Membership, 
Development, Economics, Trade Fair, Entertainment, and Premises. 
Most other large associations have simUar specialist sub-sections. 
THE REPRESENTATION OF INDUSTRY 
Representational functions are considered to be the most important 
by many of the association officials interviewed. In a list of twenty-
three objects and purposes of associations arranged in order of import-
ance by the Western Australian Registrar of Trade Associations, 
representational aims rate highly. After three general objects comes 
the object: "To watch and consider legislation; to prepare statements 
of case in respect of industrial matters and/or government control."^ 
This object, however, covers only the main part of the representa-
tional functions, and associations do pursue their aims further into 
the general industrial and commercial spheres. The advantages of 
regular contact between governments and organizations representing 
business interests are weU known and are fully discussed in P.E.P.'s 
Industrial Trade Associations: Activities and Organization^'^ and we 
shall limit ourselves to a brief summary of the main points arising 
out of discussion with Australian association officials. 
The government often finds it vety useful to be able to consult at 
short notice with association officials representing a particular industry 
rather than with a large number of independent firms. By periodic 
discussions with association officials, government departments can 
keep abreast of major industrial developments, gauge the reaction 
of industry to government proposals likely to affect business interests, 
and obtain specialist advice on technical and commercial matters. 
Industty can also gain by contact between government departments 
and associations. Among the benefits is a recognized channel through 
which industry can press its case for changes in existing and proposed 
legislation, and in other ways protect and promote its members' 
interests. As association officials regularly consult with a number of 
government departments, they know by experience how to present 
their case and often may be able to do so more effectively than an 
individual firm. This not only saves time for industty but increases 
the likelihood of success. 
In Australia the position is complicated by the high degree of 
monopoly and oligopoly in many major industries, which has tended 
to restrain the growth of the representational functions of associa-
tions below that of their counterparts in Great Britain.^^ Another 
apparent difference is the greater diffusion of effort in Australia 
resulting largely from the lack of co-ordination between trade associa-
tions. Some industries are represented by up to eight associations 
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attempting to achieve the same ends in one State. This unnecessaty 
duplication of effort is probably the main factor hindering the growth 
and influence of associations today. Apart from the advantages to 
industty and the public service of the representational functions, the 
main reason for the increasing emphasis placed on it in recent years 
has been a growdng awareness by associations of their responsibility 
to ensure that members abide by the law. Associations must not only 
keep their members fuUy informed of aU relevant legislation, but they 
must also be aware of an attempt to influence the nature of pro-
posed legislation and amendments to legislation which are likely to 
affect their members' interests. 
As would be expected, the Federal system of government in 
Australia has resulted in a weU-defined division of duties between 
national and State associations. In the majority of cases investigated 
by the author, national associations are concerned principaUy wdth 
matters under Federal Government jurisdiction, and State associations 
are only involved from time to time. Larger State associations such 
as the Employers' Federations and Chambers of Manufactures, how-
ever, do participate in business and commercial deputations to the 
Federal Government. Both the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures 
and the Melboume Chamber of Commerce have within their organiza-
tions a "legislative" section whose duties cover both State and federal 
government activities. The Victorian Employers' Federation carries 
out simUar functions and issues a regular "Parhamentaty Service 
Letter" which contains commentaries on the main items of parhamen-
taty interest (federal and State), proposed legislation, and a list of 
federal Ministers due to visit Melbourne. 
Over the last three years joint consultations between associations 
and the Federal Government have increased markedly. The proposed 
Restrictive Trade Practices Legislation has been in part responsible 
for this. It is quite common for associations to form a special organiza-
tion when they consider the free enterprise system is being threatened, 
as they did during the 1948 Bank Nationahzation campaign. The 
Restrictive Trade Practices proposals have had the same effect: "A 
Trade Practices Division is being established within the Associated 
Chamber of Manufactures of Australia so that the needs of manu-
facturing industty in relation to the Federal Govemment's proposals 
for restrictive trade practices legislation may be serviced fuUy and 
prompdy. Major representations have been made by A.C.M.A. to the 
govemment recommending modifications and reductions in the scope 
of the proposals. A.C.M.A. was the first national organization to 
make such representations; it has led in public discussions of the 
proposals: and it has jomed wdth other major bodies in making 
representations to the Prime Minister and his Ministerial coUeagues."^^ 
The submission of the Associated Chambers of Manufactures of 
Austraha to the Federal Govemment on the proposed Restrictive 
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Trade Practices legislation was in fact made m conjunction wdth the 
Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries, the Australian CouncU of 
RetaUers and the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Australia. 
Many national and State associations also made representations to the 
Attomey-General's Department on the proposals, and often did so 
at the request of the Department. 
Apart from the periodic issues regarded by associations as major 
attacks on the free enterprise system, there are several issues—usuaUy 
of a contentious nature—which are subjects of recurring deputations 
to the Federal Govemment. PayroU taxation, sales taxation, and 
company income taxation appear regularly in annual reports, parti-
cularly of the larger associations, as subjects of discussion with the 
Federal Treasuty. For example, the Victorian Chamber of Manu-
factures have in the past, made representations to the Federal 
Treasurer to remove existing taxation anomalies, prior to the formula-
tion of the Budget. One interesting case was reported from the soft 
drink industty in 1959: "The Secretary reported having sent 798 
telegrams to members of both Federal Houses of Parliament, asking 
them to take action to secure the remission of sales tax on soft drinks. 
Each Federal member received 38 telegrams, all worded alike, and 
the cost to each association member was £4 14s. 9d."^' 
A recent development of some significance for economic policy and 
planning is the introduction of periodic consultations on economic 
matters between the government and representatives of the national 
associations. It is now official policy of the Associated Chambers of 
Manufactures to work for an expansion of the practice of joint con-
sultation on economic pohcy. With the increasing co-operation be-
tween the Chambers of Commerce, Chambers of Manufactures, the 
Employers' Federations, other smaller associations and the Depart-
ment of Trade, it is essential that representatives of industty are 
consulted regularly on effects of fiscal and monetaty policy in the 
interests of the national economy and the growth of manufactured 
exports. 
Although national associations are primarUy responsible for industty 
liaison with Federal Govemment departments, some of the State 
associations are also active in this field. The smaller State associations, 
however, are more interested in representing their members on more 
commercial and technical matters than their federal counterparts. 
In dealing wdth State governments "one trade" associations are 
more important, the larger associations being involved mainly tn the 
wider fields of education. State development, decentralization, etc. 
The Master Plumbers' Association of Victoria is an interesting case 
study, even though its activities in these fields are more highly 
developed than those of most other small associations. The plumbers 
have regular quarterly meetings with the Melbourne and Metropolitan 
Board of Works to discuss policy and technical matters. It is not 
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unusual for the agenda of these meetings to contain over a dozen 
major items. Regular meetings are also held wdth the Victorian 
Education Department and the C.S.I.R.O., and on a less formal basis 
occasional deputations are sent to the State Public Works Department 
and Housing Commission, mainly to discuss commercial rather than 
technical problems. 
Association officials may also represent industty before Federal 
Government enquiries and boards established to investigate aspects 
of policy-making and administration. A recent example of this is the 
associations' submissions to the Commonwealth Committee of Eco-
nomic Enquiry covering industty's views on such things as economic 
growth, tariff policy, immigration, overseas investment. Common-
wealth purchasing and decentralization. 
While national and State associations seldom overlap in their 
dealings with government departments, they are both active at 
hearings before the Tariff Board. The State and Associated Chambers 
of Manufactures and Chambers of Commerce are frequent witnesses 
for their members before the Tariff Board and many smaller State 
associations are also concerned with tariff matters and submissions to 
the Board. However, trade associations do come into open conflict, 
not evident elsewhere, with regard to tariff matters. This is not really 
surprising where associations representing manufacturing and retail-
ing interests respectively use the Tariff Board to protect their mem-
bers' interests which may be diametrically opposed on matters of tariff 
policy. 
THE PROVISION OF COMMON SERVICES 
This category includes organization of trade fairs and exhibitions, 
provision of trade and business information and statistics, publication 
of trade journals, and provision of joint advertising and facUities for 
research. As P.E.P. point Out, the distinguishing feature of these func-
tions is that they do not ". . . primarily involve representation to other 
groups, but arise out of the recognition that some things can only 
be done, and others done more effectively, by collective action, and 
are equally part of the extemal economies which associations organize 
for their industries".^* Associations dffier in their provision of common 
services in much the same way as they do in their representational 
activities. Larger associations aim to improve the efficiency of and 
provide assistance for the development of industry generaUy, whUe 
small associations are normaUy concemed with the promotion of a 
single industty or trade. 
The organization of trade fairs and exhibitions is mainly the con-
cern of small single industty associations; often however, several 
associations join forces to stage an exhibition. In Victoria, for instance. 
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the Boat Show is organized by the National Marine Association which 
consists of the Boat BuUders' Association, the Boat and Yacht Fittings 
Association, and the Boating Industries Association. Some associations 
have been formed purely to organize exhibitions. Of the larger asso-
ciations, the Chamber of Manufactures and the metropolitan Cham-
bers of Commerce are the most active in this field of promotion. 
Associations use a variety of methods to provide their members 
with trade and business information, but the main medium is the 
trade journal. Publication of many trade journals is undertaken by 
commercial publishers, as is the Textile Journal of Australia, which 
is published by Merchandising Magazines Pty. Ltd., for 31 associa-
tions. The range of material contained in some journals is of interest. 
The Leather Journal which is the official publication of five associa-
tions recently contained articles on overseas fashions, imports of 
Chinese shoes, new production techniques, export possibUities, tariffs, 
production trends, and social events. The Australasian Grocer in the 
past year has contained items on the retaUing of frozen foods, decimal 
currency, improvements in packaging, retaU trading statistics, and 
company news. Normally, journals of smaller associations cover events 
in a particular industry or trade. Articles of more general interest are 
sometimes included in journals of smaU associations, but normally 
they are found in journals of larger associations. A journal, representa-
tive of the publications of larger associations, Queensland Industry, 
has recently contained articles on the introduction of decimal 
currency, national economic planning, state of the labour market, 
trade and tarffis, and employers' liabUities imder the National Service 
Trammg Act, 1964. 
Many associations are too small to afford journals even if they com-
bine with other associations in the same or related industries. These 
associations normally issue news sheets and trade bulletins. They 
may rely, however, on space provided for news of their industry in 
journals of larger associations and particularly those of the Chamber 
of Manufactures. News sheets may also be issued as regular supple-
ments to journals. Information contained in news sheets and bulletins 
normaUy follows the same pattern as in journals, but some associations 
have specialised bulletins devoted to such things as political develop-
ments, labour news, and trade statistics. 
Statistics issued by trade associations are of two main types; first, 
those collected by associations from official sources, and second, 
statistics obtained from individual firms. Many associations devote a 
considerable part of their time to collecting material from the Com-
monwealth and State Government Statisticians. Where information is 
required from members, a confidential questionnaire is normally used. 
An interesting example of this method is that which has been used by 
the New South Wales RetaU Traders' Association and the Victorian 
Master Drapers' Association. Each month a representative group of 
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department stores in Melboume sent returns of sales to the Common-
wealth Bank in Sydney where the returns were coUated. The total 
figures were then sent by the bank to the association which distri-
buted them to members. The returns submitted to the bank were 
identified by a code number knowm only by the association, whUe the 
association does not see individual returns. In this way detaUs of 
sales of individual stores remain confidential. 
WhUe several larger associations employ quahfied research officers, 
associations often engage market research agencies for detaUed 
surveys. This, however, does not detract from the usefulness of the 
services provided by associations; indeed, for many smaU businesses, 
associations are the only source of trade and business information. 
FinaUy, there is technical research. Only a limited number of indus-
tries have sponsored or undertaken research on technical matters 
through their associations; the plastics and bread industries are two 
which have done so. The plastics industty has no formal research 
organization; private firms and the CSIRO are commissioned by the 
Plastics Institute of Australia from time to time to undertake research 
projects. At present several separate projects are in progress on the 
possibihties of adapting PVC piping for general industrial and house-
hold use. Associations in the bread industty support the Bread 
Research Institute of Australia which was established in 1947 to 
undertake research and development work and to provide technical 
services for the industty. The Institute which had a technical staff 
of nineteen in 1964, works in haison wdth the CSIRO Wheat Research 
Unit. Income m 1964 was £85,646, of which the CSIRO contributed 
£18,100. The major part of the Institute's income, however, comes 
from the Bread Manufacturers' Association in each State who levy 
their members 2s. per ton of flour used. The Institute's work is inter-
nationaUy recognized and some of the methods it has developed are 
in use overseas. 
THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION 
This aspect of association functions includes aU activities normaUy 
caUed restrictive trade practices, and is that part of associations' func-
tions which has attracted most attention. Sir Garfield Barwdck, when 
he was Austrahan Attomey-General considered that "A quick measur-
ing rod of the extent to which restiictive trade practices are being 
operated is the number of trade associations which are functioning", 
and further that, "The primaty reason for the existence of most of these 
associations is to devise and to admmister trade practices to protect the 
interests of their members".^^ Professor Hunter is more guarded; in 
his view ". . . the only method of assessing the incidence of restrictive 
activity in Austialia appears to he m an exammation of the nature 
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and number of trade associations—the principal vehicle for the opera-
tion of restrictive agreements".^® As was indicated previously, the 
only Australian State which enforces restrictive trade practices legis-
lation at the present time is Westem Australia, but the scope of the 
legislation is maiiUy concerned with the registration of associations 
and provisions as to association constitutions. 
Clearly there is an obvious and accepted relationship between 
associations and the administration of restrictive trade practices. 
It is, however, questionable whether "most" Australian trade asso-
ciations are concerned with trade restriction, or that trade restriction 
per se is "the primaty reason for the existence" of such associations. 
For any worthwhUe assessment of restrictive practices two main 
features must be borne in mind. The first in the institutional and com-
petitive structure of the Australian economy as such, and in parti-
cular the highly monopolised structure of the economy. Second, and 
arising out of this is the nature of trade practices, some of which 
may be restiictive and operate with or without the assistance of 
associations. 
Many associations issue recommended price lists to be foUowed 
by their members. However, these associations do not usually have 
the power to enforce compliance with such recommendations, and 
the price lists are intended to be used as a guide to pricing policy 
only. In many cases associations' price lists are based on the formulae 
laid dowm during the Second World War by Federal and State Prices 
Commissioners wdth adjustments for increases in costs being made 
from time to time. The price lists of some associations are based on 
decisions made by the South Australia Prices Commissioner where 
applicable. South Australia and Queensland are the only States which 
still retain price control on some items, but price control is more 
effective tn South Australia and in some cases the prices laid down in 
South Australia appear to be adopted in Queensland. 
Industries and trades whose market activities are normaUy influ-
enced by associations' recommended price lists, are generaUy those 
which consist of large numbers of business units. Industries in this 
category would include clothing and footwear, many types of food 
manufacturing, and such trades as plumbing, electrical installation, 
and general hardware supplies and services. The establishment of 
wartime price control has contributed more than any other factor to 
the present pricing policies of many associations. Associations point 
out tihat proprietors and management of many small businesses have 
littie knowledge of adequate costing and pricing techniques and 
therefore rely on the price hsts issued regularly by their associations, 
who naturally continued to provide price listing as this function was 
gradually abandoned by the Federal and some State governments. 
Other institutional factors in the Australian economy have also 
encouraged the widespread adoption of orderly marketing schemes 
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and simUarity of prices between large numbers of firms. Statutoty 
Marketing Boards for primaty products, the policy of protection 
against cheaper overseas imports as administered by the Tariff 
Boards, and the Austrahan system of arbitration and wage determina-
tion are in aU cases in point. Statutoty Marketing Boards, by setting 
prices for primaty products, are acting in a restrictive fashion. WhUe 
these activities may be justified, they have the important influence of 
affecting the abihty of other sections of the business world to compete 
effectively. For instance, the costs of raw materials for much of the 
food industry, are identical for all firms, and the margin in which indi-
vidual firms can compete on price is narrowed. In isolation, these 
effects may not be large, but when combined wdth the other institu-
tional arrangements mentioned above they have a considerable 
impact on the nature of industrial and market activity. SimUar con-
siderations also apply wdth respect to the national policy of protection 
against cheaper overseas products. Hearings before the Tariff Board 
take the form of enquiries into the cost structure of individual firms 
and industries, and the findings of the Boards are freely avaUable. 
Any protection granted by the Board has the effect of establishing a 
common minimum price for aU firms in the industries concerned. 
Associations may play a part in representing their industries before 
the Tarffi Board, but in general, associations representing manufactur-
ing interests seek protection, whUe retailers' and wholesalers' associa-
tions oppose restrictions and tariffs on imports. 
The Australian system of arbitration and wage determination is 
another important factor which has repercussions on the competitive 
structure of the economy. There are, of course, smaU variations 
between States in the wage rates in different occupations, but mini-
mum wages are determined generally on a national basis. Many asso-
ciations which have employer members represent them at hearings 
of the various wage-fixing bodies in aU States, and seem to encourage 
the establishment of more uniform wage rates. The employers' Total 
Wage argument in recent years is the most important example of 
this trend. The effect of national uniform wage rates on the cost 
structure of Australian industty is considerable as labour costs repre-
sent the largest item of expense in many industries and trades. In 
1961-62 salaries and wages paid represented over 50 per cent of the 
value of production for 11 of the 16 major categories of industty 
defined by the Commonwealth Statistician.^'^ Because of this and the 
inflexible nature of wages, there would be little variation in costs 
between firms in many industries. PossibUities for individual firms 
to compete on price are therefore substantially reduced. 
It is clear that there are institutional arrangements and traditions of 
price control in the Australian economy, apart from any deliberate 
action by associations, which have produced a marked degree of 
price rigidity. This price rigidity throws doubt on the usefulness of the 
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proposed Restrictive Trade Practices Legislation. The proposed legis-
lation may increase price and other forms of competition, but because 
of the relatively smaU margins between total costs and costs which 
are determined on a national basis, the impact of the legislation may 
be marginal. Traditions of price rigidity also focus attention on the 
high degree of concentration in Australian industry. Dr. Maureen 
Brunt estimated that on the basis of employment statistics, 50 per 
cent of Australian manufacturing industry is highly or fairly con-
centrated,^® while 50 per cent of retaU industries mvestigated by Dr. 
Brunt represent ohgopolistic markets.^^ Industries said by Dr. Brunt 
to be concentrated or oligopolistic are those industries which could 
be expected to be lacking in effective competition. These industries 
are, however represented by a relatively smaU number of associations. 
Many industries which are not highly or fairly concentrated support 
the greatest number of associations and industries in these categories 
often support several associations in each state. 
The importance of restrictive practices varies considerably from 
association to association. In manufacturing industries, much depends 
on the number of firms and whether or not agreement has been 
reached wdth the retaUers. The smaller the number of firms, the 
easier it is to police restrictive agreements and little time is spent by 
associations in policing agreements. As the number of firms increases, 
problems of enforcing restrictive agreements multiply and associations 
become more important. This is particularly true in retailing. Associa-
tions appear to be most active at those levels of competition where 
restrictions on competition will have the least effect. In many associa-
tions the operation of restrictive trade agreements is not of great 
importance, and for many representational functions and the provi-
sion of common services are of equal importance. 
Some idea of the importance of associations in the entire field of 
trade restriction in Australia may be obtained by looking at a few 
examples of restrictive practices which are apparently organized and 
controlled without assistance of associations. Perhaps the outstanding 
example of an industry operating restrictive practices without assist-
ance of associations is the oU industty. A highly concentrated industry 
consisting of ten major firms and a fully-owned subsidiary, the 
industty administers a variety of restrictive practices. Among the 
more important of these practices are retail price maintenance, dis-
criminatoty rebates, tied retail outlets, and standard industty quali-
fications for installation of dispensing equipment. The position is 
somewhat different in South Australia and Queensland where price 
control stUl applies to petroleum products. Breaches of these agree-
ments are common but there are well-established procedures to 
handle complaints of unfair trading. There are other agreements be-
tween oU companies, but these apply mainly to the distribution of 
petroleum products and result in prices being lower than would be 
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the case if they did not exist. The most important agreements of this 
type are refinety borrow and loan and exchange agreements. Briefly, 
under these agreements a company may borrow or exchange a parcel 
of fuel with another company in a different State, and save on trans-
port costs from, say, its refinety on the eastern coast to its Western 
Austiahan market. 
Information avaUable about trade practices in some of the other 
more highly concentrated Australian industries indicates that associa-
tions are not always involved in the operation of agreements at all 
levels. This is the case in manufacturing industty, and particularly in 
respect to the sale of tyres, tubes and fittings, batteries, fine paper, 
some types of iron and steel products, glass and cigarettes. The 
nature of agreement varies from industty to industty; the most 
common type is price control enforced by threat of withholding 
supplies. The manufacturers of these repeat seUing products normaUy 
lay dowm a structure of wholesale and retaU prices which generally 
apply throughout Australia. Manufacturers fear that if price control 
breaks dowm then big buyers may obtain an oligopoly position in the 
market, which may reduce the scope of distribution of their products. 
Conversely, in other industries, notably cigarettes, manufacturers may 
seek to handle the situation dffierentiy and by-pass wholesalers' and 
retaUers' associations. Cigarette manufacturers are forcing the price 
breakers to seU below the agreed retaU price by threatening to with-
hold supplies. In this way they are disciplining the price breakers at 
the expense of the wholesalers' margins. 
In general, the type of practices described above are not related 
to association activities as such, but they reflect the non-competitive 
and monopolistic nature of Australian industty which has enabled a 
limited number of large firms to impose their policies on the market. 
This in turn is a reflection of many factors, including the limited size 
of most markets in the early stage of development and the policy of 
tariff protection associated with the founding of a national system of 
wage determination. It appears difficult to substantiate Sir Garfield 
Barwick's claim that the "primaty reason for the existence of most 
trade associations is to devise and administer trade practices . . ." of a 
restrictive nature. In practice, many associations have little or nothing 
to do wdth the operation of restrictive trade practices. 
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Chief of aU signfficance. 
45 Not such frequent opportunities, however, as Committee and certain Cabinet 
meetings mentioned later. 
46 Since this article is not concemed with the general question of the powers 
of Gk)vemors, the above deals only with the one point of formal contact 
between Ministers and Govemor. The Governors are also, like the Queen, 
entitled to be kept informed in a more personal way about the course of 
Ministerial and Cabinet pohcy. The Prime Minister sees the Govemor-
General and keeps him fully informed about Cabinet business. The Govemor-
General and his staff also see other Ministers from time to time and obtain 
information from them and their permanent heads. Owing to the range and 
complexity of the matters for decision, a Govemor-General determined to 
exercise his functions with the knowledge of their import must be allowed 
a good deal of flexibihty in his contacts with the executive govemment; the 
Prime Minister could not possibly spare the time personaUy to keep him fully 
informed. However, the Govemor-General's main contacts are with the Prime 
Minister, and the situation involves no threat to Cabinet sohdarity. What 
is said here about Governors-General can apply as much in the state sphere, 
but there is more likehhood of the Commonwealth post attracting men with 
the abihty and ambition to play a constructive part in govemment. 
47 8.64. 
48 Pursuant to s. 65. 
49 This view seems to be held by the present Govenmient; see per Mr. Holt, 
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(then) Minister for Labour and a senior Cabinet member, in C.P.D. (1955) 
H. of R., I, 83. 
50 See G. Sawer, AustrdUan Constitutional Cases (Sydney, 1948), pp. 302 et 
seq., 408 et seq. 
51 In the early stages of such an arrangement, personal difficulties might arise 
from the suggestion that an assistant Minister "shares the administration". It 
might also be difficult to get assistants to expose themselves to the risk of 
common informer proceedings imder s. 46 of the Constitution, but that is a 
flexible provision; Parliament could repeal the provision for penalties and as 
suggested later could itself finaUy determine the constitutional question under 
s. 47. 
52 Not to give them in Parhament; Ministers value too highly this form of 
pubhcity—especiaUy since the introduction of radio broadcasting of debates— 
and probably questioners would make absence of a personal reply a matter 
for pohtical criticism. If Ministers and Members would accept at least sharing 
of answers between Minister and assistant, the burden on the former would 
be appreciably eased. 
53 C.P.D., CCXVII, 717; CCXVHI, 618. 
54 Parliamentary Practice (15th ed.; London, 1950), pp. 197 et seq. 
55 H. of C , 194(M1, No. 120. 
56 E.g. in its account of the 1945 Coatbridge and Springbum case. May 
describes fhe payments made as "a trivial amount for subsistence and 
travelling expenses". ActuaUy, provision was made for two distinct payments, 
one for expenses, the other a fee for doing the work. There seems to be no 
case where payment of expenses, clearly and solely as such, has been treated 
as a "profit". 
57 Many of the examples cited by Govemment speakers, however, were 
irrelevant; for example, the salaries paid to the Speaker, the Chairman of 
Committees, the Leader of the Opposition and the Whips. These are in no 
sense offices under the Crown. Somewhat more interesting were second war 
cases of Labour administrations appointing M.P.s to assist overburdened Min-
isters with certain types of pubhc relations work, such as haison with trade 
unions; these Members were given no official tide, and were paid a smaU 
fixed fee per day when they were engaged on the work as an estimate of 
expenses. The fees were sufficient to make the posts attractive and so incur 
the ban of one main ground for the "office-of-profit" rule—namely preventing 
the Executive Govemment from having too great an influence with Members. 
But probably fhe posts could not be regarded as under the Crown. 
58 The position of the Secretaries appointed in 1952 remained at this writing 
(1956) uncertain. On this writer's view, the resignation of the whole Ministry 
which occurred in January 1956—to facihtate Cabinet reconstruction—involved 
the resignation or dismissal of the Secretaries, whatever view one takes of 
their status. 
59 There are no Honoraries in the present (1956) Cabinet (nor have any been 
appointed since). 
60 The Senate has 60 members, the House of Representatives 124 (or 122 with 
fuU voting rights—123 since 1967). 
61 J. A. Lyons (1932-39, United Austraha Party) and John Curtin (1941-45, 
Labour). 
62 Area about 3 miUion square mfles, population just over 9 nuUion (1956; 
l l^mflhonbyl967). 
63 Population 33,000 (1967-95,000). It is about 180 mfles from Sydney, 400 
from Melboume, 600 from Brisbane, 700 from Hobart and Adelaide and 
2,100 from Perth. 
64 At this writing (1956), only five Members-none of them Ministers—regularly 
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use rafl travel. Members have unlimited free travel on raflways, and free air 
travel to and from Canberra as often as they please. 
65 Even in Canberra itself, geography and accommodation problems iinpede 
executive co-ordination. Ministers and Members are crowded into a biulding 
designed for a smaUer Parhament; most of the departmental bufldings are 
too distant for Minister to have their offices in their Departments. A complete 
new legislative and administrative housing plan is needed, with underground 
troUey communication such as that of the Capitol in Washington, D.C., so 
that Ministers can be with their Departments and yet have rapid access to 
Parhament. (The American arrangements are to solve the different problems 
of legislators who belong to Congressional Conunittees, but they would be 
just as useful for Ministerial transport.) 
66 Public Administration (Sydney), XIV (1955), 193. 
67 For example, the Economic Committee frequently throws off a sub-group 
caUed the Works Committee, usuaUy nOt chaired by the Prime Minister, to 
consider pubhc works programmes. 
68 E.g. the Department of War Organisation of Industry supphed the secretariat 
for the Production Executive. 
69 Within twenty-four hours of the meeting; usuaUy within twelve. The record 
of decisions is as brief and bald as possible. In aU these arrangements, Sir 
AUen has profited from the experience of the United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 
to which some of his officers have been seconded. 
70 Staff has remained constant since 1950. This has prevented experiments in 
organising "foUow up" procedures to check the carrying out of pohcy, a point 
on which aU the Austrahan Cabinets are weak. Sir AUen Brown has initiated 
a scheme for seconding senior administrators from other Departments to his 
Cabinet Secretariat for two-year periods, so as to provide himself with 
additional manpower and also create in aU Departments a cadre of officers 
famihar with Cabinet procedure and trained in the most effective way of 
setting out submissions to Cabinet. This may also enable foUow-up tech-
niques to be developed. 
71 Cabinet Ministers receive a higher salary. This form of differentiating 
between "Senior" and "Junior" Ministers, mairdy on a basis of time in 
office, has existed since 1952. The classffication is in the discretion of the 
Prime Minister. 
72 Circulation and filing of Cabinet papers present difficulties, because Austraha 
has inherited the United Kingdom principle that the records of one Cabinet 
should not be avaflable to the next. Whatever justffication this rule had in the 
past, it should now be abandoned. The main business of Cabinet is to carry 
on and co-ordinate pohcies which are Departmental in origin, and it is in 
the public interest that the fuUest records should be kept of those pohcies, 
and should be avaflable to successive governments. So far as secret party 
pohtical considerations enter, the claim for concealment is usuaUy not rqiut-
able and such considerations of tactics or 'low cuiming" as might be can-
vassed should be put forward oraUy in Cabinet and not recorded at aU. In 
fact. Departmental files inevitably contain a good deal of the material leading 
to Cabinet submissions, often the submissions themselves, and often a note of 
Cabinet decision. The Secretariat has not adopted the fiction of the United 
Kingdom Cabinet Office, by which Departmental submissions, often left on 
the files, are caUed "drafts" and the printed Cabinet submissions, usuaUy 
virtuaUy identical with the Departmental record, are alone given complete 
protection from subsequent Ministerial inquiry. 
73 C.P.D. (1956), H. of R., I, 39 et seq., 57 et seq.; Sen., H, 68 et seq. 
74 The views of senior Labour leaders deserve great respect, since they had 
intensive experience of war administration under maximum pressure. They 
were joined by some Government supporters in urging that an attempt to 
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differentiate between pohcy and detafled administration at Ministerial level is 
a mistake; the best pohcy comes from bringing together all the heads of 
administration. But although Labour governed with a smaller Ministry, it did 
so at the cost of putting a grievous strain on particular Ministers. If more 
Ministers means keeping the nation's leaders alive and fit longer, the increase 
is justffied; perhaps, however, the distribution of responsibflity is more 
signfficant in this connection than the number of Ministers. 
75 Doubts about the scheme rest on three main grounds. First, the somewhat 
similar ChurchiU scheme for "Overlord" Ministers in the United Kingdom is 
said to have broken down—perhaps mainly because it was poorly designed? 
Secondly, it is doubted whether aU junior Ministers would play the game; 
being in control of the detafled work, they could disregard or at least 
subtly distort the pohcy directives of their senior Minister, and of Cabinet. 
However, difficulties of the latter nature also arise from the differentiation 
between Cabinet and Ministry. Third, Departments may not always faU into 
the same groupings for all purposes; for example, Territories is in some 
respects a "Public Works" Department, and in others related to "Extemal 
Policy" (with P.M.'s and Extemal Affairs). Hence the Wentworth scheme 
might produce the equivalent of a rather rigid sort of Committee system, 
instead of the present very flexible one. Even under the Wentworth scheme. 
Cabinet would need to include Ministers for reasons other than their relation 
to Departments—for example, the Senate Leader and the Vice-President. 
76 Under the Senate system of one-half the membership retiring every thfee 
years, new Senators elected the previous December take their seats on July 1. 
The rigid constitutional voting rule in the Senate is that the President has a 
dehberative but no casting vote, and when the house is equaUy divided 
the question passes in the negative (Constitution, s. 23). The remedy for 
persistent Senate obstmction of Govemment legislation is a dissolution of 
both Houses under s. 57 of the Constitution. 
77 Jennings' Cabinet Government (2nd ed.; Cambridge, 1951), pp. 222 et seq.; 
Keith's British Cabinet System, ed. Gibbs (London, 1952), pp. 97 et seq. 
These authors say nothing exphcitiy as to the freedom of junior Ministers to 
criticise Cabinet policy, but presumably they must be granted the freedom 
of Cabinet Ministers plus something. 
78 It might be necessary to distinguish between decisions finaUy taken by the 
Committee and those finaUy taken by Cabinet after a Committee report. 
79 C.P.D. (1956). 
5. THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN 
CABINET, 1901-39 by K. A. MacKirdy, p. 76 
1 National Australasian Convention, Official Record of the Proceedings and 
Debates (Sydney, 1891), p. 134. 
2 Ibid., p. 135. 
3 Ibid., p. 136. Cf.: "And the plain tmth is that the federal system is simply 
inconsistent with the first principles which must prevafl in a properly 
organized British responsible central govemment." C. Dunkin in Province of 
Canada, Confederation Debates (Quebec, 1865), p. 503. 
4 The academic commentary includes: N. McL. Rogers, "Federal Influences on 
the Canadian Constitution", Canadian Bar Review, XI (1933), and "Evolu-
tion and Reform of the Canadian Cabinet", ibid., and R. MacG. Dawson, 
"The Cabinet—Position and Persormel", Canadian Journal of Economics and 
PoUtical Science, XII (1946). 
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5 The Premiers were Sir Wilham Lyne, New South Wales, Sir George Turner, 
Victoria, and Sir John Forrest, Westem Australia. The former premiers were 
C. C. Kingston, South Australia, and James Dickson, Queensland. Lyne, as 
Premier of the senior colony, was the first person whom Lord Hopetoun, the 
newly appointed Governor-General, commissioned to attempt to form a gov-
emment. As Lyne had been a consistent opponent of the federation scheme, 
the choice was singularly inappropriate, and after he reported his faflure, the 
Govemor-General turned to Barton, the leading advocate of federation and 
"Leader of the Convention" in the assembhes of 1897-98. The three members 
of Barton's cabinet who were not premiers were himself, R. E. O'Coimor 
from New South Wales, and Alfred Deakin from Victoria. 
6 Examiner (Launceston), 31 December 1900. According to section 65 of the 
Constitution, "Untfl Parhament otherwise provides, the Ministers of State shaU 
not exceed seven in number . . ." To the seven portfohos thus authorized. 
Barton had added the office of Vice-President of the Executive Councfl. 
7 Forrest was Premier of Westem Austraha, 1890-1900; Postmaster-General, 
January-February 1901; Minister for Defence, 1901-3; Minister for Home 
Affairs, 1903-4; Treasurer, 1905-7, 1909-10, 1913-14, 1917-18. Prime Minister 
W. M. Hughes relieved himself of the dangerously ambitipus coUeague by 
having him created Baron Forrest of Bunbury. He died on his way to 
London to take his seat in the House of Lords. Pearce was elected to the 
Senate in 1901 as a Labor supporter (he left the Labor Party with Hughes 
in 1916). He was Minister for Defence, 1908-9, 1910-13, 1914-21; Minister 
for Home and Territories, 1921-26; Vice-President of the Executive Councfl 
(whfle remaining leader of the Govemment in the Senate), 1926-29; Minister 
for Defence 1932-34; Minister for Extemal Affairs (with control of extemal 
territories), 1934-37. He was defeated in the general dection of 1937 and 
retired from active pohtical hfe. 
8 Cf. first Macdonald administration in Great Britain, 1924. Higgins, a Liberal 
member of the Legislative Assembly of Victoria, 1894-1900, and representa-
tive for Victoria in the federal conventions, 1897-98, entered the House of 
Representatives, 1901-6, generaUy foUowing an independent Liberal pohcy. 
He was Attorney General, 1904; Justice of the High Court of Austraha, 
1906-29; Chairman of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion, 1907-21. 
9 "Selected" was the term used in the resolution as originaUy drafted. The 
wording, though not its intent, was softened by amendment. Dean McHenry, 
"Origins of Caucus Selection of Cabinet", Historical Studies—Australia arid 
New Zealand, VU (1955). 
10 Argus (Melboume), 13 November 1908 noted: "No regard has been paid to 
state representation." 
11 Advertiser (Adelaide), 13 November 1908. 
12 A member of the Liberal Opposition asked the state Premier, "WiU the 
Govemment make a remonstrance against the injustice done to South Aus-
traha?" and "Do you not think that this State should have one representative 
in the Federal Govemment?" The Premier made the type of non-committal 
reply required on such occasions. Advertiser (Adelaide), 28 October 1915. 
13 Courier (Brisbane), 28 October 1915. 
14 West Australian (Perth), 18 August 1904. The paper, a Govemment sup-
porter, deprecated the suggestion editoriaUy in a manner which suggested 
that it was a tender point. 
15 "In the aUocation of portfohos there has been a marufest desire to secure the 
widest representation compatible with strength" (editorial Courier (Bris-
bane), 3 June 1909). The same paper's Melboume correspondent explained 
that the choice of the Queenslander, L. Groom, as Minister for Extemal 
Affairs, and of the South Australian, M. Glynn, as Attorney General, was 
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dictated by federal considerations, since the leading alternative candidates for 
both posts were Victorians. 
16 There was no Tasmanian in the Bmce-Page cabinet immediately foUowing 
the reorganization of Febmary 1928, but J. E. Ogden, a relatively recent 
convert from Labor, entered as honorary minister on 29 November 1928. 
Tasmania again lacked cabinet representation from 7 April 1939, when Joseph 
A. Lyons died, to 7 October 1942. 
17 Examiner (Launceston), 23 October 1929. 
18 No Westem Austrahan appeared on the hst of cabinet appointments 
announced by Prime Minister Menzies on 19 December 1949. The pro-
Government West Australian news story included the reassuring, but un-
founded, suggestion that an assistant ministership would be granted to a 
newly elected member from the State. 
19 In 1939 the Canadian Parhament contained 341 members (245 in the House 
of Commons, 96 in the Senate); the Austrahan Parhament 111 (75 in the 
House of Representatives, including one from the Northern Territory with 
limited voting rights, and 36 in the Senate). 
20 The pohtical imphcations of this situation are discussed in K. A. MacKirdy, 
"Geography and Federahsm in Austraha and Canada", Australian Geographer, 
VI (1953). 
21 Irvine: Premier of Victoria, 1902-4; elected to House of Representatives, 
1906; Attomey General, 1913-14; Minister for Works and Raflways, 1917-18; 
Treasurer, 1918-20; Acting Prime Minister, 1918-19. Theodore: Premier of 
Queensland, 1920-25; entered House of Representatives by manufactured 
by-election, 1927; deputy leader of the Opposition, 1929; Treasurer, 1929-30, 
and again in 1931. Lyons: Premier of Tasmania, 1923-28; elected to House of 
Representatives, 1929; Posbnaster-General, 1929-31; Prime Minister, 1931-39. 
22 The Launceston Examiner admitted in its editorial (12 November 1925) that 
Crouch's experience in the Commonwealth Parhament as member for Corio, 
and his military career, were respectable qualffications, but then asked 
". . . but why should he be in Tasmania aspiring for federal honours? Tas-
mania should be represented by Tasmanians." 
23 "The Transaustralian Raflway Sleepers: How Tasmania was Treated", 10 
May 1913. O'Malley was bom in Canada and pubhcly regretted this fact 
on aU possible occasions, claiming that it deprived him of the opportunity 
of becoming President of the United States. Rejecting any lesser honour that 
the repubhc might offer, he emigrated to the other land of opportunity. He 
served in the South Austrahan assembly from 1896 to 1899. From 1901 to 
1917 he sat in the House of Representatives for a Tasmanian constituency. 
24 "The Federal Ministiy", 27 Aprfl 1904. 
25 "New Federal Ministry", 3 June 1909. Cf. the Hobart Mercury's attack (21 
November 1922) on a former cabinet minister who was guflty of being a "Big 
Australian" and taking a national view of an issue: "He put office first, 
or Mr. Hughes first, or Austraha first. He did not put Tasmania first." 
26 Melboume served as the temporary capital of the Commonwealth untfl a 
permanent site could be decided upon and facihties made available. Although 
the Commonwealth Parhament had been meeting in Canberra since 1927 Ae 
process of moving govemment offices to the new capital has not yet been 
completed. 
27 J. W. Hackett to Walter James, 9 May 1907, "The James Papers-Letters on 
Federa;tion", Australian Quarterly, XXI (1949). 
28 (Since the above hnes were written the experiment was tried. A special 
meeting of the Canadian Cabinet was held in Quebec City on 28 December 
1961 in an effort to placate restless Quebecois by armoimcing for the Citadel 
that an additional French Canadian was joiiung the Cabinet) 
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29 Report of the Joint Committee of the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons Appointed to Consider the Petition of the State of Westem Aus-
tralia, H.C. LXXXVIII (1935). 
30 West Australian (Perth), 24 June 1935. 
31 Sydney Moming Herald, 4 February 1939. 
32 C.P.D., H. of R., IX, 40. 
33 Some changes from the original article have been incorporated into the 
present text. The author particularly wishes to acknowledge the helpful 
suggestions of Professor J. A. La Nauze. 
6. THE POLITICAL fiLITE IN AUSTRALIA by S. Encel, 
p. 86 
1 For example, W. L. Guttsman, "The Changing Social Structure of the 
British Pohtical Ehte", British Journal of Sociology, U (1951); D. R. Mat-
thews, The Social Background of PoUtical Decision^Makers (New York, 
1954). 
2 This section was based on the author's (S. Encel) Cabinet Government in 
Australia, pubhshed by the Melboume University Press, and the author wishes 
to acknowledge the Melboume University Press's permission to include 
material from it. 
3 W. K. Hancock, Australia (Sydney, 1945), pp. 61 et seq. 
4 Quoted by Albert Metin, Le Socialisme sans doctrines; Ugislation ouvriire 
en Australie et Nouvelle ZSlande (Paris, 1901), p. 229. 
5 Socialism, the Reid-Holman Debate (Sydney, 1905), pp. 62-63. 
6 Quoted by D. E. McHenry, "The Origins of Caucus Selection of Cabinet", 
Historical Studies—Australia and New Zealand, VII (1955). 
7 D. E. McHenry, "Caucus over Cabinet", University Studies in History and 
Economics, II (1955). 
8 Ibid. 
9 The accepted usage is "Premier" in the states and "Prime Minister" in the 
federal sphere. 
10 Australian Pubhc Opinion PoUs, BuUetin, June 1954. 
11 As It Happened (London, 1954), p. 156. 
12 George Black, History of the N.S.W. Labour Party, Part 6, p. 27. 
13 V. G. Chflde, How Labour Governs (London, 1923), p. 23. 
14 J. T. Lang, I Remember (Sydney, 1956), p. 167. 
15 The Worker (Sydney), 9 September 1918. 
16 Ibid., 1914, quoted by H. V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader (Sydney, 
1940), p. 340. 
17 J. D. B. Mfller, "Party Disciphne in Ausbraha", chap. 22. 
18 "The Organization of the Austirahan Labour Party 1916-1941" (Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Melboume, 1954). 
19 For example, Tom Truman, Catholic Action and Politics (Melboume, 1959); 
I. F. Wilson, The Election in Yarra (1959: mimeo). 
20 At a special party conference in Victoria in 1955. 
21 L. F. Crisp and S. P. Bennett:, A.L.P. Federal Personnel 1901-1954 (1954: 
mimeo). 
22 A sharper contrast could hardly be imagined. Scullin was not only a devout 
Cathohc but a puritanical one, and he had started his pohtical career as an 
A.W.U. organizer. IronicaUy, it was Curtin who succeeded him as leader 
of the parliamentary party in 1935, with strong A.W.U. backing. 
23 C.P.D., LII, 47-63. 
24 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
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25 L. F. Crisp, The Parliamentary Govemment of the Commonwealth of 
Austrdia (2nd ed.; Melboume, 1954), gives examples in his fourth chapter. 
26 Sir Frederick Eggleston, Reflections of an Austrdian Liberd (Melboume, 
1952), pp. 135-36. 
27 Sydney Morning Herald, 1 January 1932. 
28 F. C. Green, in a series of articles in the Sun-Herald, in 1959. 
29 AUowance has been made in this table for the increase in size of the 
Commonwealth parliament in 1949 from 110 to 181 members. Where Minis-
ters changed their party, they are aUotted to the party in which they originally 
held office. 
30 L. F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901-1951 (London, 
1955), appendix 7. 
PART III, PARLIAMENT 
INTRODUCTION, p. 107 
1 S. Encel, Cabinet Govemment in Australia (Melbourne, 1962). 
7. AUSTRALIA'S COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENT AND 
THE "WESTMINSTER MODEL" by G. S. Reid, p. 109 
1 Anthony TroUope, Austrdia and New Zealand (Melboume, 1874), p. 100. 
2 Ibid., p. 514. 
3 C.P.D., 1, 782. 
4 Rt. Hon. Harold Holt, M.P., C.P.D., H. of R., XIV, 340. 
5 J. Quick and R. R. Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Austrdian 
Commonwealth (Sydney, 1901), p. 681. 
6 Hon. E. A. Roberts, M.P. (Labor, Adelaide 1908-13), C.P.D., LXXII, 3320. 
7 Report from the Senate Select Committee on Standing Committees, Paper 
No. S. 1, Session 1929-30, 13, Q. 180. 
8 Ninth Progress Report of the Joint Committee on War Expenditure—Control 
of Natiorud Expenditure, Pari, paper No. 73, Session 1945-46, 3. 
9 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (Fontana ed.; London, 1963), p. 
136. 
10 Op. cit, p. 48. 
11 Lord Campion, "Parliament and Democracy" in Campion (ed.). Parliament 
-A Survey (London, 1952), p. 29. 
12 J. D. B. MiUer, Australian Government and Politics (London, 1954), p. 91. 
13 Standing Order (1963), No. 218A. 
14 Sir Edward FeUowes, "General Memorandum on Procedural Reform", 2, in 
Report from the Select Committee on Procedure, H.C. 92-1 (1958-59). 
15 C.P.D., LXXII, 4244. 
16 F. C. Green, "Changing Relations between Parliament and the Executive", 
Public Administration (Sydney), XIII (1954). 
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8. THE AUSTRALIAN SENATE AS A HOUSE OF REVIEW: 
ANOTHER LOOK by Anthony Fusaro, p. 123 
1 For a brief discussion of the capital dispute, see Sir John Kirwan, "The First 
Commonwealth Parhament", Early Days, VIII n.s. (1946), 6-16; and Don 
Whitington, The House Will Divide (Melboume, 1954), p. 1. 
2 J. D. B. MiUer, "Parhamentary Govemment in Austiaha", Parliamentary 
Affairs, 11 (1949). 
3 See "Austraha: The General Election and the Referenda", Round Table, 
II (1912-13), 725. 
4 For instance, see various articles in Round Table 1913-14, and J. R. Odgers, 
Australian Senate Practice (2nd ed.; Canberra, 1959), pp. 9-12. 
5 See "Austraha: The Turmofl of Pohtics", Round Table, IV (1913-14), 342. 
6 Taken from a statement by the President of the Senate to the Governor-
General, 17 June 1914, reprinted in Odgers, op. cit., p. 11. 
7 For a brief coverage of the 1914 election, see "Austraha", Round Table, 
V (1914-15), 201. 
8 A. F. Davies, Australian Democracy (Melboume, 1958), p. 47. 
9 United Austiaha Party, "Work of the Senate Not Hampering Legislation, 
131 Bills Passed", Speaker's Notes, Commonwealth Election Campaign 
(1931), No. 1, passim. 
10 C.P.D., CXXV, 3966. 
11 C.P.D., CXXVIII, 1221. 
12 C.P.D., CXXIX, 1615 ff. 
13 C.P.D., CXXVI, 5298. 
14 C.P.D., CXXVIII, 880. 
15 See L. F. Crisp, The Parliamentary Govemment of the Commonwealth of 
Australia (Melboume, 1949), p. 81. 
16 "Austiaha: The Federal Chronicle", Round Table, XXI (1930), 181. 
17 C.P.D., CLXXIV, 2250-69. 
18 C.P.D., CLXXIV, 2501-53. 
19 Sydney Moming Herald, 1 January 1950. 
20 For a summary of the issues before the Senate during the session, see "Aus-
traha: Pohtics in Deadlock", Round Table, XL (1950), 377-78. 
21 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 Aprfl 1950. 
22 J&id., 2 May 1950. 
23 Ibid., 27 September 1950. 
24 Ibid., 28 September 1950. 
25 Ibid., 17 October 1950. 
26 See "Austiaha: Labour and Communism", Round Table, XLI (1951), 180. 
27 Sydney Moming Herald, 26 May 1950. 
28 Ibid., and C.P.D., CCVII, 2955. 
29 C.P.D., CCVII, 3139. 
30 C.P.D., CCVII, 3188. 
31 C.P.D., CCVII, 3027. 
32 Sydney Morning Herald, 27 May 1950. 
33 Ibid., 17 October 1950. 
34 Ibid., 1 January 1950. 
35 Australian Pubhc Opinion PoUs, Bulletin, May-June 1950. 
36 Ibid., June-July 1950. 
37 Ibid., July-August 1950. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., Aprfl-May-June 1951. 
40 Recapitulated in ibid., June-July 1957. 
41 C.P.D., CLXI, 753. 
ft 
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42 J. R. Odgers, "The Senate-Case for the Defence", Austrdian Quarterly, XX 
(1948), No. 4, 88-91; and Australian Senate Practice (2nd ed.; Melboume, 
1959), pp. 167-72. 
43 C.P.D., CCXVII, 1221. 
44 C.P.D., Sen., XVI, 1929. 
45 C.P.D., H. of R., XXV, 3319 ff. 
46 Ibid. 
47 C.P.D., Sen., XVHI, 1584. 
48 C.P.D., Sen., XVIH, 2043. 
49 Sydney Moming Herdd, 7 December 1960. 
50 C.P.D., Sen., XVIH, 2154. 
51 C.P.D., Sen., XVHI, 2140-41. 
52 C.P.D., Sen., VII, 615. 
53 Sydney Moming Herald, 10 May 1956. 
54 C.P.D., Sen., X, 568. 
55 Sydney Morning Herald, 4 May 1957. 
56 C.P.D., Sen., X, 955. 
57 C.P.D., Sen., XVIII, 877, 
10. THE CHOICE OF THE SPEAKER IN AUSTRALIAN 
PARLIAMENTS by Geoffrey Bolton, p. 155 
1 P. Laundy, "The Speaker of the House of Commons", Parliamentary Affairs, 
XIV (1960-61). 
2 C.P.D., H. of R., XXIV, 732-34. 
3 Westem Australia retained Crown Colony status until 1890. 
4 Thus in 1899 Queensland Labor members supported a successful bid to 
supplant A. S. Cowley, whose harsh and peremptory manner as Speaker had 
antagonized many of his own (non-Labour) party, and whose advocacy of 
coloured labour in the sugar industry was disliked by the tiade unions. 
5 There were then three parties in Victoria: the Conservatives and Liberals 
(who united in 1909) and Labour. 
6 V.P.D., CV, 5. 
7 H. V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader (Sydney, 1940), pp. 287-95; 
N.S.W.P.D., 2nd ser., XLII, 3-201. 
8 Quoted by Sir Ivor Jennings, Parliament (Cambridge, 1948), p. 66. 
PART IV, ELECTIONS 
INTRODUCTION, p. 173 
1 Henry Mayer and Joan Rydon, The Gwydir By-election 1953 (Canberra, 
1954). 
2 D. W. Rawson and Susan M. Holtzinger, Politics in Eden-Monaro (London, 
1958). 
3 D. Carboch, "The FaU of the Bmce-Page Govemment", in Aaron Wildavsky 
and Dagmar Carboch, Studies in Austrdian Politics (Melboume, 1958), 
4 D. W. Rawson, Australia Votes (Canberra, 1961). 
5 Creighton Bums, Parties and People (Melboume, 1961). 
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12. ELECTORAL METHODS AND THE AUSTRALIAN 
PARTY SYSTEM, 1910-1951 by Joan Rydon, p. 175 
1 Party Govemment (New York, 1942), p. 69. 
2 American Political Science Review, XLVII (1953). 
3 "The Influence of Electoral Systems on Pohtical Life", Intemational Social 
Science Bulletin, HI (1951), 314. 
4 R. S. Parker, "The People and the Constitution" in G. Sawer et al.. Federalism 
in Australia (Melboume, 1949). 
5 L. F. Crisp, "Compulsory Voting in Austialia", Parliamentary Affairs, VI 
(1953). 
6 OriginaUy the quota for seats was lower in both Tasmania and Westem 
Austialia than in the other States. As the population of the smaUer States 
has increased the discrepancy has been disappearing, particularly since 1949 
when the increase in the membership of the House of Representatives from 
74 to 123 meant a considerable decrease in the quotas for all seats. Westem 
Austiaha then became entitled to eight seats; Tasmania has stiU only five, 
but the quota for these is only shghtiy lower than those in the maiiJand 
States. 
7 In Victoria, the inequahty has now been removed. See A. Davies, "Victorian 
Govemment and Politics" in G. Leeper (ed.). Introducing Victoria (Mel-
boume, 1955), pp. 296-99. In South Austiaha and Queensland, gerry-
mandering persists; see R. Anderson and D. Dunstan, "Gerrymandering in 
Two States", Voice, V (1956). 
8 R. H. Barrett, Responsible Party Politics in Australia (Ph.D. thesis. University 
of Melboume, 1954), chap. 6. 
9 There have been attempts to find a definite relation between votes and 
seats won in a two-party system; e.g. The Cube Law which states that if 
total votes poUed by the parties are in the ratio A : B they wiU win seats 
in the ratio A^ : B3. For a discussion of this and other suggested relations 
between seats and votes in British elections see D. E. Butier, The Electoral 
System in Britain 1918-1951 (Oxford, 1953). 
10 Barrett, op. cit. 
11 Mr. J. McEwen stated in 1937 that his party "never secured and under 
the present system of selection never could secure, a single representative in 
the Upper House of this Parliament without the co-operation of another 
political party". C.P.D., CLIII, 352. 
12 So caUed because each party would tend to nominate more candidates than 
they would expect to be elected, whereupon these candidates would cam-
paign against one another to secure the coveted seat. 
13 "Contingent voting" can be described as preferential voting with the 
recording of second, third, etc., preferences optional. 
14 See Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (1929), 287. 
15 It would be interesting, however, to calculate the percentage of the total vote 
for each party not merely on first preference votes but on the final counting 
in each electorate—in other words where preferences were distiibuted they 
would be accredited as votes for the party to which they were finaUy aflotted 
rather than to the party for which they were first preferences. 
16 There has only been one contest clearly decided on Communist preferences. 
In 1951 79-89 per cent of a Communist candidate's preferences enabled the 
A.L.P. candidate to win a seat from a Liberal who topped the first count. 
17 For a case study of multiple endorsement and a contest between three parties 
in a mral electorate see Henry Mayer and Joan Rydon, The Gwydir By-
Electionl953 (Canberra, 1954). 
18 Duverger, op. cit., especiaUy pp. 322-24, 
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13. THE RELATION OF VOTES TO SEATS IN ELECTIONS 
FOR THE AUSTRALIAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES, 1949-1954 by Joan Rydon, p. 192 
1 Particularly in the work of D. E. Buder in the statistical appendices to the 
Nuffield shidies of British elections: R. B. McCaUum and A. Readman, The 
British General Election of 1945 (Oxford, 1947); H. G. Nicholas, The 
British General Election of 1950 (London, 1951); D. E. Butler, The British 
General Election of 1951 (London, 1952) and The British General Election 
of 1955 (London, 1955); and R. H. Brookes, "Seats and Votes in New Zea-
land", Political Science, V (1953). 
2 "Preferential voting" is the term generaUy used in Austialia to describe what 
is elsewhere often caUed the "dtemative vote". A more satisfactory term 
would be "preferential voting with ehminative counting" as suggested by 
J. F. S. Ross, Elections and Electors (London, 1955), pp. 16-17. 
3 On these particular features of Austialian elections see Henry Mayer and 
Joan Rydon, The Gwydir By-Election 1953 (Canberra, 1954); Joan Rydon, 
"Electoral Methods and the Austiahan Party System, 1910-1951", pp. 175-91 
of this book; L. C. Webb, "The Austialian Party System", pp. 321-43 of this 
book; and the article by S. R. Davies in The Australian Political Party 
System (Sydney, 1954). 
4 The 1954 election was unique in that there was no concurrent election for 
the Senate, but this is not important here since we are considering voting in 
elections for the Lower House orJy. (The 1963 and 1966 elections subse-
quently were for the House of Representatives only. Ed.) 
5 Throughout the paper "votes" are taken to mean "formal votes". The percent-
age of informal votes does not vary greatiy, usuaUy being about 2 per cent 
of aU votes cast. Moreover, figures for the two seats (Austrahan Capital 
Territory and Northern Territory) whose members did not have fuU voting 
rights are excluded, so the House of Representatives is regarded as having 
121 seats. 
6 The 1949 figure includes 0.71 Lang Labour. 
7 These aUowances have sometimes involved the elimination of a number of 
Communist and independent candidates on the grounds of probable distortion 
from the lack of choice in major party candidates, as mentioned earlier. In 
calculating these adjustments the percentage of enroUed electors usually 
voting in each of the electorates concemed was also taken into consideration. 
One of the difficulties with these adjustments is that they assume that 
"swings" would have been equal in seats (in the same state) with simflar 
voting patterns. There are also other difficulties, e.g. in Victoria, in 1954, 
two of the three Country Party seats were uncontested, so that there was 
htde to work on in making the adjustments. Adjustments of this nature are 
necessarily arbitiary, but it seems that no satisfactory comparison of election 
figures would be possible without them. 
8 In 1949 Caiming was contested by four candidates: A.L.P., Liberal, Country 
Party, and Independent. Both the A.L.P. and the Independent were elimin-
ated when preferences were counted, and the final contest was thus between 
the Liberal and the Country Party. Since we are primarily interested in 
Labour versus non-Labour the final figures have not been used in this case. 
Instead the figures have been taken after the elimination of the Indepen-
dent when there were stiU three candidates in the field. 
9 Again these figures are necessarUy arbitiary and there would doubtless be 
disagreement as to how such an allocation should be made and as to how 
some candidates should be classffied. The method of aUocation used in the 
Statistical Notes to chap. 12 in L. C. Webb, Communism and Democracy in 
Australia (Canberra, 1954), is somewhat different from that used here. 
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10 It seems that any reasonable aUowance for seats uncontested, or not con-
tested by a major party would show that Labour votes exceeded those cast 
for the Govemment in 1954, e.g. roneoed analyses of the figures issued by 
the research section of the Liberal Party credit Labour with 50.5 per cent 
of the total (including infonnal) votes. 
11 See Rydon, pp. 175-91 of this book. In earher elections the operation of 
preferential voting at times contributed substantiaUy to the favourable position 
of the Countiy Party, but this has not been the case in the three elections 
considered here. 
12 For perhaps the earliest formulation of the cube rule see testimony of Rt. 
Hon. J. Parker Smith in "Minutes of Evidence Before the Royal Commission 
on Systems of Election", Cd. 5352 (1910), pp. 77-81. There has been 
considerable discussion of the rule in recent years, e.g. see Butier, op. cit.; 
Brookes, op. cit.; Samuel J. Eldersveld, "PoUing Results and Prediction" in 
James K. Pollock et al., British Election Studies 1950 (Ann Arbor, 1951); 
M. G. KendaU and A. Stuart, "The Law of the Cubic Proportion in Election 
Results", British Journal of Sociology, I (1950); Economist, 7 January 1950, 
pp. 5-7, and 28 January 1950, pp. 194-95. 
13 Dean E. McHenry, "The Australian General Election of 1954", Austrdian 
Quarterly, XXVII (1955), 1, 14-23. 
14 This has been done by calculating from the cube mle the percentage of 
votes necessary to win 61 seats plus the number in the difference column, 
i.e. for 1949 68-9 seats and so on. 
15 It wfll be noted that in applying Butler's method to predict election results, 
it is usuaUy necessary to assume that "swings" wiU be equal only in fairly 
close seats—not in aU seats. This lessens a serious objection to the method, 
namely that it seems more reasonable to expect "swings" in each electorate 
to be related to the previous voting in that particular electorate. If, for 
example, there is an increase from 50 to 51 in the Labour percentage of the 
overall vote and a corresponding decrease from 50 to 49 in the non-Labour 
figure, there would seem to be no reason why Labour should gain 1 per cent 
of the votes in each electorate. Rather, if one assumes that one-fitftieth, or 
2 per cent, of the total previous non-Labour voters have switched to 
Labour, one might more reasonably assume that 2 per cent of such voters 
in each electorate would have switched sides. Thus the change to Labour 
would be greater in a seat where the voters had previously divided 20 per 
cent Labour and 80 per cent non-Labour than in one where the figures had 
been 80 per cent Labour and 20 per cent non-Labour. On the basis of this 
assumption, we could again calculate the number of seats which would 
change hands for each change in over-aU voting. However, this makes very 
httie difference to the results obtained by the Butier method, although the 
differences increase as the assumed A.L.P. vote moves further from the 50 
per cent level. Thus it would appear that the two concepts of the "swing" 
wfll produce divergent results only in the case of large changes in the overaU 
vote between elections—considerably larger than those which occurred in the 
three elections dealt with here. 
16 Butier based his calculations on voting figures expressed as percentages of 
Labour plus Conservative votes. Under preferential voting, however, votes for 
minor candidates might be the deciding factor in close seats; hence we have 
used electorate results adjusted as for Table 2. 
17 The figures in italics represent the actual percentage of votes polled and seats 
won by Labour in the three elections. Those figures in heavy type indicate 
the points at which a majority for Labour would first emerge; a majority 
being 61 or more seats. It has been assumed that aU seats would be won by 
the A.L.P. or the Liberal-Countiy Party coalition. 
18 Compare Brookes' conclusions, op. cit. 
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19 Butler found tiiat factor (a) caused "over-representation" of tiie British 
Labour Party in 1945, whfle (b) has caused its "under-representation in 
subsequent elections. 
20 Since compulsory voting in Austraha aUows one, to aU intents and purposes, 
to ignore abstentions, and because informal votes are insignfficant, the total 
of formal votes has been taken to represent the size of the electorate. 
21 For example, compare the figures already given with those for the average 
size of electorates always won by the Country Party: 1949 35.7, 1951 36.1, 
and 1954 38.0; or with those contested by the Country Party: 1949 35.1, 
1951 35.6, 1954 37.4, the size in each case being in thousands of formal 
votes cast. Those seats in which Country Party candidates were excluded 
when preferences were counted have not been included. 
22 The figures are based on the final distribution of aU votes to either Labour 
or Non-Labour, as in Table 2. 
23 In all three elections there were only 22 seats in which Country Party 
candidates were in the final count, but of these they won 19 in 1949 and 17 
in each of the foUowing elections. 
24 Compare K. J. Scott, "Gerrymandering for Democracy", Political Science, 
v n (1955). 
14. THE CHOICE OF VOTING METHODS IN FEDERAL 
POLITICS, 1902-1918 by R. D. Graham, p. 202 
1 This study pursues lines of enquiry which were first investigated by L. C. 
Webb, "The Austiahan Party System", pp. 321-43 of this book; and by 
Joan Rydon, "Electoral Methods and the Austiahan Party System", pp. 175-
91 of this book. 
2 The myth took shape within Country Party tiadition and was set out in 
some detafl by J. P. Abbott, "Contemporary Party Pohcies: The Country 
Party" in A. CampbeU Gamett, Freedom and Planning in Australia (Madison, 
1949), p. 297. Abbott's account has been accepted by other writers. See 
for example, Louise Overacker, The Australian Party System (New Haven, 
1952), pp. 221-22. 
3 The terms used in this article are taken from Appendix 1 of Enid Lakeman 
and James D. Lambert, Voting in Democracies (London, 1955), pp. 234-39, 
except that "simple-majority" has been preferred to "relative-majority" in 
describing the first-past-the-post voting system. A distinction has been made 
between optional preferential voting, in which an elector is not obhged to 
indicate his preferences for aU candidates offering, and compulsory prefer-
ential voting, in which he is obliged to do so. 
4 See W. A. Townsley, "The Electoral System and the Constituencies" in 
F. C. Green (ed.), Tasmania, A Century of Responsible Govemment, 1856-
1956 (Hobart, 1956), pp. 73-74; J. G. Davies and R. M. Johnston, "Hare-
Clark System of Voting", C.P.P., 1901-2, II, 193-200. 
5 "Duahsts" is the term used here to describe those men who recognised 
the plurahty of pohtical interests but who nevertheless wished to constiain 
aU groups to remain within the two-party framework. They must be dis-
tinguished from the conservatives, who tended to think of the two-party 
system as the usual state of affairs produced by the unhampered working 
of natural laws in society. 
6 Miss C. H. Spence, Effective Voting: Australia's Opportunity, An Explanation 
of the Hare System of Representation (Adelaide, 1898). Cf. John Stuart 
Mfll, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government (R. B. 
McCaUum ed.; Oxford, 1946), pp. 172-73. 
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7 The conservative case was argued during the debate on the 1902 Electoral 
Bfll by Sir Josiah Symon (S.A.), C.P.D., VIH, 10405-31. Cf. "Speech to 
the Electors of Bristol, 3 November 1774", The Works of the Right Honour-
able Edmund Burke (London, 1887) II, 96. 
8 ArgMs (Melboume), 8 March 1902. 
9 T. R. and H. P. C. Ashworth, Proportional Representation Applied to Party 
Govemment, A New Electoral System (Melboume, 1900), p. 13. 
10 Ibid., p. 83. ' " t 
11 For example. Sir Edmund Barton, Official Record of the Debates of the 
Australasian Federal Convention, Third Session, Melboume, 20th January 
to 17th March, 1898, II, 2446. 
12 See letter from E. PoUet, Consul General for Belgium, to Sir Edmund Barton, 
10 June 1901, held at the Commonwealth Archives Office, Canberra (Extemal 
Affairs, Ffle no. 01/1884). 
13 "Report of Conference re Federal Elections BiU", C.P.P., 1901-2, II, 201-7. 
For a reference to Lyne's personal views see Advertiser (Adelaide), 17 Janu-
ary 1902. 
14 Nanson's views are set out in detafl in his The Real Value of a Vote and 
How to Get It at the Coming Federal Elections (Melbourne, 1900). He 
conferred on several occasions with R. R. Garran, who was then secretary 
to the Attomey-General's Department, which drafted the bfll (see Advertiser 
, Adelaide), 14 January 1902). 
15 A BiU for An Act to Regulate Parhamentary Elections (As presented to 
the Senate on 24 January 1902), Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, Bills 
Introduced, 1901-2 Session, pp. 891-936. 
16 See Age (Melboume), 4 Febmary 1902 and 28 Febmary 1902. 
17 L. F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labor Party, 1901-1951 (London, 
1955), p. 220. 
18 Age (Melboume), 6 Febmary 1902. 
19 C.P.D., VII, 9762. 
20 C.P.D., VIII, 10615. 
21 C.P.D., v m , 11019-20. 
22 See the explanation given by the Labor leader, J. C. Watson, C.P.D., X, 
13790, and also Crisp, op. cit., p. 220. 
23 C.P.D., XI, 14612-13. 
24 The voting percentages are based on figures given in Votes According to 
Parties, 1901-14, House of Representatives and Senate; Classified Election 
Returns, 1901-25, and the numbers of members retumed are taken from 
Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law, 1901-1929 (Melboume, 
1956). 
25 C.P.D., LXIII, 4056-56. 
26 Sydney Morning Herald, 16 July 1914. 
27 "Report from the Royal Commission upon the Commonwealth Electoral Law 
and Administration", C.P.P., 1914-17, II, 435-54. 
28 In 1914 the West Austialian F.S.A. at one stage contemplated nominating a 
farmers' candidate for Dampier, but its annual conference decided against 
such drastic action. West Australian (Perth), 17 July 1914, 18 July 1914; 
Western Australian Farmers' and Settlers' Association, Conference Report 
1914 (Pertii, 1914), pp. 6, 8, and 47-52. 
29 Victorian Farmers' Union, Central Councfl Minutes, I, 21 February 1917, 41. 
30 Sydney Moming Herald, 30 March 1917. 
31 Primary Producer, 18 October 1918. 
32 Examiner (Launceston), 21 April 1917. 
33 Figures taken from Table 1 of Joan Rydon's "Electoral Methods and the 
Austiahan Party System, 1910-1951", pp. 175-91 of this book. 
34 These seats were: Fawkner (National vote 51.10 per cent), Warmon (54.76 
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per cent), Calare (51.77 per cent) , Hume (51.86 per cent) , lUawarra 
(54.30 per cent), Werriwa (52.77 per cent), Angas (50.84 per cent), 
Kalgoorhe (51.26 per cent), Oxley (52.78 per cent) , Herbert (51.31 per 
cent), Moreton (50.09 per cent) . Wide Bay (52.88 per cent) . 
35 C.P.D., LXXXVII, 8139. 
36 Farmers' Advocate, 1 Febmary 1918. 
37 Primary Producer, 18 October 1918. 
38 See Ukich EUis in The Countryman, November 1954, p . 4. 
39 See Argus (Melboume), 9 May 1918 and 11 May 1918. 
40 See West Australian (Pertii), 24 October 1918. 
41 C.P.D., LXXXVI, 7484-501. 
42 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, I I (23 November 1918) 184, 2257. 
43 The actual figures for the first and final counts were: 
Candidates First Count Final Count 
per 
cent 
J. H. ScuUin (Labor) 10,633 42.47 10,944 43.71 
G. H. Knox (National) 5,737 
1,174 
892 
6,604 
per 
cent 
22.91 
4.69 
3.56 
26.37 
R. F . Coldham (Independent Nat.) 
T. D. Leaper (Soldier Nat.) 
W. G. Gibson (V.F.U.) 604  14,096 56,29 
Valid votes 25,040 25,040 
(These results and those for the Flinders and Swan by-elections are given in 
Biographical Handbook and Record of Elections for the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth, 5th issue (Canberra, 1926). However this source (p. 493) 
gives the wrong figure for ScuUin's primary vote, which was 10,633, not 
10,630.) 
44 The Electoral Act of 1919, which need not concem us here, provided for 
preferential voting in Senate elections but also laid down vote-counting 
procedures which ensured absolute-majority rather than proportional repre-
sentation. 
45 C.P.D., LXXXVI, 7333. 
46 C.P.D., LXXXVI, 7402. 
47 C.P.D., LXXXVI, 7347. 
48 In such situations, the preferences of centie voters wfll usuaUy favour one 
of the two flank parties. Thus in the 1919 and 1922 elections. Nationalist 
candidates obtained most of the preferences of excluded Country Party 
nominees. As a result, minority Labor candidates with votes of under 45 per 
cent rarely won through on the second count (see in Table 2 the results for 
Corangamite, Gwydir, and Riverina in 1922). 
15. THE EFFECT OF THE "DONKEY VOTE" ON THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES by C. J. Masterman, 
p. 220 
1 The "Donkey Vote" for the House of Representatives (1963: mimeo). 
2 Ibid., p . 22. 
3 Ibid. 
16. COMPULSORY VOTING by Colin A. Hughes, p. 225 
1 Modem Democracies (London, 1921), I, 60. 
2 J. E. LleweUyn, "CompeUed to Vote", Dissent, No. 11 (1964), p . 37, 
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3 Creighton Bums, Parties and People (Melboume, 1961), p. 137. 
4 LleweUyn, op. cit. 
5 An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York, 1960), p . 122. 
6 "In Defence of Apathy: Some Doubts on the Duty to Vote', PoUtical Studies, 
11(1954), 36. 
7 "Compulsory Voting", PoUtical Science Quarterly, XXXVIII (1923), 576. 
8 Data in Tables 1-4 come from the forthcoming Handbook of Australian 
Government and Politics (Canberra). 
9 Communications from the Commonwealth Chief Electoral Officer, 30 August 
1966, the New South Wales Electoral Commissioner, 22 August 1966, the 
Victorian Chief Electoral Officer, 23 August 1966, the Queensland Chief 
Electoral Officer, 23 August 1966, the South Austrahan Assistant Returning 
Officer, 9 September 1966. 
10 Austialian Pubhc Opinion PoUs, BuUetin, November-December 1963. 
11 Colin A. Hughes and John S. Westem, The Prime Minister's Policy Speech 
(Canberra, 1966). 
12 A. CampbeU et al.. The American Voter (abr. ed.; New York, 1964), p. 57. 
13 "CompvJsory Voting in Austraha", Parliamentary Affairs, VI (1953). 
14 R. Rose and A. J. Heidenheimer (eds.). Comparative PoUtical Finance 
(GainesviUe, Fla., 1963), pp. 797-98. 
15 Colin A. Hughes, No Change (forthcoming). 
16 CampbeU et al., op. cit., p. 51. 
17 R. E. Lane, PoUtical Life (New York, 1959), p. 53. 
PART V, FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 
INTRODUCTION, p. 241 
1 A. P. Canaway, Tfte FoiZttre o/Federafom (London, 1930). 
2 Gordon Greenwood, Future of AustrdUan Federalism (Melboume, 1946). 
3 H. V. Portus (ed.), Studies in the Australian Constitution (Sydney, 1933). 
4 Geoffrey Sawer (ed.). Federalism: A Jubilee Study (Melboume, 1952). 
5 Richard H. Leach, Intergovernmental Relations in Australia (Lexington, 
1965). 
17. THE RECORD OF JUDICIAL REVIEVi^  by Geoffrey 
Sawer, p. 243 
1 (1803) 1 Cranch 137. The arguments fafled. 
2 The assumption that only what courts say is "objectively tme" is sometimes 
irritating to legislators, but it is undeniable that the courts are less tempted 
to misconstme basic constitutions than are pohticians. 
3 The common law of contempt of court has been swaUowed up by the 
guarantee of free speech and press freedom in the First Amendment. 
4 C.P.D., XIII, 591 ff.; XV, 2694 ff. 
5 (1918) 25 C.L.R. 506. 
6 (1925) 37 C.L.R. at pp. 412, 413. 
7 (1947) 74C.L.R. a tp . 82. 
8 The Australian Law Journal has always been prepared to pubhsh material 
of the highest scholarly standard; the difficulty has been dearth of the 
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material, and tiiis in tiim has been largely due to die inadequate numbers of 
fuU-time teachers in Austialian law schools. 
9 See especiaUy Tasmania v. Commonwealth (1904) 1 C.L.R. and the 
Engineers' Case (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129. 
10 See especiaUy Baxter v. Commissioners of Taxation (1907) 4 C.L.R. at p. 
1105. 
11 Cf. Griffitii, C.J. in 1 C.L.R. at p. 343, 4 C.L.R. at p. 1128, p. 1129, contra 
per cur. in 4 C.L.R. at p. 534. 
12 1907 A.C. 81. 
13 (1947) 74 C.L.R. 31. 
14 Ibid. 
15 1C.L.R. 208 (Aprfl). 
16 1 C.L.R. 329 (June). 
17 The latter constmction was adopted by a majority of the High Court in the 
First Pharmaceutical Benefits Case (1945) 71 C.L.R. 237. 
18 1891 Debates (Sydney, 1891), pp. 788-89. 
19 (1928) 41 C.L.R. 128. 
20 (1938) 59 C.L.R. 555. 
21 (1947) 74 C.L.R. 421. 
22 (1929) 42 C.L.R. 481. The dissent of Isaacs J. upholding the arrangement 
in question is convincing. 
23 (1935) 54 C.L.R. 262. 
24 Their role might have been more facultative ff they had not rejected the 
power to give advisory opinions as to which see p. 259. 
25 (1914) 18 C.L.R. 224. 
26 Farey v. Burvett (1916) 21 C.L.R. 433. 
27 28 C.L.R. 129. 
28 (1936) 55 C.L.R. 608; (1939) 61 C.L.R. 634. 
29 (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373. 
30 (1946) 71 C.L.R. 29. 
31 See especiaUy per Dixon J. in R. v. Poole, ex parte Henry 61 C.L.R. at p. 
650. The cases in which a "commingling" argument has been rejected are 
inconclusive, since on the facts there was no pressing need for Common-
wealth intervention; e.g. Newcastle and Hunter River Steamship Co. Ltd. v. 
A. G. (1921) 29 C.L.R. 357; King v. Turner (1927) 39 C.L.R. 411; 
Nagrint v. "Regis" (1938) 61 C.L.R. 688. 
32 See especiaUy their opinions in the Holyman Case (1914) 18 C.L.R. 273, 
the Tramways Case No. 2 (1914) 19 C.L.R. 43 and the Queensland Sugar 
Award Case (1916) 22 C.L.R. 261. O'Connor J. was notably free from tiiis 
bias. 
33 See G. Sawer, "Developments of the Last Twenty-Five Years" in Federalism 
in Australia (Sydney, 1949), and "Implication and the Constitution", Res 
Judicatae, IV (1948-50), 15, 85; and K. H. Bailey, "Fffty Years of tiie Aus-
tiahan Constitution", Australian Law Journal, XXV (1951-53), 314. 
34 (1931) 44 C.L.R. 492. 
35 This was characteristic. Sir Frank was one of the most learned and wittiest 
lawyers this countiy has produced (see his inimitable verses, "A Dream of 
Fair Judges", in Res Judicatae I (1937). Would that aU realist jurispmdence 
could be expressed in such felicitous languagel) but he never fuIfiUed on 
the bench the promise of his bar career; he sometimes avoided the respon-
sibflity of either giving or joining in a broad decision on a constitutional 
point and had littie influence on the doctrinal developments of his time. See 
for a sort of parody of this tendency, his opinion in Daimler Co. Ltd. v. 
Registrar of Trade Marks (1914) 18 C.L.R. 447. 
36 Although Starke J. went along with Isaacs J. in the expansion of Common-
wealth power from 1919 untfl about 1928, his views from then on grew in-
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creasingly conservative; indeed during the Second World Wax, he dehvered 
a series of dissenting opinions in cases of the defence power in which he 
displayed a contempt for the judgment of the parhament and executive, and 
for the opinions of his brothers on the bench, which is exhflarating for 
students but not in the best of judicial taste. See especiaUy 69 C.L.R. at p, 
62, at p. 507, and 70 C.L.R. at p. 428. 
37 Arguments of a supposedly logical character seeking to measure the ambit 
of a power by its "essential characteristics" have often been put forward in 
the High Court, and both Rich and Dixon JJ.—men with stiong training in 
lawyer's law with its extensive use of scholastic casuistry—have tended at 
times to rely on such verbal counters. The reductio ad absurdum of such 
quasi-logic is the proposition that under a power to make laws about dogs, 
tiie only valid law would be one in the form: "No dog may bite another 
dog without the consent of a third dog." From the various attempts at con-
stmcting a "logic of characterisation", and at contrasting the form in which 
powers have been granted by the Australian, United States and Canadian 
Constitutions, only one sensible conclusion can be drawn; the problem of 
measuring the limits of a power can be solved only by reference to the 
linguistic and political habits of the community and by a rough common 
sense. The classical discussions of characterisation of statutes are in 8 C.L.R. 
at pp. 410 ff. (Higgins J.), 69 C.L.R. at p. 471 (Dixon J.) and 76 C.L.R. 
a tp . 182 (Latham C.J.). 
38 The assumption that legislation can "truly" or "in pith and substance" be 
with respect to only one head of power, evident in such cases as Barger 
(1908) 6 C.L.R. 41, seems to be a survival of classical metaphysical 
notions of "essences". 
39 (1936) 54 C.L.R. 657. 
40 Dignan's Case (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73. 
41 R. V. Mahoney (1931) 46 C.L.R. 131. 
42 Dignan v. Australian Steamships Pty. Ltd. (1931) 45 C.L.R. 188. 
43 Stone, "A Govemment of Laws and Yet of Men", West Australian Annual Law 
Review, I (1948-50), 461; Beasley, "The Commonwealth Constitution: Section 
92", ibid., p. 97; Sawer, "The Case of Bank Nationalization", Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law XXXII (1950), III and IV, 17. 
44 (1915) 20C.L.R. 54. 
45 (1916) 21 C.L.R. 357. 
46 (1916) 22C.L.R. 556. 
47 (1920) 28 C.L.R. 530. 
48 1932 A.C. 542. 
49 To prevent States from nuUtfying a Commonwealth protectionist policy by 
imposition of countervaihng excise duties. 
50 Peterwdd v. Bartley (1904) 1 C.L.R. 497. 
51 (1950) 80 C.L.R. 55. 
52 (1938) 60 C.L.R. at p. 304. 
53 1934 A.C. 45. 
54 1943 A.C. 550. 
55 Under the Canadian Constitution, the question is not whether a tax is an 
"excise", but whether it is "direct" or "indirect", so that it is always open 
to the High Court to disregard such precedents. 
56 See the remarks of Griffith C.J. quoting Bryce in 4 C.L.R. at p. 1110. 
57 1936 A.C. 578. 
58 The High Court has given over 400 decisions on the Constitution, of which 
more than 200 involve important questions of principle. 
59 1907 A.C. 81. 
60 28 C.L.R. 129. 
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61 1914 A.C. 237. 
62 1917 A.C. 528. 
63 See ex parte Nelson (No. 2) 42 C.L.R. at pp. 270 ff. 
64 1931 A.C. 275. 
65 Hence the confusion of opinion the Rola Case 69 C.L.R. 185. 
66 1940 A.C. 838. 
67 James v. Cowan 1932 A.C. 542; James v. Commonwealth 1936 A.C. 578; 
The Bank Case 79 C.L.R. 497. 
68 81 C.L.R. 144. 
69 The Board suggests that Dixon J. would not regard questions of exclusive 
power as inter se. Dixon J. was dealing with the quite different question of 
prohibitions. 
70 1903 A.C. 471. 
71 1906 A.C. 360. 
72 (1921) 29 C.L.R. 25. 
18. THE INTER-STATE COMMISSION by J. A. La Nauze, 
p. 261 
1 Federal Convention Debates (Melboume, 1898) II, 2509. 
2 Ibid., p. 1525. 
3 Ibid., p. 1531. 
4 C.P.D., LXIX, 7069. 
5 C.P.D., LXIX, 7071. 
6 C.P.D., LXIX, 7603. 
7 C.P.D., LXIX, 7113 
8 Adelaide Register, 6 August 1913. 
9 C.P.P., 1914-17, VI, 247. 
10 C.P.P., 1914-17, VI, 1794. 
11 "Commonwealtii Tariff Investigation Report, 1915", C.P.P., 1914-17, Vol. VI. 
12 E. H. Sugden and F. W. Eggleston, George Swinburne, A Biography 
(Sydney, 1931), p. 325. 
13 Second Annual Report of the Inter-State Commission, p. 9. 
14 Op. cit., p. 345. 
15 "Inter-State Commission Report on New Industries", C.P.P., 1914-17, VII, 
616. 
16 Australia (Sydney, 1945), p. 109. 
19. THE AUSTRALIAN LOAN COUNCIL-ITS ORIGIN, 
OPERATION AND SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FEDERAL 
STRUCTURE by C. G. Headford, p. 271 
1 R. C. MiUs, "The Financial Relations of the Commonwealth and the States", 
Economic Record, IV (1928), 1. 
2 R. C. Mills, "Australian Loan Policy" in Persia CampbeU et al. (eds.J, 
Studies in Australian Affairs (Melboume, 1928), p. 105. 
3 R. R. Garran, Minutes of Evidence, Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution (1929), p. 73. Cf. Mr. Barton's speech at the Federal Con-
vention, Melboume, 1898 in Convention Debates (Melbourne, 1898), pp. 
-8-9> 
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4 A. Deakin, Letter to the London Morning Post 12 May 1902, quoted by 
J. A. La Nauze, "The Chariot Wheels of the Central Govemment", 
Economic Record, XXVIII (1952), 242. 
5 Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (1929), p. 192. 
6 Commonwealth of Australia Yearbook, No. 37, p. 640. 
7 J. T. Lang Budget speech 3 December 1925, quoted in Sydney Morning 
Herald, 4 December 1925. Cf. L. F. Gibhn, The Growth of a Central Bank 
(Melboume, 1951), p. 51. 
8 L. F. Giblin, op. cit. 
9 In September 1923 a loan of £38,750,000 matured. Conversions and sub-
scriptions fell short by £6,500,000. Round Table, XIV (1923-24). 
10 C.P.D., CIV, 1662. 
11 C.P.D., CII, 84-85. 
12 C.P.D., CVII, 2727. 
13 Sydney Morning Herald, 8 July 1925. 
14 Sydney Morning Herald, 4 December 1925. 
15 "It would be madness for us to permit an outside Federal authority to regu-
late our public works policy by deciding how much we should be permitted 
to borrow, and when and where we should borrow it." Sydney Morning 
Herald, 11 Febmary 1927. See also Reports of Debates, Conference of 
Commonwealth ir State Ministers 1927 (16 June 1927), p. 17. 
16 G. Wood, Borrowings and Business in Australia (London, 1930), p. 222. 
17 Round Table, XVII (1926-27), p. 182, and Sydney Moming Herald, 17 June 
1927. 
18 Institute of Intemational Finance, Credit Position of Australia, BuUetin No. 
11, 8 Febmary 1928, p. 21 (held ia MilcheU Library, Sydney). 
19 Round Table, XVII (1926-27), p. 184. 
20 Labour Treasurers "expressed amazement" at New South Wales not re-
joining, Sydney Morning Herald, 5 December 1925. On 15 August 1925 the 
Council passed a resolution expressing regret at the decision of the N.S.W. 
Govemment to withdraw and urged it to rejoin. The resolution stated: "The 
Councfl emphasizes the fact that it is a non-party body, with advisory 
functions, but without executive authority; also that no decision of the loan 
councfl can bind any Govemment, unless it endorses the decision." Sydney 
Morning Herald, 17 August 1925. 
21 Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (1929), p. 188. 
22 Conference of Commonwealth h- State Ministers (May 1926), pp. 38, 61. 
23 C.P.D., CXIV, 4238-39, 4248, 4536. 
24 Conference of Commonwealth ir State Ministers (June 1927), especially 
pp. 16-17. 
25 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
26 The Commonwealth was to get one-fifth—its proportion over the last five 
years—and the balance was to be split up among the States on the basis of 
each State's borrowings over the past five years. Population and production 
bases were rejected because "a grave injustice would be done to the large 
undeveloped States if they were adopted", ibid., p. 13. 
27 S. M. Bruce in Conference of Commonwealth ir State Ministers (June 
1927), p. 21. 
28 In the hght of subsequent events, it is interesting to note that clauses 
reading "tiie Loan Councfl shaU control aU future borrowings" were altered 
to "arrange" such matters: "In order to remove any feelings of misapprehen-
sion that too much power might be claimed by the Councfl," Sydney 
Moming Herald, 21 June 1927. 
29 Of the Premiers who accepted the agreement proposed by a non-Labour 
Commonwealth Govemment, five were members of the Labour Party. 
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30 Each State receives a proportion of the remainder equal to the ratio of its 
net loan expenditure in the preceding five years to the net loan expenditure 
of aU States during the same period. For fuUer detafls see the Schedule to 
the Financial Agreement Act 1928. 
31 See Conference of Commonwealth 6- State Ministers (June 1927); also 
S. M. Bmce, The FirMncial and Economic Position of Australia (The Joseph 
Fisher Lecture in Commerce, University of Adelaide, 1927), pp. 12-13. 
32 D. B. Copland and C. V. Janes, Cross Currents of Australian Finance 
(Sydney, 1938), p. 4. 
33 L. F. Gibhn, op. cit., p. 52. 
34 Sydney Morning Herald, 11 January 1929. 
35 Round Table, XXIII (1932-33), 76. 
36 For a fuUer description of the events, see particiJarly N. Cowper, "The 
Financial Agreement" in G. V. Portus (ed. ) , Studies in the Australian Con^ 
stitution (Sydney, 1932), pp. 130 ff.. Round Table, XXIII (1931-32), 878-
85, L. F. Giblin, op. cit, chap. 3. 
37 Round Table XXV (1934-35), 173; W. R. McLaurin, Economic Planning in 
Australia 1929-36 (London, 1937), pp. 179, 181. 
38 Which, during those years, pursued a pohcy largely independent of the 
Commonwealth Govemment, L. F . Gibhn, op. cit. 
39 See Appendix. 
40 Copland and Janes, op. cit., pp. 11, 14. 
41 Sydney Moming Herald, 28 May 1935. 
42 Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1925. 
43 Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 1929. 
44 Copland and Janes, op. cit, p . 16. 
45 Commonwealth of Australia Year Book, No. 38, p. 818. 
46 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 Aprfl 1938. 
47 Sydney Morning Herald, 23 June 1939. 
48 B. S. B. Stevens, "The Functioning of the Loan Council", p. 2 (A summary 
of a speech dehvered 24 November 1939 to the Economic Society of Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, held in MitcheU Library, Sydney). 
49 N.S.W. Year Book 1941-42 and 1942-43, p. 422. 
50 Sydney Moming Herald, 16 July 1943. 
51 H. V. Evatt, Post-War Reconstmction: A Case for Greater Commonwedth 
Powers (Canberra, 1942), p . 58. 
52 W. K. Hancock, Australia (London, 1930), p . 125. 
53 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 August 1944. 
54 Sydney Moming Herald, 26 August 1944. 
55 R. G. Menzies in Austrdian Financial Review, 11 October 1951. 
56 Austrdian Financial Review, 17 April 1952. 
57 In fact, only £63,810,000 was raised from tiie market; C.P.D., CCXVHI, 81. 
58 Ibid. 
59 R. G. Menzies in Austrdian FirMncial Review, 11 October 1951. 
60 C.P.D., CCXVHI, 68. 
61 C.P.D., CCXVHI, 96. 
62 S. R. Davis, "Co-operative Federahsm in Retiospect", Historicd Studies-
Australia and New Zealand, V (1952), 225. 
63 A description given it by R. G. Menzies many years ago—see C. A. V. 
Hawker, "Towards Federal Equihbrium", Austrdian Quarterly, IX (1937), 
62. 
64 S. R. Davis, op. cit, p. 229. 
65 Conference of Commonwealth ir State Ministers (June 1927), p. 23. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Notes to Text | 487 
20. THE COMMONWEALTH GRANTS COMMISSION AND 
POLICY FORMULATION IN THE CLAIMANT STATES 
by R. J. May, p. 283 
1 "Commonwealth-State Relations—Administiative Trends and Problems", 
Public Administration (Sydney), XXI (1962). 
2 Ibid., p. 101. 
3 Commonwealth Grants Commission, Third Report (1936), p. 75. 
4 Ibid., p. 75. 
5 Ibid., p. 90. 
6 In 1935 and 1936 New South Wales was excluded from the standard be-
cause of several "abnormal" features of its finances. 
7 See Nineteenth Report (1952), p. 46. 
8 And the nature of the adjustment for severity of taxation had been greatiy 
altered by the unfform tax scheme. 
9 See Twenty-fifth Report (1958), pp. 31-37. 
10 Seventeenth Report (1950), p. 91. See also Seventh Report (1940), pp. 
61-63; Eighth Report (1941), p. 80; Fourteenth Report (1947), pp. 90 and 
111; Nineteenth Report (1952), pp. 49-50. 
11 Although, of course, an addition to revenue could lead to a complete re-
vision of the composition of expenditure. 
12 Financial Statement by the Premier and Treasurer of Western Australia 
(hereafter W.A.F.S.) 1945-46, p. 10. At this stage the Commission had 
additional powers under the States Grants (Income Tax Reimbursement) 
Act 1942. 
13 Fifth Report (1938), p. 53. 
14 In several instances tiiere had been a substantial write-off of pubhc debts 
shortly before State elections. 
15 Ibid., p. 88. South Australia's grant was reduced by £10,000, Westem 
Austraha's by £9,000 and Tasmania's by £7,000. 
16 Ibid., p. 81. 
17 Seventh Report {1940), p. 65. 
18 Ibid., p. 63. 
19 Quoted in ibid., p. 70. 
20 See W.A.F.S., 1939-40, p. 9; and W.A.P.D., 1939,1, 920. 
21 See W.A.F.S., 1948-49, p. 5. 
22 See W.A.F.S., 1953-54, pp. 6-7. 
23 On this, see the comments by Senator Lflhco (Tas.) during the Second 
Reading of the States Grants Bfll 1959, C.P.D. Sen. I, 1713-14. 
24 See ibid. 
25 See Budget Speech and Financial Statement of the Treasurer of Tasmania 
(hereafter T.F.S.), 1957-58, p. 12. 
26 South Austrdian Financid Statement (hereafter S.A.F.S.), 1951-52, p. iii. 
27 See ibid., p. v. 
28 South Austraha, Submission to the Commonwedth Grants Commission for 
a Special Grant for 1954-55, p. 13. 
29 Ibid., p. 12. 
30 W.A.F.S. 1953-54, pp. 5-6. 
31 W.A.F.S. 1954-55, p. 1. 
32 W.A.F.S. 1960-61, pp. 4-5. 
33 See Mercury (Hobart), 4, 6, 7, 14, 19 September 1957. 
34 Mercury (Hobart), 19 September 1957. 
35 This evaluation is the Hobart Mercury's (17 October 1957)—not the Under-
Treasurer's. The relevant memorandum had apparently been written early 
in 1957. 
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36 For a final assessment of the episode see Mercury (Hobart), 26 October 
1957, "Political Observer". 
37 From report given by A.L.P. General Secretary, on behalf of the Premier, 
Minutes, Trade Unions Industrial Council, 13 April 1954, quoted in R. M. 
Martin, Trade Union and State Enterprise in Australia (Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 
1958). 
38 A further example in this category of the Commission's influence is quoted 
by Senator LiUico, loc. cit. It relates to the Tasmanian Govemment's take-
over of the Hobart and Launceston tiamway systems. 
39 Tasmania, Statement Prepared for Presentation to the Commonwedth 
Grants Commission by Way of Application for a Special Grant for 1952-53, 
p. 5. 
40 See Tasmania, Statement . . . for a Specid Grant for 1953-54. 
41 Senator LiUico referred to this subject in the extiact cited in n. 23. 
42 See Eleventh Report (1944), pp. 86-87. 
43 r.F.S., 1946-47, p. 6. 
44 Recorded in W.A.F.S., 1941-42, pp. 12-13. 
45 Victoria and Queensland applied for special grants, for the first time, in 1958 
thereby forcing the Commonwealth to review Commonwealth-State financial 
relations. For a detailed account of this see the Commission's Twenty-sixth 
Report (1959), chap. IL 
46 See Fourth Report (1937), p. 94. 
47 See Mercury (Hobart), 8 September 1942; and C.P.D., CLXXII, 1077 
and 1082. 
48 E.g. see reports in Mercury (Hobart), 23 January 1945. 
49 See Mercury (Hobart), 20 October 1944, editorial. 
50 See Financial Relations between Commonwealth and the States. History of 
Tasmania's Parliamentary Formula and Brief Explanation of the Present 
Position (1943). 
51 See Mercury (Hobart), 17 October, 1940. 
52 E.g. see W.A.F.S., 1945-46, p. 10; W.A.F.S., 1947-48, p. 11; S.A.F.S., 1956-
57, p.. iv; and Conference of Commonwealth <b- State Ministers (August 
1948), p. 12. 
53 E.g. see W.A.P.D., 1940, II, 1458-61, and 1949, II, 872, and W.A.F.S., 1950-
51, pp. 1-2. 
54 See Senator LiUico, loc. cit. 
55 W.A.P.D., 1942, H, 870-71. 
56 E.g. see W.A.F.S., 1940-41, p. 14. 
57 E.g. see Conference of Commonwealth 6- State Ministers (September 1950), 
p. 12. 
58 See W.A.P.D., 1940, II, 1451. The motion was opposed by the Premier—see 
n. 52—and was withdrawn. 
59 See S.A.F.S., 1959-60, p. iv. 
60 S.A.P.D., 1959,1, 172. 
61 See r.F.S., 1959-60, p. 14, and Conference of Commonwedth ir State 
Ministers (March 1959), pp. 36-38. 
62 Cf. F. L. Neumann, "Federalism and Freedom: A Critique" in A. W. Mac-
mahon (ed.), Federdism Mature and Emergent (New York, 1955); and 
W. S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change (Oxford, 1956), 
chaps. 1 and 2. 
63 On this point see, for example, S.A.P.D., 1937, I, p. 98; Mercury (Hobart), 
26 October 1944 (reporting moves in the Tasmanian Legislative Council); 
and Conference of Commonwealth ir State Ministers (June 1955, June 1958, 
March 1959). The record of Westem Austialia, Soutii Austialia and Tas-
mania in referenda tavolving extension of federal powers and Tasmania's 
claim to being the only State not to oppose the uniform tax scheme on 
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grounds of States' "sovereignty" (see Tasmania, Statement , . . for a 
Special Grant for 1944-45, pp. 2-3) may also be relevant here. 
64 Cf. H. Mayer's "Intioduction" to A. Wfldavsky and D. Carboch, Studies in 
Australian Politics (Melboume, 1958). 
65 This is the more so since, the claimant States being relatively "small" (in 
some respects), such central direction is more feasible. Cf. S. Encel, 
"Cabinet Machinery in Australia", Public Administration (Svdnev), XV 
(1956), 99. 
21. THE AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL COUNCIL: A 
SUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENT IN COMMONWEALTH-
STATE RELATIONS by F. O. Grogan, p. 297 
1 The Commonwealth Grants Commission set up in 1933 to investigate the 
claims of the States for financial assistance drew attention to the clash 
between State and central developmental policies, since the Commonwealth 
had been mainly concemed with the fostering of secondary industries, by 
means of the tariff whereas the States had been interested in developing 
primary production and aiding land setdement. 
2 The late J. F. Murphy, a former Secretary of the Department of Commerce 
and Agriculture, stated that since the inception of the Councfl aU (Common-
wealth) proposals (relating to agriculture) of a fundamental character have 
been placed before it. No revolutionary change has been made, no new plan 
has been devised, in either peace or wartime that has not first been put to 
and discussed with the Austialian Agricultural Councfl. 
3 J. F. Murphy, who was a member of the Commission, has expressed reserva-
tions regarding the Commission's views on the Agricultural Councfl. 
4 See J. G. Cravword, "Administiative Aspects of Food and Agricultural Policy", 
Public Administration (Sydney) XI (1952); and Austrdian Agricultural 
PoUcy (Adelaide, 1952). 
PART VI, PARTIES AND PRESSURE 
GROUPS 
INTRODUCTION, p. 319 
1 Louise Overacker, The Austrdian Party System (New Haven, 1952). 
2 James Jupp, Austrdian Party Politics (Melbourne, 1964). 
22. THE AUSTRALIAN PARTY SYSTEM by L. C. Webb, 
p. 321 
1 51 C.L.R., 358-86. 
2 Leshe Lipson, "The Two-Party System in British Pohtics", American Politicd 
Science Review, XLVII (1953). 
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3 For an account of the period see L. F. Fitzhardinge, "Pohtical and PubUc 
Life" in Groom (ed.). Nation Building in Australia (Sydney, 1941); also 
Walter Murdoch, Alfred Deakin (London, 1923), pp 206-70. 
4 C.P.D., XXI, 4884. 
5 Fitzhardinge, op. cit., p. 55. 
6 Ibid., p. 81. 
7 C.P.D., XXII, 5261. 
8 Murdoch, op. cit., p. 235. 
9 Fitzhardinge, op. cit., p. 82. 
10 Zfctd., p. 83. 
11 Murdoch, op. cit., p. 279. 
12 M. Duverger, "The Influence of the Electoral System on Political Life", 
International Social Science Bulletin, III (1951), 335. 
13 For a discussion of this episode and of the case for preferential voting 
see C.P.D., LXXXVI, 7193-220, 7242-58, 7397-423. 
14 Sir Frederic Eggleston, Reflections of an Australian Liberal (Melboume, 
1953), chap. 5. 
15 Louise Overacker, The Australian Party System (New Haven, 1952), pp. 
220 and 236-39. 
16 L. F. Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia (Melboume, 1949), p. 130. 
17 Sydney Morning Herald, 2A March 1953. 
18 Lipson, op. cit., p. 339. 
19 H. J. Laski, Communist Manifesto: Social Landmark (London, 1948), pp. 
136-37. 
20 M. Duverger, Les Partis Politiques (Paris, 1958). 
21 A. L. Rowse, Politics and the Younger Generation (London, 1931), p. 76. 
22 For a discussion of this proposition see R. Centres, The Psychology of Socid 
Classes (Princeton, 1949). 
23 M. Benney and P. Geiss, "Social Class and Politics in Greenwich", British 
Journal of Sociology, I (1950). 
24 E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York, 1942), p. 87. 
25 The Union Democrat (issued by the Cential Industiial Executive of the 
A.L.P.), July 1953. 
26 W. Stargardt (ed.). Things Worth Fighting For (Melboume, 1953), p. 8. 
27 Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 9 Aprfl 1953. 
28 Fitzhardinge, op. cit., p. 86. 
29 Ibid., p. 85. 
30 B. Disraeli, Coningsby, Book 2, chap. 6. 
23. PARTY DISCIPLINE IN AUSTRALIA by J. D. R. Miller, 
p. 344 
1 The quotation is from W. K. Hancock, Australia (Sydney, 1945), p. 175. 
Other works in which Labour party discipline is discussed are Bryce, Modern 
Democracies, (London, 1921) II; W. Harrison Moore' in Atkinson (ed.), 
Australia: Economic and PoUtical Studies (Melboume, 1920); various writ-
ings by F. A. Bland, such as the Introduction to his Government of Australia 
(2nd ed.; Sydney, 1944); J. D. B. Mfller, "Aspects of the Party System in 
Austialia", Parliamentary Affairs, VI (1953); Alexander Brady, Democracy 
in the Dominions (Toronto, 1947); and L. F. Crisp, The Parliamentary 
Govemment of the Commonwealth of Australia (Melbourne, 1949). 
2 W. H. L. Ranken, The Dominion of Austrdia (London, 1874), pp. 288-90. 
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3 See J. A. Fronde, Oceana (London, 1886); Charles Dflke, Greater Britain 
(London, 1890) and Problems of Greater Britain (London, 1890); and 
Anthony TroUope, Australia and New Zealand (Melboume, 1876). The last 
two books are the more informative. 
4 There has always been a higher proportion of Cathohc Irish in Austiaha 
tiian in New Zealand. In 1881 Catholics were 23.3 per cent of the Austiahan 
population, 14.1 per cent of the New Zealand. 
5 C. Gavan Duffy, My Life in Two Hemispheres (London, 1898) II, pp. 135-36. 
6 Henry de R. WaUcer, Australasian Democracy (London, 1897), pp. 264-65. 
7 See Parkes's Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History (London, 1896) 
and his Speeches (Melbourne, 1876) for his views on parhamentary govern-
ment. It is significant that Parkes was continually made the subject of 
ridicule for his sometimes pompous insistence upon "correct" procedtue; 
the people around him wanted to share in the dignity of Parhament, but were 
scornful and impatient of the means necessary to ensure that dignity was 
preserved. 
8 Ambrose Pratt's David Syme (London, 1908) is misleadingly laudatory; 
a tmer picture is to be found in J. A. La Nauze's essay in his Politicd 
Economy in Australia (Melboume, 1949), altiiough tiiis is meant to deal only 
with Syme's views on economics. 
9 See Leslie Lipson, "The Origins of the Caucus in New Zealand", Historical 
Studies—Australia and New Zealand, II (1942). 
10 See Walter Murdoch, Alfred Deakin (London, 1923), pp. 78-79, and the 
Australasian, 25 June 1881. 
11 See Daily Telegraph, 6 November 1885 ff. 
12 W. G. Spence, Australia's Awakening (Sydney, 1909), p. 307. 
13 Sydney Morning Herald, 21 January 1889. Some candidates were refused 
endorsement by the cential organisations because their assurances of inten-
tion were held to be unsatisfactory. 
14 Sydney Morning Herald, 2 Febmary 1889. 
15 The point may be made that colonial society, in New South Wales at least, 
did not resent the use of disciplinary methods. In fact, tiiey were seen as 
desirable means of ending the anarchy of local pohtics, by radicals such as 
the Bulletin editors and conservatives such as the Sydney Morning Herald 
editors. The means were tried, but found wanting by the older parties. 
Only when Labour began to use them with real effect did newspaper 
opinion, and popular opinion with it, begin to attack party discipline as a 
bad thing. 
16 V. G. Chflde, How Labour Governs (London, 1923), pp. 5-6. 
17 In the later stages of a festive evening, the old I.W.W. song, "Solidarity 
for ever", is stiU popular with Labour men of the right, left, and centie. 
18 Daily Telegraph, 19 January 1892. 
19 Daily Telegraph, 19 June 1891. 
20 G. Black, History of the N.S.W. Labour Party (Sydney, 1910), p. 7. In 
making this speech, which accurately expressed the desires of the party. 
Black forfeited his opportunity of becoming leader of the new party whose 
members did not know each other weU enough to elect a leader, and were 
therefore functioning under a committee of management. Black "took it upon 
himself" to state the pohcy as ff he had been chosen leader, an action much 
resented by other members. 
21 The Sydney Morning Herald (20 January 1892) declared that "an interest-
ing experiment in Parhamentary pohtics, the birth of novel and peculiar 
conditions, has been tried and has hopelessly fafled", and that "the scheme 
was one which might have occasioned a great embarrassment to the general 
community by its success, a result that is obviated by its premature decease 
under conditions which, as the dirges of its mourners si^uficantiy indicate. 
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preclude the faintest hope of any resurrection". The Daily Telegraph of 
the same date said that the party was "dead as the proverbial dooraafl for 
aU the purposes which it was intended to serve". 
22 Quoted in Black, op. cii., pp. 2-3. 
23 In Austiaha the leader of the govemment is called Premier in the State 
Parhaments, Prime Minister in the Commonwealth. 
24 See Black, op. cit.; Childe, op. cit., pp. 8-11; Spence, op. cit., pp. 232-37; 
G. V. Portus, "The Austiahan Labour Movement" in Atkinson (ed.), op. cit.; 
H. V. Evatt, Austrdian Labour Leader (Sydney, 1942), chaps. VIII and IX. 
25 Minutes of Federal Parhamentary Labour Party (hereafter Minutes), 20 May 
1901 and 6 June 1901. The Federal pledge, as later amended, also included 
the submission to the executive. See W. M. Hughes, The Case for Labour 
(Sydney, 1910), pp. 65-84. 
26 Louise Overacker, "The Austialian Labour Party", American Political Science 
Reuieu), XLin (1949),68. 
27 C.P.D., XIX, 1360-61. 
28 A.L.P. of N.S.W. Rules and Constitution. 
29 The State Executives of the Labour Party remain the bodies with power of 
endorsement over the candidates, even for Federal elections—a situation 
which sometimes causes confusion. There is a Federal Executive of the Labour 
Party, but its work is largely confined to settling quarrels between the States 
and laying down a Federal programme. 
30 Master Buflders' Association of New South Wales, Ten Years of Labour 
Rule in New South Wales (1902), p. 5. This pamphlet gives numerous 
instances of Labour influence over the administiative policy of govemment 
departments, despite the fact that another party was ostensibly in power. 
31 See Murdoch, op. cit., and L. F. Fitzhardinge, "Political and Public Life" in 
Groom (ed.). Nation Building in Australia (Sydney, 1941). 
32 See Official Reports of Commonwealth Pohtical Labour Conference 1905 
and 1908. 
33 Minutes, 10 Aprfl 1908. 
34 The one state in which it still continues is Victoria, where the electorates 
have been so arranged as to make it almost impossible for Labour to win 
a majority of seats. But tiiere is more bad blood between the Liberal and 
Coimtry Parties in Victoria than in any other State, and this has enabled 
Labour, by supporting Country Party govemments, to gain certain things 
that it regarded as important. (Since Professor Mfller wrote, a combination 
of the Liberal and Labour Parties reformed the electoral system, but 
subsequendy the Liberal Party debauched it a trifle again. Ed.) 
35 See Spence, op. cit, chap. XX. 
36 Minutes, 19 June 1901. 
37 Minutes, 23 Aprfl 1904. 
38 Minutes, 26 Aprfl 1904. 
39 Nettie Palmer, Henry Bourne Higgins (London, 1931), p. 176. Higgins was 
the last non-Labour man to be a member of a Labour ministry. 
40 Official Report of Commonwealth Political Labour Conference 1905. L. C. 
Jauncey maintains (Austrdia's Government Bank (London, 1933), p. 48) that 
this resolution was engineered by King O'MaUey, a Tasmanian Federal M.P. 
who had been left out of the 1904 Ministry, in order to gain a seat in the 
next. O'Malley may have had some influence, but the motion was moved by 
delegates from Westem Australia, where there had recentiy been conflicts 
over the Labour Premier's (Daglish) attitude towards his Cabinet and 
caucus. See Spence, op. cit., pp. 357-58. It seems hkely that the Daglish 
question was in delegates' minds, rather than any shortcoming of the 
Watson Ministry of 1904. 
41 Chflde, op. cit, p. 16. 
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42 See Daily Telegraph, 9-13 November 1908. The facts about the baUot are 
taken from Minutes, 12 November 1908. 
43 Minutes, 6 October 1914. 
44 That is, precedent in England. But in Austiaha the impermanence of minis-
tiies and the hole-and-corner iatrigue by which they were selected had made 
msmy people advocate elective ministries on the Swiss model. The same 
advocacy was heard in New Zealand, cf. Leslie Lipson, The Politics of 
Equality (Chicago, 1948), p. 130, for the same reasons. Syme in Victoria was 
a hfe-long advocate of elective ministries, and they were ahnost adopted in 
South Austialia. Such a strict constitutionahst as A. Berriedale Keim went 
so far as to say that in the circumstances of Austialian parliaments with their 
kaleidoscopic changes of ministry. Labour's method of having a ministry 
elected by caucus was "a practice somewhat vehementiy resented by their 
opponents, but one which it is difficult to avoid and which secures effective 
legislation". Responsible Govemment in the Dominions (Oxford, 1912) I, 
327n. 
45 These practices were taken stiaight from PameU's Irish Party in the House 
of Commons. 
46 Minutes, 14 June 1915. 
47 See Evatt, op. cit., chaps. XLVII and LII; and Chflde, op. cit., chaps. II 
and III. 
48 J. P. Osbome, Nine Crowded Years (1921), p. 30. 
49 There is no good, fuU-length study of the conscription split and its effects. 
The reader should consult L. C. Jauncey's Story of Conscription in Aus-
trdia (London, 1935), which is useful for the facts from one viewpoint, 
and Ernest Scott, Official History of Australia in the War (Sydney, 1936) 
XI from the other. 
50 The debate is reported on pp. 40-42 of the Report of the Eighth Common-
wealth Conference of the A.L.P. 1949. 
51 W. Harrison Moore, "Pohtical Systems of Austiaha" in British Association 
for the Advancement of Science, Federal Handbook on Australia (Melboume, 
1914), p. 563. See also his essay with the same tide in Atkinson (ed.), 
op. cit. 
52 Brady, op. cit., p. 194. See also Crisp, op. cit., pp. 206-7. 
53 See Warren Denniag, Caucus Crisis (Parramatta, 1937), for a full account 
of this govemment's misadventures. 
54 See J. D. B. MiUer, "Australian Public Opinion: The Bretton Woods Con-
troversy", Australian Outlook, I (1947), for an account of the arguments 
throughout the Labour movement. 
55 Quoted by Evatt, op. cit, p. 340. 
56 See W. K. Hancock, "England and Austiaha", in his Politics in Pitcairn 
(London, 1947), for a brflliant analysis of Lang's position in the early 
1930's, and J. A. McCaUum, "The Austrahan Labour Party", Austrdian 
Quarterly, VIII (1936), for a brflhant accoimt of Lang's rise to power. 
57 The A.W.U. is the Austiahan Workers' Union, the largest union in Austiaha, 
and tiie only major union not affihated with tiie A.C.T.U. (Australian Councfl 
of Trade Unions). Even before the A.C.T.U. was formed in 1927, the 
A.W.U. was playing a lone hand in pohtical and industiial matters. In the 
1920's it effectively controUed the Labour organisation in most of the States 
of the Commonwealth, and today it is supreme m tiie Labour Executives of 
Queensland, Westem Austialia, South Austiaha and Tasmania. It also 
exercises great influence in the Federal Executive and within tiie Federal 
Parhamentary Labour Party. It is not popular with any other unions, for it is 
looked on as a "body-snatcher" of members, and as an organisation which 
aims at swallowing up otiier unions. (In 1967 die A.W.U. joined the 
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A.C.T.U.; its pohtical influence has been much reduced since Professor 
Mfller wrote. £d . ) . . x i . c j . t j 
58 See Osbome, op. cit., pp. 134-35, for a descnption of how tiie first trade 
union "ticket" was successfuUy run in opposition to Hohnan at tlie 1916 
Conference of die Labour Party in New Soutii Wales. Ever since, tickets 
have been the order of the day. , , . T TI • xi 
59 This process was demonstiated at the 1952 conference of tiie A.L.P. m New 
Soutii Wales, when the A.W.U. successfuUy led a coalition of opposition 
groups to defeat the sitting Executive's "ticket". 
60 See Brian Fitzpatrick, The Australian People, 1788-1945 (Melboume, 1946), 
pp. 42-43, for his conception of the tiade unions as "reaUy the continuing 
expression of the stmggle of non-owning Austiahans", in contrast with the 
A.L.P. 
61 Crisp, op. cit., chap. III. 
62 Hancock, Australia (Sydney, 1945), pp. 169 ff. See Lloyd Ross, William 
Lane and the Australian Labour Movement (Sydney, 1936), pp. 155-56, for 
an interesting commentary on Hancock's view. 
63 A recent instance of this was the attitude of the Federal Parliamentary 
party towards the Menzies Govemment's anti-Communist biU; the party 
waited untfl the Federal Executive had framed an "attitude" for it. 
64 This is the situation as it has developed in the Commonwealth, New South 
Wales, Victorian, Queensland, and Westem Austialian Parliaments. The non-
Labour forces are united in South Austialia and Tasmania. 
65 There have been nineteen years of non-Labour govemment in the Common-
wealtii since 1923 (to 1953). For only tiiree of these (1931-34) was the 
main non-Labour party of sufficient stiength to dispense with the assistance 
of the Country Party in a coalition—which it gladly did. For the rest of the 
time the Country Party has been the junior member of a coahtion. This 
situation broadly apphes in the other parliaments, except Victoria, where 
there is great bittemess between the two parties. They have occasionally 
worked together, but more often the Country Party has taken office with 
Labour support (but not in a coalition). 
66 See Fitzhardinge, op. cit, for an excellent account of the fusion. 
67 J. A. McCaUum, "How Fares Parliamentary Govemment in the Federal 
System?" in Federdism in Australia (Sydney, 1949), p. 112. 
68 See Evatt, op. cit, pp. 470-1, for the formation of one "consultative council", 
and Warwick Fairfax, Men, Parties and Politics (Sydney, 1943), p . 14, for 
the doings of another. 
69 See Crisp, op. cit., pp. 131-35 for a number of examples of this; and note 
especiaUy the case of Liberal Speakers in Victoria who have been pressed 
to resign office in order to give the Party better advantage. 
70 The word "caucus" is rarely used now by the Liberal Party, although it was 
used quite freely in earher years. "Party meeting" is the usual phrase. 
71 See Reports of Annual Conference of Farmers' and Settiers' Association of 
N.S.W. 1910, pp. 15-30, for tiie debates. 
72 See J. P. Abbott, "The Countiy Party" in A. C. Gamett (ed . ) . Freedom 
arid Planning in Austrdia (Madison, 1949); Hancock, op. cit., pp. 194-95; 
Evatt, op. cit., chaps. LXIII-LXVI; Frank Browne, They Called Him BUly 
(Sydney, 1946). 
73 The matter is discussed in Brady, op. cit. See also Crisp, op. dt, where 
chap. IV contains a useful analysis of the relations between Liberal and 
Country Parties and of the Country Party "machine". 
74 The Federal Councfl consists of the Federal parliamentary leader, the State 
leaders, two members of the Federal parliamentary party, three representatives 
from ea«h State Councfl and one woman from each State; details are from 
the 1946 Federal Constitution of the Austiahan Country Party. 
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75 The detafls on Victoria are from Louise Overacker's The Austrdian Party 
System (New Haven, 1952). 
76 In New South Wales such bodies include the Institute of Public Affairs, 
the Constitutional League, the People's Union, the Sane Democracy League. 
No suggestion is made here that these bodies are officiaUy connected with 
the Liberal Party. But personal relationships are close in a number of 
instances, and the efforts of the bodies concemed are exerted in directions 
which serve the advantage of the Liberal Party. 
77 See Parliamentary Affairs, V (1951) for a series of articles on fhe British Party 
System which affords a number of interesting parallels with Austrahan and 
New Zealand conditions. 
78 The phrase is Hancock's. See his Australia (Sydney, 1945) for a brilhant 
epitome of Austrahan political development in terms of "ample govemment". 
24. THE PLACE OF FINANCE COMMITTEES IN NON-
LAROR POLITICS, 1910-1930 by R. D. Graham, p. 367 
1 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London, 1954), p. xxxiv. 
2 L. F. Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of 
Australia (Melboume, 1949), pp. 132-37. 
3 A. Wfldavsky and D. Carboch, Studies in Australian Politics (Melboume, 
1958). 
4 See in particular statements by F. W. BirreU, S.A.P.D., 1923, I, 95, and 
F. M. Forde, C.P.D., CXII, 982-83. See also a coUection of tiie Queensland 
Labor Party's pamphlets held at the National Library, Canberra, especiaUy 
those printed for the 1926 state election campaign. 
5 Argus (Melboume), 8 January 1912. 
6 ArgMS (Melbourne), 5 October 1915. 
7 V.P.D., CLXXVI, 867. 
8 An expose in the Age (Melboume), 27 October 1922, gives a highly 
coloured account of the latter meeting and of the National Union's back-
ground. 
9 See in particular ibid., and Argus (Melboume), 15 November 1922. 
10 The preceding account is drawn from irfformation given to Smith's Weekly 
by a former salaried official of the National Union; the leads given were, 
of course, exploited by the Weekly's reporters. Smith's Weekly, 20 Febmary 
1926, 6th March 1926. 
11 Argus (Melboume), 9 June 1920, 10 June 1920. 
12 See Smith's Weekly, 6 March 1926, and a letter from J. E. Deane to W. M. 
Hughes, 2 July, 1924, amongst the Hughes Papers, Canberra. 
13 See Brisbane Courier, 3 December 1913. 
14 H. V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader (abr. ed.; Sydney, 1954), pp. 356-57. 
15 Brisbane Courier, 12 March 1925. 
16 Sydney Morning Herald, 11 Aprfl 1929. 
17 Sydney Moming Herald, 3 June 1927. 
18 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 December 1926. 
19 Letter from Sir John Forrest to John Sanderson, 25 July 1916, John 
Sanderson papers. West Australian State Library, Perth. 
20 Annual Report of Primary Producers' Association 1926, p. 51. 
21 West Austrdian, 4 Febmary 1927. 
22 Brisbane Courier, 3 December 1913. 
23 Brisbane Courier, 17 January 1918. 
24 Brisbane Courier, 23 January 1920. 
25 Brisbane Courier, 31 January 1920. 
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26 Brisbane Courier, 3 May 1920. 
27 Brisbane Courier, 23 March 1925. For the other articles in this series on 
which the above accoimt is partly based see ibid., 12,14,16,19 and 26 March 
1925. For other articles bearing on the Union's activities see ibid., 3, 25, and 
28 Febmary 1925; 3, 4, and 5 March 1925. 
28 Graziers' Review, 16 November 1922, p. is. 
29 See Brisbane Courier, 26 and 27 January 1923, 
30 Brisbane Courier, 13 March 1925. 
31 Brisbane Courier, 20 November 1925; 16 December 1925. 
32 See Advertiser (Addaide), 23 March 1918, and S.A.P.D., 1923, I, 149-50. 
33 See Examiner (Launceston), 3 Aprfl 1922. 
34 Brisbane Courier, 3 December 1913. 
35 Smith's Weekly, 6 March 1926. 
36 See Brisbane Courier, 21 October 1919, 31 January 1920, 5 March 1925. 
37 Mercury (Hobart), 8 November 1924. 
25. GROUP INTERESTS AND THE NON-LAHOR PARTIES 
SINCE 1930 by R. S.Parker,p.380 
1 W. G. K. Duncan (ed.), Trends in Austrdian Politics (Sydney, 1935), pp. 
22-24. 
2 See reports in Sydney Morning Herald, September-December 1943; also 
Warwick Fairfax, Men, Parties and Politics (Sydney, 1943). 
3 F. W. Eggleston, "Political Parties and their Economic Policies", The Annals 
of the American Academy of Politicd and Socid Science, CLVIII (1931), 
245-46. 
4 James Bryce, Modem Democracies (London, 1921), II, 238; W. K. Hancock, 
Australia (Sydney, 1945), chap. XI. This thesis and its variants are criticaUy 
surveyed by Mr. Henry Mayer in "Some Conceptions of the Austialian 
Party System 1910-1950", Historical Studies—Australia and New Zealand, 
VII (1956); it is also touched on by Professor Partridge in an A.N.U. seminar 
paper on "Pohtical Thought of the Right since 1930". 
5 Burgess Cameron, "A National Wages Policy", Austrdian Quarterly, XXVIII 
(1956) No. 1, 20. See also New Zealand Official Year Book 1950, p. 1033, 
Appendix on Economic Pohcy and National Income, by J. V. T. Baker and 
H. G. Lang, especiaUy pp. 1064 ff., and 1036: "We have shown that imder 
existing conditions it would need a 15 per cent wage increase to raise the 
1949-50 share of salary and wage earners (in the national income) by orJy 
1.7 per cent to the average of the preceding eleven years . . . We are there-
fore of the opinion that the Court (or Arbitiation) is unable to maintain 
a given factor income distribution unless there is (a) an extensive system 
of price controls or (b) a complete contiol over the aggregate money 
measure of effective demand." 
6 L. F. Crisp, Parliamentary Govemment of the Commonwedth of Australia 
(Melboume, 1949), p. 116. 
7 "The following example occurred in 1926: "Week after week the Manufacturer 
openly and directly offered their 'friends the secondary industry workers' 
a strict quid pro quo deal: they would pay the workers practically anything 
they wanted and let them have 'all sorts of beautiful iimovations' if the Labor 
forces would only assure them that the tariff would be raised to absorb the 
costs. Whenever higher wages or lower hours were awarded there could 
be an automatic provision for a FederaUy contioUed body to raise the tariff 
so as to maintain the 'margin of effective protection'. With Labor support 
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there would be no difficulty in passing the necessary legislation." Wfldavsky 
in Studies in Australian Politics (Melboume 1958), pp. 72-74. 
8 Contribution to discussion on chapter by J. A. McCaUum, "The Economic 
Bases of Austiahan Politics" in W. G. K. Duncan (ed.). Trends in Australian 
Politics (Sydney, 1935), pp. 71-72. This whole paper and discussion are 
worth re-reading in the present context. 
9 Op. cit., p. 62. 
10 Eggleston, op. cit., p. 138. 
11 Op. cit, pp. 139-40. 
12 Fairfax, op. cit., p. 14. 
13 Sydney Moming Herald, 2 November 1943. 
14 Sydney Moming Herald, 28 October 1943. 
15 For detafls, see Sydney Moming Herald, October-November 1943, 
16 Op. cit., pp. 135-36. 
17 Sydney Moming Herald, 17 Aprfl 1945. 
26. TRADE UNIONS AND LAROUR GOVERNMENTS IN 
AUSTRALIA: A STUDY OF THE RELATION HETWEEN 
SUPPORTING INTERESTS AND PARTY POLICY by 
R. M. Martin^ p. 392 
1 J. D. B. Mfller, Australian Government and Politics (2nd ed.; London, 1959), 
p. 80. 
2 Ibid., p. 82. 
3 S. R. Davis, in S. R. Davis (ed.), The Govemment of the Australian 
States (Melboume, 1960), p. 625. 
4 Henry Mayer, "Some Conceptions of the Austialian Party System", Historicd 
Studies-Australia and New Zealand, VII (1956), 270. 
5 I am not concemed with any question of "real" interests—e.g. a situation 
in which a govemment policy, adopted against a group's wishes, is later 
accepted by it as favourable to its interests; or a situation in which a policy, 
adopted on the urging of a group, is after experience regarded by it as 
conflicting with its interests; or a situation in which outsiders consider 
that the group's interests would be better served by a pohcy other than that 
advocated by the group itseff. Attention is concentrated here on the question 
of the group's attitude towards a pohcy at the time that govemment decides 
to adopt such pohcy. 
6 See MiUer, op. cit, p. 65. 
7 Davis, op. cit, pp. 252 and 625. 
8 Ifetd., p. 710. 
9 This is not simply a matter of instinct on the part of union leaders, though 
it may be partly that, too. It is apparent that on such issues the official is 
most often conscious of his members (and, where applicable, the "out" 
faction in his union) looking over his shoulder. Ot course, this need not 
always preclude officials from stalling a decision, or avoiding action on i t -
say, by arguing about "priorities". 
10 Courier-Mail, 12 November 1955. It is to be noted that unions affiliated 
to the A.L.P. in Queensland are directiy represented on the Q.C.E.; aU but 
13 of whose members at that time were union delegates. 
11 Courier-Man, 1 March, 1957. The fact that this vote was not along factional 
lines is suggested by tiie vote of 35 to 30 on the Q.C.E.'s later decision to 
expel Gair, ibid., 25 April 1957, 
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12 Amalgamated Engineering Union (Austialian Division) Monthly Journal, 
August 1962, p. 23. 
13 The same factors, though in a rather different way, are also reflected in 
changed official pohcy on compulsory unionism. See R. M. Martin, "Legal 
Enforcement of Union Security in Austialia", Industrial and Labour Relations 
Review, XIII (1960), 240 ff. 
14 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 Aprfl 1957; cf. the voting figures in n. 12 above. 
15 This, of course, is also the sense in which Davis speaks of govemment policy 
in the passage quoted above. 
16 In Davis, op. cit, p. 252. 
17 It is irrelevant that by 1956 unions in South Austialia had obtained some 
of the Queensland statutory conditions from industrial tiibunals: the point 
is that in Queensland the unions obtained these conditions by poUtical 
methods. 
18 It is to be noted that the present argument does not exclude the possibflity 
of a preferential relationship, involving fulfilment of the conditions of 
unanimity and exclusiveness, between a Labour government and a non-
Labour supporting interest. The only limitation imposed by the argument 
in this respect is that if there is such a preferential relationship, it wiU turn 
on policy issues outside the area of direct and general industrial benefits, 
as defined above. 
19 A. F. Davies in Davis, op. cit, p. 221. 
20 See ibid., pp. 229-31. 
21 Party Govemment (New York, 1942), p. 85. 
22 See J. D. B. Miller, "Party Disciphne in Austiaha", chap. 23. 
23 Common Cause, 24 Febmary 1962. 
24 Austialian Tramways and Motor Omnibus Employees' Association N.S.W. 
Branch Journal, Febmary 1962, p. 4. 
25 In 1957, e.g., the Tasmanian General Executive was the A.L.P.'s only major 
executive body on which union officials were in a minority, three out of a 
membership of eleven—a reversal of the normal pattem that is probably a 
result of the smaUness of Tasmanian unions and the comparative rarity there 
of fuU-time union officials. 
26 Davis, op. cit., p. 625. 
27 For example, the non-Labour parties and their supporting interests enthusias-
ticaUy welcomed the federal industiial tribunal's abandonment of quarterly 
cost-of-hving adjustments to the basic wage in 1953. But no non-Labour state 
govemment has since directed a state tribunal to foUow the federal body's 
policy. The 1956 legislation of the Victorian non-Labour govemment, it is to 
be noted, formally did no more than restore the discretionary power of the 
state wages boards in this respect, by repealing the previous Labor govem-
ment's direction. 
28 See "Pohtical Chronicle", Australian Journal of Politics and History, III 
(1957-58), 111 and 245. 
29 Most notably, in its provision enabling employers to give such leave piece-
meal, by extensions to annual leave entitlements, instead of in lump form. 
30 Stiictiy speaking, federal legislation is outside the scope of these remarks, 
but it is worth noting that the terms of the Menzies government's 1961 
measure giving long-service leave to waterside workers, and the circumstances 
in which it was enacted, are strikingly similar in character. 
31 A. F. Davies, Austrdian Democracy (Melboume, 1958), p. 143. 
32 British "unions' hopes from (the Labour party) are less and less directiy 
and immediately related to their industrial needs", Martin Harrison, Trade 
Unions and the Labour Party since 1945 (London, 1960), p. 349. 
33 That is not to say that Australian unions do not resort to methods other than 
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pohtical action for tiie achievement of tiieu: aims, nor that they do not often 
place greater reliance on these other methods. 
34 The quahfication is unportant. I am not asserting that the unions' concem 
with politics can be explained solely in terms of policy aims. Nor is this 
argument advanced as a complete explanation of the reasons why the unions 
have preserved their close links with the A.L.P. 
35 P. H. Partridge in G. Sawer (ed.), Federdism: An Austrdian Jubilee 
Study (Melboume, 1952), p. 178. 
36 Thus a federal Labour govemment in 1947 could only empower the federal 
tribunal to award absolute preference in employment to unionists, whereas 
the N.S.W. Labour govemment in 1959 could direct the state tiibunal to 
make such awards. 
37 It suggests, for example, that Davies' assertion of "the obvious fact that the 
major interest groups in Austrahan society . . . are concemed predominantiy 
with , ,^ , Federal politics, and find very much less to interest them in the State 
sphere", requires rather heavier qualification than he gives it. (A. F. Davies 
in Davis, op. cit., p. 232.) It also has important consequences for union 
attitudes towards the federal system of govemment. 
38 Signalized, most notably, in Henry Mayer's critique, loc. cit, pp. 253-70. 
39 RusseU H. Barrett, Promises and Performances in Australian Politics (New 
York, 1959), p. 106. 
40 For example, the one "industiial relations" plarJc in the N.S.W. Labour 
govemment's election platform of 1956 was a promise to "modemise" the 
arbitration system (see table in Davis, op. cit., p. 628). During its subsequent 
term of office this government enacted legislation providing for three weeks 
annual leave and equal pay for women. 
41 Paul H. Douglas, Economy in the Natiorud Government (Chicago, 1952), 
p. 220. 
42 See S. Encel, "The Concept of the State in Australian Politics", chap. 3. 
These individual items, of course, are not confined to those on which the 
supporting interests are organized. 
27. AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNIONS AND POLITICAL 
ACTION by R.M. Martin, p. 412 
1 Industrial Democracy (London, 1897), pp. 247 and 253-54. 
2 This article is concemed only with the unions, chiefly of manual workers, 
tiaditionally regarded as constituting the trade union movement. 
3 These include not only parliamentary legislation in the strict sense, but also 
subordinate or delegated legislation and "pure" administiative decisions. 
4 The term "independent political action" is often used to denote what I have 
preferred, on the ground of greater descriptive clarity, to caU "party-political 
action". 
5 See L. J. Hume, "Working Class Movements in Sydney and Melboume 
before the Gold Rushes", Historical Studies—Australia and New Zealand, 
IX (1960), 268-69. 
6 See, e.g., a resolution of the Intercolonial Trades Union Congress, 1884, 
quoted by J. T. Sutcliffe, A History of Trade Unionism in Austrdia (Mel-
boume, 1921), pp. 50-51. 
7 See, e.g., Robin GoUan, Radical and Working Class Politics (Melboume, 
1960), chap. 8. 
8 June Phflipp, "1890-The Tuming Point in Labour History?", Historical 
Studies—Australia and New Zealand, IV (1950), 153-54. 
9 AU Australian Trade Union Congress Minutes, October 1934, p. 27. 
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10 The "Premiers' Plan", a depression measure involving wage and social 
services reductions, was sponsored by a federal Labour government and 
agreed to by aU state Premiers. It was foUowed, among other things, by 
serious divisions within Labour ranks, the parhamentary and electoral defeat 
of the federal govemment, and the dismissal from office of the Labour 
Premier of New South Wales by the State Govemor. See P. H. Partiidge, 
in Gordon Greenwood (ed.), Austrdia: A Social and Political History 
(Sydney, 1955), pp. 361-64. 
11 AU Austiahan Trade Union Congress Minutes, October, 1934, p. 28. A 
delegate agreed that it should be possible "to force antagonistic Govemments 
to do something". 
12 United Trades and Labour Councfl of South Austiaha Minutes, 18 November 
1927. 
13 For evidence of the wiUingness of British trade union leaders to consult 
with non-Labour govemments during the 1920's, see R. M. Martin, "Steady, 
Sober and British", Political Science, XIII (1961), 85-86. 
14 See The Labor Call, 22 May 1941. 
15 Trades and Labour Councfl of Queensland Minutes, 25 October 1950. 
16 Trades and Labor Councfl of Queensland Minutes, 25 July 1951. 
17 On the Industrial Groups, see especiaUy D. W. Rawson, "The A.L.P. Industiial 
Groups—An Assessment", Austrdian Quarterly, XXVI (1954), No. 4, 30-46; 
Ian CampbeU, "A.L.P. Industrial Groups—A Reassessment", Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, VIII (1962). 
18 The council's field of interest was so broad that the benefits of participation 
were less obvious and less immediate than in the case of other bodies with 
more specffic functions. In addition, the govemment tieated the councfl as 
something of a show-jriece, which in the eyes of many gave participation a 
political flavour and provoked criticism from Labour party and left-wing 
union quarters. Govemment backbenchers reinforced this impression by em-
barrassing the Labour opposition with assertions that the councfl's considera-
tion of certain legislation implied A.C.T.U. approval of its provisions. The last 
straw was the Govemment's faflure to consult the councfl before bringing 
down the 1956 amendment to the Conciliation and Arbitiation Act, the 
unions' complaints on this score being echoed by the employers' representa-
tives on the councfl. 
19 Kenneth F. Walker, Industrial Reldions in Australia (Cambridge, Mass., 
1956), p. 333. 
20 The members of the growing organisations of non-manual employees are also 
relevant here, though outside the terms of reference of the present article; 
see n. 2 above. 
21 E.g. the Advertiser (Adelaide), 13 May 1953; C.P.D., H. of R. XVIII, 502; 
Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 1959, 17 Novemlier 1960. 
22 See B. A. Santamaria, in Henry Mayer (ed.). Catholics and the Free Society 
(Melboume, 1961), chap. 3; Tom Tmman, Catholic Action and Politics 
(Melboume, 1960), chap. 1; also n. 17 above. 
23 Report of the Convention of Federal Unions CaUed by the Federal Govem-
ment (June 1942), p. 16. 
24 See R. M. Martin, "The Rise of the Austialian Councfl of Trade Unions", 
Australian Quarterly, XXX (1958), No. 1, 30-42. 
25 This correspondence is reproduced in the A.C.T.U. Bulletin, September 1956, 
pp. 12-13. 
26 See R. M. Martin, "The Authority of Trade Union Centres: The Australian 
Councfl of Trade Unions and the British Trade Union Congress", Joumd 
of Industrial Relations, IV (1962). 
27 See R. M. Martin, "What is at Stake in the Westem Austialian A.L.P. 
Contioversy?", A.P.S.A. News, V (1960), 
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28 E.g. the contioversy in 1957 over the govemment's long-service leave pro-
posals; and, in 1953-55, over the questions of union representation on the 
advisory committee on workers' compensation and the committee's subsequent 
recommendation to govemment. 
29 E.g. the Menzies govemment's acceptance, in place of legislation, of A.C.T.U. 
assurances on "indemnity payments" to maritime unions in 1958 and on 
compulsory pohtical levies in 1959; and its abandonment of important and 
controversial provisions of the Stevedoring Industry Act of 1954. 
30 See R. M. Martin, "Trade Unions and Labour Govemments in Austialia: A 
Study of the Relation between Supporting Interests and Party Pohcy", pp. 
392-411 of this book especiaUy pp. 403-5. 
31 These advantages can be completely discounted only on the assumption that 
the Labour party is permanently excluded from office, an assumption that is 
difficult to justffy in the case of even a single Austialian state. Moreover, a 
relevant effect of the Federal system, which seems likely to persist, is the fact 
that at aU times since 1910 there has been at least one Labour govemment in 
office somewhere in Australia; and, for example, while the Labour party 
has been in opposition at the federal level throughout the period since 1949, 
it has controUed as many as five, and never less than IAVO, of the six State 
govemments at the one time. 
32 D. W. Rawson, "Politics and Responsibflity in Australian Trade Unions" 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, IV (1958). 
33 See R. M. Martin, pp. 392-411 of this book. 
34 Martin Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945 (London, 
1960), p. 349. This was written before the advent of the Wflson govemment 
and its adoption of an "incomes policy"; but the contrast is not vitiated 
thereby, particularly given the "restiaining" character of that pohcy. 
28. AUSTRALIAN FARM ORGANIZATIONS AND AGRI-
CULTURAL POLICY by Keith O. Campbell, p. 426 
1 This does not mean that individual farmers in some areas do not belong to 
more than one farm organization. However, such overlapping of membership 
as exists does not destioy the validity of the generalizations made here. 
2 Two major reasons were given by the A.W.G.C. for severing its connections 
with the N.F.U. One was financial. The President explained that "The Coun-
cfl beheves the return by way of service for our membership fees is not com-
mensurate with the cost", Sydney Morning Herald, 30 June 1965. The second 
very significant reason was an aUeged divergence of economic interest 
between protected and unprotected primary industiies. To quote the 
' A.W.G.C. President again: "My Councfl!, which is responsible for protecting 
the interests of the unprotected wool and meat producers, has formed the 
view that tiiose interests are not sufficientiy consistent with producers of 
commodities which are mainly marketed witiiin Austiaha (or which enjoy 
export subsidies) to warrant an undertaking by the Councfl to be hmited in 
its actions by the requirements of the N.F.U. constitution . . ." Minutes, 
7 July 1965. , ,. r J 
3 Recentiy a new consultative councfl of farm organizations has been tormed 
in Westem Australia. 
4 Primary Producer, 22 April 1955. 
5 J. G. Crawford, Australian Agricultural Policy (Joseph Fisher Lechire in 
Commerce, Adelaide, 1952), pp. 6 and 49. 
6 Country Life, 18 January 1966. 
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7 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 September 1964. Pendleton Herring expressed the 
same thought tiiirty years ago when he said: "The greater the degree of 
detafled and technical control the govemment seeks to exert over industrial 
and commercial concems, the greater must be their degree of consent and 
active participation in the very process of regulation if regulation is to be 
effective or successful". Herring, Public Administration and the Public 
Interest (New York, 1936), p. 192. 
8 In one State, Queensland, the Primary Producers' Organization and Marketing 
Act, as weU as providing for the constitution of state marketing boards, pro-
vides for statutory membership of certain farm organizations e.g. the Queens-
land Cane Growers' Council. 
9 Address to the Annual Conference of the Austialian Primary Producers' Union 
by the Rt. Hon. John McEwen, 21 October 1964, p. 4. 
10 Interestingly, attempts have been made to reconcfle this tenet of Country 
Party phflosophy with the economic hberalism espoused by the Liberal Party. 
See address by Hon C. F. Adermaim to the Annual Conference of the 
National Farmers' Union of Austraha, 27 October 1960, pp. 1-2, 
11 C.P.D., H. of R., XLIX, 3044-45. 
12 See "The R.S.L.", Current Affairs Bulletin, XXXV (1965), 187. 
13 Other examples would be the report prepared by Persoimel Administiation 
Pty. Ltd. purporting to justify increased expenditure on wool promotion 
and the report prepared by the last Commonwealth Sugar Industry Committee 
of Enquiry. 
14 Formal representation at basic wage hearings is not necessarily confined to 
organizations registered with the Court. The faflure of the N.F.U. to appear 
in 1961 despite a chaUenge by the Prime Minister was explained in terms of 
lack of funds. See Presidential Address to the 1961 Annual Conference of the 
National Farmers' Union, p. 2. 
15 Kingsley Laffer, personal communication. See also Laffer, "Wages Policy" 
in A. Davies and G. Serle (eds.). Policies for Progress (Melboume, 1954), 
pp. 88-89; and D. Whitehead and M. Cockbum, "Shares of National Income: 
Some Neglected Implications", Journal of Industrid Relations, V (1963), 
135-36. 
16 In early 1966, the headquarters establishment of the National Farmers' 
Union in London numbered 190. Of these positions 36 were secretarial, 59 
clerical and the remaining 95 were broadly classed as professional. The 
American Farm Bureau Federation on the other hand has a staff of 53 
professional employees and 33 clerical and secretarial workers. 
17 See K. O. Campbell, "Agricultural Adjustment in a Changing Economy", 
Journal of the Australian Institute of Agricultural Science, XXX (1964), 
162-63. 
18 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Government Today (rev. ed.; Melboume, 1963), 
p. 56. 
19 See B. D. Graham, "Graziers in Politics", Historical Studies—Austrdia and 
New Zealand, VHI (1959), 387. 
20 Address to the Annual Conference of the Australian Primary Producers' 
Union by the Rt. Hon. John McEwen, 21 October 1944, p. 2. 
21 Age (Melboume), 25 Febmary 1961. 
22 Address by Hon. C. F. Adermann to the Annual Conference of the Queens-
land Councfl of Agriculture, 31 July 1963, p. 1. 
23 Address by the Chairman, Hon. C. F. Adermann, to the Austialian Agricul-
tural Councfl, 8-9 Febmary 1965, p. 4. See also Address by Hon. C. F. 
Adermann to the Annual Conference of the National Farmers' Union of 
Australia, 26 October 1960. Senior administiators of the Department of 
Primary Industiy have also joined in these pleas for unity. Even the former 
Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, has urged that the "views of primary 
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producers as a whole in Austiaha . . . should be as far as possible, fuUy 
concerted ones". Address to the Annual Coifference of the National Farmers' 
Union, 15 November 1962. 
24 Other examples of intia-industry conflicts would include those in the citras 
and barley industiies. The defensive stand of the Sydney-based Mflk Zone 
Dairymen's Councfl against the pressure by butter producers to get a footing 
in the more lucrative Sydney mflk market might also be considered as 
evidence of an intia-industry conflict. 
25 See Report of the Wool Marketing Committee of Enquiry (1962), pp. 128-31. 
The Phflp Committee also seems to have been carried away by me notion 
that a single voice in the industry was essential when in paragraph 674 it 
spoke of the need for a "commission or board upon whose decisions the 
Govemment could confidentiy rely and which could speak with final authority 
on aU matters affecting the industry". This implies to say the least a some-
what unconventional theory of govemment. 
26 See "Wool and Pohtics", Current Affairs Bulletin, XXXVI (1965), 188. In 
the wool marketiog referendum every grower of 10 bales of wool or more 
or owner of 300 sheep was entitied to one vote. 
27 McEwen and Adermann are not the first proponents of farm organizational 
unity. Franklin D. Roosevelt, for one, originaUy advocated such an approach 
during the New Deal period in the United States. But some of the distin-
guished administiators that served in the United States Department of 
Agriculture during this period have since pointed to the dangerous nature 
of such a power situation. See Christiana CampbeU, The Farm Bureau and 
the New Deal (Urbana, 1962), pp. 51, 171, and 194. 
28 Commercial Policy in Relation to Agriculture (Tenth Report of the Rural 
Reconstruction Commission) (Canberra, 1946), p. 237. 
29. TRADE ASSOCIATIONS IN THE AUSTRALIAN 
ECONOMY by R. D. Freeman, p. 443 
1 J. Hutton, "Restiictive Trade Practices Legislation, Trade Associations and 
Orderly Marketing Schemes in Westem Austiaha", Economic Record, XL 
(1964). 
2 Alex Hunter, "Restrictive Practices and Monopolies in Austialia", Economic 
Record, XXXVII (1961). 
3 Second Report of Registrar of Trade Associations for period to 30th June, 
1961, Schedule 1. 
4 P. Cook, Trade Associations in South Austrdia (B.Ec. thesis. University of 
Adelaide, 1961), p. 2. 
5 Report of the Royal Commission on Prices and Restrictive Practices m 
Tasmania (1965), p. 9. , „ , , , 
6 John Nfland, "Employers' Associations in New South Wales , Journal of 
Industrial Reldions, VI (1964), 58. 
7 P. Cook, op. cit, p. 4. , , ^ i • 
8 Objects of The Victorian Chamber of Fmit and Vegetable Industiies, 
Clause N. 
9 Second Report of Registiar of Trade Associations for period to 30th June, 
1961, p. 6. . . 
10 Political and Economic Planning, Industrid Trade Associations: Activities 
and Organization (London, 1957), pp. 66-68. 
11 Ibid., pp. 68-107. 
12 Industry Today, VII (1964), 103. 
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13 Austrdian Soft Drink Joumd (January 1959), p. 30. 
14 Pohtical and Economic Planning, op. cit., p. 112. 
15 Sir Garfield Barwick, Trade Practices in a Developing Economy (G. L. Wood 
Memorial Lecture 1963), p. 9. 
16 Hunter, op. cit,, p. 26. 
17 Calculated from the tables "Salaries and Wages Paid, 1961-62", p. 163, and 
"Factories: Value of Production, 1961-62", p. 169, Commonwedth Year Book 
No. 50. 
18 P. H. Karmel and M. Brunt, The Stmcture of the Australian Economy 
(Melboume, 1962), p. 79. 
19 Ibid., p. 74. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
